

Works of St. Bonaventure



COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES: PHILOSOPHY OF GOD

Translation, Introduction and Notes
by R.E. Houser and Timothy B. Noone

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ST. BONAVENTURE

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BONAVENTURE
TEXTS IN TRANSLATION
SERIES

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COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES:
PHILOSOPHY OF GOD

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The Franciscan Institute
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Note: All references to the Latin works of Bonaventure are cited by volume number and page number of the Quaracchi edition: *S. Bonaventurae doctoris seraphici Opera Omnia*. Studio et Cura PP. Collegii a S. Bonaventura (Ad Claras Aquas). Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882-1902.

- ACPQ: *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*.
- AL: Avicenna Latinus series. Ed. Simone Van Riet. Louvain: Peeters and Leiden: Brill, 1972-.
- Borgnet: *B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, Volume XXVIII: *Commentarii in III Sententiarum*. Ed. Steph. C. A. Borgnet. Paris: Vives, 1894.
- CCSL: *Corpus Christianorum. Series latina*. Turnhout: Brepols, 1954-.
- CCCM: *Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio medievalis*. Turnhout: Brepols, 1971-.
- CSEL: *Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum*. 1866-.
- CUA: The Catholic University of America.
- CUP: Cambridge University Press.
- CV: *Corpus Victorinum*
- In Sent: *Sancti Bonaventurae Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, contained in vol. 1-4 of *S. Bonaventurae doctoris seraphici Opera Omnia*. Studio et Cura PP. Collegii a S. Bonaventura (Ad Claras Aquas). Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882-1889. References take the following form: *In Sententiis*, 3. d. 24.3.2c, which means Bonaventure's *Commentary on the Sentences*, Bk. 3, distinction 24, Article 3, question 2, the 'corpus' or 'response.'
- Loeb: Loeb Classical Library series.
- NCE: *New Catholic Encyclopedia*. 15 vols. New York: Mc-Graw Hill, 1967-.
- OUP: Oxford University Press.
- PIMS: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto.
- PG: *Patrologiae cursus completus. Series graeca*. Ed. J. P. Minge. Paris: 1857-1866. 161 vols.
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- WSB: Works of St. Bonaventure, Texts in Translation Series, Franciscan Institute Publications. St. Bonaventure, NY.

INTRODUCTION

BONAVENTURE OF BAGNOREGIO: LIFE AND WORKS

On February 2, 1257, Bonaventure was elected General Minister in charge of the Franciscan Order.¹ This act of ecclesiastical preferment effectively split his life into two halves; the burdens of the ecclesiastical administrator replaced the leisure of the scholar. He is thought to have been forty years old at the time—the minimum age for a General Minister—giving him a birth date of 1217.

Bonaventure was born Giovanni di Fidanza in Bagnoregio in Tuscany. He himself attests that he was healed miraculously as a child by the intervention of Francis of Assisi, shortly after the saint's death on October 3, 1226: "when I was a boy, as I still vividly remember, I was snatched from the jaws of death by his invocation and merits."² He did not rush to join the Franciscans, but matriculated as a layman in the Arts faculty at the University of Paris in 1235 and proceeded all the way to the Master of Arts, around 1243. The Arts curriculum at Paris then consisted of the seven liberal arts, supplemented by some works of Aristotle. Heavily weighted in favor of the *trivium* (the linguistic arts of grammar, rhetoric, and logic), teaching in the *quadrivium* (the four mathematical and scientific disciplines) was somewhat limited, partially due to the prohibition of Aristotle's works in natural philosophy at Paris in 1210. While some Masters of Arts, such as Roger Bacon and Richard Rufus, were teaching Aristotelian natural philosophy, the requirements for becoming a Master of Arts, as late as 1252 listed only the old logic, new logic, and the *De anima* among Aristotle's works. The earliest record of Aristotle's entire natural philosophy and metaphysics as required for graduation only appears in 1255,³ two years before Bonaventure left the University. His writing

reflects this education. A master of logic and rhetoric, he was less widely read in the Aristotelian and Islamic philosophical texts than the Dominicans Albert and Thomas.

About the time young Giovanni began to study Arts, Alexander of Hales, Master of Theology and initiator of the practice of commenting on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, took the Franciscan habit. His conversion gave the Franciscans a Chair in Theology, the Dominicans having acquired two Chairs during the university strike of 1229-30. Hales held him in the highest regard and said that “in him Adam seemed not to have sinned.”⁴ Giovanni took the Franciscan habit in 1243/44, using the name “Bonaventure” to celebrate his “good-fortune” under Francis and Hales.

Bonaventure attended lectures and disquisitions in theology from 1243 to 1248. Writing about 1280, the Franciscan chronicler Salimbene said:

Br. John of Parma [Franciscan General Minister] gave the license to Br. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio to read at Paris, which he had never yet done because he was not yet installed in a Chair. He then read the whole Gospel of St. Luke, a commentary that is very beautiful and complete. This was in 1248.⁵

This entry refers to Bonaventure’s *cursorie* lectures as “Bachelor of the Bible,” 1248-1250. From 1250-52 he commented on the *Sentences*. Once Master, he revised the *Commentary*, his major philosophical and theological work. In 1252-53 he was a “formed Bachelor” of Theology, performing the three duties of a Master: lecturing on the Bible, engaging in disquisitions, and preaching. In 1253, the Masters and students of the University of Paris went on strike; all, that is, but the friars. The two Dominicans and William of Melitona, O.F.M. continued to teach and refused to take an oath of loyalty to the University corporation, for which they were expelled from the “university of masters,” an action defended by the University in a letter of February 4.⁶ Bonaventure received the *licentia docendi* by Easter 1254, in the midst of this conflict. The first version of his *On Retracing the Arts to Theology* was part of his inception as Master of Theology in 1254, the second half of his inaugural sermon, his *resumptio*.⁷ When he assumed the Franciscan Chair in theology, he taught only at the Franciscan convent, unrecognized by the University.

Bonaventure performed all three tasks of a Master of Theology from 1254-57. He revised his commentary on *Luke* and composed commentaries on *John* and *Ecclesiastes*. He also held three sets of disputed questions. The questions *On the Knowledge of Christ*, which develop his illumination theory of knowledge, probably came out of his inception as Master in 1254. The questions *On the Mystery of the Trinity*, which elaborated his view of God, were likely the last ones he wrote.⁸ Both sets were composed in a lofty style that gives no evidence of the conflict embroiling Paris at the time. The third set of disputed questions, however, were *On Evangelical Perfection* and consisted in a defense of the friars' way of life, under attack by non-mendicant Masters led by William of Saint Amour. In October 1256, Pope Alexander IV ordered the secular Masters at Paris to accept Bonaventure and the Dominican Thomas of Aquino in their rightful places as Masters of Theology, but it was not until August 12, 1257 that they did so. Six months earlier Bonaventure had been elected General Minister.⁹ In addition to the normal magisterial writings, probably in 1257, while leaving the University, he managed to compose his *Breviloquium*, a "short reading" that contains in outline the main theses, but without much argumentation, of a theological *summa* that would never be composed.

From this point on, Bonaventure's writing reflected the needs of the Order. But he did not cast aside his philosophical habit of mind. He quickly set a firm direction for the Order in an "encyclical letter" to all the friars on April 23, 1257, which admonished them to recover the "somewhat tarnished" luster of the Order. The General Minister followed with three tracts written in 1259-60 for the spiritual edification of the friars: *A Soliloquy about Four Mental Exercises*, *The Tree of Life*, and *The Triple Way*.

Bonaventure's most influential work over the centuries was composed at this time. For Francis's feast day in October, 1259, Bonaventure visited Mt. LaVerna, the very place where Francis himself had received a mystical vision of Christ "under the appearance" of "a Seraph having six wings" and had had "imprinted in his flesh" the stigmata or wounds of Christ.¹⁰ Here Bonaventure conceived the idea for his *Journey of the Mind to God*, a mental and spiritual journey to God whose basic outline—though perhaps not its details—could be understood by even the simplest friar. The journey follows the route first charted by St. Augustine: from the exterior world (c. 1-2) to the interior mind, and from the interior but inferior human mind (c.

3-4) to the superior mind, namely, to God (c. 4-7). It ends with mystical union with God (c. 7). For each step, Bonaventure used material from earlier writings, especially his *Commentary*; but like all his later works, the *Journey* is only a sketch the General Minister knew he would never have the leisure to complete.

The General Chapter of 1260 held in Narbonne, France, the first where Bonaventure presided, ratified his codification of the legal statutes under which Franciscans lived, known as the “Constitutions of Narbonne” and also asked him to write a definitive *Life of St. Francis*, which he did in 1261. These two works set the Order on a moderate course that lasted for centuries, ensured their influence in the Catholic world, and led Franciscans to call Bonaventure their “second founder.”

For most of the period from 1257 through 1266 Bonaventure trekked through France and Italy by foot, as did all friars when they traveled. In 1266 he returned to Paris, where his friars were under attack both from conservatives in the Theology faculty and from radicals in Arts. Bonaventure began a series of writings devoted primarily to moral matters: *Collations on the Ten Commandments*, Lent of 1267; *Collations on the Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit*, Lent of 1268; and a defense of the friars bearing the Socratic title *Apologia pauperum*, 1269. On December 10, 1270, Etienne Tempier, bishop of Paris, condemned certain erroneous Aristotelian propositions. During Eastertide of 1273 Bonaventure delivered his magisterial *Collations on the Hexameron*.

The last period of Bonaventure’s life saw him rise to become one of the most prominent men in Christendom. When Clement IV, a most political pope, died on November 29, 1268, Bonaventure, sensing trouble, walked from Assisi to the papal palace at Viterbo, and on December 16 preached a sermon on the “humility” and “authority” of John the Baptist. For two years the papal electors exhibited neither of these virtues, but after the palace roof was removed and they were put on bread and water, they turned again to Bonaventure and “freely gave over their own votes to him, so that if he nominated himself or another to be Pope, they would elect him,” according to the chronicler Bartholomew of Pisa. Bonaventure suggested Teobaldi Visconti, who as Pope Gregory X appointed Bonaventure cardinal on May 28, 1273,^{[11](#)} which is why his *Collations on the Hexameron* were left incomplete. At the Council of Lyons (1274) he preached on reunification of eastern and western Churches, a major goal of

the council which seemed to have been achieved, when he suddenly fell ill on July 15, 1274.

At the hour of Matins died Br. Bonaventure of happy memory, Bishop of Albano, who was a man eminent for his knowledge and eloquence (*homo eminentis scientie et eloquentie*), a man outstanding for his sanctity and acknowledged for the excellence of his life, both religious and moral ... Br. Peter of Tarantasia [also a Cardinal] celebrated the funeral mass and preached on the theme 'I am saddened over you, my brother Jonathan.' There were many tears and much weeping, for the Lord had given him such grace that the hearts of all who saw him were seized with a desire for his love.¹²

BONAVENTURE'S PHILOSOPHY OF GOD

Without exception, every word of philosophy Bonaventure ever wrote is contained in works explicitly religious—in sermons, works of spiritual direction, and theology. He never wrote the kind of introductions to the principles of metaphysics and natural philosophy that his contemporary Thomas of Aquinas composed in his *On Being and Essence* and *On the Principles of Nature*, nor did he comment on Aristotle's works. For this reason, we must begin by looking at Bonaventure's conception of theology and the place of philosophical reasoning within it.

PHILOSOPHY WITHIN THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE

The pressing issue concerning philosophy, faith, and theology in the 1240s and 50s resulted from the translations of Aristotle and the Muslim philosophers Avicenna and Averroes into Latin. These "philosophers" had conceived of "wisdom" as an Aristotelian demonstrative science. Since theology is Christian wisdom, some Parisian theologians thought that it, too, should be set up along the lines of an Aristotelian "science," which would have three parts: a "subject" studied, "principles" assumed, and "conclusions" demonstrated by means of those principles. Among the

Dominicans, Hugh of St. Cher (Master of Theology at Paris, ca. 1230-1236) made an initial step in this direction, and Albert of Cologne (at Paris, 1243-1248) took a few more steps. But it was the Parisian Franciscans who led this movement. Alexander of Hales (Master of Theology, 1221-1243, Franciscan from 1236) pointed them in this direction. The *Summa* that bore his name, though mainly the work of John of La Rochelle, second Franciscan Master (1243-1245) and William of Melitona, fourth Franciscan Master (1248-1253), was a giant work organized as a fully systematic presentation of theology. Odo Rigaldus, third Franciscan Master (1245-1248) and William of Melitona made considerable progress in how to conceive of theology as a science, and Bonaventure finally perfected the model that Franciscans would follow until the time of John Duns Scotus. The task these Franciscans had set for themselves, then, was to discover and present systematically the truths set out in that most unsystematic of books—the Bible.

Bonaventure devoted to this topic the four questions in the *Prologue* of his commentary on Book 1 of the *Sentences*, and also several questions from his consideration of the theological virtue of faith, in Book 3. Since “science” is causal knowledge, in the *Prologue* Bonaventure considers the four causes—efficient, final, formal, and material—of theological “science.”

Bonaventure begins with the *material* cause or “subject” of theology. While it is obvious that theology includes the study of God, it also studies creation; for did not the Nicene Creed begin “I believe in God, Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth”? But there had been considerable dispute among the masters about how to describe theology’s “subject” in a way that would include the entire range of things studied. For help, Bonaventure turned to the Liberal Arts. From Albert, he knew that Priscian had noted three different senses of the subject of grammar. Its subject in the sense of its “root principle” is the “letter”; its subject conceived as an “integral whole,” including everything studied is “a fitting and complete oration”; while its subject conceived as “a universal whole,” which contains the “intelligible aspect” (*ratio*) that characterizes the discipline of grammar as “meaningful, sound, articulated and ordered.” Bonaventure found three correlative senses of the subject of theology: “God” is the “root principle” of the subject; “Christ—head and members” is the “integral whole” encapsulating everything theology studies. But “the subject” of theology,

“properly speaking,” is the “object of belief” (*credibile*), because the “aspect” of religious faith distinguishes theology from the philosophical sciences. And in order to distinguish theology from sheer belief, Bonaventure adds “as the object of belief passes over *into intelligibility by the addition of reasoning*,” which ensures the role of philosophical reasoning within it.¹³

As a “science,” the *form* of theology is its “method of proceeding.” Now “the end imposes necessity on the means, since ‘teeth are sharp in order to cut,’ as Aristotle says.” Since theology is “designed to promote the faith,” it employs “the method of argumentation or inquiry.” Bonaventure situated theology among the sciences by using Aristotle’s notion of “subalternated sciences.” Optics, which studies visible lines, is a science “subalternated” to geometry, which studies lines as such. Theology depends upon Scripture in a similar way, because Scripture offers “belief.” Theology then adds “the aspect of proof,” which produces a “science.” So from the beginning of his explanation of the nature of theology, Bonaventure makes rational or philosophical reasoning an integral part of “theological science.” But the Christian’s intellectual progress does not end there. Having begun in faith, and developed faith through “science,” the wayfarer then can move on to Christian “wisdom,” a gift of the Holy Spirit in the present life, and the beatific vision in our “heavenly homeland (*patria*).”¹⁴

Bonaventure understood that Aristotle had sharply distinguished practical from theoretical sciences by their *ends*. So he asks whether theology is “for the sake of contemplation or for the sake of our becoming good.” The answer is that theology is more perfect than any philosophical science. It breaks through the limits of this Aristotelian dichotomy, because it seeks a Christian “wisdom” that “involves knowledge and affection together.” The “knowledge that Christ died for us,” for example, is far different from the knowledge of geometry or general knowledge. Consequently, theological wisdom is both “for the sake of contemplation and also for our becoming good, but principally for the sake of our becoming good” through enlivening our knowledge and deeds with Christian “affection.”¹⁵

In order to understand the *efficient* cause of any theological book, we must distinguish Scripture from theology, even though both have the same “subject.” Peter Lombard was no mere scribe, compiler, or commentator; he was the “author” of his book of *Sentences*; and the same is true of

Bonaventure himself, or any theologian. God may be the ultimate author of Scripture, but the theologian is the author of his theology.

In the *Prologue*, then, Bonaventure accounts for the *subject* of theology and its *end*. While he does not directly address its principles, we do see that its *form* or method of “argumentation” involves both faith and reason. He did not directly address its principles in the *Prologue*, because he took them up in considering the virtue of “faith” in Bk. 3, which likely was written before Bk. 1.

In treating faith, the schoolmen of the mid-thirteenth century were attracted to succinct statements of the contents of the Christian faith, like the so-called “Apostles’ Creed,” which over time had come to be divided into short “articles” (twelve or fourteen, depending on the method of division). The Creed was useful in attempting to re-conceive theology as an Aristotelian “science” based on a *limited* set of principles. The Franciscan Masters were familiar, not only with the distinctions among the subject, principles, and conclusions in a science, but also with the difference between *common* principles or axioms and the *proper* principles peculiar to a particular science. And they exploited this difference in order to find a precise place for faith and reason within theological science. Bonaventure gives his own answer in replying to the question: “Does the Apostles’ Creed *sufficiently* contain *all* those things that are appropriate to believe for the sake of salvation?” Realizing that the creeds cannot substitute for the whole panoply of scripture and tradition, his answer is affirmative, but qualified: “if we are speaking of the doctrine of the faith *with regard to those things that are its principal and proper contents, as are the articles* [of faith], they are sufficiently contained in this creed.” The meaning of this answer becomes clearer when we look at his reasoning:

One ought to note that among its objects, *the doctrine of the faith* has some that are antecedent, some that are consequent, and some that are its principal objects. As in the other sciences, we see there are certain *common principles* that are presupposed, such as the axioms; there are certain things that are like the *proper principles* of these sciences, as are the intrinsic principles of their demonstrations; and there are certain things that are like consequences, as are *conclusions* that follow as corollaries. In this manner also in the doctrine of the faith, the *antecedents* are those

things that fall under the determination of the natural law; the *principal* objects are those to which the illumination of faith directly leads, and these are called the *articles* [of faith]; and the consequences are those that can be elicited *from* these articles and those that must lead *toward* these articles.¹⁶

Here Bonaventure takes the subject of theology as already established in the Prologue to Bk. 1, and he divides a science into common principles, proper principles, and conclusions. The “proper principles” of theology are the “articles” set down in the creed. This means that theology becomes “scientific” by a kind of “demonstration” of conclusions that show the connection between the few articles of faith and the vast array of truths included in theology. Bonaventure alludes to two ways such demonstrations can work. When arguing syllogistically in the *synthetic* mode, the theologian proceeds *from* these articles to prove other conclusions; but when arguing syllogistically in the *analytic* or *reductive* mode—Bonaventure’s favorite—the theologian proceeds from other truths back *toward* these articles, to show how the multitude of religious truths are connected with the fundamental truths of faith.

A more difficult problem was where to place the *philosophical* truths contained in theology. Are they included among its common principles, its proper principles, or its conclusions? The *primary* rational truths theology uses cannot be *conclusions*, for the simple reason that they are principles. And they cannot be *proper* principles of theology, which must come from faith. Aristotle’s common axioms, however, are known rationally by all humans. Their rationality and universality, then, seem to be the reason why the Franciscan Masters thought the rational and philosophical principles contained and used in theological “science” should be conceived as its *common* principles. The theologian does not abandon reason, but embraces it, when developing theological science.

Bonaventure’s explanation of this point is tantalizingly foreshortened. He says merely that the “common principles” of theology are “the *antecedents* ... that fall under the determination of the *natural law*.” Natural law here alludes to St. Paul’s conception of a law known by “the gentiles” because “written on their hearts,” that is, understood by *reason*, not by faith (Romans 2:14-15). The phrase “*determination* of the natural law” (*dictamine iuris naturalis*) underscores the rational character of this

knowledge and also widens its scope. While Aristotle had limited his “axioms” to *principles* commonly known by all humans, like non-contradiction or the subtraction axiom, Bonaventure’s “determination” makes room for theology’s “axioms” to include both philosophical conclusions, as well as philosophical principles. Finally, *antecedents* indicates that this rational knowledge is brought into theology from elsewhere, is presupposed by it, and is perfected *within* it, much as nature is presupposed by and perfected within grace.¹⁷

Bonaventure did not create his doctrine out of whole cloth. Previous Franciscan Masters had faced the same problem and said that the proper principles of theology are the “articles of faith.” There was agreement on this point. And they said the axioms of theology are not revealed but are *rational* truths. Odo of Rigaud said that “in theology there are axioms, which are manifest to all, namely, that God is the highest good, to be loved above all other things, and that [God is] just to the highest degree, and things of this sort.” And William of Melitona had added a third example of an axiom, that “you should not do to another what you do not want to be done to you, and such things that are naturally impressed on the human mind.”

The Dominican Albert of Cologne, by contrast, said the *common* principles of theology were known by *faith*, not by reason, revealed truths such as God’s existence, God’s truthfulness, and the truth of Scripture. These he conceived as “preambles” to the articles of faith, which became in his doctrine, not principles but the first set of conclusions the theologian draws.¹⁸ So when Albert’s student Thomas of Aquino said theology’s *proper* principles are the articles of faith and its *common* principles are known by reason, not faith, he was adopting a Franciscan position he learned from Bonaventure.

In his *Sentences*, Bk. 1, d. 1, Master Peter Lombard had said this book is about “the mystery of the Trinity”; in d. 2, he set out scriptural evidence for the Trinity; and in d. 3 he considered how the Trinity is known by humans. These preliminaries were followed by consideration of the inner life of the persons of the Trinity (d. 4-34), though the Master devoted one brief section (d. 8) to the one divine essence, a passage more philosophically minded thirteenth century masters like Bonaventure would develop considerably. Then in d. 35-48, the Master considered the triune God as cause of the world, focusing on God’s knowledge, power, and will.

In his *Commentary*, Bonaventure followed Lombard's order of presentation closely, so in this volume we shall focus on those sections of his commentary where Bonaventure made the greatest use of philosophy, a philosophy not simply adopted from Aristotle or Augustine or Avicenna, but one that he himself *developed* in pursuing his vocation as a Christian theologian.

ON KNOWING GOD FROM CREATURES

In Bk. 1, d. 3, the Master had used Romans 1:20 to introduce the issue of knowing God: "Ever since the creation of the world, the invisible things of him, namely, his eternal power and divinity, are seen by the creatures of the world, through the things that have been made." Paul defended the ability of human reason to understand God, based on evidence from creation, and Bonaventure agreed. "As the greatest light, God is intrinsically knowable in the highest degree." Deficiencies in knowing God, then, come "from the side of the mind knowing God." Through reason, humans can know the existence and something of the nature of God. But deficiencies arise when we do not read rightly the signs in creatures that point to God. On the other hand, "the plurality of persons combined with unity of essence is *proper* to the divine nature alone. Nothing similar is found in a creature, nor can it be found in a creature, nor can it be known by reason."¹⁹ Knowing the trinitarian features of God depends exclusively upon revelation.

In his commentary on d. 3, Bonaventure takes care to explain enough about creatures to provide a sound base for arguments that proceed from them to God. Ever a man of the *trivium*, Bonaventure favored a memorable vocabulary for creatures. At Genesis 1:26, "God said: 'Let us make man in our own *image*, in the *likeness* of ourselves, and let them be masters of the fish of the sea, the birds of heaven, the cattle, all the wild animals and all the creatures that creep on the ground.'" And in Hebrews 10:1 we read: "Therefore, since the Law contains no more than a *shadow* of the good things which were still to come, and no true *image* of them, it is quite incapable of bringing the worshippers to perfection." The term *vestige* (lit. "footprint") goes at least as far back as Augustine, whom Bonaventure quotes in this very question: "Woe to those who love things that come forth from your will in place of you and who have wandered away among your

vestiges while abandoning you to whom they lead.” These terms—shadow, vestige, image, and likeness—Bonaventure uses to describe creatures in memorable ways, but they are not just fanciful metaphors. In his commentary on d. 3, he explains what he means by them, because precise understanding of these terms undergirds the “scientific” character of the arguments to come. Bonaventure’s explanation proceeds in two stages.

In reply to the objection that “knowledge [of God] through a creature is the way to error,” Bonaventure replies that “one can know a creature in two ways, either in its *special properties*, which characterize its imperfection, or in its *general conditions*, which characterize its perfection.” This distinction goes back to Avicenna, and Bonaventure knew it through Philip the Chancellor and his Franciscan predecessors in the Chair of Theology at Paris. The “special conditions” of being (*esse*) are descriptions that divide the most universal of terms—a “being” (*ens*)—into Aristotle’s ten categories, substance and the nine “accidents.” Bonaventure describes them as “being limited” (*esse limitatum*) through definitions of species that use genus and difference, and as “being mixed” (*esse mixtum*) of potency and act. Since God is not “limited” and has no “potency,” these descriptions cannot truly be affirmed of God—that is “the way of error”—though they truly can be denied of God. By contrast, what was for Bonaventure the traditional list of the “general conditions,” later called “transcendentals” (*transcendentia*), includes “a being” (*ens*), “one,” “true,” and “good.” These notions are so universal that they apply to all beings. Consequently, they do not necessarily connote imperfection in their very nature. When the transcendentals are predicated of God, then, “this is the way of knowing God through his superlative perfection. For every property of a creature that is fine (*nobile*) is attributed to God in a superlative degree.”

After this preliminary distinction, Bonaventure goes on to use it to answer another question: “What is the difference between a *vestige* and an *image*? Since there is a vestige of God in every creature, one can ask why every creature is not also an image of God and a vestige of God, in some respect.” He replies:

Something is called a *shadow*, because it represents God from a distance and confusedly; something is called a *vestige* because it represents God from a distance but distinctly; and something is called an *image* because it represents God closely and distinctly.

Bonaventure explains these three terms by using the distinction between categorical and transcendental terms and the distinction between reason and faith. Every creature is a *shadow* of God, a truth reason can discover. This means that it has categorical attributes. It is a certain kind of substance having certain accidental traits, say, St. Paul speaking on the Areopagus hill in Athens (Acts 17). Such features of some being point to God, but they do not pinpoint the precise kind of causality God exercises over creatures. The reason is because God himself does not fall under the categories. Moreover, the categories do not allow us to distinguish the persons of the Trinity. Such ‘shadowy’ rational knowledge, while it can be certain about creatures, it leaves us at the level of opinion about God.

Every creature is also a *vestige* of God. Here reason allows us to identify definite attributes in the creature and also definite kinds of causality God exercises over the creature. This knowledge is possible because Bonaventure locates being a vestige, not in the categorical aspects of a creature, but in its transcendental attributes—being, unity, truth, and goodness. Each of the three attributes that follow being can be considered as they are found in a creature, as they point to God, and as they exist in the soul of the human knower, what we might call the ontological, cosmological, and epistemological aspects of unity, truth, and goodness.

For example, taken ontologically, *one* means every being (*ens*) is “divided from others, undivided in itself,” but taken cosmologically “one” means a thing derives from God as *efficient* cause. The reason is that God, as supremely one, creates beings that are themselves one, they are individuals. If *unity* points to God as *efficient* cause, *truth* points to God as *formal* cause, and *goodness* points to God as *final* cause. And if to rational knowledge we add knowledge through faith that God is a trinity of persons, then “the creature as *vestige* leads to knowledge of common attributes which are *appropriated* [to different persons of the Trinity].”

Bonaventure ends his consideration of these memorable names of creatures by considering *image*.

Since every creature is related to God as cause and as triple cause, every creature is a shadow or vestige of God. But only the *rational creature* is related to God in the objective order of cognition, for it alone is capable of reaching up to God through

knowledge and love. Consequently, only the rational creature is an *image* of God.

This much we learn about how creatures point to God in d. 3. Bonaventure deepens his explanation of creatures in later texts, by further analyzing what each of the transcendentals means.

THE ONTOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY OF CREATURES

As a prelude to his argument for the existence of God, we should look a bit more carefully at the ontological composition of creatures. In order to do so, let us consider Bonaventure's most important philosophical source and then look to a signal text where he contrasts the ontological complexity of creatures with the simplicity of God.

The Muslim philosopher Avicenna (d. 1037) had developed a fully articulated metaphysics in the Aristotelian tradition, one focused on God as one and ontologically simple, in contrast with creatures which are ontologically mixed or composite. Over and above compositions of substance and accident, matter and form, that Aristotle had uncovered, Avicenna said a created being (*ens*; *mawjud*), when understood metaphysically, is fundamentally a composite of being (*esse*; *wujud*) and quiddity (*quidditas*; *mahiyya*) or essence (*essentia*; *dhat*).²⁰ This is how he had drawn a sharp line between all created beings, including spiritual ones, and the creator, who is “one” and absolutely simple, because he has no essence other than being (*esse*). While a Latin translation of Avicenna's work *The Cure* was available to Bonaventure in Paris, he was attracted more by the metaphysics found in the *Fount of Life*, written a few years later by a Jewish Neo-platonist in Spain, Solomon ibn Gabirol (d. 1057/58), whose name in Latin became Avicebron or Avencebrol. As fate would have it, both works were translated by the same translation team—which included the Christians Domincus Gundissalinus and “Master John,” and the Jewish Scholar Avendeuth—who worked in Toledo about a century later. While Bonaventure does not mention him by name in his *Commentary*, Avencebrol's ideas are scattered throughout the writings of his Franciscan Masters, especially the *Summa Halesiana* and also the works of Bonaventure's three predecessors in the Franciscan Chair of Theology.

Avencebrol had also drawn a bright line between an ontologically simple God and ontologically mixed or composite creatures, but he did so differently from Avicenna. Avencebrol thought of God as the ontologically simple *first essence*, who creates the world in conjunction with a second hypostasis called *divine will*. All created things are composites, not of being and quiddity, but of form and matter: “Everything composed of matter and form is divided into two sorts: composite *corporeal substance*, and simple *spiritual substance*. Corporeal substance is likewise divided into two: *corporeal matter* which underlies the form of qualities, and *spiritual matter* which underlies the *form of corporeity*.” “Corporeal matter” is a body extended in three dimensions which is the principle of continuity in the changes—both accidental and substantial—that bodies undergo. “Spiritual matter” is the principle of potentiality in all created things, physical or spiritual, which makes them receptive to different forms. The fundamental components of corporeal or bodily substances, then, are “corporeal” matter and also form, which accounts for the “qualities” different things have. But the complexity does not stop here.

Corporeal matter is itself composed of a the more basic matter Aristotle called *prime* and Avencebrol calls *spiritual*, that is, pure potentiality, with the first kind of form that makes matter actually extended in space, the “form of corporeity.” Spiritual substances do not have corporeal matter because they are not bodies; but they must have some kind of matter because matter “*exists in virtue of itself*,” while the function of form is to give a being its substantial or accidental *nature*, which distinguishes it from other creatures. A corporeal substance, then, is highly complex. In addition to physical matter composed of “spiritual matter” and “the form of corporeity,” it must have forms, both substantial and accidental. A spiritual substance is “simple” only by comparison; for it consists of prime or “spiritual” matter and substantial and accidental forms.^{[21](#)}

While Avencebrol conceived his ontology in terms of matter and form, he also explained it using ‘being’ terms, though not in the same way Avicenna had done. The *Fons vitae* now exists only in its Latin translation, and there we find matter explained using the term *existere* (or *exsistere*) and form using the term *esse*. These translations were reasonable because for Avencebrol, as we have seen, matter makes something to “exist in virtue of itself,” that is, to “stand up independently” or to “exist on its own,” and this

is exactly what *exsistere* means in Latin. Moreover, in translating Avicenna, the same translation team used *exsistere* to translate the Arabic term *qama*, which means ‘to stand up’ or ‘to stand independently.’ So it is highly likely that *exsistere* and its variants is their translation of *qama* in Avencebrol, as well. And the reason why Avencebrol correlated form with *esse* is because he understood *esse* to mean the *essence* of the creature, which is caused by form. So if created substances are composites of matter and form, then created *beings* are also composites of “existence” (*exsistere*) and “being” (*esse*). We find this formulation in the *Fons vitae*, and we shall also find it in Bonaventure, as well.²² Roger Bacon, Bonaventure’s fellow Franciscan (in Paris, 1237-47 and 1256-80, d. 1292), summed up the contribution of Avencebrol in what he called the *binarium famosissimum*, the two related doctrines of universal hylomorphism and the plurality of substantial forms.

When treating God’s ontological simplicity in d. 8, in reply to the question “Does simplicity in the highest degree apply *only* to God?” Bonaventure says that “simplicity is a *property* of God,” that is, it is found only in God. His argument consists in comparing God with creatures, by pointing out several respects in which creatures are complex, while God is simple. Now there are two ways to look at a creature, as a *substance* composed out of parts, the approach of the natural philosopher, or as a *being* (*ens*) analyzable into principles, the approach of the metaphysician. Each approach uncovers three ways in which creatures are ontologically complex.

Each created substance (*ens per se*) is composed of “essential parts.” These most fundamental parts are matter and form, the fundamental components out of which all creatures are made, even spiritual ones like the angels and the human soul. Here Bonaventure embraces Avencebrol’s theory of universal hylomorphism in creatures, in order to explain the ontological gap between complex creatures and the simple God. Aristotle had uncovered the composition of form and matter while trying to understand change in physics. For him, matter was the principle of continuity through a change and also the principle of potential for change. Form was the principle of the essence that is lost or acquired through change and the principle that actualizes matter’s potential to be many kinds of things. When Avencebrol used these concepts in his metaphysics, he had altered them in a slight but significant way. For matter to be the principle of continuity in change, it must be a principle that remains in existence

through change; so matter gives the composite its *actual existence*, where *ex-sistere* indicates a thing ‘stands outside’ its causes. But matter must also be the principle of potentiality for a body receiving its essential actuality from form. Later in his *Commentary*, while treating angels, Bonaventure looks at form and matter as a metaphysician does, and he correlates form and matter respectively with the being (*esse*) or essence (*essentia*) and the existence (*existentia*) in a creature:

The metaphysician considers the nature of every creature, and especially of substance, a being on its own (*substantiae per se entis*); and within it he considers both the act of being (*actum essendi*), and this the *form* gives, and being established as existing on its own (*stabilitatem per se existendi*), and what gives and displays this is what the form depends on, namely, the *matter*.²³

Considered metaphysically, a created being (*ens*) is composed of two principles: *esse* and *existere*. *Esse* gives the thing its *actual essence* or nature, distinguishing it from other kinds of things, and this is caused by *form*; *existere* gives the thing its *independent existence* and is caused by *matter*. Bonaventure here correlates the creature’s substantial composition, expressed in the language of matter and form, with the creature’s ontological composition, expressed in the language of being. This is a development of Avencebrol’s universal hylomorphism, but in no way inconsistent with it.

Bonaventure then mentions two more kinds of substantial *composition*, which he later elaborates in explaining the Genesis account of creation, in his *Commentary* on Bk. 2. Here in Bk. 1 he next adds that the body of each physical substance is composed of “integral parts,” the parts that together make it a whole body. While the small parts that themselves are bodies are important, Bonaventure is no atomist; so far more important to him are the spiritual matter and the form of corporeity Avencebrol had posited. Bonaventure notes that “we speak of matter in two senses: either insofar as it exists in nature; or as it is considered by the soul.” In the second respect sense, “matter, *according to its essence* is unformed thanks to being pure potentiality.”²⁴ At the base of every created substance is Aristotle’s “prime matter,” Avencebrol’s “spiritual matter.” What turns such matter into an actual body, which is extended in space and visible? Reflecting an Arabic

tradition, Avencebrol had said “the form of corporeity” does this; but Bonaventure never uses this phrase. Under the influence of his Franciscan Masters and the Genesis account of creation, which appeals to the “light” that changed the “formless void” into a formed body—the earth—Bonaventure says that light (*lumen*) is the very first “substantial form” that turns prime matter into a body, to some degree luminous and actually extended in space, but as yet without an actually determinate essence. Such corporeal matter, however, when considered in itself, does have the *capacity* to become any number of kinds of things. To explain why this same original matter has the potential for becoming every creature, Bonaventure incorporates into bodies Augustine’s “seminal reasons” that help to explain the successive emergence of the different kinds of bodies capable of higher and higher life forms. In short, physical bodies are ontologically complex; they are composed of prime matter, light, and “seminal reasons.”

The third kind of composition Bonaventure finds in physical substances “comes from dissimilar or opposing parts, and this kind of composition is found in all animate or living things,” because they are composed of a physical body and the soul that animates it. He calls soul and body “dissimilar” because each is ontologically complex, but in a different way. Following the Greek tradition, Bonaventure thinks of the soul as an internal animating principle for any living thing—plant, animal, or human. The ontological complexity of the plant or animal soul comes from the way it functions as the form of the body. As we have seen, Bonaventure holds that “seminal reasons” have been in all matter since the first day of creation; so each body has “seminal reasons” that contain the proximate potency for all forms of life, whether as a petunia or platypus. In generation, the efficient cause actualizes some of these potencies, but not others. So the “souls” of plants and animals must contain a plurality of substantial forms, corresponding to the difference between the essences of living things.

The case of humans is even more complicated.

So that divine power might be manifest in human nature, God fashioned it from the two natures that were the maximum distance from one another, united in a single person or nature. These are the body and the soul, the former being a corporeal substance, the latter a spiritual and immaterial substance.

And the human soul is different, as well: “it is not only a form, but also an individual substance (*hoc aliquid*).”²⁵ The human soul is a substance existing on its own, even though it functions as the animating principle of the human body. Now every substance requires matter, as the cause of its independent existence. So in addition to a plurality of substantial forms, as the lowest of the spiritual substances, the human soul must contain matter, not corporeal matter, but spiritual matter.

The natural philosopher, then, sees in created substances composition of matter and form, sees in physical bodies prime matter, “light,” and “seminal reasons,” sees in all living things a soul containing a plurality of substantial forms, and sees in humans a soul consisting of such forms that give the soul its *essence* and a spiritual matter that gives the soul its *existence*. All these kinds of composition will allow Bonaventure to use creatures as points of departure for understanding God.

A different kind of complexity emerges when the *metaphysician* looks at creatures as “beings” (*entia*). Metaphysical “analysis” (*reductio*) of “a being” (*ens*) reveals three kinds of “differences” in created beings. The first kind of analysis considers the being as an *active agent* in the world. This approach uncovers differences between substance, power, and action, or substance and accidents, in a created being. These features are related to each other as potency and act. Consequently, an individual created being has what Bonaventure calls “being mixed” (*esse mixtum*) of potency and act. Now potency and act must be understood in relation to each other. In order to have the potency to grow in a certain way, the petunia must actually have the substance of a certain kind of flower. But in order to be actually grown to its normal height, the petunia already must have had a power of growth. Bonaventure finds such a mixture within the substantial order, as well. In order to have the power to have the nature (*esse*) of a petunia, the substance must already actually exist (*existere*) as a body. And having an actual nature (*esse*) depends upon on the body already actually existing (*existere*), as well as having the potential to be a petunia. So since every creature is composed of matter and form, by that fact its being also divides into potency and act. God, of course, is neither composed nor divisible in these ways.

Bonaventure finds a second kind of “difference” when he analyzes the *esse* (or essence) of a creature, for the purpose of defining it. Every created being has an essence in common with other creatures of the same sort, an

essence normally defined by distinguishing its genus, species, and difference. These aspects of a definition limit the being (*esse*) or essence of such a being within a definite horizon. This horizon is confined to the *categorical* features of things. So in this way Bonaventure says each individual being (*ens*) has “limited being” (*esse limitatum*), because the most important aspect of its reality—its essence—falls within the confines of the categories. Each creature, of course, has transcendental attributes, as well; but these features of its being are of secondary importance for understanding its nature. The divine essence, of course, will not be so confined; and understanding it will focus on the transcendentals, not the categories.

A third mode of metaphysical analysis of a being comes from considering its cause. On this approach, every created being has “being from elsewhere” (*esse aliunde*), namely, from God. When we look at the created being as a whole (*ens*), we find there is a difference between the whole and the essence (*esse*) that gives it the nature it has in common with other beings. This difference between whole and ontological part, Bonaventure says, requires that the whole composite be created by God.

Metaphysical analysis uncovers three kinds of “differences” in creatures. They have *esse mixtum* because they act, not directly through their essences, but through powers based in their essences. Since all such actions are teleological, *esse mixtum* points forward to God as final cause. A creature considered in its definition exhibits *esse limitatum*; its essence is limited in its perfection. Such limited perfection in nature, however, points forward to God as formal or exemplar cause, whose perfection is absolutely without limit. Finally, because of the difference between a creature and its essence, a creature has *esse aliunde*. It cannot exist unless caused to exist. This points to God as external efficient cause. Each of these ways also can be used to argue from the composition found in creatures to the simplicity found in God.

THE TRANSCENDENTALS AS THE WAY TO GOD

In the *Commentary*, Bonaventure developed a three-fold argument for the existence of God, based on the ontological, cosmological, and epistemological senses of *truth*. As a preface to his argument for God’s

existence, Bonaventure asks whether “truth” characterizes God alone (d. 8.1.1.1). He begins his “response” by distinguishing three senses of truth.

Truth is compared to the [created] subject it informs, the principle it re-presents, and the [human] intellect it affects. In comparison with the subject of truth, truth is said to be the *indivision of act and potency*. In comparison with its principle, truth is said to be the *representation or imitation of the supreme and first truth*. And in comparison with the intellect, truth is said to be *the reason for distinguishing* [one thing from another].

The first sense of truth is ontological. If we peer within any being, it is true to the extent that act and potency in it are not divided from each other. As he begins his course, a logic student, say, has the potential to be a *true* logician, but he is not one yet, because potency and act are still divided from each other. Truth in this sense has two opposites: falsity, to be sure, but also “*mixture*, since the true is called *pure and unmixed*.” By noting both opposites to truth, Bonaventure can conclude that the kind of truth opposed to falsity is found in both creatures and God, but “truth in the other sense, as it is opposed to mixture and impurity, is in God alone.” The reason is because “in a creature there is indivision, but combined with diversity between act and potency.” Truth, then, foreshadows a sharp contrast between creatures, who are ontologically “mixed,” and God, who is ontologically “simple.” Then in reply to an objection, Bonaventure sharpens the terms of his analysis: “the notion of *essence* is different from that of *truth*, for essence signifies *what it is*, while truth signifies a *condition* of the being (*entis*). When we apply essence and truth to God, even though they are identical in him, by reason of their general signification, one is taken as the property of the other. But when applied to God, there is no synonymy, they are not synonymous terms.” Truth, then, opens up an understanding of creatures and God at the level of the transcendentals and the concepts associated with them. Among those concepts, thus far Bonaventure has pointed out: being (*ens*), essence, act, potency, truth, unity, and goodness.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

When he read “the books of the Platonists,” in his *Confessions* Augustine learned to do what is counter-intuitive and turn his attention from

the exterior world inward to his own mind, and then he proceeded from his own inferior mind to the superior mind of God above him. This neoplatonic turn opened up three different routes to proving the existence of God, routes philosophers would follow over the next millennium. Arguments like Aristotle's that begin in the world must proceed from effect to cause and have come to be called *cosmological* arguments. When Augustine turned within his mind he opened up two other routes to God. The second route also proceeds from effect to cause, but starts within the mind and searches out God as the ultimate cause of the mind's knowledge. This is the *illumination* argument for God that Augustine himself explored. His inward turn opened up yet a third route, one consisting in meditating on the consequences of our idea of God. Anselm developed this route, and later it was given by Kant the unhappy name of *ontological* argument. The fullest development of this threefold neoplatonic approach to God stood ready to be realized, when all three routes—cosmological, illuminationist, and ontological—would be scouted out by one and the same philosophical mind. That mind, however, was neither Augustine's nor Anselm's; it was Bonaventure's.

Master Peter Lombard had introduced the one section of Bk. 1 devoted explicitly to the divine essence (d. 8), by saying: "Now the *truth*—or property—and *immutability* and *simplicity* of the divine nature or substance or essence must be treated."²⁶ This sentence set the three topics Bonaventure takes up in his commentary on d. 8: God as first truth; God as immutable; and God as ontologically simple. His treatment of the divine truth Bonaventure turned into a philosophical argument for the existence of God. In it, he made use of materials he had already developed in his *Commentary*. First, he used the transcendentals, basing his three arguments for God's existence on transcendental truth. Second, he used his conception of "science" by approaching the existence of God with a sharp distinction between principles and conclusions in mind. The question he asks is not "Does God exist?" His question takes an Anselmian form: "Is the divine being so true that it cannot be thought not to be?" If God exists, there are two options: either his existence is a principle or it is a demonstrated conclusion. Philosophers are inclined to pick one route to God and turn away from the others, but Bonaventure had learned from Francis, the poor man of Assisi, that the world is filled with signs of God that even the simplest peasant can grasp. So his response to this question was most

unusual. He pursued *all three routes* to God; and he even ranked them. Illumination arguments make us “certain” of God’s existence; cosmological arguments give us “more certain” knowledge of God’s existence; while ontological arguments show that God’s existence is “a truth that is most certain *in itself*, in as far as it is the *first and most immediate* truth.”²⁷ Let us consider each argument in turn.

BONAVENTURE’S ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Bonaventure was the first thirteenth century thinker to pay serious attention to the ontological argument; but he read the *Proslogion* of Anselm through Aristotelian lenses. Anselm seemed to mean that God’s existence is an axiom of thought known by all humans. And at the outset of his argument in the *Commentary*, Bonaventure agrees: “since our intellect is never deficient in knowing about God *if he is*, so it cannot be ignorant of God’s existence, *absolutely speaking*, nor even think God does not exist.” But this conclusion is only true, “absolutely speaking.”

While Anselm thought his argument ruled out even the possibility of atheism, Bonaventure more realistically shows how atheism is possible. The problem is with our defective knowledge of God’s *nature*. Error there can lead by logical inference to the conclusion that God does not exist in the first place. We are spontaneously theists, but can convince ourselves to become atheists. Inadequate definition of God points to a second problem. Knowing God exists is similar to knowing axioms, because both are recognized by all. The difference is that we are quite certain “the whole is greater than the part,” because the terms involved in this axiom are so familiar to us; but about God’s existence we have more an opinion than certain knowledge, because we lack an adequate definition of God’s nature.

There are two remedies for the defects in our knowledge of “what” God is. Both make knowledge of God’s existence more like a *postulate* known with certitude by the “wise” than like an axiom recognized by “all” humans.²⁸ For Christian belief and for theology, God’s existence is part of the very first article of faith and is accepted on the basis of faith. The other remedy is Bonaventure’s adaptation of Anselm’s argument, now conceived as a philosophical argument on behalf of a metaphysical principle.

Bonaventure’s ontological argument contains two moments, so to speak: one negative, the other positive. On its negative side, his ontological

argument proceeds as a reduction to absurdity of the atheistic proposition. Anselm had used a particular description of God, “something than which a greater cannot be thought.” Augustine had invented this description of God, in order to argue for the conclusion that God must be *incorruptible*, Boethius used it to argue that God must be *good*, and Anselm used it to argue by *reductio* for an even more fundamental truth, that God must exist in the first place. Bonaventure recognized the affinity between his ontological argument and arguing by *reductio* in support of the principle of non-contradiction:

As a union of things in the greatest degree distant from each other is entirely repugnant to our intellect, because no intellect can think that *one thing at the same time both is and is not*, so also the division of something entirely one and undivided is entirely repugnant to that same intellect. For this reason, just as it is most evidently false to say that *the same thing is and is not*, so also it is most evidently false to say at the same time that the same thing *is in the greatest degree and in no way is*.²⁹

But his study of Aristotelian philosophy made Bonaventure more sensitive than Anselm to the limitations of *reductio* arguments. Positive insight into principles is more than negative *reductio* leading up to principles, so snaring the atheist in a contradiction is still one step away from affirming that God exists. In order to take this final step, he emended Anselm’s argument in a positive direction.

This approach led Bonaventure to explain what makes a proposition “self-evident.” His explanation—which would be widely adopted—in turn opens the way for deducing God’s existence out of a description of God’s essence. Principles are “self-evident.”³⁰ In the second of Aristotle’s modes of “through itself” (*per se*),³¹ the essence of the subject *causes* the predicate. This sense of the term *per se* provided Bonaventure with an ingenious explanation of why principles are self-evident: “We know principles to the extent that we understand the terms which make them up, because the *cause* of the predicate *is included in* the subject.” If the essence of the subject term is what connects it to the predicate term in a self-evident proposition, then the essence of God must be what makes “God exists” self-

evident. Bonaventure's *positive* ontological argument contains an inference to the existence of God that runs *through the divine essence*.

Now most descriptions of the divine essence are inappropriate for an ontological argument, because they are couched in *categorical* terms. But the *transcendentals* are the right terms, because they do not imply imperfection, can be predicated non-metaphorically of God, and are primordial, the "first notions falling into the mind."³² All more specific concepts presuppose transcendental notions, and Anselm's own formula was no exception to this rule.

In his *Commentary*, Bonaventure uses transcendental *truth* as the middle term of his positive ontological argument. We have seen that Bonaventure introduces his arguments for God's existence by first distinguishing three senses of truth. Ontological truth in creatures is *indivision* between potency and act within the creature. This opens our mind to a similar indivision in God. Here is how Bonaventure presents his own ontological argument in the *Commentary*:

The *truth* of the divine being is evident both in itself and through proof. That the divine being is evident in itself is seen as follows: We know *principles* to the extent that we understand the terms which make them up, because the cause of the predicate is included in the subject. This is why principles are self-evident. And *the same thing is true about God*. For God, or the highest truth, is being itself (*ipsum esse*), than which nothing better can be thought. Therefore, he cannot not exist, and he cannot be thought not to exist; for the predicate is already included in the subject.³³

Bonaventure here offers *three* descriptions of the divine essence. To Anselm's formula he adds "being itself" and "the highest truth." Each of these three descriptions offers a different middle term for proving God exists, that is, evidence that connects the subject "God" with the predicate "exists." Following Hales, Bonaventure thinks that Anselm's formula actually proves, not so much that God exists, as that God's existence cannot be denied. This was Anselm's conclusion in *Proslogion* 3. This seems to be the reason why Bonaventure draws two conclusions, not just one. Anselm's formula proves that God "cannot be *thought* not to exist."

The two descriptions of God's essence Bonaventure adds to Anselm's are more appropriate middle terms for proving the conclusion that God "cannot not exist." The way "the highest truth" works in the argument is based on Bonaventure's definition of truth as "indivision." This definition of truth seems to be the basis for Bonaventure re-conceiving the ontological argument as establishing an *indivision* between the subject term of the conclusion—*God*—and its predicate term—*exists*—via an appropriate middle term describing God's essence. *Highest truth* is such a middle term. On the one side, it is connected to God as a description of God's essence that is appropriate because a transcendental term. God is the highest truth; and one who understands the meaning of the term *God* will understand that it includes the notion *highest truth*. On the other side, since truth is indivision and the highest truth is pure indivision, the highest truth cannot be divided off from existence. The notion of *highest truth* necessarily includes *existence*. Consequently, God, on this description, must exist.

Bonaventure's other innovation is the middle term "being itself" (*ipsum esse*). Bonaventure seems to have been led to this term because of the inner logic of the transcendentals. Unity, truth, and goodness are attributes of the primary transcendental—being (*ens*)—so being has a certain primacy over the other three transcendentals. Now it is true that God is a being. But the basic transcendental notion of *being* (*ens*) can no more be used to prove God's existence in this way, than can the basic notion of *true* (*verum*). So just as Bonaventure chose the highest truth for argument from transcendental truth, he picks the notion of *being itself* (*ipsum esse*), that is, being alone with no admixture of non-being, for an argument from transcendental being. In both cases, he picks terms whose precise meanings come from his own metaphysical vocabulary. But just as the prior argument does not assume the real existence of the highest truth, or of God, so this argument does not assume the real existence of *being itself*. This term is but one of a plethora of being terms Bonaventure uses. But like *highest truth* it has the advantage of being an appropriate middle term connecting *God* with *exists*. God is being itself, because *being itself* is included in the very notion of God. God is the kind of being that includes no admixture of non-being. And *being itself* must exist because being, and only being, is included in this notion. So again, God, described as being itself, must exist.

In *On the Mystery of the Trinity*, Bonaventure will change the focus of the ontological argument to goodness, with a memorable result. As before,

the basic transcendental notion, here the good (*bonum*), is not by itself sufficient to mount an ontological argument, but analysis of goodness uncovers the notion of the best (*optimum*), and with it Bonaventure's most striking version of the argument:

No one can be ignorant of the fact that this is true: the best is the best; or think that it is false. But the best is a being which is absolutely complete. Now any being which is absolutely complete, for this very reason, is an actual being. Therefore, if the best is the best, the best is. In a similar way, one can argue: *If God is God, then God is*. Now the antecedent is so true that it cannot be thought not to be. Therefore, it is true without doubt that God exists.³⁴

Since goodness completes or perfects something, *the best* must be "a being which is fully complete" (*ens completissimum*). Now what is absolutely complete must possess all possible perfections. But existence is not just *a* perfection, one component among many making up such ontological completeness, it is *the* most fundamental feature of such completeness. Consequently, such an absolutely perfect being must exist. This version of Bonaventure's argument, then, connects *God* to *exists* through the middle terms *good*, *best*, and *fully complete being*. In Bonaventure's shortest and most memorable formulation, "If God is God, God is," the premise *If God is God* is not an empty tautology.³⁵ It means 'if the entity to which the term God refers truly possesses the divine essence.' And the conclusion means that such an entity must exist.

Bonaventure was well aware of criticisms of the ontological argument, beginning with Gaunilo's retort that the greatest of all possible islands should also really exist. His reply is more effective than Anselm's because it uses the transcendentals. An island is an inherently imperfect being (*ens defectivum*) because it is categorical; but *ens completissimum* is not inherently imperfect, because it is articulated using the transcendentals.³⁶

In *The Journey of the Mind to God*, c. 5, Bonaventure took his brief use of transcendental *being* in his *Commentary* and expanded it into the fullest version of his ontological argument. Bonaventure begins by laying out his argument strategy, the same one he had used since his *Commentary*:

So one who wishes to contemplate the invisible things of God, with regard to his unity of essence, must first formulate an insight into being itself (*ipsum esse*), and then he may see that being itself is so absolutely certain in itself that it cannot be thought not to be.³⁷

Here he connects *God* with *exists*, by means of middle terms derived from analysis of the transcendental notion of being (*ens*). From the concrete notion “a being” (*ens*), Bonaventure uncovers “the being” (*esse*), which yields in turn “being itself” (*ipsum esse*), then “pure being” (*esse purum*), and finally “completely pure being” (*esse purissimum*). In this way, the basic structure of this more elaborate argument parallels his earlier arguments. God (*Deus*), whose essence can be described as divine being (*esse divinum*), is seen to be being itself (*ipsum esse*), which is also seen to be completely pure being (*esse purissimum*). But completely pure being must exist; so it follows that God must exist (*est*). As support for the final inference, Bonaventure contrasts being itself with non-being:

For completely pure being itself (*ipsum esse purissimum*) occurs only in full flight from non-being (*non-esse*), just as nothingness is in full flight from being. Therefore, complete nothingness contains nothing of being or its attributes, so by contrast being itself contains no non-being, neither in act nor in potency, neither in reality nor in our thinking about it.³⁸

In contrast with creatures, which are mid-level on the scale of being, because they are open to both existence and non-existence, the notions of complete nothingness (*omnino nihil*) and completely pure being (*esse purissimum*) have absolutely opposed implications for existence. “Complete nothingness” is logically inconsistent with real existence, so there is a perfectly valid inference from the *notion* of nothing to real non-being (*non-esse*). Nothing cannot exist. If the nature of nothing entails its non-existence, the nature of its opposite—*completely pure being*—entails its real existence. Making use of transcendental terms from his own metaphysics in this way shows more effectively than merely backing the mind into a contradiction why the ontological *inference* is valid.

Implicit, then, within the very *notion* of transcendental “being” (*ens*), the very first notion that falls into the mind, as Avicenna had said, and revealed by analysis of this notion, is the notion of a kind of being with no hint of non-being (*esse purissimum*). Even if only implicit, this notion must be present in the mind of anyone who understands being (*ens*), that is, everyone who understands anything at all. This is the sense in which Bonaventure the metaphysician understands God’s existence to be “evident in itself.” Bonaventure’s versions of the ontological argument are all arguments designed to support God’s existence as a metaphysical principle, which itself is one articulation of the universal human insight that God must exist.

BONAVENTURE’S COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Bonaventure describes the cosmological argument as “more certain,” one step down from the ontological argument. It begins with an effect in the created world and argues to the existence of God, going from effect to cause. It better fits Aristotle’s model of demonstration than does the ontological argument, but Bonaventure does not follow Aristotle’s argument from motion, because motion falls under the categories. More promising were neo-platonic cosmological arguments,³⁹ which combined an *empirical* premise with a *participation* premise. This is how Bonaventure packed his cosmological argument into a single syllogism:

Now [God’s existence] is not just evident in itself, it also is evident from proof. For every truth and every created nature proves and leads to the conclusion that the divine truth exists. For if there is a being (*ens*) by participation and from another, there must exist a being (*ens*) due to its own essence and not from another.⁴⁰

For his *empirical* premise Bonaventure turns to ontological truth. All creatures are true (*verum*), but they are only *partial* realizations of the truth (*veritas*). They are true to the extent that they actualize the potential perfections of their natures, and they are false to the extent that they fail to do so. “In a *creature* there is indivision combined with difference between act and potency.” From rocks to angels, all creatures are true to the extent

that the potencies of the “existence” given by matter are realized through the perfection of their “being” given through form.

Bonaventure’s *participation* premise then moves from effect to cause within the line of formal causality. A necessary condition for the existence of any attribute *by participation* is that the same attribute is present in its exemplar *essentially*, that is, intrinsically. Participation does not immediately take us to God, however, but initially describes relations between creatures. A statue can have certain human attributes—shape, color, size—but only because these features are caused by the artisan who made it. This is how participation works *within the created order*. Transcendental truth, however, moves the argument beyond creatures to God. If incomplete realization of an intrinsically *imperfect* categorical attribute—like white or horse or dirt—implies that those attributes must also exist in some other creature “essentially,” then transcendental attributes should behave the same way. But no creature could be an exemplar of a transcendental attribute, because no creature can be a being or one or true or good “due to its own essence,” which is confined within the categories. The exemplar for ontological truth must therefore be God, who perfectly realizes his own essence, which is to say that God is true “essentially.”⁴¹ So Bonaventure’s cosmological argument uncovers God as formal cause of truth in creatures.

BONAVENTURE’S ILLUMINATION ARGUMENT

Bonaventure bases his illumination argument on the *epistemological* sense of truth. He seems to have been inspired by Augustine’s memorable description of his own inward route to God:

And admonished by all this to return to myself, I entered inside myself, you leading and I able to do so because you had become my helper. And I entered and with the eye of my soul, such as it was, I saw above that eye of my soul, above my mind, an unchangeable light.... Whoever knows *the truth* knows this light.... O *eternal truth* and true love and loved eternity, you are my God; to you do I sigh both night and day.⁴²

In his *Commentary*, Bonaventure extracted from Augustine's stirring rhetoric the logical core of the illumination argument, reducing it to plain and dispassionate syllogisms, as he had learned to do from his teachers in Arts at Paris:

All correct understanding proves and concludes to the truth of the divine being, because knowledge of the divine truth is impressed on every soul, and all knowledge comes about through the divine truth. Every affirmative proposition proves and concludes to that truth. For every such proposition posits something. And when something is posited, the *true* is posited; and when the true is posited that *truth* which is the cause of the true is also posited.⁴³

This short argument starts with an affirmative proposition, say, 'man is an animal,' in contrast to 'man is an ass.' This proposition posits "something," namely, the connection of animal with man. If this connection is true in reality, then it is also true in the mind. Ontological truth begets epistemological truth. In this way, "the true is posited" in the knower's mind. Bonaventure then considers what makes it possible for this true proposition to be in his mind. While he does not go into detail here, the general thrust of his reasoning is clear. The proposition in the knower's mind can be true, only because it participates in the truth of the divine mind. There is something the human mind requires from the divine mind, in order for it to have true knowledge.

Bonaventure understood that the step from a true proposition in a human mind to divine truth is a large one, and in later works he elaborated his theory of moderate illuminationism, one that depends on both divine and created causes. His theory avoids the problems of Platonism, which turns knowing the world into knowing God, and the problems of Muslim illuminationism, which thought a creature—the "giver of forms," an angel—could do what it takes the infinite mind of God to accomplish.⁴⁴

For *certain* knowledge, *eternal reason* is necessarily involved as a regulative and motive cause, however, not as the sole cause or in its full clarity, but along with a *created cause* and as *contuited* by us 'in part' in accord with our present state of life.⁴⁵

To explain the contribution of the “created” causes of knowledge, Bonaventure noted that the *content* of human knowledge comes from “created” causes.⁴⁶ Above and beyond them, however, human knowledge also requires an “eternal” cause. In the mental acts of abstracting universals and arguing inductively, the human mind generalizes well beyond the data of our experience. It is one thing to be able to generalize in this way, quite another to be sure one has succeeded. Intuition into the essence of a creature involves truths that are not only universal, but also necessary and certain; and it is the certainty that is the problem. God is acquainted with the full extension of any universal, since the divine idea of any truth consists in knowledge of that truth in *absolutely all its actual and possible instantiations*. The infinite extension of God’s knowledge is what makes divine understanding certain, and this certainty in the divine mind is on loan, so to speak, to the human mind.

If full knowledge requires recourse to a *truth* which is fully immutable and stable, and to a *light* which is completely infallible, it is necessary for this sort of knowledge to have recourse to the heavenly art as to light and truth: a light, *I say*, which gives infallibility to the [created] knower, and a truth which gives immutability to the [created] object of knowledge.⁴⁷

In his illumination argument, Bonaventure makes more precise Augustine’s “light” and “truth.” They are the two sides of certainty. So it is the certainty, and only the certainty, found in human knowledge that requires divine illumination. All other features of human knowledge—abstraction, universality, correspondence—come from created causes.

In sum, Bonaventure locates knowledge of God’s existence within all three parts of an Aristotelian science—as demonstrated conclusion, as common axiom, and as proper postulate. God’s existence can be proven through two kinds of “demonstrations of the fact,” in his illumination argument and in his cosmological argument. Such proofs proceed from created truth as a *vestige* to the *one* God as its cause. But “God exists” is also a *principle* recognized by virtually all humans, a kind of axiom built upon creatures conceived as *shadows* of the *one* divinity. Finally, there are two ways God’s existence is known as a *postulate*. His ontological argument functions like a dialectical argument supporting a metaphysical

supposition. And God's existence is also revealed as the very first "article of faith," a theological supposition. Knowledge of God's existence, in sum, is ubiquitous. Thus spoke the follower of Francis.

THE NATURE OF GOD

After considering the truth of God's existence at the beginning of his commentary on d. 8 of Lombard's *Sentences*, Bonaventure completes his commentary on this distinction by looking at God's essence. After that, d. 9 – 34 are devoted to a lengthy consideration of the Trinity, while d. 35 – 48 take up God's knowledge, power, and will. Aristotle and his many philosophical descendents had tried to understand God's nature through his operations in relation to creatures, and in d. 35–48 Bonaventure will follow that approach, as we shall see. But in considering God's essence in the rest of d. 8, he takes a different approach, attempting to look at God's essence *in itself*. On this subject, the Master had treated two topics, God's immutability and simplicity; and Bonaventure takes up both in his commentary.

DIVINE IMMUTABILITY

In reply to the question "Is God alone unchangeable (*immutabilis*)?" Bonaventure distinguishes three kinds of change. With his eye on the natural world, Aristotle had divided change into accidental change, which Bonaventure calls *variation*, and substantial change, which Bonaventure, following the Philosopher, calls *generation* and *corruption*. What both types of change recognized by the philosophers have in common is that change presupposes something pre-existing, from which change comes about, and it leaves something behind after the change has ceased. God alone is *invariable*, because he has no accidents, but every creature is subject to variation. And God is *incorruptible*; but there can also be incorruptible creatures, such as "simple beings" like the human soul and the angels. The third kind of change Bonaventure did not cull from the philosophers but from the Church Fathers. This is *creation* and *destruction* (*versio*). If variation, generation, and corruption are readily perceivable in nature, creation, destruction, and indestructibility are not. From scripture and revelation Bonaventure knows that God alone is indestructible by nature, and his reason is that the divine nature is ontologically simple.

Since he is following Lombard's order in his *Commentary*, Bonaventure has not had the opportunity of treating divine simplicity before taking up God's immutability; but he already recognizes the proper logical order, which he will follow when he re-works this material in his disputed question *On the Mystery of the Trinity* (1256-57). In that work he will begin with the existence of God as first or highest principle. Then he will reverse the order of d. 8, treating divine unity, simplicity, immensity, and eternity, before taking up divine immutability. This change in order will show that Bonaventure recognized that the center-piece of his doctrine concerning the divine essence is found in consideration of divine unity and simplicity, not in God's immutability, which follows that simplicity as a consequence.

DIVINE SIMPLICITY

In Part 2 of his commentary on d. 8, Bonaventure offers an extensive consideration of divine simplicity. The Master had mentioned divine simplicity, which for him was just a way of noting that the three persons of the Trinity are one in essence. But Avicenna and Avencebrol had developed much stronger senses of divine simplicity; and thirteenth century Parisian Masters followed their lead. Simplicity is an aspect of transcendental unity. Describing something as "one" includes two points: first, the thing is divided off or different from other things; second, considered internally it is whole or undivided in itself. In order to deal with divine simplicity, Bonaventure makes use of the full scope of his theory of the ontological complexity of creatures, as explained above.⁴⁸ Here in the second part of d. 8, he argues for God's ontological simplicity (q. 1); contrasts the divine simplicity with the ontological complexity of creatures (q. 2); deals with the special case of creatures composed of soul and body (q. 3); and culminates his treatment by arguing that God is so ontologically simple that he is not even a substance, and certainly not an accident (q. 4). The need to understand God's essence using transcendental notions rather than categorical ones is in play throughout his consideration of divine simplicity.

In his affirmative response to the question "Is God simple in the highest degree?" Bonaventure offers no arguments of his own, but accepts the arguments on the affirmative side of the question. They are based on a neo-platonic principle he took from the *Liber de causis*: in the hierarchy of beings, priority in rank order immediately implies greater internal

ontological simplicity. The higher the being in rank, the more ontologically simple it is. Three of the four arguments *pro* are simply variations on this theme, concentrating respectively on the notions of “first” (an aspect of transcendental unity), “fine (*nobile*)” (another transcendental), and “power.”

Having established God’s ontological simplicity, in reply to the second question—“Does simplicity in the highest degree apply only to God?”—Bonaventure says that “simplicity is a *property* of God,” that is, is found only in God. His argument consists in comparing God with creatures, based on six ways in which creatures are complex.

As noted above, when Bonaventure considers a creature as a *substance*, he says it has “essential parts,” that is matter and form. Its body is composed of “integral parts,” that is, prime matter, light, and “seminal reasons.” And living things are composed of “dissimilar parts,” body and soul. By contrast, God is not composed of matter and form, nor of existence and being (*esse*), for God is only being (*esse*). God has no body, so he lacks all the components that constitute matter, including the metaphysical principle of *existence*. Rather, God is being itself (*ipsum esse*). And God has neither body nor soul. The reason underlying these negative conclusions is fundamental for understanding God. The divine being (*esse divinum*) is not a substance, properly speaking, at all, as we shall see.

Metaphysical analysis of God, considered as “a being” (*ens*), allows Bonaventure to draw three more conclusions about divine simplicity. God does not have “being mixed” of potency and act. God’s being is purely act, the “act of being” (*actus essendi*). Moreover, God does not have “being limited” through categorical definition. God’s being is unlimited and “infinite.” Finally, God does not have “being from elsewhere” (*esse aliunde*), but his being comes from within (*esse in se*). In sum, “composite creatures are not truly simple,” when considered ontologically; God alone is truly simple and is simple in the highest degree.

The Bonaventure’s final question is the culmination of his argument about divine simplicity, and is this: “Is God in a definite genus or category?” The stark logic of his answer determines the issue magisterially. Step one: “God cannot be in *one* definite genus,” say, substance, “because every such thing has the kind of being that is limited (*esse limitatum*), confined, and composed” by the constraints of definition, potency, and ontological composition. In short, everything in a category is inherently imperfect. But God cannot be imperfect or so confined, he must have

“being simple and infinite (*esse simplex et infinitum*).” Step two: God cannot fall into “several genera ... through a diversity of natures and properties,” for that would just multiply imperfections and undercut God’s simplicity. The first two steps in Bonaventure’s argument lead inexorably to the transcendentals. Step three: one way of understanding the transcendentals is as attributes that move *across* but are confined *within* the categories. Unity, for example, in the category of substance is sameness, in the category of quantity is equality, and in the category of quality is similarity. When a transcendental is conceived in this way, however, it still connotes imperfection and “has nothing distinct from created things.” Step four: there is another way of conceiving the transcendentals, which can be used of God and in no way undermines divine simplicity. Transcendental being in this sense signifies “a kind of being that goes beyond every genus” (*esse extra omne genus*). The same is true of transcendental truth and transcendental goodness. God’s transcendental unity is absolute simplicity, of a sort impossible for any being confined within the categories. Divine simplicity, in short, requires that God not be a substance, the traditional Aristotelian way of understanding God, nor can God fall within any category. God must transcend the categories, which is why the transcendentals, not the categories, are the appropriate language for describing God in the theological and philosophical “sciences.”

THE DIVINE NAMES

The importance given to the transcendentals in describing God’s essence is further underlined in his consideration of the “names” or “terms” appropriate for describing God—the divine names. Owing to the influence of the book *On the Divine Names* by the anonymous Syrian monk who called himself Dionysius, purporting to be the man who heard St. Paul speak in Athens (Acts 17:34), the real issues in d. 22 concern the knowledge humans can have of God. The kind of comprehensive knowledge we can have of creatures is more than we can have of God, whom we can know only with “halfway (*sempilene*) cognition.” Now all knowledge involves a relation of knower to known. And all relations involve three things: the subject of the relation (in this case, the human knower); the terminus of the relation (here, God); and the foundation or nature (*ratio*) of the relation. The difficulties that arise in knowing God, of

course, come about because of the distance between the finite knower and the infinite object of knowledge. This is the reason why there are religious and philosophical traditions that limit humans to the kind of poetic and metaphorical language about God favored by Scripture, mystics, and poets.

But Bonaventure argues that, in addition to metaphorical language, we can know God in a “scientific” way, that is we can develop demonstrative understanding of God. So he asks: “Are all the divine names said by transference (*translative*) or are some of them said properly?”⁴⁹ This question actually involves two points. Is the reality (*res*) predicated actually found in both God and creatures? And is the name “applied” (*impositio*) to both God and creatures? This approach uncovers three different kinds of divine names. Some divine names, like “eternal” and “immense,” are *unique* to God; so they involve no transference at all. At the other end of the scale, some divine names are *metaphors*. These names transfer the “application” of the name from creature to God, but they do not transfer the reality. God is not a “lion.” Then there is a middle set of divine names, ones that involve a two-fold transference. There is transference of the *reality* of divine wisdom, for example, to human wisdom, since human wisdom is a *likeness*, but only a likeness, of divine wisdom. And there is also a transference going in the opposite direction. The name “wisdom” we first “apply” to humans, and then we “apply” it to God. Here the ontological basis for applying the name to both God and humans is found in God; but the application of the name to God and humans is based in human wisdom. So for Bonaventure there are two kinds of “transference,” metaphorical and what we might call analogical, though he himself does not use this term.

DIVINE KNOWLEDGE

In order to understand God’s knowledge, we must start with a kind of knowledge we know better—human knowledge. In humans, speculative knowledge proceeds from the object of knowledge, which influences our senses and our intellect. This influence produces a “likeness” (*similitudo*) of the thing known, which “is received and impressed from outside, because our intellect is possible with respect to what is known, and it is not pure act. Therefore, it becomes actual through something from the thing known, which is a *likeness* of it,” the means whereby we know that object. Humans think using many such “likenesses,” which nowadays we call ideas. Our

practical and productive knowledge also involves ideas, but reverses the direction of influence. In this realm, our ideas produce some effect—an action or a product. So in this case the idea in our mind is still a “likeness” of the effect produced, but here the effect imitates the “likeness” or idea which causes it, not the other way round.

When Bonaventure considers God’s knowledge, he is not concerned with God’s knowledge of himself, but with God’s productive knowledge of the things he creates and the practical knowledge he uses to govern that creation. So just as there are “likenesses” in the mind of a human craftsmen, which are the model or exemplar of what he produces, so there must also be “likenesses” of the things God creates in the divine mind. These are the *divine ideas*. “Both the saints and the philosophers” say that “God knows through ideas, and God possesses in himself the reasons (*rationes*) and the likenesses (*similitudines*) of the things which he knows.” And Bonaventure adds: “And in these not only does God himself know, but so too do those who gaze upon him.” So the divine ideas function not just in God’s knowledge of creation but in a human’s knowledge of God—a reference to Bonaventure’s illumination theory of human knowledge.

As solid as this position seems to be, it immediately presents the serious difficulty of reconciling God’s absolute unity with the plurality of divine ideas, for in order to create many things it seems there must be many creative ideas in the divine mind. Bonaventure turns directly to the issue of whether there is but one divine idea, or many. Since it is impossible to deny some kind of plurality among divine ideas, the problem is how to explain this plurality without denying God’s unity. About the divine ideas in the mind of God, then, Bonaventure asks two connected questions: “Should a *real* plurality (*pluralitas secundum rem*) of ideas be posited [in God’s mind]?” (q. 2) and “Is there a plurality of ideas according to reason (*secundum rationem*)?” (q. 3). In reply to q. 2, Bonaventure says:

The ideas are *one in reality*. Now this is made clear as follows. An idea in God describes a *likeness* which is a rational means of knowing (*ratio cognoscendi*). Now this “reason” in reality is the divine truth itself, as was shown above (q. 1). Since the divine truth is one, it is clear that in reality (*secundum rem*) all the ideas are one. [50](#)

This response, as true as it is, only covers half the issue. When we look at the reality of divine ideas, they are ontologically one, because God is ontologically simple. But this point does not explain how they might be many. And if the divine ideas are not many in some way, how could they cover the vast range of created things? Bonaventure faces this difficult problem and answers it directly:

Just as [in a human] the rational means of knowing is one, yet it represents many things that are known in completely distinct ways, according to their proper conditions [as through the one idea of white we know the whiteness of many white things], so the divine knowledge, as regards the *mode of knowing* (*modum cognoscendi*), is one and simple, and without distinction. But in comparison with its *object* (*divine knowledge*), it knows things distinctly. Therefore, when it is said ‘God knows all things distinctly,’ if the distinction is posited in knowledge *in comparison to the knower*, the statement is *false*; but if it is posited in knowledge *in comparison to the thing known*, the statement holds true.^{[51](#)}

When we consider divine ideas as the means (*modus*) whereby God knows, that is, as they exist in the divine mind, they must be one because God is utterly, ontologically simple. But when we look at the divine ideas in comparison with the objects God knows, then they are many because the things known are many. God knows all things and the number of divine ideas is determined, not by the mind of the divine knower, but by the differences in kind and in individuality of *the things known*. This is how God’s ideas are many, *but they are many only in this respect*. By distinguishing these two ways of looking at the divine ideas, in relation to the divine knower and in relation to the objects of God’s knowledge, Bonaventure truly can say that the divine ideas are in a certain respect “one” and in another respect “many.”

In d. 38, still following the Lombard’s order, Bonaventure considers the perplexing issue of God’s “foreknowledge” (*praescientia*) of future contingents, a topic with which Christian thinkers had wrestled since Boethius’s *Consolation of Philosophy*. Bonaventure insightfully

distinguishes the issue of *causality* from the issue of *necessity*, asking two questions about each topic.

When we consider *causality*, Bonaventure first notes that the term “foreknowledge” does “not signify in the manner of a cause.” Then he distinguishes three different cases. Sometimes God is the “total cause,” as in “those things that are created.” Sometimes a creature is the “total cause,” as the human will is the total cause of “defects and sin.” The most numerous cases, however, are where “both God and creature together are the cause, as are the products of *nature* and *moral deeds*, because God co-operates with his creatures.” The actions of things in nature and of humans require causality coming from both God and the creature. *Nature* in a creature is an internal principle of motion and rest, but it could not operate without God as a cause of its being. And the same is true for the moral deeds of humans. So while our acts of will are free and our own, real actions that follow upon our willing also require divine causality, as does the very being of our will itself. Bonaventure sums up his argument with a memorable analogy:

If an artisan is working upon some knotty wood that is not suitable to receiving a form, he foreknows that there will be a defect in the image, but it does not come from him. We should understand something similar about God and free choice, that it produces a defect in its work when it is not conformed and obedient to God the maker.⁵²

About necessity, Bonaventure asks: “Does the foreknowledge of God *impose necessity* on the things foreknown?” and “Does God *necessarily foreknow* the things which he foreknows?” The “Catholic” and true answer to the first question is that “there is divine foreknowledge, but nevertheless, it does *not* place necessity upon things. For divine foreknowledge knows in advance all things that will come to pass, *just in the manner that they will come to pass*.” So when God foreknows “things that are going to come to pass contingently” he “foreknows the *mode of contingency* according to which they are to come.”

In order to make his answer more precise, Bonaventure distinguishes two kinds of necessity. “Absolute necessity” or “the necessity of the consequent” is an ontological necessity and so is opposed to contingency.

“Relative necessity” or “the necessity of the consequence” is the logical necessity of a conclusion following from its premiss; and it is consistent with contingency. Bonaventure gives the example of when “something contingent follows necessarily, for example, if someone is walking, it follows necessarily that he is moving.” It is not necessary that the thing be moving; but if it is walking, it follows necessarily that it is also moving, because walking is a sub-species of motion.

Having uncoupled the necessity of the consequence from its cause, Bonaventure then concludes in the last question in this series that, even though many of the things God foreknows are in their nature contingent, God’s *knowledge*, considered in itself is necessary. God’s *foreknowledge*, however, is contingent, but only because of the future contingency it *connotes*. “In foreknowledge these two things are expressed, namely, the act of divine cognition, and this *necessarily* is or was; and the order of the future to this act of knowledge, and this order of the future to that act is *not necessary*.” God’s way of knowing is “a necessary and eternal act ... But since divine knowledge, when it is referred to in the manner of *foreknowledge*, *connotes* things judged to be contingent, the *entirety* of divine foreknowledge is judged to be contingent.” This is true even though the contingency of God’s foreknowledge is not intrinsic to God’s knowledge itself, but is due only to the “connotation” that it concerns a future contingent created thing. This is how Bonaventure safeguards both the necessity of God’s knowledge and the contingency of what God foreknows, events in his created world.

On both of these issues—the doctrine of the divine ideas and God’s foreknowledge of future contingents—Bonaventure is willing to say something that, if taken out of context, might seem erroneous. There are many divine ideas; and God’s foreknowledge of future contingents, when considered as a whole, is contingent. But his careful analysis gives the lie to opponents who might try to object that he is saying something untrue or uncatholic.

DIVINE POWER

After treating God’s knowledge, Bonaventure takes up divine power, following the order of Master Peter Lombard’s text. First he explains the topics the Master (and he) cover about divine power. The first topic is

divine “power in comparison with the things [God] is able to do” (d. 42). The second concerns “power with regard to quantity, showing his immensity” (d. 43). And the third topic “about power concerns its manner [of operating]” (d. 44). These topics show Bonaventure is basing his treatment of God’s power on his view of power in creatures. Aristotle had said that a substance has a definite essence that carries along with it certain natural powers; powers have “dispositions” for developing naturally in certain directions; actions derive immediately from powers, not directly from the underlying substance; and repeated action can develop “habits” in the powers, skills built up through practice. To understand an action we need to look at its goal or end, later called the “object” of the action. So our understanding of a complex creature proceeds from object to action to habit to power to substance.

Bonaventure follows this way of understanding a power through its “objects.” When creatures affect other things, their powers are characterized by the “distance” between them and their effects, by the “dependence” of the agent on its effects, and by the “imperfection and debility” of the powers of creatures. By contrast, there is no distance between God and his effects, God does not depend upon his effects, and God’s power is in no way imperfect (q. 1). This is why God is said to be “all-powerful” (q. 2). And God can do things that are impossible for created agents to do, with the exception of things that are intrinsically impossible, like creating square circles or making what is true to be false (q. 3).⁵³

In his Commentary on d. 43, Bonaventure treats “the infinity of divine power.” His consideration includes the objects of God’s power, his mode of operating, and the divine power itself. He first asks “whether divine *power* is infinite” (q. 1), and then “whether the divine *essence* is also infinite” (q. 2). After that, Bonaventure turns to its objects, asking “whether God can produce an *actually infinite effect*” (q. 3). Finally he considers whether God’s “mode of operating” (*ratio operandi*) is infinite (q. 4).

Not surprisingly, Bonaventure concludes that God’s power is infinite. What is more enlightening are his five reasons. The first two arguments consider the divine power in itself. The first reasons that God’s effects as creator require that God’s power be infinite. The second argument proceeds the other way round, “from what is, as it were, prior.” Since God is ontologically simple, there is no division between God’s “power and

essence,” as there is in creatures. Since “there is the greatest unity within [God’s] power,” God’s power must be infinite.

Bonaventure’s other three arguments compare creatures with God. His third argument concerns causality. The *active powers* in creatures allow them to act as causes; but their power is finite, which is why “a creature’s power needs to be preserved by divine influence.” God’s power, by contrast, is always “purely active” and therefore must be infinite.

Bonaventure then turns to the *passive powers* found in a creature. Such a power is infinite in what it can receive, but only potentially so, not actually. And it depends upon something else to be actualized. Consequently, “since the potentially infinite depends upon the actually infinite,” this kind of passive potency in creatures “depends on the infinitude of uncreated power” in God.

Bonaventure’s last and strongest argument concerns “simplicity or unity.” “In no creature, however fine, is there power that is completely simple; for every power in a creature involves some relation of dependence.” The reason a creature’s powers are not completely simple is because a creature’s being is not completely simple. Its powers depend upon its substance, which is ontologically diverse from those powers. By contrast, God is completely simple in his being, as we have seen. So it follows that “divine power is completely simple in itself, and has a completely simple essence or substance, completely lacking differentiation from that essence. Therefore, it is completely one with every sort of unification, and *consequently is infinite*.” God’s ontological simplicity, in short, is the reason God’s *power* must be infinite.

Based on this argument from divine simplicity, Bonaventure further concludes that the same line of reasoning shows that the divine *essence* is infinite (q. 2). From God’s ontological simplicity, then, Bonaventure concludes that God’s power and essence must be infinite. This rational conclusion is in accord with the faith, with the authority of the “saints,” that is, the Church Fathers, and with the masters of the medieval schools. As an *explicit* on this issue, Bonaventure quotes the authority of John Damascene, who had called God “an infinite ocean of being.”

Bonaventure turns from God’s infinite power to consider whether the effects of God’s power can be infinite. In q. 3, he considers whether “the divine power can produce an actually infinite effect?” His answer:

There are two kinds of infinite, the *actually* infinite and the *potentially* infinite. God can produce the potentially infinite, and he does produce it. God cannot produce the actually infinite, and he does not produce it. I say “cannot produce” because that would be inconsistent with the nature of God and with the nature of a creature.

Although God has actually infinite power and essence, even God cannot do the impossible, which is what producing an actually infinite effect would be; for there can be only one actually infinite being, and a creature, as creature, is actually finite, not infinite in its nature.

Finally, in q. 4, if God cannot produce something actually infinite in nature, perhaps his power extends to an actually infinite number of things. Bonaventure completes his consideration of God’s infinite power by noting that this option would also work against the nature of God. While it is true that God’s power *can* extend to an infinite number of things, it can do so only potentially. In quantity as well as quality, what God’s power can actually produce is finite, because an actually infinite number of finite things is impossible. Bonaventure will make further use of arguments from infinity when arguing for a creation that is finite in time, as well as nature. But that is a topic for another volume in this series.

DIVINE WILL

Bonaventure ends his consideration of the divine essence as understood through the divine operations, by considering God’s will, in d. 45-48. D. 45 concerns the “quiddity” or nature of the divine will, and is divided into three parts. “In the first, [Lombard] shows that the will of God is the divine essence itself; in the second, that is the cause of all things; and in the third he shows that ‘the will of God’ is itself said in many ways.” We have translated the first two of these three parts.

About the nature of the divine will, Bonaventure begins with whether there is a will in God, in the first place (q. 1). The two sides of the argument in q. 1 arise from the fact that what we know about God’s will philosophically is based on our knowledge of the human will. On that basis, the *Objections* argue that there can be no will in God; while the arguments *To the contrary* reason that there is a will in God, but his will must be

different from the human will, with regard to four “conditions”: its power, enjoyment, equity, and freedom. These four traits are found in both the human and divine wills, but they exist there in vastly different ways. Bonaventure begins his “response” by accepting that some of the arguments *To the contrary* prove the *existence* of the divine will, so he concentrates on its *nature*, by focusing on how human and divine wills are different in nature.

The most fundamental difference, once again, concerns the ontological simplicity of God in comparison with the ontological complexity of creatures. Humans have a will because of “the differences among our substance, our action, and how far we are removed from our end.” Due to these differences, “our will presides over the other powers and varies through its diverse actions.” Moreover, “there is will in us due to how far we are removed from our end.” By contrast, God’s will “does not rule over inferior powers,” does not vary in what it wills, and “is completely conjoined to its end.” In short, our finite will accomplishes limited actions spread out over time, while God’s will accomplishes unlimited actions in an eternal now. In humans, there is a real diversity among substance, power (like the will), and end. In God, there are no such differences. Bonaventure avoids the extremes of denying there is a will in God or calling God “all-willing,” even though he is “all-knowing” (*omnisciens*) and “all-powerful” (*omnipotens*). The reason is because God does not will evil (q. 2).

In art. 2 of d. 45, Bonaventure turns to the “*causality* of the divine will,” first asking whether God’s will, as distinct from other divine attributes—like essence, intellect, or power—is the cause of things (q. 1). His “response” is a splendid short essay on how our finite intellect can philosophically understand the ontologically simple God and also how another transcendental—the good—explains the workings of God’s will. In order to understand the divine will’s causality, “one should note that even though the divine essence is one, utterly simple quiddity, nonetheless it is an ‘infinite sea of substance’,” as John Damascene said. So while wisdom, power, and will are ontologically diverse parts of our soul, in God they are ontologically one to the highest degree. Now our finite intellect cannot understand God all at once, but needs “many ways” to understand him. This limitation is *on our side*, and it has consequences for what we know and say about God. “Since we understand God in one way when we say God is good, and in another way when we say God is eternal, we grant that he

diffuses himself *because* he is good, not because he is eternal.” While this might look like a difference due purely to our mode of understanding, it is not, because in reality “diffusion” is caused by God’s goodness, not by God’s eternality. What follows is that God causes things because he “has a will,” not for some other “reason” (*ratio*).

Once he has established that it is the divine will, and not another aspect of God, that “causes things,” Bonaventure then explains how God’s will functions as a cause. Here he emphasizes what the divine and human will have in common. The “reason (*ratio*) for causing things is goodness,” which has two sides. First, the good is called “diffusive.” This is the beneficial side of goodness, in which the good showers benefits on things. In this respect, the good functions as an *efficient cause*. But it “only becomes an efficient cause in actuality for the sake of an *end*.” So the teleological sense of goodness is that “the good is that for the sake of which all things are.” The good, then, functions in a circular manner, as Aristotle had said and the neo-platonists emphasized. “Therefore, what describes the conjunction of the efficient principle with the end is the reason (*ratio*) for causing an effect.” Since goodness involves both efficient and final causality, “the will is an act, in which a good is turned back to a higher good or to goodness itself.” In order to cause something, then, an intellectual being must act as an agent seeking a cognitionally grasped end. Both the agent and the end are good, though in different ways; and what joins these two lines of causality together is the will. “This is why the will is the rational means (*ratio*) that produces an effect.” This conclusion is true for humans, so they must have wills in order to cause things; and it is also true for God, so God must have a will in order to cause things. So “we attribute causality to God by reason of the will, not for any other reason.” This is true even though the divine simplicity requires that there is no ontological diversity between God’s will and other divine attributes.

Bonaventure then ends his explanation of why the divine will “causes things,” with a human example:

So actuality in causing is referred to the will, not just at the instant in which one wills, but in what one wills to do. For example, I will to hear mass tomorrow, and my will makes me be tomorrow in act with respect to the thing willed. The same thing is true of God, in his own manner.

Bonaventure then turns to the tricky question of “whether the will of God is the first *and* immediate cause of things?” (q.2). In this question the preliminary arguments are especially important. The Objections reason that God’s will is the “first” or highest cause of creatures, but it is also the “immediate” or proximate cause of creatures. These arguments are directed against the views of Islamic philosophers who had espoused ‘mediated creation,’ where God is the first or highest creative cause, but he passes his creative power to lower causes, such as Avicenna’s “giver of forms.” On Avicenna’s view, lower causes, not God, are the “immediate” creative cause of things. The arguments *To the contrary* raise an important problem. If God’s will is *both* first or highest cause of creatures *and* the immediate cause of creatures, then what room is left for secondary causality, the causality exercised by creatures? Islamic theologians had seen this alternative and concluded there is no room; God is the one and only true cause of creatures. While Bonaventure did not read extensively the texts of Islamic philosophers like Avicenna and Averroes, he was familiar with Islamic views on a number of issues, including this one. The dilemma facing him is this: God must be the *first* cause of created things; otherwise he would not be God. But God must also be the *immediate* cause of things, otherwise the Muslim philosophers were right. On the other hand, if God is *both* first and immediate cause of things, then it looks like the Muslim theologians were right to say that God is the only cause, thereby denying secondary causality.

In his response, Bonaventure begins with creatures, as is his custom. “Among creatures we find universal causes and particular causes.” Each kind of cause has greater impact on the effect, but in different ways. “With regard to what is innermost in things, a universal cause, because it is a prior agent, has more influence; but with regard to actuality, and what is proper to the thing, it has less influence.” This difference, however, does not hold for God. “The divine will is a cause which is first and completely universal and completely actual.” So in addition to being the most universal cause, “the divine will must be an immediate cause in every action and in every thing.” So causality is divided among created causes in a different way than it is divided up between God and a created cause. God is the immediate cause of all things and the only cause of some things, such as being the only cause of creation. Of other things, God “is a cause, along with another, particular cause,” which Bonaventure calls the “concurrent cause.” With two *created*

causes, their causal effects are divided; but with God and a creature, “the one cause takes nothing away from the other, but the *whole effect* comes from the created cause, and the *whole effect* comes from the uncreated will.” In short, God is the sole, universal, and immediate cause of creation, that is, of each thing being created. He is the universal and immediate cause of every other positive feature of everything. “His great liberality,” however, also allows for created causes to work on all other aspects of things. Their causality is not required, but it is allowed; and this is the way God chose to make the world.

This introduction has not been designed to cover all the profound points Br. Bonaventure made in treating God philosophically in his *Commentary*, but only to highlight a few important issues, so that the reader will have a preliminary view of the whole, before plunging into the vast and refreshing pool that is his “philosophy of God.” If there is an overall theme that comes out of this introduction, it is the importance of the doctrine of the transcendentals for Bonaventure’s way of understanding God. In his attempt to present a theology that is a “science” which leads us to “wisdom,” Bonaventure by no means drops colorful and metaphorical language, for humans need inspiration as well as insight in the hard task of attempting to understand God. But Bonaventure’s care in making language that might at first glance seem to be merely metaphorical actually to be a vehicle for developing precise and philosophical understanding of God is a tribute to the optimism the greatest Masters of Theology at mid-thirteenth century Paris had in the rational possibilities of the human mind. And it was the Franciscans, and especially Br. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, who provided the greatest “weight” toward that end. To be sure, Bonaventure was no ‘rationalist’ in the later meaning of the term. For him, the “science” of theology must begin with religious faith in God and end with a “wisdom” that exhibits the intimate co-operation of faith and reason. And to that end, the translators of this volume look forward to the completion of Bonaventure’s view of God, with the volume in this series that will translate the Trinitarian texts of Bonaventure’s theological consideration of God, in his *Commentary* on Bk. 1 of Lombard’s *Sentences*.

All translations were made from the critical edition published at Quaracchi by the Patres Franciscani beginning in 1882, a great monument to the first wave in the neo-scholastic revival initiated by Pope Leo XIII with his encyclical *Aeterni Patris* of 1879.

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Both translators dedicate the present volume to the memory of a great Franciscan scholar, Fr. Gedeon Gál, O.F.M. from whom we both learned so much, and to the future students, through whose labors and research a revival of widespread interest in Bonaventurian philosophy and theology may yet come to pass.

¹ Two dates of Bonaventure are recorded in medieval sources—his death (July 15, 1274) and the year he was licensed by John of Parma (1248); all other dates are determined by inference. Our chronology follows J.G. Bougerol, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Bonaventure*, 2nd ed (Paris: Vrin, 1988); J. Quinn, "Bonaventure," *Dictionary of the Middle Ages* 2: 313-19; "Chronology of St. Bonaventure (1217-1274)," *Franciscan Studies* 22 (1972): 168-86; and Dominic Monti, "Introduction," *Writings concerning the Franciscan Order*, in WSB V (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1994), 1-36.

² *Legenda maior*, prol. 3, in *Francis of Assisi: Early Documents*, ed. R. J. Armstrong, J.A. Wayne Hellman, W. Short, Vol. II *The Founder* (New York: New City Press, 2000), 528. Cf. *Legenda minor*, lec. 8. Texts of Bonaventure will be quoted in the Quaracchi edition, 1882-1902.

³ Prohibition of 1210: *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* 1: 70, trans. L. Thorndyke, *University Records and Life in the Middle Ages*, 26-27. Rules for determining in Arts, 1252: *CUP* 1: 227-30, trans. Thorndyke 52-56. Courses in Arts, 1255: *CUP* 1: 277-79, trans. Thorndyke, 64-65. Cf. F. van Steenberghen, *Aristotle in the West* (Louvain: 1970). For student guides for examinations dating to the period 1230-1250, see Claude LaFleur, *Quatre introductions à la philosophie au XIII^e siècle: textes critique et étude historique* (Montréal/Paris: Institut d'études médiévales/Librairie Philosophique, J. Vrin, 1988) with a helpful overview of student life in the Arts faculty to be found on 141-54.

⁴ Salimbene, *Catalogus generalium*, ed. Holder-Egger, in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* 32: 664.

⁵ Salimbene, *Chronica* (ed. Holder-Egger, 209), quoted in Bougerol, *Introduction*, 178. T. Crowley, "St. Bonaventure's Chronology Revisited," *Franziskanische Studien* 46 (1974): 310-22, erroneously thought Salimbene meant Bonaventure incepted as Master of Theology in 1248.

⁶ *CUP* I, no. 230: 252-58, trans. Thorndyke, 56-64. Cf. *CUP* I, no. 219: 242, April 1253, expelling the friars from the University. On this conflict see: M.-M. Dufeil, *Guillaume de Saint-Amour et la polemique universitaire parisienne: 1250-1259* (Paris: 1972).

⁷ See Joshua C. Benson, "Identifying the Literary Genre of the *De reductione artium ad theologiam*: Bonaventure's Inaugural Lecture at Paris," *Franciscan Studies* 67 (2009): 149-78; Jay Hammond, "Dating Bonaventure's Inception as a Regent Master," *Franciscan Studies* 67 (2009):

179-226; Joshua C. Benson, “Bonaventure’s *De reductione artium ad theologiam* and Its Early Reception as an Inaugural Sermon,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 85 (2011): 7-24.

⁸ Cf. Zachary Hayes, *Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ*, 40-44; *Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity*, 24-29.

⁹ Condemnation of William of Saint-Amour, *CUP* I, no. 287-88: 329-33. In *CUP* I, no. 293: 339, referring to Odo of Douai and Christian of Beauvais, Alexander IV ordered “that the Friar Preachers and Minors present at Paris, masters and their students, and especially and by name, Friars Thomas of Aquino of the Order of Preachers and Bonaventure of the Order of Minors, doctors of theology, with maximum effort they shall receive them into the academic community and to the University of Paris, and expressly they shall receive these doctors as Masters; and that, while they are in Paris, they shall publicly make this same promise, and, in accordance with the aforesaid ordinance they shall attempt to have those doctors received by the University, both masters and students, with good faith; and they shall not plan or agree to anything contrary to the foregoing.” Christian of Beauvais did so, *CUP* I, no. 317: 366.

¹⁰ Bonaventure, *Legenda maior* 13.3. *FA:ED* 3, 632-33.

¹¹ A. Franchi, “Analisi storiografica del ruolo di Bonaventura al Conclave di Viterbo (1268-1271),” *Doctor seraphicus* 28 (1981): 65-77. Cf. Quarrachi, 10: 61. Bartholomew of Pisa, the earliest source for Bonaventure suggesting Teobaldo’s name, wrote ca. 1385.

¹² A. Franchi, *Il Concilio II di Lione (1274) secondo la Ordinatio Concilii Generalis Lugdunensis* (Rome: 1965), 95, in J. Bougerol, *Introduction à S. Bonaventure* (Paris: Vrin, 1988), 11. English translation is available in *Introduction to the Works of St. Bonaventure* (Paterson, NJ: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1964).

¹³ See [3](#) below.

¹⁴ See below, [xxiii-xxiv](#).

¹⁵ See below, [21 n.42](#).

¹⁶ See below, [52](#).

¹⁷ See below, [53](#).

¹⁸ See below, [61 n.6](#).

¹⁹ See below, [83](#).

²⁰ Avicenna, *Metaphysics of the Healing*, 1.5. Arabic text: Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of the Healing*, ed. and trans. M. Marmura (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2005). Latin text: *Avicenna Latinus. Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, ed. S. Van Riet (Leiden: Brill, 1983), vol. 1.

²¹ Avencebrol, *Fons vitae* 1.1-4, ed. C. Bäümkker, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, vol. 1, heft 2 (Münster, 1891).

²² For the translation of the Arabic terms mentioned in Avicenna into Latin, see S. van Riet, ed., *Avicenna Latinus. Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, I-X, Lexiques* (Leiden: Brill, 1983). For *qama* translated as *existere*, see Arabic root *qwm*, no. 716. (*qama* is also translated as *constituere*. Both Latin terms derive from *sto*, meaning ‘stand’.) For *wujud* translated as *esse*, see Arabic root *wjd*, no. 917. For Avencebrol, see previous note.

²³ Bonaventure, *In Sententiis* 2.d.3.1.1.2c (2: 97).

²⁴ Bonaventure, *In Sententiis*, 2. D. 12.1.1 (2: 294a).

²⁵ Bonaventure, *Breviloquium* 2.10.3 and 9.1, trans. Monti, 90 and 84-85.

²⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* 1.8.1 (ed. Quaracchi, 1: 95).

²⁷ Bonaventure, *De mysterio trinitatis* 1.1 concl. (5: 49); tr. Hayes, 116.

- ²⁸ Boethius, *De hebdomadibus*, (ed. Loeb, 40).
- ²⁹ Bonaventure, *De mysterio trinitatis*. 1.1 (5: 49).
- ³⁰ Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* 1.1 (100a31-b21).
- ³¹ Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 1.4 (73a34-b3).
- ³² Bonaventure, *Itinerarium* 3.3 (5: 304a); cf. Avicenna, *Metaphysics*
- ³³ See [108](#) below.
- ³⁴ Bonaventure, *De mysterio trinitatis* 1.1, fund. 29 (5: 48).
- ³⁵ J. Seifert, “*Si Deus est Deus, Deus est*,” 216-17.
- ³⁶ Bonaventure, *De mysterio trinitatis*. 1.1 ad 6 (5: 50).
- ³⁷ Bonaventure, *Itinerarium* 5.3 (5:308): *Volens igitur contemplari Dei invisibilia quoad essentiae unitatem primo defigat aspectum in ipsum esse et videat, ipsum esse adeo in se certissimum, quod non potest cogitari non esse.*
- ³⁸ Bonaventure, *Itinerarium* 5.3 (5:308): *quia ipsum esse purissimum non occurrit nisi in plena fuga non-esse, sicut et nihil in plena fuga esse. Sicut igitur omnino nihil nihil habet de esse nec de eius conditionibus; sic econtra ipsum esse nihil habet de non-esse, nec actu nec potentia, nec secundum veritatem rei nec secundum aestimationem nostram.*
- ³⁹ Boethius *Consolatio philosophiae*, 3.10; Anselm, *Monologion*, 1-3.
- ⁴⁰ Bonaventure, in *I Sententiis* d. 8. 1.2 (1: 155).
- ⁴¹ In *De mysterio trinitatis*, Bonaventure expands this line of argument further in the direction of the transcendentals. There he identifies nine more disjunctive transcendentals, in addition to the pair “by participation” and “essentially,” where the lesser implies the existence of the greater. *De mysterio trinitatis* 1.1, arg. 11-20 (5: 46b-47b). The disjunctive transcendentals are: posterior and prior; from another and not from another; possible and necessary; relative and absolute; qualified and absolute; from another and from itself; by participation and essentially; potential and actual; composite and simple; and changeable and unchangeable.
- ⁴² Augustine, *Confessiones*, 7.10 (CCSL 27: 103).
- ⁴³ See [108](#).
- ⁴⁴ Bonaventure, *De scientia Christi*, q. 4c (5: 23).
- ⁴⁵ Bonaventure, *De scientia Christi*, q. 4c (5: 23).
- ⁴⁶ Bonaventure, in *Sententiis II.* d. 24. 1.2.4 (2: 567-571). Cf. J. Quinn, *The Historical Constitution of St. Bonaventure’s Philosophy* (Toronto: PIMS, 1973) 345-52.
- ⁴⁷ Bonaventure, *De scientia Christi*, q. 4 (5: 23).
- ⁴⁸ See [xxix-xxxvii](#) above.
- ⁴⁹ See [d. 22, q. 3](#), below [177](#).
- ⁵⁰ See [201-02](#) below.
- ⁵¹ See [204](#) below.
- ⁵² See [227](#) below.
- ⁵³ Bonaventure, *In Sententiis I*, d.42. 1-3.

TOPIC 1: PHILOSOPHY, FAITH, AND THEOLOGY

BOOK 1

PROLOGUE

QUESTION 1

What is the matter or the subject of this book, or of theology?¹

*It seems God is its subject:*²

a. For the subject of a science is that about which and about whose properties the whole science is concerned.³ But this whole book concerns *God* and his works, such as *creation* and *reparation*.⁴ Therefore, etc.

b. It seems the subject of this book is *things and signs*.⁵ For the subject of a science is what provides the basis for divisions affecting that science, since the sciences are divided by things, that is, according to the division of their subjects. But things and signs divide up this science, as is clear. Therefore, etc.

c. It seems the *object of belief* is the subject of this book.⁶ For the subject of a book is that on which the intention and treatment of the author focuses. But the object of belief is this sort of thing. Consequently, the Master says in his prologue that his intention is “to fortify our faith with shields from the tower of David,”⁶ that is, to bring forward arguments proving faith, not, I say, proving the habit of faith, but what is believed through faith. Therefore, etc.⁸

To the contrary:

1. The subject of a science ought to incorporate everything determined in that science. But in this book determinations are made not just about God, but also about creatures. Therefore, *God* is not the subject of all four books of the *Sentences*, but only of the first book.

2. The same thing can be proven in another way. Although three of the causes can coincide in one cause,⁹ *matter* cannot coincide with the end, for *matter* signifies something incomplete, while the end signifies the completion of the whole work. But God is the end of this whole work because he is the end of the whole of theology. Therefore, God is not the subject or matter of this science.

3. It seems *things and signs* are not the subject of this science. For every science is about things or signs. Therefore, if things and signs are the subject of this book, this book is a general discipline in comparison with all the sciences. But if this book develops a special science and doctrine, it is clear that things and signs ought not be designated as its subject.

4. Clearly a science about things differs from a science about signs, for the language arts are different from natural science. Therefore, either the science developed in this book does not have one subject-genus or it is not about things and signs together. But it does have one subject-genus. Therefore, etc.

5. It seems the *object of belief* is not the subject, because a science and a virtue are different habits and therefore have different objects. Therefore, since the object of belief as such is the object of a virtue, it cannot be the object of a science as such.

6. Just as this book takes up faith it also takes up hope and charity. Therefore, if what is hoped for or loved, or the object of love, are not the subject of this book, for the same reason the object of belief cannot be the subject of this book.

Response:

The subject of a science or doctrine can be understood in three ways: In one way, what is called the subject of a science is that to which everything in the science is reduced as to its *root principle*.¹⁰ In a second way, the subject is that to which everything in the science is reduced as to an *integral whole*. In a third way, the subject is that to which everything in the science is reduced as to a *universal whole*.

There is a clear example of these three modes of reduction in grammar. Taken in the first way, the subject to which everything is reduced as to an elementary or root principle is the letter. Therefore, Priscian calls it an element, because it is the smallest part, the point at which grammatical analysis stops. The subject to which everything is reduced as to an integral whole is a fitting and complete oration. And the subject to which everything is reduced as to a universal whole is meaningful speech, articulated and ordered to signifying something either in itself or in another.^{[11](#)}

We can also use this mode of distinguishing the senses of subjects in the quadrivium. In geometry, the subject to which everything is analyzed as to its principle is the point; the subject to which everything is reduced as to an integral whole is body, which contains in itself every type of dimension; and the subject to which everything is reduced as to a universal whole is immobile, continuous quantity.

Using this distinction we can also identify three different senses of subject in this book:

The subject to which everything is reduced as to a principle is *God* himself.

The subject to which all the conclusions in this book are reduced as to an integral whole is *Christ*, understood as including both divine nature and human nature, or the created and uncreated, which are treated in the first two books, and Christ as including head and members, which are treated in the other two books. I take integral whole in a wide sense, one that includes many things, not only as components, but also through unification and through order.

The subject to which everything is reduced as to a universal whole we can describe by using two terms conjunctively or disjunctively. In this way, the subject is *things and signs*, and here a sign is called a sacrament. Or we can describe it using one term. In this way, the subject is the *object of belief*, as the object of belief passes over into intelligibility by the addition of reasoning. This is the way to understand the subject of this book, properly speaking.^{[12](#)}

Therefore, as has been said, I grant the arguments showing in their different ways that the subject is God, things and signs, and the object of belief.

Replies to the arguments to the contrary:

1. To the objection to the contrary that God is not the only thing treated in this book, I reply: While this book does not treat only the substance of God, it treats God in his substance and in his works. Therefore, God is not the subject considered as the whole of what is treated, but is the subject considered as the principle of what is treated.

2. To the objection that in one thing matter does not coincide with the end, I reply: Matter is said in three ways: matter *from which*, matter *in which*, and matter *about which*. It is more accurate to call the last kind of matter an object than to call it matter. Therefore, when it is said that matter does not coincide with the end, this is true about matter from which, which is matter properly speaking. But it is not true of matter about which, which is the object properly speaking. For the same thing can be both the object of a habit and an end. And this is the way the matter of a science is understood, as the object of a power in the knower.

3-4. To the objection about *things and signs*, that they are subjects for all the sciences, I reply: Things and signs can be taken in a general way. If so taken, they pertain neither to a special science, nor to a particular book, nor to the same science. Things and signs can be taken in a second way, as they enter into the notion of the object of belief. When taken in this way, just as there is one virtue and one habit covering all the objects of belief, whether they are things or signs, for example, faith, so there is one special science covering everything to the extent that they enter into this notion, whether they are things or signs.

A second reply: We speak of things and signs in two ways: absolutely, or in relation to enjoyment or what is the source of enjoyment. In the first way, things and signs pertain to different special sciences; but in the second way they pertain to one science or doctrine. Consequently, just as there is one science and one book about all beings in so far as they are reduced to one first being, so there is one science about all things and signs, in so far as they are reduced to one thing: the Alpha and Omega.

5-6. To the objection that the *object of belief* is the object of a virtue, etc., I reply: The object of belief is the object of a virtue in one sense and the object of a science in another. As it contains in itself the aspect of the first truth to which faith assents, because of that truth and beyond all other

things, the object of belief pertains to the habit of faith. As the object of belief adds the aspect of authority to the aspect of truth, it pertains to the doctrine of sacred scripture. As Augustine says in his *Literal Commentary on Genesis*: “its authority is greater than human ingenuity.”¹³ But to the extent that it goes beyond the aspects of the truth and of authority, by adding the aspect of proof, it pertains to the consideration of the present book, which contains arguments proving our faith. In this way, it becomes clear how faith about the object of belief, the canonical books of scripture, and the present work differ.¹⁴

Consequently, the last argument is invalid, as well. For this book is not designed to defend hope and charity in the way it is designed to defend the faith. Therefore, the analogy breaks down.

QUESTION 2

*What is the formal cause or the method of proceeding in these books of Sentences?*¹⁵

The second question concerns the formal cause or method of proceeding. It has been said that the method is one of examination or inquiry into what is hidden.

*Objections against this understanding of its method of proceeding:*¹⁶

1. In *Isaiah* it says, “God makes as nothing those who examine what is hidden.”¹⁷

2. In *Proverbs* it says, “Whoever searches out majesty is oppressed by glory.”¹⁸

3. In *Sirach* it says, “Seek not what is too high for you, and search not into things above your ability.”¹⁹ Therefore, if the Master has examined what is hidden, they are great matters and are too high for us and above our ability. The Master, then, has proceeded wrongly.

This point can also be made through rational argument:

4. The method of proceeding in part of a science ought to be the same as the method of proceeding in the whole science. But the method of proceeding in sacred scripture is to use moral typology and a narrative mode, not the method of inquiry. Since this book pertains to sacred scripture, it should not proceed using the method of inquiry.

5. The method of proceeding should be appropriate to the subject-matter at issue. Therefore, it says at the beginning of the *Ethics*: “Methods of inquiry should follow the material.”²⁰ But the subject matter of this science is the object of belief. Now the object of belief surpasses reason. Therefore, a method of proceeding using rational arguments is not appropriate to this doctrine.

6. The method of proceeding should be appropriate to the end to which the science is ordered. As the Master says, this science is ordered to promote the faith. But rational arguments do not promote the faith, they empty it. Consequently, Gregory says: “That faith has no merit to which human reason gives proof.”²¹ Therefore, this method of proceeding works against the end, and so is inappropriate. Consequently, Ambrose says: “Leave off arguments in matters of faith; believe fishermen, not dialecticians.”²² Therefore, this method of proceeding seems vain and useless.

To the contrary:

a. *1 Peter* says: “Be prepared to give a reason to anyone who calls you to account for the hope and faith that is in you.”²³ Therefore, since there are many who impugn our faith, not just calling us to account for it, it seems useful and right to strengthen it through arguments and to proceed in the methods of examination and inquiry. Therefore, etc.

b. In his book *On the Trinity* Richard of St. Victor says: “Without doubt I believe that for explaining those things that exist necessarily, arguments are not lacking; not just probable arguments, but necessary ones, even if our efforts have not yet uncovered them.”²⁴ Therefore, since our

faith believes those necessary arguments, but their rational evidence is obscure and such points require examination to be made clear, it is obvious that the method of examination is especially appropriate to this science.

c. The truth of our faith is not in a worse condition than other truths. Concerning other truths, for each truth which reason can attack, reason also can and should defend. Therefore, by this argument, the same thing should hold for the truth of our faith.

d. Our faith is not now in worse condition than it was at the beginning. But in the beginning, when our faith was attacked by the false miracles of magicians, it was defended by the true miracles of the saints. Therefore, when it is now attacked by the false arguments of heretics, it should be defended by the true arguments of the Masters.

Response:

A method of proceeding that uses examination is appropriate for this doctrine and this book. The end imposes necessity on the means, since, as the Philosopher says: “Teeth are sharp in order to cut.”²⁵ Consequently, since this book is designed to promote the faith, it follows the method of inquiry. For the method of reasoning or inquiring is good for promoting faith.²⁶ And it does so in three ways directed to three types of humans: some are adversaries of the faith; others are weak in their faith; while the faith of others is complete.

In the first place, the method of inquiry works to confound the adversaries of the faith. Consequently, Augustine says in *On the Trinity*: “Against loquacious quibblers, whose self-esteem outstrips their abilities, make use of Catholic arguments and like arguments that are suitable, in order to defend and assert the faith.”²⁷

In the second place, the method of inquiry works to strengthen those who are weak in their faith. Just as God strengthens charity in the weak through temporal benefits, so he strengthens the faith of the weak through arguments using proof: for if the weak were to see that there are no arguments using proof for the faith, but that opposing arguments abound, none of them would persist in the faith.

In the third place, the method of inquiry works to bring delight to those whose faith is complete. For in a wonderful way the soul delights in understanding what it already believes with complete faith. Consequently, Bernard says: “There is nothing we understand with more pleasure than what we already believe through faith.”²⁸

Replies to the objections:

1-3. All these authoritative texts should be understood to refer to *curious* examination, not to *studious* examination. For the Lord himself said to the Jews: “You search the scriptures, etc.”²⁹

4. To the objection that the method of examination is not appropriate for sacred scripture, I reply: This book is reduced to sacred scripture through a kind of subalternation; but it is not part of scripture. The same is true for the books of the learned, which are designed to defend the faith. The following consideration makes this clear. Not every determination dividing science into parts produces a subalternate science, but only determinations dividing it in a certain manner. For knowledge of straight lines we do not say is subordinated to geometry, but knowledge of visual lines is subordinated, since this determination draws on other *principles*.³⁰

Therefore, since sacred scripture is about the object of belief *as it is believed*, this science is about the object of belief *as made intelligible*. This determination does serve to distinguish them: “for what we believe we owe to authority, and what we understand we owe to reason.”³¹ Consequently, just as superior and inferior sciences attain different levels of certainty, so there is one level of certainty in sacred scripture, and another in this book. Thus, they use different methods of proceeding, as well. And as when a subalternate science falls short it turns to the higher science, which is more certain, so likewise when the Master’s reasoning falls short, he turns back to the certain authority of sacred scripture, which exceeds the certainty of reason.³²

5. When you object that the method of proceeding ought to be appropriate to the material, I reply: It is appropriate. And when you object that the object of belief surpasses reason, I reply: This is true, it surpasses reason as far as acquired knowledge is concerned; but it does not surpass

reason that has been elevated through faith and through the gifts of knowledge and understanding. For faith elevates reason so that it can assent, while the gifts of knowledge and understanding elevate reason to understand what it has already believed.³³

6. To the objection that it is not appropriate to the end because it empties merit, I reply: When there is assent to reason on account of itself, then there is no longer a place for faith, because in the human soul the force of reason is dominant. But when faith does not assent on account of reason, but on account of the love of that to which it assents, it desires to obtain reasons for what it believes. Then human reason does not empty merit, but adds solace. Ambrose understands things in the first way, so that one should not bring forward dialectical arguments as the primary thing on which a human should depend, but rather one should depend on authority more than reason.³⁴

QUESTION 3

*Is this book, or theology, for the sake of contemplation or for the sake of our becoming good, or, is this a speculative science or a practical science?*³⁵

The third question concerns the final cause. When it is said that this book is to reveal what is hidden, a question arises: Is this work for the sake of contemplation or for the sake of our becoming good?

*It seems it is for the sake of our becoming good, from the following arguments:*³⁶

a. Every doctrine about that without the knowledge of which one cannot live well, is for the sake of our becoming good. But this book is designed to know the true faith, with out which it is impossible to please God and live well, as is said in *Hebrews*.³⁷ Therefore, this doctrine is for the sake of our becoming good.

b. Every doctrine that includes virtue within its object is for the sake of our becoming good, as is self-evident. But this doctrine includes faith within its object, since it concerns the object of belief, about which or within which there is also faith. Therefore, etc.

c. Concerning its end, a particular doctrine agrees with the wider doctrine of which it is a part. Now the end of the whole of sacred scripture is that we become not just good, but blessed, for beatitude is the highest end. Therefore, the end of this science is that we become good.

To the contrary:

1. Master Peter Lombard says in his book that his end or intention “is to reveal the secrets of theological inquiries.”³⁸ But this pertains to an endeavor whose end is speculative. Therefore, etc.

2. Science that is for the sake of our becoming good pertains to morals. While theology concerns faith and morals, this book concerns what involves faith, not what involves morals. Therefore, this work is not for the sake of our becoming good.

3. Every science which is for the sake of our becoming good is practical. Now every such science is about things which come about from our actions. This science, however, is not about things that come about from our actions, but from God. Therefore, this science is for the sake of contemplation, not for the sake of our becoming good.

Response:

To understand what has been said we should note that our intellect can be perfected by scientific knowledge. Now we can consider the perfection of the intellect in three ways: in itself; as it applies to our affections; and as it applies to deeds, an application the intellect achieves through giving orders and ruling. Corresponding to these three modes of perfection, our intellect, because subject to error, has three kinds of directive habits.

If we consider the intellect in itself, it is properly speculative and it is perfected by a habit which exists for the sake of contemplation.³⁹ This habit is called speculative science.

If we consider the intellect as it applies to deeds, it is perfected by a habit which exists for the sake of our becoming good. This habit is practical or moral science.

If we consider the intellect in a way falling between these two, as it applies to our affections, it is perfected by a habit that lies between the purely speculative and the purely practical, but one that embraces both. This habit is called wisdom and it involves knowledge and affection together: “For the wisdom of doctrine is like her name.”⁴⁰ Consequently, this habit is for the sake of contemplation and also for our becoming good, but principally for the sake of our becoming good.⁴¹

Such is the kind of knowledge contained in this book. For this knowledge aids faith, and faith resides in the intellect in such a way that, in accord with its very nature, it moves our affections. This is clear; for the knowledge that Christ died for us, and other such truths, move us to love, unless we are talking about a hardened sinner. But a truth like ‘the diameter is incommensurate with the side’ does not. Therefore, we should grant that this science is for the sake of our becoming good.⁴²

Replies to the arguments to the contrary:

1. To the objection that it is for the sake of revealing secrets, I reply: This science is not designed to remain at that point, because this revelation is further ordained to our affection.

2-3. To the objections that it is not about morals nor about what comes from our actions, the response is already clear, for the Master speaks about the kind of science that is *properly* for the sake of our becoming good or practical.⁴³

QUESTION 4

*What is the efficient cause, or who is the author, of this book?*⁴⁴

Finally, to complete the point, one can ask about the efficient cause. This seems to be Master Peter Lombard, Bishop of Paris.

Objections that he ought not be called the author of this book are seen in the following arguments:

1. The only person who should be called the author of a book is the one who is the teacher or author of the doctrine. But Augustine says in *On the Teacher*: “Christ alone is teacher.”⁴⁵ Therefore, he alone should be called the author of this book.

2. The Philosopher says: “Not everyone who does something grammatical or musical should be called a grammarian or musician, for instance, if he does it by happenstance, or by chance, or owing to another.”⁴⁶ But the Master has composed this work based on the doctrine of others, as he himself says in his book: “in this work you will find examples and doctrines from those greater than myself.”⁴⁷ Therefore, he should not be called its author.

If you say: Here is found not only the doctrine of the saints, but also his own doctrine, for which reason he should be called the author:

To the contrary: Denominating the author is based on who plays the main and most important role. But the Master says his own voice sounds just a little and that he has not strayed from the limits set by the Fathers.⁴⁸ Therefore, this book should not be said to belong to the Master.

To the contrary:

a. God obviously did not write this work by his own hand. Therefore, it has another, created author, who can be no one but Master Peter Lombard.

b. Authorship is accepted by the Master in this case, for he himself says in the book: “We have composed this volume with much labor and effort, and with God’s help.”⁴⁹ Therefore, it seems he is the author of the present book.

Response:

To understand this point we should note there are four ways of producing a book. One who writes down the words of another, neither adding to them nor changing them, is called merely a *scribe*. One who

writes down the words of another, adding to them but not adding his own words, is called a *compiler*. One who writes down both the words of another and his own as well, but principally those of another, adding his own as corroboration, is called a *commentator*, not an author. One who writes down his own words and those of another, but principally his own, and those of others by way of corroboration, should be called an *author*. The Master was this last sort, for he put down his own views (*sententiae*) and confirmed them with the views of the Fathers. Consequently, he ought to be called the author of this book.

Replies to the objections that the Master is not the author:

1. To the objection that Christ alone is teacher and author, I reply: As Augustine says in his book *On Christian Doctrine*, there are two ways of teaching, just as there are two ways in which someone makes another see something. In one way, someone makes another see by restoring vision; but in another way, by showing someone something visible. God makes things visible in the first way, humans in the second. Likewise, one teacher offers or shows the science he has in his soul through speech and writing; the other imprints the very habit of science on the soul. Both are called teacher and author, but principally God, as has been said.⁵⁰

2. To the objection about someone producing a book with the help of another, I reply: Someone is not said to do something owing to another simply because one learned from the other, for then very few would be teachers or grammarians. Rather, knowledge is owing to another when that knowledge so completely depends on another that he lacks an internal habit; for example, those whose Latin is correct because others have told them what to say, even though they have no grammatical knowledge themselves. Master Peter Lombard's theology was not like this, for he composed this work based on the science he acquired over a long time and with much effort, and he confirmed his own views using the doctrines of the Fathers. Just because there are many quotations from others here does not take away the Master's authority; rather, it confirms his authority and evinces his humility.

NOTES

¹ Cf. Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, prologue, 1; *Summa Halesiana* 1. Intro. 1.1, 3 (1: n. 1, 3), begun by Alexander of Hales before his death in 1245, completed by John of la Rochelle, William of Middleton, and other Franciscans, perhaps including Bonaventure, sometime after 1260; Odo Rigaud, *In Sententiis*, 1 d. 1.1 (ed. Sileo, 2: 96-101) and *Quaestio de scientia theologiae*, 1, 3 (ed. Sileo, 2: 5-19, 28-40); Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1 d.1.2; Aquinas, *In sententiis*, 1 prol. 4; *Summa theologiae*, 1.1.7.

² Bonaventure was among the group of Franciscan and Dominican theologians in the 1240s and 1250s who conceived theology as an Aristotelian demonstrative science (Latin: *scientia*, Greek: *episteme*), whose hallmark is knowing things through their causes. In his literary prologue to the commentary on Book 1, Bonaventure sought out the four Aristotelian causes of Sacred Scripture. Here he explains the science of theology by laying out its four causes: q. 1 treats the matter or subject of theology; q. 2 the form or mode of thinking in theology; q. 3 the end of theology; and q. 4 the agent who produces theology.

Bonaventure sets the problematic for q. 1 by having Arg. a-c lay out the answers of his main predecessors. The problem all of them faced was how to include in the science of theology both God and other matters, as the Scriptures had done. Following his usual practice, Bonaventure identifies these positions with brief formulas rather than extensive quotations. Arg. a reflects the answers of his Franciscan teachers, Alexander of Hales and Odo Rigaud; Arg. b the position of Augustine, repeated by Peter Lombard, and Arg. c the position of the Dominican Albert of Cologne.

³ Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 1.7 (75a40-75b2): In demonstrations there are three parts: one is what is proven, the conclusion, and this is something inhering in some genus essentially; second are the principles, where principles are that from which the demonstration proceeds; and third is the subject genus, whose attributes and essential accidents demonstration makes clear. Also 1.10 (76b12-16). For example, Euclid had concluded that the three interior angles of a triangle equal two right angles by arguing from two fundamental principles the definitions of triangle and parallel lines. Bonaventure's q. 1 is devoted to determining the subject of theology conceived as a science, q. 2 touches on the demonstrative principles of theology, and the whole of his commentary sets out the conclusions proven in theology. See [n. 14](#) below.

⁴ *Summa Halesiana*, 1.intro.1.3 (1: n. 3). Theology is the science of the divine substance understood through Christ in his work of reparation for sin. Odo Rigaud, *Quaestio de scientia theologiae*, 3 (ed. Sileo, 2: 35): Let us say that the one subject of theology is Christ, by reason of head and members, by reason of divinity and humanity, as creator, informer, and restorer.

⁵ Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, 1.2.2 (PL 34: 19; CCSL 32:7), quoted in Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, 1. d.1.1.1 (1: 55.9-12).

⁶ "Object of belief" translates *credibile*. In treating the articles of faith, Bonaventure also defines faith through its object: the very object of faith, which is what is believed (*ipsum obiectum fidei, quod est creditum*), *In Sententiis*, 3. d. 24.3.2c. *Credibile* is the object about which one can believe, *creditum* is the object about which one does believe.

⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, 1. prologue (1: 3.10).

⁸ Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1.d.1.2, distinguished three senses of the subject of theology, which are the same as the three views contained in Arg. a, b, and c: "The subject of a science is said in a general way and in a specific way. In a general way ... what Augustine said is true, *things and signs* are the subject. ... In a second way, subject is said specifically about what a *science* treats when it proves its properties that are called attributes and its differentiae by means of proper principles. In this way some older thinkers said that the *object of belief*, taken generally, is the subject of theology. Now I

say that the object of belief, taken generally, is a preamble to an article [of faith], for example, that God is truthful, that God exists, that sacred Scripture was made by the Holy Spirit, that the Scripture cannot perish, and claims such as these. Likewise, the articles [of faith] that follow the division of those who edited the creed ‘I believe in God’ are twelve, while according to another division, which is based on the beliefs in the creed ‘I believe in one God’ are fourteen. ... And that is also specifically called the subject which is the worthiest thing considered in the science, and in this respect the subject of this science is *God*.” Also, Albert, *Summa theologiae* 1.1.3.1 (Cologne ed.: 10.65-89).

⁹ Aristotle, *Physics*, 2.7 (198a24-27).

¹⁰ Bonaventure introduces his central doctrine of reduction (*reductio*) to explain the subject of theology. Plato had said dialectic reaches up to the good through two intellectual techniques: collection and division of forms (*Republic* 7). Dionysius the Areopagite called the movement to God *analysis*, translated by Scotus Eriugena, not literally as *resolutio*, but as *reductio*: leading back the mind to God. But *reductio* was also used to refer to Aristotelian *analysis*, one of two ways of reasoning demonstratively. The other, *synthesis*, moves from premises to demonstrated conclusion, as in Euclidean geometry, while analysis moves in the opposite direction, from conclusion to premisses, the normal path of argument in the physical sciences and metaphysics. Bonaventuran reduction typically begins with Aristotelian analysis of some possible conclusion into the principles that prove it, but ends neoplatonically, since analysis of creatures into their principles can lead the mind to their first cause, namely, God. See *On Reducing the Arts to Theology* and *The Journey of the Mind to God*.

¹¹ Priscian, *De arte grammatica*, 1.2. Bonaventure also uses the example of grammar when explaining the articles of faith, and justifies this practice: “Since the other sciences are servants of theology, it takes the properties of its own terms from what it finds well said in the other sciences,” *In Sententiis*, 3. d. 24.3.1c.

¹² Three senses of subject:

sense of subject 1) root principle = ultimate cause	grammar 1) letter	geometry 1) point	theology 1) God in himself
2) integral whole = everything treated	2) whole oration in all aspects, logical, rhetorical, etc.	2) body with all three dimensions	2) Christ, divine & human [1]; uncreated & created [2]; head & members [3-4]
3) universal whole = subject as specified by formal aspect	3) speech meaningful <i>through</i> <i>signification</i>	3) <i>unchanging</i> <i>quantity, continuous</i> [vs. discrete = arith.]	3a) things & signs 3b) object of belief as <i>intelligible</i>

¹³ Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, 2.5.9 (PL 34: 267; CSEL 28.1: 39.17-8).

¹⁴ This important reply clarifies Bonaventure’s preferred description of the subject of theology as the “object of belief (*credibile*)”: First of all, it involves the virtue or habit of faith, which exists subjectively within the individual believer. Such belief comes from God, whose authority is manifested in Scripture. Once personal faith is received from God, it stands ready to be perfected and developed through adding the aspect of proof (*addit rationem probabilitatis*) to mere belief. Having introduced proof, Bonaventure is now ready to consider the way faith and its object develop first into science (q. 2) and then into wisdom (*sapientia*) (q. 3).

¹⁵ Cf. Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, prologue; *Commentarium in Evangelium S. Ioannis*, prologue, 10; *Summa Halesiana*, 1. Intro. 1.1, 1.4.2, 2.3.4 (1: n. 1, 4, 23); Odo Rigaud, *Quaestio de scientia theologiae*, 2 (ed. Sileo, 2: 19-28), *In Sententiis* 1. Prol. 2 (ed. Sileo, 2: 86-90); Albert, *Summa theologiae*, 1.1.5; Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1. prologue. 1.5; *Summa theologiae*, 1.1.8.

¹⁶ Bonaventure's problematic: Obj. 1-6 hold that the addition of rational arguments takes away from what is known by faith; while Arg. a-d hold that rational proof helps perfect what is initially known through faith.

¹⁷ Isa 40: 23 (Vulgate).

¹⁸ Prov 25: 27 (Vulgate).

¹⁹ Sir 3: 22 (Vulgate).

²⁰ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 2.2 (1104a2-4; *Aristoteles Latinus*, 26: 7.9-10).

²¹ Gregory, *Homilia in evangeliiis*, 2.26.1 (PL 76: 1197; CCSL 141, 218).

²² Ambrose, *De fide*, 1.13.84 (PL 16: 571). This is not a precise quotation. See *Sancti Ambrosii Opera Pars Octava, De fide [Ad Gratianum Augustum]*, ed. Otto Faller, CSEL 78 (Vienna: Hoelder-Pickler-Tempsky, 1962), 36.

²³ 1 Peter 3: 15.

²⁴ Richard of St. Victor, *De trinitate*, 1.4 (PL 196: 892).

²⁵ Cf. Aristotle, *Physics*, 2.9 (200b5; *Aristoteles Latinus*, 7-1.2:95.7-8).

²⁶ The method (*modus*) of theology is described as examining (*perscrutatorius*), inquiring (*inquisitivus*), and reasoning (*rationativus*), all of which indicate that theological science uses a *rational* method of argument. In a later section, Bonaventure clarifies the structure and principles of scientific theology, and thereby its method: The *common* principles of theology are constituted by *rational* or philosophical knowledge, while its *proper* principles are the articles of faith. (See below [53](#).) Consequently, theology becomes scientific by a kind of demonstration that shows the connection between the few articles of faith and the vast array of things included in theology taken as an integral whole. The connections proven transform the subject of theology from integral whole (all the topics theology contains) into universal whole, by bringing to light the connection between theology's conclusions and its formal aspect: "belief as made intelligible" (Reply to Obj. 4).

²⁷ Augustine, *De trinitate*, 1.2.4 (PL 42: 822; CCSL 50: 31.13-14).

²⁸ Bernard, *De consideratione*, 5.3.6 (PL 182: 791a; SBOp 3.471). Bonaventure's three lines of argument are also found in *Summa Halesiana*, 1. Intro. 2.3.4 (1: n. 23) and William of Auxerre (d. 1221), *Summa Aurea*, 1. Prol. (Rabailier, 1:15-16).

²⁹ John 5: 39.

³⁰ In the replies to Obj. 4-6, Bonaventure gives his own particular interpretation of "faith seeking understanding." Here he adopts the Aristotelian notion of one science being subalternated to a higher science, as optics is subalternated to geometry. The lower science is not determined by dividing off a portion of the subject of the higher science; there is no distinct science of straight lines, because geometry studies curved as well as straight. Rather, the subalternated science borrows its *proper principles* from the higher science. Mathematical optics takes its proper principles from geometry, then applies them to study physical lines, planes, and solids. Theology therefore receives its proper principles from scripture, as codified in the articles of faith.

Writing shortly after Bonaventure, Aquinas (1252-6) will use the same example of optics to say that theology is subordinated, not to scripture but "to the *science that exists in God*. For we know imperfectly what he knows most perfectly, and just as a science subalternated to a superior science presupposes certain truths and proceeds by means of them as through principles, so theology presupposes the *articles of faith* that are infallibly proven in the knowledge of God, *believes* in them, and in this way proceeds to *prove other things* that follow from the articles. Therefore, theology is a science as it were subalternated to the divine science from which it takes its principles" (Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1. Prologue. 3.2c).

³¹ Augustine, *De utilitate credendi*, 11.25 (PL 42: 83; CSEL 25: 32.23).

³² Here Bonaventure shows how rational argument perfects faith. Scripture presents the *credibile ut credibile*, the object of belief as believed on the authority of God, where the certitude of faith comes on loan from God. As a science, theology transforms the object of belief into the *credibile ut factum intelligibile*, made intelligible through rational argument, which gives theology a *rational* certainty. Such rational arguments connect the wide-ranging data of belief with the few articles of faith, and by so doing, provide rational as well as scriptural certainty for the theologian's knowledge of the object of belief.

³³ The reply to Obj. 5 indicates that divine aid can lift reason up to an even higher state. Two of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, namely, knowledge (*scientia*) and understanding (*intellectus*) allow reason, when perfected by these gifts, not just to assent but to *understand* what was believed.

At *In Sententiis*, 3. d. 35.un.2, Bonaventure distinguishes four senses of science: 1) the rational and speculative science of the philosophers; 2) theological science; 3) the rational but practical science called prudence; and 4) the gift of the Holy Spirit called science, which is infused and practical. By "science" in Reply 5 here, he means 4) the gift of science. The gift of understanding, by contrast, is primarily speculative: it "is directed to consideration of the truth," which helps us "find our rest in the Most High" by "knowing the supreme truth." *Breviloquium*, 5.5.7 (trans. Monti, 189); also, *In Sententiis*, 3. d. 35.un.3. Practical science and speculative understanding point ahead to the complex character of wisdom, the end of theology (q. 3).

³⁴ By the end of q. 2, Bonaventure has shown that theology begins with faith, which provides its proper subject; it proceeds to a first level of knowing this subject, through demonstrative science; and then it proceeds further to a second level of understanding its subject, through the infused gifts of the Holy Spirit. In his university sermon "Christ, the one Teacher" (n. 15), delivered at Paris while still teaching (1254-7), Bonaventure, ever the master of the succinct formula, summed up this movement: "It is clear, by what order and by what author one comes to *wisdom*. The order is that one begins from the firmness of *faith*, proceeds through the clarity of *reason*, in order to arrive at the sweetness of *contemplation*. This is what Christ meant when he said: 'I am the way, the truth, and the life'."

³⁵ Cf. Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, prologue; *Summa Halesiana*, 1. Intro. 1.1, 1.4.2 (1: n. 1, 5); Odo Rigaud, *Quaestio de scientia theologiae*, 6 (ed. Sileo, 2: 49-53), *In Sententiis*, 1. Prol. 3 (ed. Sileo, 2: 90-92); Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1. d.1.4; Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1. prologue.1.3; *Summa theologiae*, 1.1.4-6.

³⁶ Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 2.2; 6.1-5) had sharply distinguished the intellectual disciplines in terms of their ends: speculative sciences are for the sake of knowledge (Bonaventure's "contemplation"); practical sciences are for the sake of human action (Bonaventure's "our becoming good"); and productive arts are for the sake of producing useful products. Arg. a-c reason in favor of theology being a practical science, while Obj. 1-3 argue in favor of it being a speculative science. In his response, Bonaventure presents theology as superior to both kinds of philosophy, because it overcomes the sharp distinction between the theoretical and practical, and contains elements of both. This theme is sounded by other Masters of theology:

Summa Halesiana, 1. Intro. 1.1 (1: n. 1): "Theology, which perfects the soul in its affections by moving us to the good using the principles of fear and love, is properly and principally wisdom. First philosophy, which is theology for the philosophers and which considers the cause of causes but only as perfecting our knowledge through art and reasoning, is less properly called wisdom. And the other sciences, which study lower causes and things caused, should not be called wisdom, but science. Consequently, I reply: the doctrine of theology is wisdom considered as wisdom; while first philosophy, which is knowledge of the first causes which are goodness, wisdom, and power, is wisdom, but only considered as science; and the other sciences, which study the attributes of a subject through its causes, are sciences considered as sciences."

Albert, *In Sententiis* 1. d. 1.4: "This science [theology], properly speaking, is affective, that is, it concerns truth that is not isolated from the aspect of the good; and therefore it perfects both intellect

and affection.”

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1.1.5: “Since this science [theology] is partly speculative and partly practical, it transcends all other sciences, speculative and practical.”

³⁷ Hebr 11: 6. All biblical references are to the Latin vulgate.

³⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, 1. prologue (1: 3.11).

³⁹ Here “contemplation” means “speculative” knowledge. In light of q. 2, Reply to Obj. 5 (above 10), it likely includes infused as well as rational knowledge. In his sermon “Christ, the one Teacher” (n. 11-15), Bonaventure expands the meaning of “contemplation” to include both theoretical and practical, and both infused and natural knowledge. But here “wisdom” is the term that expands knowledge into both theoretical and practical realms.

⁴⁰ Sirach 6: 22 (Vulgate).

⁴¹ See *In Hexaemeron* 19.3, written in 1273: “There is no easy movement from science to wisdom; therefore one must lay down a means, namely, sanctity. But movement requires exertion: exertion in moving from zeal for science to zeal for sanctity, and from zeal for sanctity to zeal for wisdom. About this the Psalm says: ‘Teach me goodness and discipline and science’.” Wisdom bestows goodness through both theory and practice, through both science and sanctity.

⁴² By the end of the response, the steps in the development of wisdom have become clear: 1) faith; 2) science, which is perfected in 3) contemplation; 4) moral perfection or sanctity; and when 2) and 4) are brought together, one attains 5) wisdom, which can be achieved imperfectly in the present life, perfectly in the next.

Bonaventure’s complex view of the development of theological wisdom led him to recognize two practical problems when he became Minister General of the Franciscan Order: that of the rigorists, later called Spirituals, who sought to jump directly from faith to sanctity and wisdom, without benefit of science, and that of the conventuals, especially university friars, who were tempted to stop at the stage of science, without developing the moral perfection and sanctity that would make them truly wise. In his *First Encyclical Letter* (n. 2) as Minister General, written 1257, Bonaventure mentions as problems “certain brothers” who “have succumbed to idleness, that cesspool of every vice, where they have been lulled into choosing a monstrous kind of state somewhere between the active life and the contemplative,” which seems to refer to academic friars. He also mentions “many more” friars who “are wandering about, intent primarily on their bodily comforts,” and friars who engage in “overly persistent begging” that is “making travelers shy away from encountering our brothers, whom they dread like highwaymen,” which seems to refer to those holding too strictly to the externals of Francis’s way of life, as did the Spirituals. (trans. Monti, 59)

⁴³ The objection positions theology as a “properly” or *merely* practical science. But theology is a science that falls between properly speculative and properly practical disciplines, and it is better because it “embraces both” speculative and practical habits.

⁴⁴ Bonaventure’s problematic: Bonaventure is the only one of his contemporaries to raise this question. He seems to have done so because in his literary prologue he had asked about the efficient cause of Scripture, namely, the Holy Spirit; so here he asks a parallel question about the efficient cause of theology.

⁴⁵ Augustine, *De magistro*, 14.46 (PL 32:1220; CCSL 29:202.22-23): “unus omnium magister in caelis sit.” This text is based on Matthew 23:10, “neither be called masters, for one only is your Master, the Christ.” This text is the inspiration for Bonaventure’s memorable sermon “Christ the one Teacher.” Even though, like Augustine, Bonaventure holds an illuminationist theory of knowledge in which God has a role to play in all human knowledge, in this q. he gives full weight to the authorship of the human theologian.

⁴⁶ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 2.4 (1105a21; *Aristoteles Latinus* 26:10.12-15).

⁴⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, 1. prol. 4 (1: 4.15-16).

⁴⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, 1. prol. 4 (1: 4.19-20).

⁴⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, 1. prol. 4 (1: 4.13-14).

⁵⁰ By Augustine in Obj. 1.

BOOK 3
DISTINCTION 23

ARTICLE 1: ON FAITH, ABSOLUTELY SPEAKING, OR ON FORMED FAITH¹

QUESTION 4

*Is faith more certain than scientific knowledge?*²

The fourth question is whether faith is more certain than science.

*It seems that faith is more certain:*³

1. Augustine says: “Nothing is more certain to a human than his faith.”⁴ Therefore, it seems that faith has more, or at least equal, certainty in comparison with scientific knowledge.

2. The Philosopher says that virtue is more certain than any art.⁵ But faith is placed in the genus of virtue, while scientific knowledge and art are in the same genus. Therefore, there is more certainty in faith than there is in the habit of scientific knowledge.

3. That is known more certainly which is known by the light of the first truth than what is known by the light of a created truth. But what is known by faith is known by the light of the first truth, while what is known by science is known by the light of created truth. Therefore, there is more certainty in faith than in science.

4. That is more certain in which no error can fall than that about which error can happen. But error is not mixed with faith, but many errors are mixed in with the knowledge of the philosophers. Therefore, there is more certainty in faith than there is certainty in some philosophical knowledge.

5. More certain scientific knowledge has a more certain foundation. But to the extent that a science is finer and more perfect, to that degree it is more certain. But the science of theology is the highest and the finest science. Therefore, it is the most certain. Therefore, if faith is the foundation of the whole of the science of theology, it necessarily follows that it is most certain. Therefore, there is in it more certainty than in any other science.

To the contrary:

a. Hugh of Saint Victor says: “Faith is a kind of certainty of the mind concerning things not present, placed above opinion and below scientific knowledge.”⁶ Therefore, there is less certainty in faith than in the habit of scientific knowledge.

b. That is known with more certainty concerning which one cannot doubt, than that concerning which one can doubt. But what one knows through scientific knowledge is known in such a way that about it one cannot doubt. But whoever knows something with the knowledge of faith is able to doubt it, as is clear. Therefore, there is more certainty in scientific knowledge than in faith.

c. That is known more certainly which is known with a clear vision than what is known only by belief. But through scientific knowledge something is known through clear vision, while through faith something is known only through belief. Therefore, scientific knowledge is more certain than faith.

d. To the extent that something is known more clearly it is known with more certainty. But faith knows “through a glass darkly,” while scientific knowledge is known “with unveiled face.”⁷ Therefore, the certainty that scientific knowledge possesses is greater than the certainty faith possesses.

e. That is known more certainly which can be proven than what cannot be proven. But what one knows by a habit of scientific knowledge one can prove to another, even to an adversary, and one can convince him of its necessity, so that he cannot contradict it. But this is not true of faith. Therefore, faith does not have as much certainty as does the habit of scientific knowledge.

Response:

When we compare the certainty of faith to the certainty of scientific knowledge, this can be understood in two ways. In one way, scientific knowledge can be said to be the clear and certain vision of God in heaven. When taken in this way, there is no question or doubt that scientific knowledge in this mode exceeds faith in certainty, just as glory exceeds grace and the state of being in heaven exceeds the state of the wayfarer. In a second way, scientific knowledge is said to be a kind of cognition that one has as wayfarer, which can exist in two ways: either in relation to those things which are the object of faith, or in relation to other objects of knowledge.

Now if we consider scientific knowledge in relation to those things which are the object of faith, then, absolutely speaking, faith is more certain than scientific knowledge. Consequently, if one of the philosophers knew through reasoning one of the articles [of faith], for example, that God is creator, or that God is redeemer, he would never know it with as much certainty through scientific knowledge as the truly faithful person knows it through faith.

But if we are speaking about scientific knowledge as it is cognition of other objects of knowledge, then in one way faith is more certain than science, but in another the contrary is true. For there is the certainty of speculation and there is the certainty of adherence; and the first considers the intellect and the second considers affection.⁸

Now if we are speaking about the certainty of adherence, then there is more certainty in faith than in the habit of scientific knowledge, for the reason that true faith makes the believer adhere more to the truth believed than scientific knowledge does to something known. For we see that neither through arguments nor through tortures nor through blandishments can the truly faithful be induced to deny the truth they believe, at least while they

have control of their lips (*oretanus*). But no scientific knower of sound mind would do this for something he knows, unless because the doctrine of the faith dictates one ought not lie. For he would be a stupid geometer who, for the sake of a conclusion of geometry he learned with certainty, would undergo death. Consequently, the truly faithful person, even if he knew all of philosophical science, would prefer that all that science perish than to be ignorant of just one article [of faith], so strongly does he adhere to the truth of faith. Therefore, concerning the certainty of adherence, it is true that faith is more certain than philosophical science, and this certainty considers truth and doctrine “according to piety.”⁹ Now the first set of arguments draws conclusions about this kind of certitude.

But if we are speaking about the certainty of speculation, which considers the intellect itself and the bare truth, then it can be conceded that there is more certainty in some scientific knowledge than there is in faith, for the reason that one can know something through science with such certainty that in no way can one doubt it, or disbelieve it in some way, or in any way contradict it in his heart. This is clear about knowing the axioms and first principles. Now the second set of arguments proceed in this way.¹⁰

This is how the response to the question proposed becomes clear.

The reply to the objections is clear, because they proceed in different ways. The first set of arguments brought forward draw conclusions about the certainty of adherence; while the arguments on the other side draw conclusions about the certainty of speculation. But the first set of arguments also seems to draw conclusions about the certainty of speculation, that by that kind of certainty faith is more certain than scientific knowledge, which is false. Therefore, one should attempt to resolve those arguments.

Replies to the objections:

1. To the words of Augustine that say that nothing is more certain to a human than his faith, it can be said in reply: The text is not relevant to the issue proposed, because it does not speak about the certainty that one has through faith, but about the certainty one has about the faith that he has in his mind. But this is a certainty of scientific knowledge. For the person of faith knows scientifically *that* he has faith.¹¹

2. To the quotation from the Philosopher, that virtue is more certain than any art, I reply: He is speaking about virtue and art, as they are compared to the same thing. For one who knows how to find the mean and knows an object through the habit of virtue rather than through a habit of pure cognition knows much more. But it is not generally agreed that a virtue is more certain about its proper object than some science is about its proper object.

3. To the objection that what is seen by the light of the uncreated truth is seen more certainly than what is seen by the light of a created truth, I reply: This is true when the light of uncreated truth shines fully, as it will in heaven. But when it shines halfway, the claim is not necessarily true. This is clear, because a human can see more certainly by the light of a candle than by the light of the sun, when the sun does not shine fully. And the same things should be understood about the issue proposed. For even though by means of faith shining comes from the eternal truth, it is not a full shining, because it remains “through a glass darkly.”¹²

4. To the objection that knowledge is more certain with which error is not mixed, I reply: This is true; but just as error is not mixed in with faith, so also it is not mixed in with scientific knowledge, in so far as it is science. This happens only from a defect on the part of the knower. And this also happens in faith itself, on the side of the believer, as it clear in the case of a faithful person who, owing to a distortion of his intellect, from knowledge of the faith lapses into heresy, when false belief is intermixed with true belief. Consequently, from this it cannot be concluded that faith is more certain than science. But this is true, that the doctrine of the faith is more truly transmitted than any philosophical science, because the Holy Spirit and Christ himself, who have taught the truth of faith and of sacred scripture, in no way have said anything false, nor can they be reprehended on any point. But I think this cannot be said of any philosopher in the transmission of any doctrine, but rather many falsities are found mixed with truths.

5. To the objection that to the extent a science is finer, to that degree it is more certain, I reply: This claim is not true. For as the Philosopher says, there is more certainty in mathematical science than in divine science; but

divine science is finer than mathematical science.¹³ Now this is owing to a defect on the part of the knower, because, as the Philosopher says, “just as the eye of the owl is related to the light, so is our mind related to the most manifest things in nature.”¹⁴ Consequently, those things that are most certain in themselves we sometimes know mixed with doubt. Nonetheless, that knowledge, though less certain, is finer and more perfect, since it concerns a finer reality. For it is better to know a modest amount about God than to have full knowledge of the heavens and the earth.

NOTES

¹ In the course of treating the virtue of faith in Book 3 (which was probably written before the Prologue to Bk. 1), Bonaventure adds to his doctrine of theology and philosophy as sciences, by raising a series of questions that compare faith with “scientific knowledge (*scientia*).”

Bonaventure divides the third book of the *Sentences* into two parts. “In the first of these the Master treats the life that Christ assumed for us, which he even exposed to death for our salvation. In the second, he treats the life of grace that Christ conferred on us.... Now since the perfection of the life of grace consists in two things, namely, in a multitude of habits given by grace and in fulfilling the divine commandments, this part [of Lombard’s text] is divided into two principal parts. In the first of these the Master treats the habits that come from grace [faith, d. 23-25; hope, d. 26; charity, d. 27-32; and the cardinal virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit, d. 33-6]. And in the second part he treats the precepts of the decalogue [d. 37-40].” *In Sententiis*, 3. d. 23, *divisio textus*.

² Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 1. Prol. 1.4.2 (1: n. 5), and 3.3.2.1.9.1 (4: n. 695); Albert, *In Sententiis* 3.d.23.17; Thomas Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 3.d.23.2.2. quaestiuncula 3.

³ Bonaventure’s problematic: Obj. 1—5 argue that faith is more certain than “science,” while Arg. a—e *To the Contrary* argue that “scientific knowledge” is more certain. The issue became inevitable with the rediscovery and use of Aristotle in the medieval universities. To understand Bonaventure’s problematic, it is helpful to start with William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* (written ca. 1225) and the *Summa Halesiana*.

In treating the virtue of faith, William had raised the question “Can the same thing be known and believed?” In answer he had distinguished the kind of knowledge of God that comes by nature to all humans (*cognitio naturalis*), from the kind of knowledge that requires additional effort or aid to develop (*cognitio accidentalis*). He illustrates the first kind by the “axioms” Aristotle said all know and the “suppositions that require at least a bit of persuasion (*levi persuasione*)” to accept, adding that before the fall, such knowledge was “evident (*aperte*)” to Adam and Eve, but after the first sin, though we still have such knowledge, it is understood “through a glass darkly” (1 Cor 13:12). Knowledge that requires effort William divided into three sorts: knowledge achieved through “rational proof”; knowledge attained through “unformed faith (*fides informis*),” which depends upon the testimony of the scriptures and miracles; and knowledge that comes from “faith graciously given (*fides gratuita*).” William made room for both reason and faith, but held faith to be so superior that, with the advent of the stronger kind of faith (*fides gratuita*), the other two kinds of “accidental” knowledge “perish,” though the reasons for them “are not forgotten.” (*Summa aurea*, 3.12.4; 3.1: 208-9).

In the *Summa Halesiana*, 1. Prol. 1.4.2 (1: n. 5), Alexander raised the question “Is the method of sacred scripture certain?” and held broadly for the superiority of faith over reason. His explanation distinguished different kinds of certainty: “Therefore, I say that the theological method is more certain by means of a certainty of *experience*, a certainty concerning *affection*, which is by way of taste, as in the Psalm [118: 103]: ‘How sweet are your words to my taste.’ But the theological method is not more certain about the *speculation of the intellect*, which is by means of *vision*. And it is more certain for the spiritual person (*homini spirituali*), but less certain for the natural person (*animali*). ‘For the natural man does not perceive those things that are the spirit of God, but the spiritual man judges all things’ [1 Cor 2:14-15].” Faith makes theological knowledge superior to rational knowledge, because it brings a higher kind of certainty, that of religious “experience” based on what Augustine called the “affection” of the mind. But theological knowledge is itself inferior to the certitude attained in the “speculation” that comes from “vision,” that is, the beatific vision in heaven.

Hales’s successors—Odo Rigaud, William of Middleton, and Bonaventure—followed his lead in distinguishing different senses of “certainty,” but they held a quite different, middle position: while faith and theology are more certain than reason in certain respects, in other ways reason is more

certain than faith. This position ushered in a period of great optimism about the power of reason among Franciscans, which lasted from Bonaventure to Ockham. It was the Franciscans who were more optimistic about the prospects for philosophical reason in theology; it was Dominicans such as Albert and Aquinas who were more pessimistic about the ability of unaided human reason to attain certain knowledge. This Franciscan optimism manifests itself in Bonaventure's view of rational proofs of God's existence, God's nature, and the creation of the world.

See Bonaventure's response and [n. 8](#) and [10](#) below.

⁴ Augustine, *De trinitate*, 13.1.3 (PL 42: 1014; CCSL 50a: 383.63-80): "As for *faith itself*, which every man sees to be in his heart if he believes, or not to be there if he does not believe, we know it in another sort of way: not like bodies which we see with the eyes ... nor like things which we have not seen and form somehow or other by thought ... nor like a living person whose soul we infer from our own, even though we do not see it ... this is not how faith is seen in the heart it is in by him whose it is, but it is *grasped with the knowledge of absolute certitude*, and proclaimed by knowledge of self (*conscientia*). So while we are indeed commanded to believe because we cannot see what we are commanded to believe, still faith itself when we have it is something that we see in ourselves, because *faith in things absent is itself present*, and faith in things outside is itself inside, and faith in things that are not seen is itself seen." WSA, trans. E. Hill

⁵ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 2.6 (1106b14-15).

⁶ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis*, 1.10.2 (PL 176: 330c; Corpus Victorinum, 226). Quoted in the *Summa Halesiana*, 3.3.2.1.9.1 (4: n. 695).

⁷ 1 Cor 13:12: "For now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face."

⁸ Alexander's students Odo Rigaud and William of Middleton adopted his distinction between "the certainty of experience" and "the certainty of speculation"; but under the inspiration of Aristotle's theory of science they added that the certainty of speculation involves four different modes of certainty: "Therefore, one is certainty by reason of that 'about which' [the subject considered]; another, by reason of the teacher; a third, by reason of the aptitude of the learner; and fourth, by reason of the method or means of transmission. In the first three ways, theology is more certain; in the fourth way, the other [sciences] are more certain" (William, *Quaestiones de theologia*, q. 8, ed. Pergamo, 326).

Odo explained: "If we are speaking about the certainty of speculation, theology is more certain, because it is about a more certain subject, comes from a more certain author, and comes because of the disposition of faith, which is presupposed and which makes all things said there certain. But nevertheless, with regard to the method of transmission, I reply that the other sciences are more certain, because they come about through necessary and inevitable arguments by which it is necessary that the intellect assent, absolutely speaking" (*Quaestiones de theologia*, q. 7, ed. Pergamo, 37).

When they wrote these lines in the 1240s, Odo and William of Middleton understood Aristotle's conception of rational science more thoroughly than William of Auxerre, Alexander of Hales, or even Albert. While admitting that faith is more certain in more respects, they held for the superiority of philosophical knowledge, when it comes to the kind of certainty that philosophy achieves through the *method* of demonstrative argument. And they embraced argumentative certitude in both philosophy and theological science. Such was the openness to philosophical reason in the springtime of Franciscan theology.

⁹ Titus 1:1. "Paul, a servant of God and an apostle of Jesus Christ, to further the faith of God's elect and their knowledge of the truth according to piety..."

¹⁰ In his response, Bonaventure takes themes from his teachers—Hales, Odo, and William of Middleton—but moves beyond them to offer a synoptic look at "knowledge" (*scientia*), beginning at its highest level.

The knowledge of the blessed in heaven is absolutely more certain than the faith of wayfarers, because all becomes clear in the direct vision of God.

But when he turns to wayfarers, Bonaventure distinguishes knowledge of the objects of faith as specified in the “articles of faith” (see below, [36-37](#)) from knowledge of other truths. Faith is more certain than the science wayfarers can attain, because matters of faith always involve an element of the mysterious unknown that rational knowledge cannot overcome. Faith allows the “truly faithful person” to be certain about matters concerning which he is not and cannot be certain on rational grounds. Bonaventure makes the point by comparing philosophical knowledge and faith about an article of faith, such as “God is creator.” He does not deny but embraces the claim that this proposition can be known through philosophical argument. (See *In Sententiis*, 2. d. 1). But philosophical knowledge is not exhaustive. There is much the philosopher cannot know about God as creator, even if he can prove that God is the creator. And the philosopher cannot be certain about those features of God’s creativity he does not understand. The faithful person, by contrast, can be certain about just those features of God as creator that are beyond the ken of the philosopher who proves this proposition. Consequently, should the philosopher convert, his certitude about God being creator would increase.

Bonaventure holds off introducing the distinction his Franciscan teachers made between “certainty of speculation” and “certainty of experience” until he turns to the wayfarer’s knowledge of truths other than the articles of faith. And he changes the phrase “certainty of experience” into “certainty of adherence (*certitudo adhaesionis*),” because he looks more thoroughly into the nature of faith. Certainty can come from direct experience, as the experience of God in the beatific vision, which is what Hales meant by “experience.” But for wayfarers who are not mystics, what makes faith certain is not direct experience of God so much as the gift of grace that allows us to adhere with our will to what lies beyond the experience or knowledge of our mind.

Consequently, once we travel outside the limited realm of the articles of faith, the answer to the question about certainty depends on whether one is talking about the “certainty of adherence” that is based on the will or the “certainty of speculation” that is based on the intellect. When we look at the certainty of adherence, there is more certainty in faith. As evidence, Bonaventure offers the historical fact that the martyrs have been willing to die for their faith, but the geometers have not been willing to die for their geometry; and rightly so, for geometry is not as important. By contrast, when it comes to the “certainty of speculation” that the intellect can achieve through demonstrative argument, rational knowledge is more certain than faith.

In short, like his Franciscan teachers, Bonaventure gives philosophical knowledge its full due. But in sketching out a hierarchy of certitudes, he is more precise than they were: highest is the certain knowledge of the blessed; next comes the certitude that faith brings to what we cannot know; third is the certitude of adherence that can make the faithful heroic in the practical realm; and fourth comes the rational certainty of Aristotelian science, whether achieved in the philosophical sciences or in scientific theology. Theology, therefore, is certain in two ways, through the certainty of adherence that comes through faith and through the certainty of speculation that comes from applying philosophical reason to faith.

¹¹ Bonaventure’s reply is based upon the passage of Augustine cited in n. 4 above.

¹² 1 Cor 13:12.

¹³ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VI.1 (1025b28-1026a23).

¹⁴ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, II.1 (993b9-11).

BOOK 3
DISTINCTION 24

ARTICLE 2: ON THE OBJECT OF FAITH IN COMPARISON WITH OUR
KNOWLEDGE¹

QUESTION 3

Is faith about those things concerning which we have scientific knowledge?²

The third question is whether faith is about those things concerning which we have scientific knowledge.

That it is, is seen by reasons such as these:³

a. A philosopher who knows through cogent reasons that God is one, the creator of all, is able to come to the faith in such a way that he does not lose sight of those reasons. But one who knows those reasons has scientific knowledge. Therefore, it seems that about the same thing at the same time he is able to have faith and scientific knowledge.

b. Someone who knows something through a demonstration of the fact or by means of an effect, if he begins to understand it by means of its cause or through a demonstration of the reason why, does not for this reason lose his earlier knowledge, even though the second kind of knowledge is finer than the first. Therefore, one can have two kinds of knowledge of the same thing, one of which is finer than the other, where the one does not drive out or remove the other. And if this is true, then it seems that at the same time

something can be known which is acquired by reasoning and also is infused by illumination. Therefore, about the same thing at the same time one can have both faith and scientific knowledge.⁴

c. When intellectual knowledge is added over and above sense knowledge, it does not destroy sense knowledge, even though one of them is worthier, more perfect, and finer than the other. Therefore, by the same reasoning, it seems that faith and science can both be had at the same time, about the same thing, and concerning the same point.

d. “Experience is the source of scientific knowledge.” But about one and the same thing we can have both faith and experience. Therefore, about one and the same thing we can have faith and scientific knowledge. The major is proven by the Philosopher.⁵ The minor is proven in the case of the blessed Virgin Mary, who knew that she had conceived of the Holy Spirit by both faith and experience.

To the contrary:

1. Just as charity loves God because of himself (*propter se*) and above all other things, so faith assents to the first truth because of itself and above all other things. But since charity loves God above all other things and because of himself, it is impossible that it be compatible with a love in which someone loves God principally because of worldly gains. Therefore, by similar reasoning, it is impossible that faith be compatible with knowledge which is principally acquired by reasoning. But scientific knowledge is this kind of knowledge. Therefore, it is impossible for faith to exist along with science, about the same thing at one and the same time.

2. Vision in the heavenly homeland removes faith because of its certainty and evidence in the knower. Therefore, if what is known through science is certain and clear, it seems that it is impossible that something at the same time be known and believed.

3. Our mind can in no way dissent from what it knows by means of the habit of science. For it is not able not to believe that a triangle does not have three angles equal to two right angles, if it knows how to demonstrate this. But things believed by faith are believed voluntarily; and just as they can be

believed, so they can be disbelieved. Therefore, it seems that the knowledge of science cannot at the same time and about the same thing stand together with faith.

4. The things that are known by science are subject to reason. But things believed by faith are above reason, since faith is an illumination that elevates reason above itself. Therefore, if the same thing cannot be under reason and above reason, it seems that it is not able at the same time to be known through science and through faith.

Response:

To understand the foregoing arguments, one should note that there are two kinds of knowledge (*cognitio*), namely, knowledge through *evident comprehension* and knowledge through *the guidance of reasoning*. If we are speaking about scientific knowledge through evident comprehension, in the way God is known in heaven, knowledge of this kind is not compatible with faith, so that the same thing at the same time would be known and believed, for the reason that this kind of knowledge excludes “darkness.”⁶ Now this will later become clearer,⁷ when we treat the passing away of the virtues, why and how the act of faith is excluded and removed through the [beatific] vision. Now concerning this kind of science, the authority of the saints says, and the common opinion of the masters holds, that it is true that the same thing at the same time cannot be known and believed.

But if we are speaking about the kind of scientific knowledge that comes from the guidance of reasoning, then some⁸ have wanted to say it is still true that it cannot stand at the same time with faith; for through such scientific knowledge the intellect assents to the very thing known principally on account of the reasoning and so assents necessarily as to a thing that is under itself. But the contrary of this is found in faith, which assents to the first truth on account of itself and voluntarily, by elevating reason above itself. Therefore, they say the habit of faith and science mutually exclude each other, in the way that charity excludes that love by which one loves God principally for the sake of temporal goods.

The position of others, however, is that about one and the same thing, at the same time, scientific knowledge under the guidance of reasoning can be had along with the habit of faith. This is what Augustine says in *On the*

Trinity, when he is explaining the text of the Apostle: “to one is given by the Spirit the utterance of wisdom, to another the utterance of science.”⁹ “I attribute to science in this sense that by which the faith of salvation, which leads to true beatitude, is born, fed, defended, and made strong. Now many of the faithful are not capable of this kind of science, even though they do have faith.”¹⁰ And Richard of Saint Victor says that “for those things that belong to faith, not only can reasons using proof be found, but also necessary reasons, though sometimes it happens that we do not have them.”¹¹ Consequently, someone who believes that there is one God, creator of all, if he should begin to understand the same claim through necessary arguments, would not on account of this stop having faith. Or, if he first knew this, when faith supervened it would not expel this kind of knowledge, just as if it were clear through experience.

Now the reason why this kind of scientific knowledge can, at the same time and about the same thing, exist along with faith, so that the one knowledge does not expel the other, is because the science that comes under the guidance of reasoning, although it produces a kind of certitude and evidence about divinity, nevertheless that certitude and evidence are not completely clear, as long as we are wayfarers. For although someone can prove with necessary arguments that God exists and that God is one, nonetheless, to discern the divine being (*esse*) itself, and the very unity of God, and how that unity does not exclude a plurality of persons cannot be done unless by someone cleansed through the justice of faith. Consequently, as was said above,¹² that faith can stand along with exterior vision, because such vision carries along with it concealment about the person of Christ, the same thing should be understood about the habit of faith and this mode of scientific knowing, that they are compatible with each other at the same time, in the same knower, and in relation to the same thing.

Consequently, the arguments for the first side should be granted.

Replies to the objections to the contrary:

1. To the first objection to the contrary, that charity is not compatible with love that principally adheres to another thing, one can reply: The cases are not similar. For to love God because of a creature in the end is part of an unjust and libidinous love, which is repugnant to just love. But assenting to something proven to be true because of (*propter*) reasoning that proves it,

when the inference is true and necessary, does not describe a sin or an error, and therefore is not repugnant to faith. This is why the cases are not similar.

But this answer does not resolve the point fully, because, whatever the case with charity, the following two states do not seem at the same time to be compatible: that one should assent to a truth believed because of itself (*propter se*) and that one should assent to it because of something else (*propter aliud*). For one should note that the preposition “because of (*propter*)” can be taken in two ways: in one way, as it denotes the final cause, and in another way as it describes the reason that moves us (*rationem moventem*). Now when it describes the final cause, one and the same thing cannot be believed because of itself and because of another, just as one cannot be loved because of oneself and because of something else. But when it describes the reason that moves us, since there can be many reasons moving us to assent to one and the same thing, just as one conclusion can be proven through its cause and through its effect, there can be proof through something extrinsic and through something intrinsic. In this way, it is not incorrect that one assents to some truth because of itself and because of something else, through different habits and considerations.

But even this does not fully solve the problem, because John 4:42 says of the Samaritans who believed, “now we believe, but not because of your word,”¹³ which is the word of faith. And so it seems that the assent of faith is not compatible with the assent of science, which depends principally on reason. Now this is why some have held that even if knowledge is not removed with regard to its habit, it is removed with regard to its act, because one does not then have the use of its act. But it is not necessary to say this, nor does it seem to be correct that one has a habit but cannot have use of it, especially when the power has not been diminished through some impediment.

For this reason, it can be said that when someone at the same time both knows and believes, in such a person the habit of faith holds the primary place. Therefore, such a person assents with the assent of faith to truth itself because of itself, so that “because of (*propter*)” describes the reason that principally moves him. But also with the assent of science the person assents to the same thing because of reason, but in such a way that “because of (*propter*)” does *not* describe the reason that *principally* moves him. Although one cannot believe one and the same thing because of itself and because of something else, in such a way that one believes both *principally*,

nevertheless, “because of itself” and “because of another” rightly can be compatible with each other, when one is principal and the other is subservient to it. Consequently, what the faithful Samaritans said, “now we believe, but not because of your word,” should be understood to refer to the *principal* cause.

2. To the objection about vision in the heavenly homeland, that it removes faith, I reply: The cases are not similar, because when vision removes everything hidden, then the belief that is part of faith is not necessary. But this is not true of science, which is obtained through the guidance of reason.

3. To the objection that the knower cannot dissent from what he knows, I reply: This is true, as far as what he knows about it; but as far as what is hidden, he can dissent from that. And by reason of that, the belief of faith is necessary about it. For example, if a philosopher knows how to prove that God is one by a necessary argument, he cannot dissent from this. But he could dissent from this: if someone were to say that this unity can be compatible with plurality. This is hidden from him and exceeds the powers of his cognition and science.

4. To the objection that faith concerns things that are above reason and science concerns things that fall under reason, I reply: Just as nothing impedes one and the same thing from being both hidden and open, so also nothing impedes one and the same thing, according to one and another mode of knowing, to be both under and above, and consequently to be both known and believed. For even though “the eternal power and divinity”¹⁴ can be known through science that is acquired, and even through science that in itself is inborn, nonetheless, when that knowledge is compared to the plurality of persons or to the humility of our humanity that God assumed, this is completely above reason and above science. For if one depends on the judgment of reason and science, he would never believe it possible that the highest unity is compatible with a plurality of persons, nor that the highest majesty can be united with our humility, nor that the highest power, from not acting should come into act without any change, and other similar things that seem to be repugnant to the common conceptions of the mind, according to philosophy. Consequently, it is too little to say that science

touches on knowledge of divinity only when it depends on faith, because in one and the same thing what is completely apparent to faith can be completely opaque to science. This is clear about the highest and finest questions, the truth of which was hidden from the philosophers, namely, about the creation of the world, and about the power and wisdom of God, which were hidden from the philosophers but now are manifest to simple Christians. For this reason, the Apostle says “God made foolish the wisdom of this world,”¹⁵ because without faith the whole of wisdom about God obtained along our way is more foolishness than truly scientific knowledge. For it leads the inquirer down into error, unless directed and aided by the illumination of faith. Consequently, through that illumination being an inquirer is not cast out but on the contrary is perfected.

NOTES

¹ Here in Bk. 3, d. 24, Art. 2, Bonaventure use the example of “doubting Thomas” (John 20:19-29). The Apostle Thomas was not with the others when Christ appeared to them on Easter evening, and in response to their claim that they saw Christ, Thomas refused to believe it “unless I see in his hands the print of the nails.”

Bonaventure uses Thomas’s doubts as a case study to argue that religious faith is not eliminated by three other epistemological states: “experience” (shown in q. 1 by using Thomas as an example of someone who had both religious faith and experience about the same thing, after Jesus appeared to the Apostles a second time); “probable opinion” (q. 2); and “scientific knowledge (*scientia*)” that comes “through the guidance of reasoning” (q. 3). Bonaventure holds that both theology and philosophy are “scientific.” Reasoning in theological science employs both faith premises and rational premises; while reasoning in philosophical science employs only rational premises. In his “response” to this question, Bonaventure stretches the concept of *scientia* to include even the knowledge of the blessed in heaven; but the focus of this question concerns whether wayfarers in this life can have both religious faith and philosophical science about the same thing.

² *Summa Halesiana*, 3.3.2.1.7.3 (4: no. 687); Albert, *In Sententiis*, 3 d. 25.9 (ed. Borgnet; 28: 487-88); Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 3. d. 24.2.2; *Summa theologiae*, 2-2.1.5; *De veritate*, 14.9.

³ Bonaventure’s problematic: Arg. a-d hold that faith is compatible with philosophical science, while Obj. 1-4 argue that they are incompatible.

⁴ This important argument underlies Bonaventure’s willingness to embrace *both* faith and philosophical argument about the existence of God and many other important theological claims. See below [114-15](#).

⁵ Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 2.19 (100a3-9); *Metaphysics* 1.1 (980a28-981b 8).

⁶ 1 Cor 13:12: “For now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face.”

⁷ *In Sententiis*, 3. d. 31.2.1.

⁸ See William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, 3.12.4 (ed. Riballier, 3.1: 208.65-209.97), quoted in *Summa Halesiana*, 3.3.2.1.7.3 (4: n. 687): “It is not incorrect that the same thing is known (*scitum*) and believed in one way and in another way, nor that the same thing is believed and sensed in one way and another way, just as it is not incorrect that the same thing is sensed and understood (*intellectum*) in one way and another way. Consequently, Peter perceived through seeing and believed the same thing in one way and in another way, because the person of Christ, considered in the form of a man, was seen, but under the divine form was believed. Therefore, the same thing was seen and believed, but in one way and in another way. Likewise, when a philosopher comes to the faith the same thing is known and believed, known in comparison with reason, believed in comparison with the first truth, on which it depends because of that truth. It is known with regard to speculative knowledge but believed with regard to dependence on the first truth.”

⁹ 1 Cor 12:8.

¹⁰ Augustine, *De trinitate*, 14.3 (PL: 42: 1037; CCSL 50a: 424.59-63).

¹¹ Richard of St. Victor, *De trinitate*, 1.4 (PL 196: 892; ed. Riballier, 8914-11).

¹² *In Sententiis*, 3. d. 24.2.1: “For Christ, in the corporeal nature he assumed, appeared to the senses of the Apostles; but in his divine nature he was concealed from every sense. Now the same person and hypostasis, in different natures, at the same time to sight was both known and unknown ... and in short, since all the articles [of faith] involve something divine, through which the article is a truth about God, it is also concealed.”

¹³ John 4:39-42: “Many Samaritans from that city believed in him because of (*propter*) the woman’s word, ‘he told me all that I ever did.’ So when the Samaritans came to him, they asked him to stay with them; and he stayed there two days. And many more believed on account of his word. They said to the woman, ‘It is no longer because of (*propter*) your word that we believe, for we have heard for ourselves, and we know that this is indeed the savior of the world.’” Vulgate.

¹⁴ Rom 1:20. Bonaventure here alludes to his own view that the existence of God can be “known through science that is acquired” through demonstrative arguments, but it is also evident to all through common sense, and it can be shown to be self-evident through arguments such as those of St. Anselm. See below, [108](#).

¹⁵ 1 Cor 1:20.

BOOK 3
DISTINCTION 24

ARTICLE 3: ON THE OBJECT OF FAITH WITH REGARD TO ITS
LANGUAGE

QUESTION 1

On the definition of “article” by Richard of St. Victor

About the first question we proceed and ask about Richard’s definition of an article [of faith], which he defines thus: “An article is an indivisible truth about God, pressing us (*arctans*) toward what we ought to believe.”

Contrary to this definition: the first set of objections concerns the first part of the definition, where it says: “indivisible truth about God.”

1. For no complex truth is an indivisible truth. But an article [of faith] is a complex truth, since it is a statement, as was shown above.¹ Therefore, it is not an indivisible truth.

2. There is only one indivisible truth about God. Therefore, if an article is an indivisible truth about God, there is only one article. But this is false. Therefore, that from which it follows is also false.

3. Nothing that is God himself is a truth about God. But the object of faith is God himself. Therefore, the object of faith is not a truth about God. But an article is an object of faith. Therefore, an article is incorrectly called a truth about God.

4. It is an article that there will be a resurrection. Now this is not true of God, but it is true of the flesh. Therefore, this is not correct in general. Therefore, it does not seem that the first part of the definition of “article” agrees with this article in general, nor in truth.

Contrary to the second part of the definition, where it says “pressing us toward what we ought to believe,” are the following objections:

5. Nothing that is beyond reason and is hidden from reason presses it toward what ought to be believed. But an article [of faith] is hidden from reason and is beyond reason. Therefore, it does not seem that it can press reason in this way.

6. Toward nothing to which we are inclined merely by will are we “pressed” by something. But we are inclined toward what we ought to believe merely by the will. Therefore, we are “pressed toward what we ought to believe” by nothing. Therefore, an article does not “press us.”

7. Just as the object of faith is related to the act of belief, so is the object of charity related to the act of love. But the object of charity does not press us toward what ought to be loved. Therefore, neither should the object of faith “press us on toward what ought to be believed.”

8. As the articles are ordered toward the act of belief, so the precepts are ordered toward the effect of obedience. And just as we are pressed toward believing the objects of belief, so we are pressed toward fulfilling the mandates of the law. Therefore, just as an object of belief is called an article, so a precept ought to be called an article. Therefore, if a precept does not receive the term “article,” it also seems that the object of faith ought not be called an article.

Response:

To understand the foregoing arguments one should note that “article,” as one considers it based on the meaning of the term, comes from “limiting,”² which can be understood in two ways, actively and passively. For something is called an article because it is something limited in itself, or it is called an article because it limits other things. As article is said

passively, as something in itself limited, it is the term of analysis, while as it is said actively, it is the beginning point (*principium*) of distinction and division.

Now it is taken in the first way in natural science, where “articles” are said to be the members or parts that are not analyzed into other parts, but analysis stops with them, such as the “articles” that are the fingers. But as an “article” is said to be a source of distinction, it is customarily used in grammar and rhetoric. For an article in grammar is something distinct that produces division into parts of speech [genera] or cases or subjects; while in rhetoric a distinction occurring in a sentence or in a speech is called an article.

Therefore, since the other sciences are servants to theology, theology appropriates what is proper to their vocabularies, when it finds something well said in the other sciences. And consequently, since our faith describes knowledge of many things, and this knowledge has its terms and its distinctions, about the very object of faith that is believed, one necessarily finds some things to which all the things that ought to be believed are reduced, as to those things in which analysis of all that ought to be believed comes to a stop, or as to those things that are the directive principles for all the things believed. Now these things are what faith believes principally and what are, properly speaking, the object of faith. For these two reasons they ought to be called by the name “article,” namely, because they are the term of analysis and because they are the beginning point of distinction.³

This is why Richard, when he defines and describes an article [of faith], makes it known based on these two properties. For when he first says “an article is an indivisible truth about God,” he implies that an article is the term of an analysis, for analysis comes to a stop with the indivisible. But when he adds “pressing us toward what we ought to believe,” he implies that it is the beginning point of division and guidance. For it “presses us (*arctat*)” as does a rule that guides us in relation to all those things we ought to believe in common. This is how Richard’s way of understanding “article” is correct, because it is not just a real description, but also gives an interpretation of the term.

Replies to the objections:

1. To the first objection to the contrary, that no complex truth is indivisible, I reply: 'Indivisible' as said of an article does not deny all division, but it does deny that kind of division which consists in a distinction of objects of belief, because an article is not divided into other articles, since at the article the process of analysis comes to a stop.

Another reply: It can be said that under the complex statement there lies an indivisible truth. For as was said above,⁴ about those things that belong to God and are in God, which are completely simple, the intellect treats and understands them under a kind of complexity. And even though the whole that is God is God himself, nonetheless, the intellect, when it understands something about God, understands that under the aspect of a subject and attributes something to it under the aspect of a predicate. Now since the intellect makes different attributions to it, this is why the first truth itself, which is one, the intellect understands in many ways and it forms propositions in many ways.

2-3. From this the replies to the next two objections are also clear. For even though the indivisible truth is one, the articles [of faith] are many, because an article is not the truth itself as it is in itself, but as it is compared to some attribute, in relation to which God is present under the aspect of a subject, as God is the creator, God is triune, or God is one. And in this way [an article] is said to be a truth about God and there are said to be many articles [of faith], because there are many propositions about God and related to God, which it is necessary to believe in faith.

4. To the objection that the resurrection of the flesh is not about God, I reply: But it is about God in so far as it has the nature of an article. For in this way our resurrection and the resuscitation of the flesh are compared to divine power. Consequently, believing in the resurrection of the flesh is nothing other than believing that God will resuscitate our bodies, because God's justice requires it and God's power makes it possible.

5. To the objection against the second part of the definition, that an article does not press reason, since it is beyond it, I reply: Article is defined here in comparison, not to the intellect in any respect, but to the intellect informed by faith; so one should note that when it says "pressing us" it means "us faithful." Although an article [of faith] is hidden from the

intellect that does not have faith and is also beyond it, it is not beyond the intellect in so far as it is illuminated and elevated by faith.

6. To the objection that believing is merely through the will and so not through “pressing us on,” I reply: There is a kind of “pressing us on (*arctatio*)” that is repugnant to freedom and there is a kind of “pressing us on” that is repugnant to ambiguity. Now when the term “article” is said because it presses us toward what we ought to believe, this is not said because it forces the will, but it is said in order to remove ambiguity, because in the very truth of an article the mind of the believer is definitely fixed, so that in no way is it inclined to another view. Consequently, just as a vocal sound is said to be “articulated” which is definite in what it signifies, although before it was in itself indifferent in relation to different things it could signify, in this way something is called an article because one must definitely believe it and assent to it, once all ambiguity and vacillation have been removed.

7-8. To the objection about the object of the other virtues and the objection about a precept, that it presses us toward obedience, I reply: The cases are not similar. For as was said above, something is not called an article just because it “presses us” through obligation, but also because it “presses us” by making distinctions and divisions, and because analysis comes to an end in it. Now this properly belongs to faith, which is a virtue that perfects the intellect and in which it sees both principles and rules for its divisions. This is why only the object of faith assumes the name “article.”

NOTES

¹ Bonaventure, *In Sententiis*, 3. d. 24.1.3. Albert, *In Sententiis*, 3. D. 24.4; Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 3. D. 25.1.1.

² Along with other medieval Latinists, Bonaventure thought *articulus* comes from *arto*, *-avi*, *artus*, misspelled in manuscripts as *arcto*, which means to press close together, to compress, to limit, to restrict, from which comes *artus*, *-a*, *-um* or *arctus*, *-a*, *-um* (adj.), meaning close, narrow, brief, small. In fact, *articulus* comes from *artus*, *-us* (n.), meaning a joint, limb, so that *articulus* meant the smaller divisions of a whole, such as the bones and muscles of the arm terminate in the fingers of the hand. See Lewis and Short, *A Latin Dictionary*.

³ Bonaventure's problematic: Theology becomes "scientific" by a kind of "demonstration" that shows the connection between the few articles of faith and the vast array of things included in theology taken as an "integral whole." Demonstrating such connections transforms the subject of theology from "integral whole" into "universal whole" (see [Bk. 1. Prol. 1, 3](#) above), by showing the connection all its claims have with theology's formal aspect—belief—as summed up in the few "articles of faith." Such demonstrations can take two forms: either analyzing a claim in a way that connects it to an article of faith, conceived as "the term of analysis (*terminus resolutionis*)"; or taking an article of faith as a "beginning point of distinction (*principium distinctionis*)" and "eliciting" its consequences. These two modes of argument—the first analytic, the second synthetic—show the overall coherence of "our faith," which "describes a knowledge of *many* things" and shows the deep influence of philosophical argument on Bonaventure's conception of theology. Bonaventure returns to the articles of faith as terms of analytic reasoning and sources of synthetic reasoning in the Replies to Obj. 6-8.

As the articles of faith are the beginning and end of the *noetic* development of the theologian—from faith, through science and holiness, to wisdom—so likewise God is the beginning and the end of the *ontological* development of the world—from creation, through the stages of the redemptive process, to perfection in the second coming.

⁴ Bonaventure, *In Sententiis*, 3. d. 24.1.3 ad 2m.

BOOK 3
DISTINCTION 25

ARTICLE 1: ON THE SUFFICIENCY OF FAITH

QUESTION 1

*Does the Apostles' Creed sufficiently contain all those things that are appropriate to believe for the sake of salvation?*¹

We proceed to the first question and ask about how sufficient for the faith is the contents of the Apostles' Creed (*symboli apostolici*). The question is whether it contains all those things that are appropriate to believe for the sake of salvation.

It seems that it does:

a. First, based on the words of Cassian to Pope Leo: “*Symbolum*, which in Latin means ‘collection,’ because when the faith of the whole catholic law of the Apostles of our Lord had been collected, whatever in its immense bounty is spread throughout the entire corpus of the divine rolls was collected together with perfect brevity into the *Symbolum*.”²

This is also shown through reason:

b. Our whole faith turns on God as its object. But one can know God in no more ways than concerning his divine nature and human nature. Therefore, if knowledge of God is given in both these ways in the Apostles' Creed, it seems that the faith contained there is perfect in its integrity.

c. We can acquire knowledge of the divine substance only through some operation of it, as long as we are wayfarers. But every divine operation is contained under one of these three headings: under the work of creation or reparation or glorification. Therefore, if the Apostles' Creed gives us knowledge of God under these three operations, because it shows God to be creator, restorer, and glorifier,³ it seems it contains the whole of the faith.

d. This is also shown from the perfection of its authors. If those who came together in order to compose the Creed were the company of the Apostles, who were filled with the Holy Spirit and had full and whole knowledge of the faith, then to say that in this Creed the faith was contained insufficiently would be nothing other than to say that the Holy Spirit and the masters of the whole Church were insufficient. Therefore, if to say this is impious and absurd, it is necessary to say that the faith is contained there integrally and fully.

To the contrary:

1. As the Catholic tradition has handed down, this creed was composed only by the twelve Apostles, where each put in it his own part. Now if in addition to the twelve there were Barnabus or Paul, who in special ways and to the highest degree were founders and teachers, but they did not put in it their own parts, then it seems that in this creed the faith was not sufficiently handed on, or at least it seems that in its composition universal apostolic agreement was not sufficiently achieved.

2. It seems that the faith is insufficiently contained in this creed, on the side of what must be believed. For if one did not believe fornication and adultery are mortal sins, then he would be judged a heretic. And if he did not believe God exists and many other such things that are not contained in this creed, he would be judged a heretic. Therefore, it does not seem that this creed sufficiently contains those things that are necessary to the Christian faith.

3. This is also shown on the side of the articles themselves, because to believe that the body of Christ is on the altar and that the bread is converted to the body of Christ is difficult to the greatest degree and where faith has

the greatest merit. Therefore, it seems that in the doctrine of faith, it is this object of belief that is most in need of explanation. Therefore, it seems that since it is not explained in this creed, the creed is defective.

4. This is also shown on the side of divine conditions and operations. For just as God is almighty, he is also immense, eternal, good, and wise; and just as God created, he also distinguished, adorned, and preserved; and just as Christ was made flesh, he also lived among human beings; and just as he was raised up, so also after the resurrection he appeared. Now the teaching of the creed says nothing about all of these things. Therefore, it seems that in it the faith is contained insufficiently, since it is necessary to believe all these things, and we are bound to all these, as we are to the articles expressed in the creed.

5. This is also shown from the addition of other creeds, namely, the Athanasian creed and the creed of the Council of Nicaea. For if the faith were sufficiently handed to us by the Apostles' Creed, the other creeds would be superfluous. But if they are not superfluous, then it follows that the faith is insufficiently expressed in the Apostles' Creed.

Along with these points, the last question concerns the differences in the creeds, with regard to content, reciting them, and other differences among them.

Response:

In order to understand the preceding arguments, one ought to note that among its objects, the doctrine of the faith has some that are antecedent, some that are consequent, and some that are its principal objects. As in the other sciences, we see there are certain *common principles* that are presupposed, such as the axioms; there are certain things that are like the *proper principles* of these sciences, as are the intrinsic principles of their demonstrations; and there are certain things that are like consequences, as are *conclusions* that follow as corollaries.⁴ In this manner also in the doctrine of the faith, the antecedents are those things that fall under the determination of the natural law;⁵ the principal objects are those to which the illumination of faith directly leads, and these are called the *articles* [of

faith]⁶; and the consequences are those that can be elicited *from* these articles and those that must lead *toward* these articles.⁷

Now when the question is whether the doctrine of the faith is *sufficiently* contained in the Apostles' Creed, I reply: if we are speaking of the doctrine of the faith with regard to those things that are its principal and proper contents, as are the articles [of faith], they are sufficiently contained in this creed. Its adequacy can be shown on two sides, namely, on the side of the authors who composed it and on the side of the articles it contains.

We see this on the side of the authors who composed it. Because all of the Apostles there agreed, there was no doubt that nothing could be omitted that pertains to the fullness of the faith. And in order that they be even more sure, each of them put in his own part, and all together approved each of the parts. This was so that the one Church, which should be founded on the Apostles, would have one belief and one confession of faith, which would be called the catholic faith, that is, the universal faith. I say it is universal because given to all by all the Apostles, who were made the foundation of the universal Church.

Consequently, Peter was the first to put down his section, when he said: "I believe in God, father almighty, creator of heaven and earth." Second, Andrew added: "And in Jesus Christ, his only son, our Lord." Third, John added: "Who was conceived by the Holy Spirit, and born of the Virgin Mary." Fourth, James the Elder added: "He suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, died, and was buried." Fifth, Thomas added: "He descended into hell, and on the third day rose from the dead." Sixth, James the Lesser added: "And he ascended to heaven, seated at the right hand of God, the Father almighty." Seventh, Philip laid down: "From there he shall come to judge the living and the dead." Eighth, Bartholomew set down: "I believe in the Holy Spirit." Ninth, Matthew added: "The holy catholic Church." And this is the sense: "I believe in the Holy Spirit, who sanctifies the universal Church." Tenth, Simon added: "the communion of saints, the forgiveness of sins," because in the communion of saints the forgiveness of sins comes about. Eleventh, Judas Thaddaeus added: "the resurrection of the body." And the sense is that God will revive that body. And twelfth, Mathias ended with: "and life everlasting. Amen."

This is how the full and complete number of the Apostles composed this Creed, when they were gathered together. And this number signifies a superabundant perfection. It was prefigured in Joshua 4:2, where it says

“twelve men” took from the middle of the Jordan river “twelve stones,” and placed them in the place where they would camp. The twelve men from each of the tribes prefigured the twelve Apostles. The twelve stones prefigured the twelve parts of the Creed, which are firm and unchanging, from which the one Creed was made. And it is called a creed (Gk: *symbolum*) because it was constructed from the many teachings of the Apostles. For *symbolum* comes from *syn*, that is “together,” and *boule*, that is “teaching.” Consequently, a *symbolum* is like a teaching of many brought together. This is how the sufficiency of the contents of the Creed comes from the side of the authors who composed it.

We can also see the sufficiency from the side of the articles that make up the Creed. Since all the articles are about God, either as in his proper nature or as united to human nature, some of the articles must look to divinity and others to humanity.

Those articles that look to divinity consider either the divine essence in itself, or they consider the persons and hypostases of the divine essence, or they consider the operations of the divine essence. If they consider the divine essence in itself, there is one article, because the divine essence is unique and simple. This is what is meant where it says: “I believe in God.”

If they consider the persons and hypostases of the divine essence, since there are three persons there are three articles: One of them is: “I believe in the Father almighty.” A second is noted where it says: “And in Jesus Christ, his only son, our Lord.” And the third where it says: “I believe in the Holy Spirit.”

If the articles consider the operations of the divine essence, this happens in three ways, because the operation of the divine essence is three-fold. One of these is in bestowing nature, and this is creation; the second is in bestowing grace, and this is sanctification; and the third is in bestowing glory, and this in revival of glory. Now on this basis there are three articles. One of them is noted where it says: “I believe in the creator of heaven and earth.” The second is noted where it says: “the holy catholic Church, communion of saints, forgiveness of sins.” And the third where it says: “The resurrection of the body, and life everlasting. Amen.”

In this way, there are seven articles about divinity, which consider the divine essence in itself, in the persons, and in its operations. The adequacy of these articles is clear, because the divinity does not have to be considered in more ways than these.

In a similar way, about humanity we find only seven principal articles, based on the seven acts of Christ the Redeemer, which are ordained toward our reparation. The first of these is the incarnation, about which there is one article: "Who was conceived by the Holy Spirit." The second is the nativity, about which there is a second article: "Born of the Virgin Mary." The third is the price he had to pay for us, about which there is a third article: "He suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, died, and buried." The fourth was the harrowing of hell, about which there is another article: "he descended into hell." The fifth is the triumph over death, about which there is another article: "On the third day he was raised from the dead." The sixth is rising to heaven, about which there is another article: "He ascended into heaven, and is seated at the right hand of God, the Father almighty." And the seventh concerns the judgment to come, about which there is another article: "From there he will come to judge the living and the dead."

In this way it is clear that seven articles look to divinity and seven look to humanity, and in them is contained all of the faith, accord to what is signified at Revelation 1:12-16, where John says he saw: "seven lampstands, and in the midst of the seven lampstands one like the son of man ... and he held in his right hand seven stars." For by the seven luminous stars, which come from celestial nature, are understood the seven articles that consider divinity; while by the seven golden lampstands, which come from terrestrial matter, though the best and purest matter, are understood the seven articles that consider humanity. This is why it says that in the midst of them he saw "one like the son of *man*."

Since these fourteen articles are contained in the Apostles' Creed, the faith itself is contained in this Creed sufficiently and fully, as far as the principal beliefs are concerned.

Therefore, the arguments on this side should be granted.

Replies to the objections to the contrary:

1. To the first objection, that Paul and Barnabas put nothing in this creed, I reply: Paul and Barnabas were chosen after the division of the Apostles for the purpose of preaching, as is clear from the Acts of the Apostles.⁸ Now since the creed had to be made when they were gathered together, so that some part would be expressed by each apostle and that the whole would be approved by all, nothing was put in the creed that was

taken from Paul or Barnabus. But from this, one cannot argue to the insufficiency of the creed, because the others were a complete and perfect number, the number God had chosen for his Apostles.⁹ Moreover, more makers does not result in more perfection in the creed made, even though it would result in more authority. For even one Apostle might be able in a series of words to enunciate the faith as sufficiently as they all did in that creed that was developed by agreement. But as was said, they wanted to do more, for the sake of preserving greater unity of faith and for the sake of greater firmness in that same faith.

2. To the objection that there are many things that ought to be believed which are not contained in the creed, I reply: This is true about antecedents such as this, that God exists, and about consequents such as many other things that sacred scripture and theological doctrine elicit from these articles [of faith], such as that Christ from his conception had the fullness of grace, and similar things. Nevertheless, there is no object believable by faith that cannot be reduced to the articles contained in the creed, as to directive principles and permanent foundations.¹⁰

3. To the objection about how insufficient these articles are about believing the body of Christ is on the altar, though this seems to pertain to the articles of faith, I reply: This is not a principal article, but is contained under an article, as are all the sacraments. Now some want to say that it is reduced to the article about omnipotence, while others say it is reduced to the article on the passion, because this sacraments is a memorial of the passion But it is better to reduce it to the article on the unity of the Church and the forgiveness of sins, like faith is related to the other sacraments. For in the sacraments remission of sin is achieved; and in them we also notice the union of the whole Church of the saints. Consequently, the Nicene Creed adds: “I confess in one baptism for the remission of sins.” Consequently, I say that just as this sacrament is reduced to some principal article, the same thing should be understood of all the sacraments.

4. To the objection on the side of divine conditions and operations, I reply: The conditions that consider the divine essence do not produce new articles, different from the article that concerns the unity of the divine essence. For when I believe that there is one God, I also believe God is

immense, simple, eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, and similar things. Otherwise, if one of these were taken away, he would not be God.

Likewise, there do not have to be articles about all God's operations, but about the principal operations, and especially about those that are ordained to reparation and salvation for us, toward which our faith directs us. But all the operations of God can be reduced to these three: for every operation considers either the being of nature or the being of grace or the being of glory. Consequently, conservation can be reduced to creation; likewise, distinction can be reduced to adornment; punishment can be reduced to judgment. Or one can reply: these do not follow the principal intention, because they do not follow an antecedent will, but they follow a consequent will.

Likewise, the operation of Christ, such as conversion and apparition, can be reduced to these articles, because an apparition is ordained to manifesting the truth of the resurrection, and his manner of life is ordained to manifesting the truth of the incarnation.

5. To the objection concerning the addition of other creeds, I reply: The two other creeds, namely, the Athanasian Creed and the Creed of the Council of Nicaea, were added for a greater explanation of the faith and for the refutation of heresies.

The Creed of Athanasius, a most distinguished doctor, was specially ordained against the error of Arius. Therefore, it especially expresses the unity of essence and distinction of persons, and that Christ is "equal to the Father in divinity, but less than the Father in humanity."

And the Creed of the Council of Nicaea was created to refute a number of heresies then developing. Consequently, it added some points for better expressing what could refute these heresies. For this reason, in order to eliminate the Manichaean heresy, it says not just "I believe in God," but "I believe in one God," and not just "the creator of heaven and earth," but also "of things visible and invisible."

And to refute the Arian heresy, it says not just "I believe in Jesus Christ, our Lord," but it adds, "And in our one Lord, Jesus Christ, only begotten son of God," and also this: "through whom all things were made."

And to refute the heresy of Eutyches and Nestorius, who said the Holy Spirit is the servant of Father and Son, it says not just "I believe in the Holy Spirit," but adds, "the Lord and giver of life, who proceeds from the

Father,” and the Latins added, “and the Son,” on account of the error of the Greeks. And to “who with the Father and the Son is likewise adored,” it adds, “who has spoken through the prophets,” in order to destroy the error of those who said that the prophets spoke like wild men.

In this way it is clear that these creeds are not superfluous. But the Apostles’ Creed is not diminished, because, while in it the faith is contained sufficiently for a proper and simple confession of faith, it was appropriate that something be added by way of explanation, in order to refute the depravity of heresy.

In response to the last query concerning the differences among the creeds with regard to content and frequency of recitation, for the most part the reply is already clear from what has been said. For the Apostles’ Creed contains less than the others, because it is designed for a precise expression of the articles; while the other two creeds are for the refutation of heretics. Consequently, even if in the other creeds something is added to the expression of certain articles, the articles are not expressed more fully. In fact, in the Creed of the Council of Nicaea, the article on the descent into hell is omitted, either because about this article few or none have erred, or because from confessing the descent of Christ to hell error can arise, which is why they preferred to suppress it and to understand it implicitly in the resurrection.

Consequently, the Apostles’ Creed is said to be better, not in how many words it contains, but in containing the articles and the authority of those who composed them. For this creed has more authority than the other two.

This is why, since the Apostles’ Creed contains the foundation of the faith, it is recited daily in the Church and is frequently cited. The other two, which are for the sake of refuting heresies, are not recited except on solemn feast days, when the whole people assemble in the churches. This is also why the Apostles’ Creed is said in a low voice, because directed toward securing our own conscience, while the other creeds are said in a loud voice, because they are directed toward restraining the garrulousness of the heretics. This is also why the Apostles’ Creed is said twice each day, morning and evening, because the faith is the source of good actions and a shield for victory over temptations. Good actions are most effective during the day, while temptations arise during the night. The other two creeds are only said during the day: the Athanasian Creed comes first and is said at the

hour of prime, while the Creed of the holy Fathers is said at Mass, in order that more heresies be confronted there with greater authority. For it was composed by 318 Fathers, who were prefigured by the 318 slaves of Abraham, which he counted when he overthrew the five kings who had captured Lot, along with his goods.^{[11](#)} Therefore, it is more often said at Mass than at another time, because then the people more often gather together. And it is said after the Gospel, in order to show that it is drawn from the truth of the Gospel. But it is said before communion, in order that, by means of the faith itself, the hearts of those faithful who want to receive the body of the Lord may be prepared so that they can partake of the sacrament worthily or at least partake of it spiritually. In this way, it is clear how the creeds are different in the frequency with which they are recited and in their contents, but are in accord as to their sufficiency.^{[12](#)}

NOTES

¹ Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 3.3.2.2.1.2 (4: n. 699); Albert, *In Sententiis*, 3. d.24.6; Thomas Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 3. d. 25.1.2.

² John Cassian, *De incarnatione*, 6.3 (PL 50: 146-49).

³ See *Summa Halesiana*, 1.intro.1.3 (1: n. 3); Odo Rigaud, *Quaestio de scientia theologiae*, 1.3 (Sileo: 35): “Let us say that the one subject of theology is Christ, by reason of head and members, by reason of divinity and humanity, as creator, informer, and restorer.”

⁴ Bonaventure’s problematic: Bonaventure draws on Aristotle’s doctrine of the structure of a “science” in order to explain how theology is a science. See [Prol. 1](#), [n. 3](#), and Prol. 2, [n. 12](#), above [16](#), [xix](#). Here he uses Aristotle’s model to explain the principles and conclusions of theological science. Alexander of Hales had not done this, but Bonaventure’s other teachers had: Odo Rigaud, OFM, third Franciscan Master of Theology at Paris (1245-48), *In Sententiis*, written at Paris, 1240-43, disputed question *De scientia theologiae*, written at Paris, 1245-47; William Melitona, OFM, fourth Franciscan Master of Theology at Paris (1248-ca. 1253), and Bonaventure’s immediate predecessor in that Chair, *De theologia*, written in Paris while master; an anonymous but probably Franciscan author of a disputed question *De divina scientia*, written ca. 1245-50; and Albert, O.P., *In Sententiis*, written at Paris, 1243-48.

⁵ Bonaventure here says the *common* principles of theology are made up of *rational* knowledge humans possess, by alluding to St. Paul’s notion of “natural law” (Rom 2:14-15), a law known by “the gentiles” because it is “written on their hearts.” For Paul, the natural law consists in *rational* knowledge all humans have about morality, both principles known to all humans and conclusions for which they are morally responsible. Bonaventure’s phrase, “determination of the natural law (*dictamine iuris naturalis*),” includes axioms self-evident to human reason and determinate consequences derived from these principles. Bonaventure’s emphasis is on the rational character of such knowledge, which he conceives as rational “axioms” or “antecedents” for theological science. If the *axioms* of theology are rational or philosophical principles, its *proper principles* are the articles of faith, taken from the Bible and set out in the creeds. Its conclusions are derived from faith and reason working together deductively.

⁶ To understand Bonaventure’s brief account of the principles of theology and how they are related to its conclusions, it is helpful to compare what he says with the views of his contemporaries:

Odo Rigaud, *De scientia theologiae*, 1 ad 1m (ed. Sileo, 2: 12-13, n. 25-27):

(n. 25) Just as in the other sciences there are principles that are known to all, such as the axioms; there are suppositions or postulates, for these are essentially the same, which are principles for that science and are presupposed in it; and there are also conclusions, so I reply: In theology there are *axioms*, which are manifest to all, namely, that God is the highest good, to be loved above all other things, and that [God is] just to the highest degree, and things of this sort. Now knowledge of these things is written in our heart, as is knowledge of principles. There are also *suppositions*, and these are the articles of faith. And there are also *conclusions*, which follow from these axioms and from these suppositions.

(n. 26) But these suppositions differ from the suppositions of the other sciences, and they also agree in a way. For they agree in this, that just as in the other sciences suppositions are not proven, so in theology the articles of faith are presupposed. But in this there is a difference, because in the other sciences suppositions are manifest to reason without extrinsic aid, for example, ‘from one point to another point one can draw a straight line.’ But in theology we need the aid of the grace of faith.

(n. 27) Therefore, in accepting these axioms that are impressed on the human mind, which it does not beg from the other sciences, theology is called ‘wisdom,’ as it were ‘knowledge of

the highest causes.’ But in the conclusions inferred from these principles, it is ‘science.’ Consequently, absolutely and necessarily it must believe in them; but by reason of knowing these suppositions it is marked by acceptance of faith. Finally, in the conclusions that follow from these suppositions, it is a science, not absolutely, but the science of faith, because it presupposes these suppositions.

For Odo, the *common* principles of theology are “axioms” that are rationally “manifest to all” (n. 25), namely, that God is the “highest good” and “completely just.” The *proper* principles of theology are the articles of faith, and so known through belief. So theology’s principles are derived from two very different sources. Theology rationally draws conclusions from these principles, and in this respect is a “science.” Bonaventure accepts from Odo that theology includes 1) rationally known axioms, 2) suppositions known from faith, and 3) conclusions deduced from them. To see why Bonaventure chose the natural law example, we must turn to another of his teachers.

William of Melitona, *De theologia*, q. 2, ed. B. Pergamo, “*De quaestionibus ineditis* Fr. Odonis Rigaldi, Fr. Gulielmi de Milona et codicis Vat. Lat. 782 circa naturam theologiae, deque earum relatione ad Summam theologicam Fr. Alexandri Halensi,” *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, 29 (1936) 311. (This work is anonymous in the manuscripts, but is attributed to William by Pergamo, an attribution Sileo thinks “possible,” 1: 61):

Response: Theology can be compared to the other sciences in the way it agrees and differs from them. In the way it agrees, because just as in the other sciences there are axioms which are self-evident principles, and suppositions which are not self-evident, and conclusions, so too these are in theology. For in theology there are *principles like the axioms* that ‘God is good to the highest degree,’ and ‘just to the highest degree,’ and likewise, that ‘you should not do to another what you do not want to happen to you,’ and such things that are naturally impressed on the human mind. The *suppositions* are certain articles of faith, which are not naturally impressed on the human mind, such as those about the trinity of persons and the incarnation. From these are *elicited certain conclusions*, such as, from this, that God is just to the highest degree, it follows that ‘he will render to each according to his deeds’ [Rom 2:6]. And from this, that he is incarnate, it follows that he is the reconciler for the human race and ‘mediator between God and man,’ as the Apostle says.

With regard to the first thing it receives it is wisdom; with regard to the second, faith; and with regard to the third, science. Therefore, in this way, with regard to certain things that are received in theology it is called wisdom, while with regard to other things it is called faith, and in these respects it is different from the other sciences. For the faith received in a temporal science is a reception that is deficient in comparison with science; but the reception of faith, as faith is taken here, is absolutely certain. Now with regard to the third feature, it is a science and agrees with the other sciences. Therefore, in this way it is clear how it is wisdom and how it is science.

William clarifies Odo’s three parts—axioms, suppositions, and conclusions—by showing how conclusions are drawn. To Odo’s *rational axioms* that God is supremely good and just, William adds the Golden Rule, which in this period was conceived as a fundamental principle of the natural law, rationally known by all (see Lev 19:18; Matt 7:12, 19:19, Rom 13:9). The conclusion that follows deductively from this axiom is that God must render justice to each human based on his deeds in the present life [Rom 2:6]. William then adds a second example. From the faith *supposition* that the Word is incarnate in Jesus Christ, it follows that Jesus must be the mediator connecting humans with God.

Anonymous, *De divina scientia*, 1c (ed. Sileo, 2: 134, n. 17): Solution. There are two responses. First, that [theology] is a science absolutely. But not all the things that are in it are known or knowable. In the other sciences, certain things are principles that are self-evident; certain things are not self-evident, but are believed on the authority of major figures; certain things produce evidence in the science, such as sensible figures in geometry; and certain are

known by means of the first principles. Likewise, in this science, certain things are *self-evident principles*, such as the *principles of natural law*, such as ‘God exists,’ or ‘do not do unto others,’ and many things that every reason determines (*dictat*), except one subverted by poverty. There are certain things in which one believes, not on the authority of the major figures, but on the authority of him [Christ], such as the *articles of faith*. There are certain things that produce evidence, such as narration of miracle stories, histories, and similar things. And there are certain things that are known or can be known by means of the foregoing principles.

The *Summa Halesiana*, Odo, and William all said theology is not a science in the narrow or “proper” sense, but only a science understood “commonly” (Odo, 2: 11). To the contrary, this author holds theology is a science “absolutely” (*simpliciter*), a view Bonaventure follows. The *proper* principles of theology are the articles of faith, as before. In his account of the *common* principles, the anonymous author’s keen feel for principles leads him to bring William of Melitona’s three claims under the rubric of two “principles of the natural law.” One is the theoretical claim that “God exists,” which is the presupposition lying under Odo’s and William’s “God is good and just to the highest degree.” The other is practical, the Golden Rule, now clearly conceived as a practical axiom. Bonaventure includes both this theoretical axiom and this practical axiom in his concept of a “determination (*dictamine*) of the natural law.” This author adds that “reason determines (*dictat*)” “many” conclusions that follow from the “principles of natural law (*principia iuris naturalis*),” language remarkably similar to Bonaventure’s. Finally, this author places such rationally demonstrated conclusions squarely within theological science, as does Bonaventure.

Albert approached the topic quite differently. In *Sententiis* (written 1243-8), 3. d. 24.8:

As with the other sciences, some things are principal, and some are substantial, such as the *principal* conclusions of an art, and some are consequences, such as the *secondary* conclusions from which in the end one is able to infer something about the operation of the art. As in geometry, there are suppositions, theorems, and corollaries, so this is also true of the faith. And in my judgment, it is first necessary to lay down this, that it is required to *believe* in God and about God, that is, that God exists and his words in scripture are true. Now these are the *suppositions and axioms*. But the *articles* themselves are like the *principal conclusions* of a science. And what pertains to good morals are like *consequent corollaries*. Now it is necessary to believe and accept all these *through faith*, as this term is taken broadly.

In his *Summa theologiae* (written after 1265), 1.1.4 (ed. Cologne, 34.1: 15.16-32), Albert held to the same views:

This science [theology] is separated from the other sciences in its subject, its proven predicates, and in the principles that confirm its reasoning. In its subject, because in the other sciences the subject is being or a part of being, as Avicenna says at the outset of his *Metaphysics*. But in theology, the subject is the object of enjoyment [= God] or related to it by way of a sign or what is useful to that end. In its proven predicates, because what is shown in this science about the subject is either a divine attribute or something ordered to it; but in the other sciences it is a property of being caused by us or by nature. In its principles, because what is in this science is proven through the faith which is an article [of faith] that is believed, or through an antecedent belonging to faith, which is scripture, or it is proven through revelation as through a principle. But what is proven in the other sciences is proven through a principle that is an axiom or a maximal proposition.

Albert also called the suppositions and axioms “preambles” to the articles of faith (*In Sententiis*, 1.d.1.2, see [17](#) above [[prol 1 n. 8](#)]). While Albert accepts the fundamental claim that theology is a science with principles, his explanation is quite different from the Franciscans on several capital points: 1) The articles of faith are not unproven principles but *proven* conclusions, though conclusions that seem readily derived from theology’s axioms and suppositions. 2) Albert does not distinguish “suppositions and axioms” from each other, as the Franciscans do. 3) Most importantly,

Albert says both “suppositions and axioms” are *believed*, rejecting the Franciscan view that the axioms of theology are rationally known, while its suppositions are believed. 4) It follows that Albert does *not* show how rational, philosophical knowledge fits within the structure of theological science, precisely because he does not distinguish axioms from suppositions, as the Franciscans do.

Following his Franciscan masters, Bonaventure says the articles of faith are *not* proven conclusions but unproven *principles*. And the axioms of theological science are known through *reason*, not faith. As “antecedents,” they are brought to theological science from outside the scope of its subject (the “object of belief”), from a pre-existing area of human knowledge—from philosophy. Just as philosophy does not reject but draws within itself common sense and experience, so theology embraces and draws within itself philosophy.

Thomas Aquinas was well aware that Albert and Bonaventure did not agree about the principles of theology, and he chose to split the difference. With the Franciscans and against Albert, he held that the articles of faith are *principles* of theology, not conclusions. But with Albert and against Bonaventure, he did not sharply distinguish the axioms of theology from its suppositions. He usually speaks in broad terms about the “principles” of theology which come from faith. See *In Sententiis*, 1. Prologue. 3; 3. d. 23. 2.1. ad 4m, d. 23. 3.3.sol.2 ad 2m; d. 24. 1.2.1 ad 2m. In one early text does he give passing notice to the axioms, but concentrates on the articles of faith. *In Sententiis*, 1. Prologue 3.2 ad 2m.

⁷ Theology becomes “scientific” by a kind of “demonstration” that shows the connection between the few articles of faith and the vast array of things included in theology. At the end of this paragraph, Bonaventure alludes to the way such demonstrations can be developed, explained at greater length earlier, at *In Sententiis*, 3. d. 24.3.1c. (See [17 n.10](#) above). When arguing demonstratively in the synthetic mode, the theologian proceeds “*from* these articles” to prove other conclusions. When arguing demonstratively in the analytic or reductive mode, the theologian proceeds from other truths “*toward* these articles,” in order to explain how other truths really are connected to the articles of faith.

The most extraordinary aspect of Bonaventure’s account is how absolutely clear and precise he is about the roles of philosophical reasoning and the articles of faith in theology. In order to connect the “consequences” of theology with its “proper principles”—the articles of faith—Bonaventure employs its “antecedent” principles—which are philosophical. Philosophy is useful both for its methods of reasoning (logic) and for its content (ethics, physics, and especially metaphysics). In order for theology to become “scientific,” then, it is absolutely necessary that it become philosophical.

⁸ Acts 12:2.

⁹ Matt 10:1; Mark 3:14; Luke 6:13.

¹⁰ God’s existence is an “antecedent.” This means it is a proposition logically prior to the first article of the creed. It can be believed, but as an “antecedent” it also can be known rationally, either as an unproven axiom or as a proven conclusion. This reply is fully in accord with the logic of Bonaventure’s argument for God’s existence in d. 8 (108 below).

In addition, this reply gives a good sense of how “consequents” are related to the articles of faith: through reduction. The “consequents” can be “elicited,” that is, deduced *from* (*de*) the articles synthetically, or, and with more emphasis here, “reduced” *to* (*ad*) the principles analytically.

¹¹ Gen 14:14-16.

¹² The Principles of Theology

Author	Axioms of theology	Suppositions	Conclusions
Odo of Rigaud, OFM (Master 1245-1248)	1) God is highest good. 1a) God should be loved above all. 2) God is supremely just. Theology is wisdom;	Articles of faith Theology is faith; known from faith.	Theology is science.

	“manifest to all” from reason.		
William Melitona, OFM (Master 1248-1253)	1) God is highest good. 2) God is supremely just. 3) Golden Rule. Theology is wisdom “selfevident” by reason.	1) Trinity 2) Incarnation Theology from faith; “not selfevident.”	1) God “will render to each according to his deeds.” 2) Christ is “mediator between God and man.” Theology is science.
Anonymous OFM (ca. 1245-1250)	1) God exists. 2) Golden Rule. “Self-evident principles.”	Articles of faith.	
Author Albert, OP <i>In Sententiis</i> , 3.d.24.8 (1243-1248) <i>In Sententiis</i> , 1.d.1.2	Axioms of theology Geometry: suppositions Theology: 1) God exists 2) Scripture is true known through faith	Suppositions	Conclusions 1) theorems. 2) corollaries. 1) Articles of faith. 2) Moral conclusions.
<i>Summa theologiae</i> (after 1265)	Preambles to Axioms and 1) God 2) God is 3) Scripture 1) Scripture: antecedent of faith 2) Revelation	the Articles Suppositions exists, truthful, from Holy Spirit. Articles of faith	Articles of faith. Divine attributes. Creation ordered to God.
Bonaventure, OFM <i>In Sententiis</i> (1250-1253)	Antecedents: “determination of the natural law” known by reason.	Articles of Faith	Conclusions leading from or to God.
Thomas Aquinas, OP <i>In Sententiis</i> , 1. Prologue, 3.2.ad 2m. (1252-1256)	“Common principles” are known by reason.	Articles of faith	Conclusions of theology.
<i>Summa</i> , 1.2.2 ad 1m. (1266-1268)	Preambles to the articles are known by reason.	Articles of faith	Conclusions of theology.

TOPIC 2: KNOWING GOD

Book 1
Distinction 3

PART 1: ON KNOWING GOD THROUGH REMOTE LIKENESSES

SINGLE ARTICLE: ON THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD¹

QUESTION 1

Can God be known (cognoscibilis) by a creature?²

That a creature cannot know God is argued as follows:³

Argument from authority:

1. In *On the Divine Names*, Dionysius says: “It is not possible to describe or understand God.”⁴

Rational argument presupposes four things which are necessary for knowledge: proportion, unification or reception, judgment, and information.⁵ For the intellect understands only what can be proportioned to it, what is united to it in some way, what it can judge, and what can inform the attention of our mind.

2. The first presupposition leads to this argument: (a) There must be a proportion between knower and known. But there is no proportion between God and the intellect, because God is infinite while the intellect is finite. Therefore, etc. (b) Further, if there is a proportion, it seems insufficient, because there is a greater distance between uncreated truth and the human intellect than there is between any created intelligible object and the sense faculty.⁶ But sense, which perceives sensible objects, is never elevated to the status of knowing created intelligible objects. Therefore, the intellect is never elevated to the status of knowing an uncreated intelligible object.

3. The second presupposition leads to this argument: There must be a union of knower and known, so that one is in the other. Now the knower is not in the known, but the reverse is true. But the infinite cannot be

contained within the finite; therefore, the infinite cannot exist in the finite; therefore, God, being infinite, cannot exist in the intellect.

4. The third presupposition leads to this argument: Knowledge requires a judgment in the knower about the known. Now every judge has power over what is judged.⁷ But the finite cannot have power over the infinite. Therefore, the finite cannot judge the infinite. But knowledge requires judgment. Therefore, a finite intellect cannot know God, who is infinite, over whom it has no power.

5. The fourth presupposition leads to this argument: The intellect that knows must be informed by the object known. Everything which informs another does so either through its essence or through a likeness. God does not inform through his essence, because God is not united to anything as a form. Nor does God inform through an abstracted likeness, because an abstracted likeness is more spiritual than that from which it is abstracted. But nothing can be more spiritual than God. Therefore, etc.

To the contrary:

a. The rational soul is made according to the image of God. Now as Augustine says in *On the Trinity*, and as the text of the present distinction says: “The mind is an image of God as being capable of receiving God and able to participate in God.”⁸ Now the mind is not capable of receiving God substantially or essentially, just as it is not capable of receiving any creature in this way. Therefore, the mind must be capable of receiving God by way of knowing and loving him. Therefore, God can be known by a creature.

This conclusion can be shown rationally as follows⁹:

b. Every instance of spiritual knowing comes about through light, indeed through uncreated light, as Augustine says in his *Soliloquies*.¹⁰ But light is knowable in the highest degree. Now God is the greatest light; therefore, God can be known by the soul to the highest degree.

c. Knowledge of things comes either through the presence of the thing known or through a likeness of the thing. Now things are known more truly through their presence, according to Augustine.¹¹ Now God is united to the

soul itself through presence. Therefore, God is known more truly than other things, which are known through likenesses.

d. As the greatest good is related to love, so the highest truth is related to knowledge. Now the greatest good is loved by our affection to the highest degree. Therefore, the highest truth is knowable by our mind to the highest degree.

e. Everything can move efficiently toward that to which it is naturally ordered.¹² Now our intellect is naturally ordered to knowing the greatest light. Therefore, that light is knowable in the highest degree.

Response:

As the greatest light, God is intrinsically knowable in the highest degree. And as the light that fills our mind as much as possible, so far as he is in himself, God would be knowable to the greatest degree, even to us, were there not some defect on the side of our power of knowing. This defect cannot be completely removed except through conformity with God in heavenly glory. Therefore, the arguments that a creature can know God, and even that God is completely knowable should be accepted, with regard to God in himself. However, there can be some impediment or deficiency on the side of the mind knowing God, as will be made clear later.¹³

*Replies to the objections:*¹⁴

1 and 2(a). To the objections against my view, I reply: Knowledge is divided into comprehension and apprehension. Apprehensive knowledge involves manifesting a truth about the thing known, comprehensive knowledge involves knowing the whole truth about the thing known.¹⁵ The first kind of knowledge requires a fitting proportion. The soul can have this kind of relation to God, since the soul is in a way all things, through being assimilated to all things.¹⁶ For it naturally can know all things, and it is especially capable of knowing God through assimilation, since it is the image and likeness of God. Comprehensive knowledge, on the other hand, requires a proportion of equality and equivalence. And the soul cannot have this kind of relation to God, since the soul is finite, while God is infinite.

Therefore, it cannot have this kind of knowledge of God. Dionysius is speaking about comprehensive knowledge, and the objection concerns this kind of knowledge, but not the other kind.

2(b). To the objection about the distance between the intelligible and sensible spheres, I reply: Distance can be considered in two ways: in relation to being and in relation to knowledge. In the first respect, the distance from intellect to God is greater than that between sense and intellect; but in the second respect, this distance is not greater, because both God and soul are intelligible realities, which is not true of intellect and sense, because sense is a limited power, while the intellect is not.¹⁷

3. To the objection that the infinite cannot be contained within the finite: Some say there are two senses of *containing* the infinite: The first concerns essence, and in this sense the finite *can* contain the infinite; the second concerns power, and in this sense the finite cannot contain the infinite. For example, a line contains the totality of a point with regard to substance, but not the totality with regard to power. But this solution does not solve the problem, because in God essence and power are the same, and both are infinite.

Therefore, the answer is that there are two senses of *infinite*. One kind of infinite is *opposed* to simplicity. The finite cannot contain this kind of infinite, for example, an infinite mass. The other kind is infinite *combined* with simplicity, as in the case of God. This kind of infinite, because it is simple, exists everywhere as a whole, and because it is infinite, is not in anything as though it were outside that thing. This is how our knowing God must be understood. Therefore, it does not follow that, if the whole of God is known, God is comprehended, because the intellect does not contain God's totality, as a creature cannot contain his immensity.

4. To the objection that the judge must have power, I reply: Judging something happens in two ways. The first way is discerning whether or not something is the case, and this way of judging applies to every intellect in relation to every object. The second way of judging is approving or disapproving whether something should be as it is. In this way, one does not judge truth, but judges other things according to truth, as Augustine says in *On True Religion*: "the judge does not judge the law, but uses the law to

judge other things.”¹⁸ In this way, what Augustine says is true: “no one judges the truth, yet no one judges without it.” In this second way, the objection is true in saying that the judge has power over what is judged. In the first way, however, it is not true that he has power over what is judged. Rather, he can be directed, as it were, to an object with the help of that object.

5. To the last objection about informing, I reply: God is present to the soul itself and to every intellect through truth. Therefore, it is not necessary to abstract a likeness of him to know him. Nevertheless, when the intellect knows God, the intellect is informed through a notion which is similar to a kind of likeness, not abstracted but impressed, and is inferior to God because it is in an inferior nature, yet superior to the soul because it makes the soul better. This is what Augustine says in *On the Trinity*: “When we learn about bodies through the bodily senses a likeness of them comes to exist in our mind; and likewise when we know God a sort of likeness of God comes to exist in our mind. Yet this notion is inferior, because it exists in an inferior nature.”¹⁹

QUESTION 2

*Can God be known through creatures?*²⁰

The second question is whether God can be known *through* creatures.²¹

And it seems not:

1. For the way leading to error is not the same as the way to knowledge. But knowledge through a creature is the way to error. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor: The book of *Wisdom* says, “The creatures of God are deception and hatred and traps for the feet of fools.”²² Further, Augustine speaks about those preoccupied with creatures in *On Free Choice*: “Turning their backs on you, they fix on corporeal works as on their own shadows.”²³

2. Darkness and dark things are not the way to understand something bright or light. But a creature is darkness, while God is light. Therefore, God cannot be known through a creature.

3. The middle term, through which we know or prove something about an extreme term, must be common in some way with that which we know through the middle.²⁴ But creator and creature have nothing in common. Therefore, God cannot be known through creatures.

4. Every middle term by which we ascend to an extreme term stands at a distance from the extreme by a finite number of steps. But every creature, no matter how fine, stands at a distance from God by an infinite number of steps. For however much it imitates him, it will never attain the fineness of God. Therefore, we cannot ascend to knowledge of God through a creature.

To the contrary:

a. In the book of *Wisdom* it is written: “From the greatness of beauty and creation its creator can be seen by the mind.”²⁵ Therefore, Isidore says: “The limited beauty of a creature makes the beauty of God, which cannot be limited, able to be understood.”²⁶

This can be shown by reason, as follows:

b. Not only can an effect be known through its cause, but a cause can be known through its effect. Therefore, if God is a cause functioning in accord with his own excellence, and the creature is his effect, then God can be known through the creature.²⁷

c. The sensible is a way of coming to know the intelligible; but a creature is sensible, while God is intelligible; therefore, one can arrive at knowledge of the creator through the creature.

d. Like is known by like; but every creature is like God, either as a vestige of God or as an image of God; therefore, God can be known through every creature.

One also can ask:

What is the difference between a vestige and an image? Since there is a vestige of God in every creature, one can ask why every creature is not also an image of God and a vestige of God, in some respect.

Response:

The cause shines forth in the effect and the wisdom of the craftsman is manifest in his work. Therefore, God, who is the craftsman and cause of a creature, can be known through the creature.

There are two arguments in support of this conclusion, one based on what is fitting, the other on insufficiency. The argument based on what is fitting is that every creature leads to God more than to anything else. The argument from insufficiency is that since God, who is the greatest spiritual light, cannot be known in his own spirituality by our intellect, which is material, as it were, our soul needs to arrive at knowledge of God through creation.

Replies to the objections:

1. To the objection that knowledge of a creature is the way to error, I reply: One can know a creature in two ways, either in its *special properties*, which characterize its imperfection, or in its *general conditions*, which characterize its perfection.²⁸

When one looks at a creature in its *special conditions* and as imperfect, one either *affirms* these of God or denies them of God. The first way is the way of error, but the second is a way of knowledge. This is how God is known through *negation*.

When a creature is known in the conditions which make it perfect, this can happen in two ways, just as a picture can be known in two ways: as a picture or as an image. For one either stops at the beauty of the creature or proceeds through that beauty to something else. In the first way, knowing creatures is a way of going astray. Therefore, in his book *On Free Choice*, Augustine says: "Woe to those who love things that come forth from your will in place of you and who have wandered away among your vestiges while abandoning you to whom they lead."²⁹ In the second way, where the creature is a way to something else, this is the way of knowing God through his *superlative perfection*. For every property of a creature that is fine is

attributed to God in a superlative degree. And so the way of knowing God through his surpassing perfection is clear.^{[30](#)}

2. To the objection that a dark medium is not the way to know light, I reply: There is a healthy eye and an inflamed eye. It is true that a healthy eye does not use a dark medium to see light, but this is not true for an inflamed eye. It uses a cloud to conceal the sun, or it uses the earth to receive brightness from the sun, as a medium for seeing the sun. The same is true of our intellect, which is related to the clearest truths of nature as the owl's eye is to the sun.^{[31](#)}

3. To the objection concerning the lack of something common, I reply: Between God and creatures things are not common univocally, but analogically. Things can be common analogically either through a relation of two things to two other things, as in the case of the helmsman and the doctor, or through a relation of one thing to one other thing, as in the relation of an exemplar to what imitates it.^{[32](#)}

4. To the objection that there is always an infinite number of steps between God and creatures, I reply: The ascent to God can take place in two ways. In one way, with respect to the aspect of God's presence, every creature by nature can lead to God and there is not an infinite number of steps between God and creature. In the other way, which concerns equality in the sense of equivalence, it is true that there is an infinite number of steps between God and creature, for no matter how much it imitates God, a created good can never be equivalent to the uncreated good.

With regard to the aspect of God's presence, the first level of ascending consists in considering visible things; the second level consists in considering invisible things, like the soul or other spiritual substances; while the third level comes from the soul's relation to God, because the image is formed by truth itself and is directly joined to God.^{[33](#)}

Concerning the other question about the difference between vestige and image:^{[34](#)}

Some say vestiges are found in sensible things, while images are found in spiritual things. But this way of explaining the distinction is incorrect,

because vestiges are also found in spiritual things. For unity, truth, and goodness, which is what *vestige* signifies, are completely universal and intelligible conditions of created beings.

Others say that *vestige* is said to represent something based on a part of it, while *image* is said to represent something based on the whole of it. But this way of distinguishing them is also incorrect. Since God is simple, nothing represents him based on a part; since God is infinite, no creature, not even the whole world, can represent the whole of him.

Therefore, one should understand that when a creature leads us to know God in the manner of a shadow or a vestige or an image, how these three differ from each other can be known clearly and is based on the way they represent God. For something is called a shadow, because it represents God from a distance and confusedly; something is called a vestige because it represents God from a distance but distinctly; and something is called an image because it represents God closely and distinctly.

This first distinction leads to a second, one based on the conditions, in which we note the following: For a creature is called a shadow based on its properties, which point to God in some type of causality, but in an indeterminate way. But a creature is called a vestige based on properties which point to God as triple cause: efficient, formal, and final cause; for example, the properties one, true, and good. And a creature is called an image based on conditions which point to God not merely in the order of real causality but also in the objective order of cognition, such as memory, intellect, and will.

From these distinctions, two more can be drawn: A third distinction concerns the knowledge derived. For the creature as shadow leads to knowledge of common attributes, seen as common [to the persons of the Trinity]. The creature as vestige leads to knowledge of common attributes which are appropriated [to persons in the Trinity]. And the creature as image leads to knowledge of proper attributes, taken as proper [to a certain person in the Trinity].

The last distinction concerns the things which are shadows, vestiges, and images. Since every creature is related to God as cause and as triple cause, every creature is a shadow or vestige of God. But only the rational creature is related to God in the objective order of cognition, for it alone is capable of reaching up to God through knowledge and love. Consequently, only the rational creature is an image of God. [35](#)

QUESTION 3

*Can a human in any state of life know God through creatures?*³⁶

The third question is whether in every state of life humans can know God through creatures?

*That a human in the original state could know God through creatures is argued as follows:*³⁷

a. In the state of innocence, no human knew God face to face. Therefore, if he knew God it was through an effect, and consequently through a vestige and therefore through a creature.

b. In the state of innocence, sense knowledge was not an impediment for a human but rather an aid in acquiring intellectual knowledge. But the intellectual knowledge for which humans were made is knowledge of God. Therefore, in the first human all sense knowledge was ordered to the end of knowing God. But knowledge of God through the aid of sensible things is knowledge through a creature. Therefore, etc.

Again, it seems that a human in the state of beatitude knows God through creatures:

c. For the blessed know a creature, though they do not remain there but return to God. Therefore, they know God through a creature.

d. Blessed souls praise God through creatures. But praising God through creatures is knowing God through creatures. Therefore, etc.

*To the contrary, that humans as originally created could not know God through creatures, is argued as follows:*³⁸

1. Knowledge through a vestige is knowledge through some medium. “But the mind,” as Augustine says, “is informed immediately by truth itself.”³⁹ Therefore, knowledge acquired through creatures is not appropriate to human nature in its original state nor in any other state.

2. Proper order does not allow what is nearer to attain an end through the medium of something more distant. But humans in the first state were nearer to God than all other creatures. Therefore, it was not right for a human to attain knowledge of God through other creatures.

Again, it seems that this kind of knowledge does not belong to a human in the state of beatitude:

3. For knowledge acquired through a vestige is acquired gradually. Therefore, it is not perfected knowledge, but is partial. Therefore, it cannot be present in the blessed, since they have left behind everything partial.

4. A vestige or creature is like a step for ascending to God, or like a route for arriving at God. But when one has arrived at a destination, there is no more use for another route. Likewise, when one has attained the top level, steps are no longer needed. But the blessed know God directly. Therefore, their knowledge is not obtained through creatures.

Response:

To understand this matter one must realize that knowing God *in* a creature is different from knowing God *through* a creature. Knowing God *in* a creature is knowing his presence and influence in the creature. Wayfarers know God this way partially, while those who comprehend God know him this way perfectly. This is why at the end of *The City of God*,^{[40](#)} Augustine says that God will be seen openly when he is all in all. Knowing God *through* a creature, by contrast, is being lifted up from knowing the creature to knowing God, as by a ladder connecting the two. This way of knowing God is proper to wayfarers, as Bernard says.^{[41](#)}

There is a further difference between how humans knew God through creatures in the state of original creation and in the fallen state. In the first state, humans knew God through creatures as through a clear mirror, but after the fall they know as “through a glass darkly,”^{[42](#)} as the Apostle says, because the intellect has been clouded and the condition of the world has gotten worse.

To the arguments that the blessed know God through creatures:^{[43](#)}

c-d. Therefore, in reply to the arguments about beatitude, I reply: As has been said, the blessed do not know *through* creatures, but *in* creatures. The arguments which seem to prove the contrary, do not prove that point, but prove that the blessed know *in* creatures.

To the arguments that humans originally did not know God through creatures:

1. To the objection based on the state of innocence, that the mind is informed immediately, etc., I reply: There are two kinds of media, those which are effective and those which are dispositive. One must understand that Augustine was talking about the first kind, not the second. For God is an effective medium and also an object of the mind. Augustine is using this language against philosophers whose opinion was that the mind is not joined to the first being immediately, but through an intermediary intelligence.

2. To the objection concerning right order, I reply: There are two ways to look at a human, in himself or in relation to things outside himself.

When looking at the human himself, he does not arrive at God by proceeding from himself *to* creatures, but rather through knowing creatures, he is recollected within himself and then is elevated above himself.

Looking at humans in the second way, one can reply that other creatures can be considered as things or as signs. Considered as things, they are inferior to humans. But when considered as signs, they are media for proceeding while we are wayfarers not yet at our end, for the other creatures do not attain God, but through them humans can attain God, after leaving them behind.

QUESTION 4

*Can the Trinity of persons combined with unity of essence be known naturally through creatures?*⁴⁴

The fourth and last question is about what aspect of God can be known through creatures. The Apostle (Romans 1:20) says “eternal power and

divinity” are known. So the question is whether the plurality of persons can be known through creatures.⁴⁵

It seems that the plurality of persons can be known through creatures:

1. The philosophers had knowledge of God only through creatures, and yet they knew the Trinity. Therefore, etc. The minor is clear from Augustine, *City of God*: “The philosophers say philosophy has three parts,” in which parts one finds knowledge of the Trinity.⁴⁶

2. In *Exodus*, the magi failed at the third sign.⁴⁷ The exposition of this text is that they failed to know the third person of the Trinity. Thus, they failed to know either what is proper to the Trinity or what is appropriated to the Trinity. They did not fail to understand what is appropriated, since goodness shines forth to us most of all in creatures. Therefore, they failed to understand what is proper to the third person of the Trinity. But it follows that they did know at least two persons.

The same conclusion follows from rational argument:

3. A vestige, as it signifies some distinction, is the basis for knowing God as distinct. But the only distinction within God is distinction of persons. Therefore, through vestiges one can know the distinction of persons.

4. Through an image one can know the Trinity, with respect to order, distinction, and equality. Now knowing through an image is knowing through a creature. Therefore, through a creature one can know the Trinity.

5. It is harder to know the hidden properties of creatures than to know the plurality of persons, because only great and subtle minds capture the former, while even the uneducated and the ignorant know the latter. Therefore, if they can arrive at the invisible things of God through the visible properties of creatures, even more can they know that the persons are many. This is written in the book of *Wisdom*: “For if they were able to know so much that they could judge about the world, how could they not more easily discover its Lord?”⁴⁸

To the contrary:

a. Knowledge of the Trinity is knowledge that comes from faith. But knowledge coming from faith concerns what is beyond reason; and what is beyond reason cannot be known through creatures. Therefore, etc.

b. There are only two ways of knowing God through a creature, either by affirming of God what is in the creature or what is similar to it, or by denying these things of God. Now the Trinity is not known by way of negation, but by way of affirmation. But a plurality of individual subjects combined with unity of essence is not found in any creature. Therefore, etc.

c. The written law stands above the law of nature, and the book of sacred scripture stands above the book of earthly creation. Now no one who lacks faith comes to knowledge of the plurality of persons by way of sacred scripture. Therefore, even less can such a one come to knowledge of the plurality of persons by way of the book of earthly creation.

Response:

Plurality of persons combined with unity of essence is *proper* to the divine nature alone. Nothing similar is found in a creature, nor can it be found in a creature, nor can it be known by reason. Therefore, the Trinity of persons is not in any way knowable through a creature, by using rational argument to move up from creature to God.⁴⁹

But even though there is nothing fully like the Trinity, nevertheless in a way there is something that *belief* finds similar in a creature. Consequently, I say that through reason the philosophers never knew the Trinity of persons or even a plurality of persons, unless they possessed something of the habit of faith, as some heretics do.⁵⁰ Therefore, what they said truly was affirmed either without their understanding it or because they had been illumined by the enlightening rays of faith.

But there is another trinity, of *appropriated* attributes: unity, truth, and goodness. And this trinity the philosophers did know, because it does have something similar to itself in creatures.⁵¹

Reply to the objections:

1. Therefore, to the objection that the philosophers have known the Trinity through the three parts of philosophy, I reply: It is true that through this and other things they came to knowledge of what is appropriated to the persons in the Trinity, but believers come to knowledge of both aspects of the Trinity.

2. To the objection based on the third sign, I reply: The sages were rightly said to fail at the third sign, because they failed to know the most powerful effect of goodness, that is, redemption.

3. To the next objection, I reply: “Vestige” signifies distinction among essential properties. The trinity of *appropriated* characteristics corresponds to it, but not the trinity of *properties* or of persons.

4. To the objection based on image, I reply: There is knowledge of the soul in its nature, which belongs to reason; and there is knowledge of the soul as an image, which belongs to faith alone.

5. To the last objection, that it is more difficult to know the world, I reply: This is understandable, on the supposition of divine aid, but absolutely speaking it is false. For a human is more readily disposed to faith than to acquiring philosophical knowledge. Nevertheless, our intellect is more able to know earthly things than the Trinity, for the Trinity is beyond reason and its contrary appears to the senses. Therefore, our mind needs to be elevated anew, by infused knowledge.

Dubia concerning the Text of Master Peter Lombard⁵²

Dubium 3: A question arises when the Master says this: “All things that have been made by the divine art, manifest in themselves a certain unity, species, and order.”⁵³

First, he seems to say something false, because if this were true, then since these three things have been made, they would also have unity, species, and order, and so on. Therefore, if there were an end to this series, these things would be things that are made, but not have these three characteristics.

Again, the Master seems to enumerate these features incorrectly, because Augustine posits these three, “mode, species, and order,” and also

these other features, “unity, truth, and goodness.”⁵⁴

Response:

To this issue some say that this is understood about perfect creatures, or if about all creatures, then these three features do not describe the conditions in a created thing, but in an uncreated exemplar. – But it can be said that among the first and general intentions there is reflection which comes to a conclusion, and one cannot proceed beyond this point.

To the question about the enumeration of these three features, that it does not seem correct, I reply: A created thing has to be considered in three ways: in itself, in comparison with other creatures, or in comparison with the first cause. And in each of these ways one finds two sorts of “trinity.”

For if a created thing is considered as in itself or in relation to itself, this happens in one way with regard to the substance of its principles. Now under this consideration we find this “trinity”: matter, form, and composite, as asserted in the book *On the Rules of Faith*.⁵⁵ In another way, this happens with regard to its relations (*habitudines*). Now in this respect, the book of Wisdom (11:21) says: “You have disposed all things through number, weight, and measure.” For by number is meant the distinction of its principles, by weight is meant the proper inclinations that follow these principles, and by their measure is meant the proportion of the principles to each other.

If one creature is considered in comparison with other creatures, this can happen in one way as it performs its natural action. Now the “trinity” described by Dionysius is meant in this way: substance, power, and action. Or this can happen as it performs a spiritual action. Now the “trinity” described by Augustine in his *Book on 83 Questions*⁵⁶ is meant in this way: “that by which it exists, that by which it agrees, and that by which it is discerned,” the last referring to the soul.

But if creatures are considered in comparison with God, this can happen in two ways. In one way, as they only refer to God; and in this respect there is this “trinity”: mode, species, and order. In a second way, as they refer to God and are made similar to God; and in this respect there is this “trinity”: unity, truth, and goodness.

Consequently, since the meaning of “vestige” is taken from a comparison with God, properly speaking, it follows that “vestige” is

properly taken from these last conditions. But since there is considerable agreement between these comparisons, the Master has mixed them together, because of this agreement and correspondence. For “unity” corresponds to “mode,” which looks to God as efficient cause; “truth” corresponds with “species,” which looks at God as exemplar; and “goodness” corresponds to “order,” which looks to God as end.[57](#)

NOTES

¹ In his *Sentences*, Bk. 1, d. 1, Master Peter Lombard had said the subject of Book 1 is “the mystery of the Trinity”; in d. 2, he set out scriptural evidence for the Trinity; in d. 3 he considered how the Trinity is known by humans. These preliminaries were followed by consideration of the inner life of the Trinity (d. 4-34) and the triune God as cause of the world (d. 35-48).

Lombard used Rom 1:20 to introduce the issue of knowing God, which Bonaventure then divides into four questions, as follows: “Ever since the creation of the world (q. 3), the invisible things of him, namely, his eternal power and divinity (q. 4), are seen by the creature of the world (q. 1), through the things that have been made (q. 2).” Knowledge involves three things: an object known, a knower, and a means of knowing. The *Summa Halesiana* (1. Intro. 2.1-3, 1: n. 8-24) had separated these three issues, but in q. 1 Bonaventure treats both God (the object known) and the human knower, in order to show that agnosticism is neither necessary nor viable. Then in q. 2 and 3, he shows *how* humans can know God rationally by means of creatures. In q. 4 he shows how we need revelation, as well as reason, to know the Trinity. His rational arguments for the existence of God are found at d. 8.

² Cf. Bonaventure, *Itinerarium*, 1-3; *Summa Halesiana*, 1. Intro. 2.1.1-2, 2.2.1-4 (1: n. 8-9, 14-17); Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1.d. 3.1-3; *Summa theologiae*, 1.3.13.1, 14.1; Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1.d.3.1.1; *Summa theologiae*, 1.12.12.

³ Bonaventure’s problematic: Obj. 1—5 argue for agnosticism at the level of rational or philosophical knowledge; Arg. a—e argue that God can be known.

⁴ Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, 1.2 (PG 3: 588; Dionysiaca: 12-13).

⁵ Bonaventure here systematically lays out four fundamental requirements of all knowledge, which seem to argue against the possibility of knowing God. In his replies to these objections he shows that knowing God does not violate any of them.

⁶ Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae*, 5.1 (PL 63: 830-862; CCSL 94: 88-105).

⁷ Augustine, *De vera religione*, 29.53 (PL 34: 145; CCSL 32: 221.19-222.33).

⁸ Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 14.8.11 (CCSL 50A: 435.1-436.13).

⁹ The four arguments in favor of our ability to know God follow respectively the lines of formal, material, final, and efficient causality.

¹⁰ Augustine, *Soliloquiorum*, 1.8.15 (PL 32: 877).

¹¹ Augustine, *De videndo deo*, *Epistula* 147, 16.38 (PL 33: 613; CSEL 44.3: 312.3-313.9).

¹² Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae*, 3.2 (PL 63: 771-774; CCSL 94: 56-57).

¹³ See [q. 2](#). Bonaventure here lays down the claim that guides his whole treatment of knowing God. Divine perfection requires that in his very reality (*in se*) God is intrinsically knowable to a supreme degree; so problems in humans knowing God all fall on the side of the human knower or his means of knowing. The distinction applies to both rational and revealed knowledge. See below, [107](#), [111-12](#), [n.2](#).

On what humans can know of God, see *Summa Halesiana* (1. Intro. 2.1.1, n. 9): “Knowledge of God is either positive or privative. Through the mode of privation we know about God *what* he is not (*quid non est*); through the positive mode we know *what* he is (*quid est*). Therefore the divine *substance* in its immensity cannot be known by the rational soul through positive knowledge, but is knowable through privative knowledge.” This claim is refined at 1. Intro. 2.2.1, (n. 14): all humans know *that* God exists, ignorance comes about *what* God is.

The Dominicans adopted a thoroughly negative interpretation of knowing God’s nature. See Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 3.2: the philosophers “knew only *that* he is and *what* he is *not*, they did not know *what* he is.” Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1.3.prol: “Once whether something exists is known,

it remains to inquire how it exists, in order to know about it what it is. But since about God we are not able to know what he is (*quid sit*), but what he is not (*quid non sit*), we are not able to consider about God how he is but rather how he is not.”

Bonaventure, following more closely the spirit of Alexander of Hales, avoided a completely negative interpretation of knowing God’s nature by distinguishing categorical terms, such as “substance,” which must be denied of God, from transcendental terms, which can truly be affirmed of God. See below, [q. 2](#), [75](#), [89 n.28](#).

¹⁴ The objections all fall victim to a common error; they assume knowing God is exactly like knowing creatures. Bonaventure repeatedly makes distinctions in order to show that the objections trade on confusing the way we know creatures with the way we can know God.

¹⁵ Augustine, *De videndo deo*, *Epistula* 147, 9.21 (PL 33: 605; CSEL 44.3: 295.1-9).

¹⁶ Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 3.8 (431b20).

¹⁷ Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 3.4 (429a10-430a9).

¹⁸ Augustine, *De vera religione*, 31.58 (PL 34:148; CCSL 32: 225.33-49).

¹⁹ Augustine, *De trinitate*, 9.11 (PL 42: 969; CCSL 50: 307.5-17).

²⁰ Cf. Bonaventure, *In Sententiis*, 2.d. 3. 2.2.2; *Summa Halesiana*, 1. Intro. 2.3.2 (1: n. 21); Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1.d.3.1-3, 9; Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1.d.3.1.3; *Summa theologiae*, 1.2.2, 1.12.12; *Summa contra gentiles*, 1.13.

²¹ Bonaventure’s problematic: Bonaventure understands the question using the Aristotelian logic he learned in Arts at Paris. The issue is whether creatures can function as middle terms in demonstrative syllogisms about God. Obj. 3 and 4 say creatures cannot; Arg. c and d say they can. In the spirit of St. Francis, in his response Bonaventure says God can be known through creatures.

To clarify how, in his Reply to Obj. 1 Bonaventure distinguishes the “special conditions” of creatures, features that fall under Aristotle’s ten categories, from their “general conditions,” or transcendental attributes. True knowledge of God is based on the latter. At the end of the question, in answer to a query raised by Arg. d, he uses this distinction to define some of his memorable terms for creatures: they are “shadows,” “vestiges” (lit. “footprints”), or “images” of God. The replies to Obj. 1 and Arg. d are essential for understanding Bonaventure’s further considerations of God.

²² Wis 14:11.

²³ Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*, 2.16.43 (PL 32: 1264; CCSL 29: 266.67-267.70).

²⁴ This argument is based on Aristotelian syllogistic. Every categorical syllogism consists in three terms, a middle term (M) that generates the conclusion by connecting the two extreme terms, the minor term (S), or subject of the conclusion, with the major term (P), or predicate of the conclusion. For example: ‘All animals (M) are living things (P); but all humans (S) are animals (M); therefore, all humans (S) are living things (P).’

²⁵ Wis 13:5.

²⁶ Isidore, *Sententiarum*, 1.4 (PL 83: 543).

²⁷ Cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 1.13 (78a22-78b32). The stronger “demonstration of the reasoned fact (*demonstratio propter quid*)” argues from a middle term that is the proximate cause to a conclusion that contains the effect; the weaker “demonstration of the fact (*demonstratio quia*)” proceeds from a middle term that is an effect to a conclusion that contains its cause, or from a middle term that is a remote cause of the conclusion.

²⁸ Unlike Aquinas, Bonaventure did not write a philosophical treatise outlining his ontology, so his metaphysics of creatures has to be pieced together from different texts in his *Commentary*. Here he adopts the important distinction between the “general conditions” and “special conditions” of being. He understood the development of this doctrine from the following texts he knew:

(1) Aristotle, at *Metaphysics* 5.7, had divided “a being (*on, ens*)” into what is a being accidentally (*ens per accidens*), such as the musician who is also a builder, but not a builder because he is a musician, and what is a being in its own right or “through itself.” This second, important sense of being (*ens per se*) then has three sub-divisions: being as divided into the ten categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, when, where, position, equipment, action, passion); being as the true, where “is means that a statement is true”; and being divided by potency and act. For Aristotle, metaphysics concentrated on being as found within the category of substance.

(2) Centuries later, the Islamic philosopher Avicenna (Ibn Sina), changed the focus of metaphysics. He famously said the notion of “a being (*ens*)” is “impressed in the soul in the first impression” (*Metaphysics*, 1.5, from the Latin), to which Bonaventure refers (e.g., *Itinerarium*, 3.3, 5.3). He then described metaphysics: “The primary subject of this science is a being in as much as it is a being (*ens inquantum est ens*), and its objects of enquiry are the consequences of being as being, without condition. Now some of these are *like species of it*, such as substance, quantity, and quality ... And some of these are *like its proper accidents*, such as one and many, potency and act, universal and particular, possible and necessary. For a being, in receiving these accidents and in being prepared for them, need not be specified as natural, mathematical, moral, or another kind of being” (*Metaphysics*, 1.2; ed. Avicenna Latinus, 1: 13:36-46). Here Avicenna reduced Aristotle’s three senses of *ens per se* to two: the ten categories, which are narrower than universal being, are “like species of being” which is like their wider genus; but truth and potency and act have this in common, they are as universal as being itself, more “like proper accidents” that necessarily accompany being. For Avicenna, metaphysics focused more on the universal attributes of being, which were later called the transcendentals (*transcendentia*), because they transcend the ten categories.

(3) Because of their importance for understanding God, who transcends the categories, the thirteenth century masters became especially interested in the transcendentals. Philip the Chancellor (d. 1236) codified the transcendental attributes of being for the masters at Paris, in *Summa de bono*, q. 7 (1:26.15-27.21):

... there are three *conditions* that follow on being: *unity, truth, and goodness*. Unity is the first of these, truth the second, and goodness the third; for the *efficient, formal, and final* cause can coincide in one thing, but not the material cause. Consequently, each essence that has these three kinds of causes has the three conditions that follow on the being of that which comes from the first being. Just as from the first being based on the notion of *one* each thing is made one being; from it as it is a formal, exemplar cause each thing is made *true*; and from it as the final cause each thing is made *good*.

(4) Bonaventure learned the doctrine of the transcendentals from Alexander of Hales. The *Summa Halesiana* treated the transcendentals extensively: unity: 1.1.1.3.1.1 (1: n. 72-75); truth: 1.1.1.3.2.1 (1: n. 87-90); goodness: 1.1.1.3.3.1 (1: n. 102-07). Its central teaching is set out at 1.1.1.1.3.1.2 (1: n. 73):

I reply: A being (*ens*) is the first intelligible, and the first determinations of being are the one, the true, and the good. For they determine a being (*ens*) (1) as it is considered the being (*esse*) of things in their proper genus, or (2) according to the relation of the being (*esse*) of things to the divine cause, or (3) according to the relation of things to the soul, which is an image of the divine essence.

As the being (*esse*) of things is considered in its proper genus, the determination of a being is three-fold. For either it is considered something absolute or is compared, and if compared then either based on difference or agreement. (1a) As some being (*ens aliquod*) is considered as something absolute, in so far as it is divided from others and undivided in itself, it is determined by the *one*. (1b) As some being (*ens*) is considered as something compared to another through distinction, it is determined by the *true*. For the true is that by which a thing is discerned. (1c) And as it is considered something compared to another based on agreement or order, it is determined by the *good*. For good is that by which a thing is ordered.

As the being (*esse*) of things is compared to the divine cause, its determination is likewise three-fold. For the divine cause is a cause in three types of causality: efficient, formal, and final. Now this causality, since it is common to the whole Trinity, is *appropriated* as an efficient cause to the Father, as exemplar cause to the Son, and as final cause to the Holy Spirit. Accordingly, the being (*esse*) in a creature, which flows from a cause, receives a three-fold impression, in order to conform to its cause. Therefore, (2a) the impression of the disposition in the being (*esse*) of the creature, according to which it comes into conformity with the *efficient* cause, is *unity*. So just as the efficient cause is one, undivided, and multiplied in every creature, so it comes about that it is possible for it to be undivided. (2b) And the impression of the disposition, according to which it comes into conformity with the *formal, exemplar* cause, is *truth*. So just as the exemplar cause is the first art of truth, so the creature, as is possible for it, comes into imitation of this art; and this is what it means to have truth. (2c) Moreover, the impression according to which it comes into conformity with the *final* cause is the good. So just as the final cause is the highest good, so in each creature there is an inclination and conformity to the highest goodness: and this is the goodness of a creature. *The unity of the being of a creature manifests the unity of the efficient cause; its truth manifests the truth of the exemplar cause; and its goodness manifests the goodness of the final cause.*

In comparison with the soul, there is also a three-fold determination. For the being (*esse*) of things is compared with the soul in three ways: namely, as the thing is ordered by *memory*, is perceived by *intelligence*, and is loved by the *will*. (3a) Therefore, in every being (*ente*) there is unity coming from the efficient cause, through which it is ordered by and preserved in memory. For memory retains its objects and makes distinctions based on some order in relation to a *one*. (3b) Also, in every being (*ente*) there is truth from the exemplar cause, through which it is perceived by intelligence. (3c) And finally there is goodness from the final cause, through which it is loved and approved by the will.

(5) Bonaventure accepted Aristotle's distinction between "a being" *per accidens* and *per se* (see below [144-45](#)), and concentrated on the latter. In this Reply to Obj. 1, he has divided *ens per se* into the "special conditions" and "general conditions" of being (*ens*).

The first set of conditions are "special" because they fall under the ten categories, conceived "like species" of being because they limit the more universal notion of a being (*ens*). Later (see below [145](#)) Bonaventure describes the kind of being (*esse*) that falls under the categories as "being limited (*esse limitatum*)" through definitions that use genus and difference, and as "being mixed (*esse mixtum*) from act and potency." Categorical being is therefore by nature imperfect. These are the aspects of a creature that make it a "shadow" that "represents God from a distance and confusedly" (see Reply to Arg. d).

Since it is as universal as being (*ens*), a transcendental is not by nature imperfect. This makes it a "vestige" that "represents God from a distance but distinctly," and therefore an appropriate basis for arguing demonstratively from creature to God. Although he does not say so here, Bonaventure also recognizes that there is a difference between a transcendental attribute like Aristotle's "unity," that is as universal as being, and disjunctive transcendentals like Aristotle's act and potency, which are as universal as being only when taken together. In his argument for the existence of God (1 d. 8.1.2, see below [104-10](#)), Bonaventure makes use of both kinds of transcendentals.

The Dominicans also presented systematic treatments of being and the transcendentals: Albert presented being, goodness, and truth systematically in *Summa parisiensis*, Part 6, *De bono*, 1.1.1-10 (ed. Cologne, 28:1-21); Aquinas divided being (*ens*) into general and special "modes" at *De veritate*, 1.1.

²⁹ Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*, 2.16.43 (PL 32: 1264; CCSL 29: 266.54-56).

³⁰ Dionysius had mentioned three ways of knowing God, "by remotion, eminence, and cause," at *De divinis nominibus* 7.3 (PG3: 869D; Dionysiaca: 403-04): "We know him from the order of all existing things, as though all things were set out by him, an order that has certain images and

semblances of his divine exemplars. We ascend to that which is beyond all through a way and order in accord with our power, by way of *remotion*, by way of *eminence*, and in the *cause* of all.”

Alexander of Hales was the first Master to use this passage from Dionysius to explain how we know God in his *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, 1. d. 3 (1: 39), an early work that formed the basis for the *Summa Halesiana*. Hales quoted this text of Dionysius and then explained it: “And so through these three—remotion, eminence, and in the cause of all—he notes three ways of knowing” God, “negatively,” “through eminence, the best in everything,” and as “cause.” “The authorities who say God is not known should be understood about the way of knowing through remotion, because in this way we do not understand what he is but rather what he is not.” In using Dionysius, Albert followed Hales (*In Sententiis*, 1. d. 3. 9) and so too did Aquinas (*In Sententiis*, 1. d. 3, *divisio textus*).

Bonaventure here correlates the three Dionysian “ways” with the distinction between categorical and transcendental attributes of being. To affirm a creature’s “special conditions” of God is to make an error, because they are inherently imperfect and therefore must be *removed* from God, who is perfect. To affirm a “general condition” or transcendental perfection of God, however, is to discover truth. But here one must be careful. Even such “perfect” attributes are not found in creature and God in the same way. Consequently, one must proceed through the Dionysian way of eminence, which opens up a positive mode of understanding the “superlative perfection” (*superexcellantiam*) of God described by the transcendentals. The concepts employed as middle terms in *causal* arguments about God, Bonaventure holds, must have already gone through the refining process of the ways of negation and eminence. This is why he turns to the transcendentals as the proper terms for knowing God. Such *positive* theology Bonaventure thought quite in accord with the Franciscan spirit.

³¹ Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 2.1 (993b10). Plato thought education could retrain the human mind to turn away from the sensible things that are its initial focus and then look directly at higher things existing in an intelligible world of “forms” that culminates in “the good,” the first principle of all reality. This “turning of the soul” he compared to men leaving a dark cave to climb out into the brightness of noon-day and eventually gazing directly on the sun (*Republic* 6-7). Aristotle thought Plato too optimistic and compared the human mind to the eye of a bat flitting around Plato’s cave. Just as the bat’s eye does not allow it to see by the light of day, so the human mind will never gaze directly on purely intelligible realities (*Metaphysics*, 2.1, 993b9-11). It can only approach them indirectly, by looking at the darkness of sensible things and then drawing inferences about God. Bonaventure understands the creature in the cave to be an “owl (*noctua*),” which actually has eyes. It is sin that has darkened the human mind, it is not dark by nature. And sin can be overcome by grace, which opens up the possibility of a Platonic conclusion achieved through grace—either in this world or the next.

³² Four term analogies are different from two term analogies. As helmsman is to oarsman, so is doctor to patient. What are similar are not the things compared but their relations; the things related need not be the same. Such proportions can be used about God by moving from relations among creatures to ones that involve God: as a sailor is directed by the helmsman, so is the patient directed by the doctor, and therefore so too should the human be directed by God. A two term analogy involves a common attribute present in two things. A creature, for example, is imperfectly good only because it participates in the perfect goodness of God. Here it is the attribute that is common, not the relation; but it is common analogously, not univocally. Both kinds of analogy are helpful for knowing God.

³³ These three levels are those of the Augustinian movement from the exterior to the interior and from the inferior to the superior. Cf. Augustine, *De 83 diversis questionibus*, Q. 51.2 (PL 40: 33; CCSL 44a: 79.29-80.50); *Confessiones*, 7.10 (CCSL 27:103.1-12). Rather than treat the steps as a sequence that attains God only at the final level, Bonaventure finds evidence for God at each step along the route. See *Itinerarium mentis in deum*.

³⁴ Cf. Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1 d. 3.13-22.

³⁵ Bonaventure explains shadows, vestiges, and images of God using the difference between categorical and transcendental attributes, and by distinguishing reason from faith. Every creature is a *shadow* of God. But the attribute in the creature does not allow us to understand the kind of causality God exercises in a determinate way. Human reason by itself can achieve such ‘shadowy’ knowledge of God. But it is not demonstrative; we are left with a suspicion or opinion, not true knowledge. The reason for such lack of precision is that the attributes that make the creature a “shadow” fall within the categories. The imperfection of such attributes does not allow our reasoning to achieve rational certitude.

Every creature is also a *vestige* of God. This is discovered when the attributes and the kind of causality are understood definitely. Here Bonaventure uses some central theses from the *Summa Halesiana* (see [n. 16](#)). He locates being a vestige in the transcendental attributes of being, namely, one, true, and good. These ontological features of things point respectively to God as their efficient, formal, and final cause. And they also serve as the foundation in things for our awareness of them, which is accomplished through memory, intellect, and will. These three aspects—unity, truth, and goodness—as they are found in creatures, as they point to God, and as they are in the soul—are what might be called their ontological, cosmological, and epistemological senses. Unity means every being (*ens*) is ontologically ‘divided from others, undivided in itself,’ cosmologically it derives from God as efficient cause, and epistemologically it can be remembered by humans. Truth means every being is ontologically distinguishable from others, cosmologically it derives from God as formal cause, and epistemologically it can be known by humans. Goodness means every being is ontologically linked or ordered to others, cosmologically it is directed to God as final cause, and epistemologically it can be loved by humans.

This much philosophy can know; but such knowledge of God through vestiges is incomplete. To go further, and “appropriate” these causes or these transcendentals to the persons of God—Father, Son, and Spirit—depends upon faith to bestow knowledge that there is a Trinity of persons in the first place.

The term “image,” and its correlative “likeness (*similitudo*),” Bonaventure limits to intellectual creatures. Some aspects of finite minds are known philosophically; but to correlate them with the persons of the Trinity requires faith to give knowledge of that Trinity. Using the philosophical categories of memory, intellect, and will in theology helps uncover features “proper” to the inner life of each person of the Trinity. If knowledge of the human as “image” focuses on the ontological categories found in human nature, elsewhere Bonaventure indicates that knowledge of the human as “likeness” focuses on moral categories found in human action (*Breviloquium*, 2.12.1).

In knowing the Trinity, Bonaventure uses the distinctions among shadow, vestige, and image to demarcate the boundary between faith and reason, in q. 4 of this distinction.

³⁶ Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 1. Intro. 2.2.5.1 (1: n. 18), 2.3.3.4.2.1 (2: n. 517-518); Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1. d.3.13; Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1.12.11, 1.94.1; *Summa contra gentiles*, 3.47.

³⁷ Bonaventure’s problematic: Guided by Rom 1: 20, “Ever since the creation of the world ...,” Bonaventure here expands his problematic beyond Lombard. To the knowledge had by “wayfarers” in the present life, he adds two other human “states,” before the fall and after the present life in heaven. The Arguments and Objections both reason that the human “state” does not alter how we know God. Arg. a and b reason that before original sin, humans proceeded “through” creatures to God, and Arg. c and d say that in heaven humans also will proceed “through” creatures to God.

³⁸ The Objections agree that the human “state” does not affect our way of knowing God, but draw the opposite conclusion from the Arguments. Humans do not need to approach God through creatures, either in their original state (Obj. 1 and 2), or in heaven (Obj. 3 and 4).

³⁹ Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus lxxxiii*, q.51. 2 (PL 40: 33; CCSL 44a: 80.46-50).

⁴⁰ Augustine, *De civitate dei*, 22.30.4 (PL 41: 803; CCSL 48: 865.112-15).

⁴¹ Bernard, *De consideratione*, 5.1.1 (PL 182: 787; ed. Leclercq, 3: 467.6-16). Rom 1:20 said humans can see God “*through* the things that have been made,” while 1 Cor 13:12 noted that “for now we see *through* a glass darkly, but then face to face,” and Augustine had explained that in heaven God will be “all *in* all.” Bonaventure here clarifies the difference between seeing God *through* and *in* creatures. When we see God *in* a creature we understand the creature, but realize certain features of the creature are effects of God’s action. Here the creature, not God, is directly the object of knowledge. But to see God *through* creatures is to begin by knowing the creature and then shift attention to God, because the creature is a sign pointing to God. Here there are two objects of knowledge, first, the creature, second, God.

Bonaventure then compares different human “states”: before the fall God was seen “clearly,” now after the fall “darkly.” When it comes to the final reward, God will be seen directly *in* himself in the beatific vision, but God also will be seen *in* creatures. The “kingdom” described in the New Testament will not be limited to a beatific vision of God alone, but, says this son of Francis, somehow will include a vision of God’s presence *in* creatures.

⁴² 1 Cor 13: 12.

⁴³ Bonaventure accepts the true claims that in the state of innocence humans knew through creatures (Arg. a and b) and that in the state of blessedness humans do not know through creatures (Obj. 3 and 4), so he does not reply to these arguments. But he does respond to the arguments for false claims: in beatitude humans will know through creatures (Arg. c and d); before original sin humans did not know through creatures (Obj. 1 and 2).

⁴⁴ Cf. Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, 1.2; *Summa Halesiana*, 1. Intro. 2.1.3 (1: n. 10); Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1. d.3.18; *Summa theologiae*, 1.3.13.3; Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1. d.3.1.4; *Summa theologiae*, 1.32.1; *De veritate*, 10.13; *De potentia*, 9.5; *In Romanos*, 1.6.

⁴⁵ Bonaventure’s problematic: Bonaventure uses the test case of knowing the Trinity to show how philosophical knowledge of God serves a higher purpose when it is combined with revealed knowledge in theology. He frames the issue by contrasting the rationalistic view that philosophy unaided by faith can provide knowledge of the Trinity (Obj. 1 - 5), with the view that knowledge of the Trinity is beyond the reach of philosophy and requires faith (Arg. a - c).

⁴⁶ Augustine, *De civitate dei*, 11.25 (PL 41: 338; CCSL 48: 344.1-13).

⁴⁷ Ex 8:17-20: “All the dust throughout the land of Egypt became gnats. But when the magicians tried to produce gnats by their secret arts, they could not. And the gnats were on men and animals. The magicians said to Pharaoh, ‘This is the finger of God.’ But Pharaoh’s heart was hard and he would not listen, just as the Lord had said.”

⁴⁸ Wis 13: 9.

⁴⁹ Bonaventure begins his “response” by drawing a bright line between “proper” truths about God that must be revealed and other truths that can be known through reason. He is unequivocal that knowledge of the Trinity of persons in God must come from faith. See *Summa Halesiana*, 1 Intro. 2.1.3 (1: n. 10): “Through natural reason, in itself, proper knowledge of the Trinity cannot be obtained; but through natural reason, aided by some kind of grace or something given graciously or producing a gracious result, it can be obtained.”

⁵⁰ Alexander of Hales and other schoolmen gave the example of Hermes Trismegistus, that is, “thrice-great,” author (first to third Century A.D.) of works on astrology, magic, philosophy, and theology. See *Summa Halesiana* (1: 19, n. 6).

⁵¹ “Proper (*propria*)” attributes are properties of a thing entailed by its essence. Three persons in one nature is proper to God alone. “Appropriated (*appropriata*)” attributes involve comparing two things, where the attribute is proper to one, but not to the other. Appropriation allows the mind to move from one thing to another by a kind of analogy. Philosophy knows that the transcendental attributes of being—one, true, and good—are proper to the nature of all beings, including God.

Philosophical knowledge of the transcendentals by itself cannot yield certain knowledge of the Trinity of persons in God; that knowledge must come from faith. But philosophical knowledge can do two things: it can open the mind dialectically to the possibility of some kind of plurality in God; and, once the Trinity is accepted through faith, the process of “appropriation” uses philosophical knowledge of the transcendentals to help the theologian explain this mystery. Each transcendental is “appropriated” to one of the three persons of the Trinity: unity to the Father, truth to the Son, and goodness to the Spirit. One function of theology is to elaborate and develop the meaning of revealed truths like the Trinity, by bringing the fruits of rational argument to bear upon them. Cf. *Summa Halesiana* (1: n. 10), which “appropriated” to the Father “power,” “wisdom” to the Son, and “goodness” to the Holy Spirit.

⁵² The *dubia* concern the meaning of the text of Lombard and in the Quarrachi edition are found at the end of Bonaventure’s commentary on each distinction. They likely were the first stage in the development of his commentary; the better developed organization into the disputed question format he uses in his commentary is often based on them. We have translated *dubia* when they are helpful for understanding Bonaventure’s commentary.

⁵³ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, 1. D. 3.1.7 (1: 70), quoting Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 6.10.12 (PL 42: 932; CCSL 50: 242.37-8).

⁵⁴ For “mode, species, order,” see Augustine, *De natura boni*, 3; also, *De civitate dei*, 5.11. For “unity, truth, goodness,” see *De vera religione*, 11. 36 and 55.

⁵⁵ Alan of Lille, *De arte seu articulis catholicae fidei*, 1.24 (PL 210: 603).

⁵⁶ Augustine, *De diversis questionibus lxxxiii*, q. 18 (PL 40: 15; CCSL 44a: 23.2-3).

⁵⁷ Here Bonaventure says a creature is considered in three ways: (1) in itself, (2) in relation to other creatures, and (3) in relation to God. Under each of these “considerations,” he isolates two “trinities” of features, the first falling under the “special consideration” of a creature as described by Aristotle’s categories, the second in accord with the “general conditions” of being that transcend Aristotle’s categories.

Consequently, creatures considered (1) in themselves and (1a) as they fall under the categories are substances in one of the three senses recognized by Aristotle—matter, form, or composite substance—later at 145 described as *esse mixtum*. (1b) Creatures considered in themselves, but as they transcend any particular category exhibit a second “trinity” of features. They have a “number” of principles; their natural principles give them a certain “weight” or direction; and their principles therefore have a certain “measure” that proportions them to each other.

(2) Creatures are related to other creatures in two ways. (2a) When we look at their natural actions, they exhibit substance, power, and action. (2b) When we look at their spiritual actions, we become aware of their existence, agreement, and cognitive discernment.

(3) Finally, we can look at the relation of creature to God. (3a) When we look just at how creatures “refer to God,” we see their mode, species, and order. (3b) But when we look at how they can be made similar to God, we finally discern their transcendental attributes: unity, truth, and goodness.

TOPIC 3: PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Book 1
Distinction 8

PART 1: ON THE TRUTH AND UNCHANGEABILITY OF GOD¹

ARTICLE 1: ON THE TRUTH² OF GOD

QUESTION 1

Is truth a property of divine being?³

That truth is a property of divine being (divini esse)⁴ is shown by the following citations from authority and arguments:⁵

a. Jerome, in his letter to Marcella, which is quoted in the Master's text, says: "Only God exists *truly*, compared to whose essence our being is not."⁶ But what is found in only one thing is proper to it. Therefore, truth is proper to the divine being.

b. In *On the True Religion*, Augustine says: "Falsity arises from things which imitate that unity whereby whatever is, is one, inasmuch as they cannot fulfill its nature."⁷ Therefore, if no creature can fulfill the nature of that highest one, then in no creature is there truth, but in all there is falsity.

c. Likewise, in his *Soliloquies* and in *On the True Religion*, Augustine says that the uncreated light is the reason for knowing itself and all that is knowable.⁸ Therefore, if truth is the reason for knowing, then only the uncreated light is truth. Therefore, truth is a property of God alone.

d. In his book *On Truth*, Anselm says that all things are true through the first truth.⁹ Therefore, he understands the first truth either as an efficient cause of truth, or as truth itself, formally speaking. It is not truth as an efficient cause of truth, because in a similar way all things could be called good through the first goodness. Therefore, it is understood to be truth, formally speaking. Therefore, there is no other truth than the uncreated truth. Therefore, if that truth is in God or is God, then truth is a property of God alone.

This can be proven by rational arguments, as follows:

e. Truth and emptiness are opposed to each other. But every creature possesses emptiness and is mixed with non-being, since it comes from nothing. Only God completely lacks such emptiness; therefore, in God alone is there truth.

f. Truth is opposed to shadow, for the shadow of a thing has no truth. But creatures are shadows of the highest being. Therefore, they have no truth in their being.

g. Truth is that by which something is true. Now truth is true, since it is knowable. But it is obvious that it is not knowable through something other than itself, since otherwise there would be an infinite regress. But what is true in itself is true through its own essence. Therefore, all truth is true through its own essence. But only the uncreated truth is true through its own essence. Therefore, truth is a property of God alone.

To the contrary:

1. If truth is a property of God, this truth is either complex or incomplex. Truth in God cannot be complex, because such truth involves composition. But in God there is no composition. Nor can truth in God be incomplex, because this kind of truth is convertible with being. Therefore, since being is not a property of God, truth is not a property of God.

2. The true is as common as the good, and in a certain way even more common. But goodness is not a property of God alone. For the same reason, neither is truth a property of God alone.

3. Truth is the reason for discerning the creator from the creature and of discerning one creature from another. But the reason for discerning or distinguishing is different in different things. Therefore, truth in God is different from truth in a creature, and truth in one creature is different from truth in another. Therefore, truth is not a property of God alone.

4. In his *Soliloquies*, Augustine says: “The true is that which is.”^{[10](#)} Therefore, the truth is the being itself and consequently truth is not a

property of an essence. For if it were, the rationale for saying “truth is a property of truth” would verify the converse, since truth and being are completely identical.

Response:

Truth involves three comparisons. For truth is compared to the subject it informs, the principle it represents, and the intellect it affects.^{[11](#)} In comparison with the subject of truth, truth is said to be the indivision of act and potency. In comparison with its principle, truth is said to be the representation or imitation of the supreme and first truth. And in comparison with the intellect, truth is said to be the reason for distinguishing.^{[12](#)}

In all these comparisons, truth can be understood in two ways: in one way, as distinguished from falsity, and in another way, as distinguished from mixture, since the true is called pure and unmixed.

In one sense, truth is opposed to falsity, inasmuch as the latter is a privation of indivision, imitation, and expression. Since in a way one finds in a creature indivision, imitation, and expression, truth in this sense is not only in the creator, but also in the creature. In this respect, truth is not a property ascribed to God alone.

Truth in the other sense, as it is opposed to mixture and impurity, is in God alone. For in God alone is there pure indivision mixed with no diversity; in God alone is there pure imitation and likeness, mixed with no unlikeness; and in God alone is the expression of light not mixed with darkness. By contrast, in a creature there is indivision, but combined with diversity between act and potency; there is imitation, but combined with unlikeness; and in a creature there is expression, but combined with darkness. Therefore, in this manner, truth is a property of divine being. This is how Master Peter Lombard, Augustine, and Jerome understand the point. For they say the true is what includes no possibility, no emptiness, and no non-being. That is why God is not subject to past and future, for they are in a way non-beings.

Replies to the arguments that truth is a property of God:^{[13](#)}

a-b, e-f. The first two arguments based on authority, and the first two based on reason, follow the points made in the response.

c. To the objection that there is no truth other than eternal truth, because it alone produces understanding, I reply: As color is the object and stimulus of seeing, though not without the action of light, and yet it is different from light; so likewise created truth, though it cannot act as a stimulus apart from uncreated truth, nevertheless acts in its own way and is a truth different from uncreated truth.

d and g. To the argument taken from Anselm, that all things are true through the first truth, I reply: The use of *true* signifies a comparison with an exemplar cause, just as *good* signifies a comparison with a final cause. For just as something is called good by reason of order, so it is called true by reason of expression. But the reason for expression is an aspect of exemplar causality. Therefore, when created goods are called good “through uncreated goodness,” in this phrase “goodness” signifies the end of creatures, not their formal nature, for the goodness of God is not the formal nature of any creature. Likewise, when it is said that all things are true “through uncreated truth,” this phrase signifies the formal exemplar cause, for all things are true and naturally express themselves through the expression of the highest light. And if that light should stop overflowing, they would cease to be true. Therefore, no created truth is true through its own essence, but it is true through participation. This also answers the last objection.

Replies to the arguments to the contrary that truth is not a property of God:

1-3. To the objection to the contrary, that truth is not a property of God, the reply is clear: The objection concerns truth as it is opposed to the defect of falsity, not truth as it is opposed to being mixed with possibility. This kind of truth applies to the creator as well as to the creature.

4. To the objection that truth is the same as the divine essence, I reply: In a creature, a property in its very nature involves three things. First, the property applies to that subject alone; second, the property is the basis for coming to know that subject; and third, the property differs from that whose

property it is. The first two involve perfection, but the third imperfection, since it excludes simplicity. Therefore, truth is called a property of the divine essence, not because it differs from or inheres in the divine essence, as an accident inheres in a subject, but because it applies to God alone and is the basis for knowing the divine essence. This is the reason why the essence is *not* a property of truth, because the divine essence is not the basis for coming to understand the divine truth. Rather, the converse is true.

You might object: Since essence and truth signify the same thing, why is one the reason for knowing the other, but the second is not the reason for knowing the first.

In reply, some have said that even though essence and truth signify the same thing, one of them—truth—is more the reason for knowing than it is the reason for what is connoted.

But this reply cannot stand, because *truth* does not connote anything. Therefore, I reply that it is due to their modes of signifying and understanding:

One can speak of these terms in two ways: In one way, based on what they denominate or signify; in another way, based on what they denominate being signified as actually posited in a subject. Thus, it is one thing to speak about sensation, it is another to speak about human sensation. For the first is said to be common to humans and brute animals, while the second is proper to humans. Therefore, if we consider terms of this sort in themselves, the notion of essence is different from that of truth, for essence signifies *what it is*, while truth signifies a *condition* of the being. When we apply essence and truth to God, even though they are identical in him, by reason of their general signification one is taken as a property of the other. And when applied to God, there is no synonymity; they are not synonymous terms. But rather the notions of subject and property remain in the mode of signification and they also remain in the mode of understanding. For we understand essence in the creator through essence in a creature, and we understand the uncreated truth through truth in a creature. Consequently, just as created truth is a property of and the reason for knowing the created essence, so uncreated truth, owing to the nature of signification and understanding, is the reason for knowing and understanding the uncreated essence.

QUESTION 2

*Is the divine being so true that it cannot be thought not to be?*¹⁴

The second question¹⁵ is whether this property applies to God in the greatest degree, that is, whether the divine being is so true¹⁶ that it cannot be thought not to be.

*Arguments in the affirmative:*¹⁷

a. The affirmative¹⁸ is seen in Anselm, who says that it is a common conception of the mind that God is that than which nothing greater can be thought.¹⁹ But what cannot be thought not to be is greater than what can be thought not to be. Therefore, since nothing greater than God can be thought, the divine being so exists that it cannot be thought not to be.

b. Damascene says knowledge of the existence of God is naturally impressed in us.²⁰ But things naturally impressed are not lost, nor do they allow of their contraries. Therefore, the truth of God impressed on the human mind is inseparable from the mind. Therefore, God cannot be thought not to exist.

c. There is more truth in the divine being than in any axiom. But some axioms are so true that one cannot contradict them interiorly. For example, every whole is greater than its parts, and similar axioms. Consequently, this axiom cannot be thought not to be. Therefore, it is much truer to say of the first truth that it cannot be thought not to be.

d. Our mind does not know anything except in virtue of the first light and the first truth. Therefore, all the intellectual activity involved in thinking that something does not exist is by virtue of the first light. But by virtue of the first light we cannot think that the first light or first truth does not exist. Therefore, in no way can we think that the first truth does not exist.²¹

e. What we can think, we can also enunciate. But we cannot enunciate that the first truth does not exist. Therefore, we cannot think that the first

truth does not exist. Argument for the middle term:²² All discourse actually enunciated asserts that it is true. Consequently, it follows: if man were really an ass, then the proposition ‘man is an ass’ would be true. But everything which posits some truth, also posits the first truth, since every truth implies the first truth. Therefore, all discourse asserts that the first truth exists. Therefore, etc.

f. Every statement actually enunciated is either affirmative or negative. Now an affirmative statement affirms ‘this of that.’ But then this follows: if ‘this’ is a being, then what is not ‘this’ is also a being, for when I say ‘this being,’ I mean a being which is limited, finite, and confined. But if this is true, one must posit a highest being. Therefore, all affirmative discourse about creatures implies God.

g. Likewise, all negative discourse implies God, because no statement is more negative than this: ‘there is no truth.’ But in his *Soliloquies*, Augustine shows that this statement actually affirms that there is some truth.²³ For if there is no truth, it is true that there is no truth. But if this is true, something is true. And if something is true, there is some truth. Therefore, etc.

*Arguments to the contrary:*²⁴

1. Damascene says: “It is only because pernicious evil prevails in humans that one says God does not exist, according to the Psalm that says: ‘The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God’.”²⁵

2. The idolater says there is no God other than the idol; he believes this and thinks about it. But it is true that the idol is not God. Therefore, etc.

3. Whenever a thing is understood not to exist, then something can be understood that can be thought not to exist. But in his book *On the Hebdomads*, Boethius says that when we understand the counterfactual “the highest good does not exist,” something can still be understood as round or white.²⁶ Therefore, the same thing is true of the highest truth, and consequently it can be thought not to exist.

4. What is most hidden from us can easily be thought not to exist. But the truth of the divine being is most hidden from us, since “God lives in inaccessible light.”²⁷ Therefore, etc.

5. I ask: What does it mean to say God cannot be thought not to exist? If it means that this cannot be thought in any way, neither truly nor falsely, it is obviously false. If it means this cannot be thought truly, then the same sort of claim can be made about the soul, or the heavens, or things like these.

6. What we can express, we can also think. But we can express the view that the divine being does not exist. Therefore, we must be able to think the same thing. That this can happen is clear when we speak specifically, saying ‘God does not exist,’ and also when we speak generally, saying ‘nothing exists.’ And that neither of these statements implies that God exists is clear, because one thing does not imply its opposite, and what posits nothing also implies nothing. But each of these statements posits nothing.

Response:

There are two ways to think something does not exist. One way this happens is when one thinks what is false, as when I think, “Man is an ass.” Thinking in this sense is nothing more than understanding *what it is* that is said. When taken in this way, the truth of the divine being can be thought not to exist. The other way is to think with assent, as when I think something does not exist and also believe it does not exist. When taken in this way, thinking something does not exist, when it actually does exist, can happen either due to some deficiency in the knower or due to some deficiency in the thing known.²⁸

Deficiency in the knower is a kind of blindness or ignorance, due to which one thinks something does not exist because one is ignorant about it. Now there are two things we can think about any being, namely, *if it is* and *what it is*.²⁹

Our intellect can be deficient in thinking about the divine truth, with regard to thinking *what it is*; but our intellect cannot be deficient with regard to thinking *if it is*. This is why Hugh of St. Victor says: “From the

beginning God so bestowed knowledge of himself on humans that, just as *what he is* can never be comprehended, so *that he is* can never fail to be known.” Therefore, since our intellect is never deficient in knowing about God *if God is*, so it cannot be ignorant of God’s existence, absolutely speaking, nor even think God does not exist.³⁰

But since our intellect is deficient in knowing *what is*, we frequently think God is what he is not, for example, an idol, or we think God is not what he is, for example, a just God. Now whoever thinks God is not what he is, such as a just God, can as a consequence also think God does not exist. Therefore, due to a deficiency in our intellect, God can be thought not to exist or can be thought not to be the highest truth, not absolutely and generally, but as a logical consequence. This is what happens, for example, when someone who denies that happiness is found in God also denies that God exists. And the arguments that an intellect does think or can think that the divine being does not exist follow this line of thought.³¹

The other way something can be thought not to exist is due to some deficiency on the side of the thing known. Deficiencies of this kind take two forms: due to some deficiency in the presence of the thing, or due to some deficiency in the evidence for the thing.³²

Examples of deficiency in the presence of the thing are that it does not exist always, or everywhere, or everywhere as a whole. What does not exist always, sometimes is and sometimes is not. Therefore, it can be thought truly not to exist at some time. The same thing holds about what does not exist everywhere. For the same reason it can be thought not to be here, it can also be thought not to be there. And the same thing holds for what is present in part and absent in part. By contrast, God exists always and everywhere, wholly always and everywhere. Therefore, God cannot be thought not to exist. Anselm gives this argument.³³

Something can be thought not to exist, not only due to a deficiency in presence, but also due to a deficiency in the evidence for it, since what is not evident in itself also may not be evident through argument. The truth of the divine being, however, is evident both in itself and through proof.³⁴

That the divine being is evident in itself, is seen as follows: We know principles to the extent that we understand the terms which make them up, because the cause of the predicate is included in the subject. This is why principles are self-evident. The same thing is true about God. For God, or

the highest truth, is being itself, that than which nothing greater can be thought. Therefore, God cannot be thought not to be, for the predicate is already included in the subject.³⁵

The evidence for the truth of the divine being comes not only from itself, but also from proof. For every truth and every created nature proves and leads to the existence of the divine truth. For if there is being by participation and from another, there must be a being that exists due to its own essence and not from another.³⁶

And all true understanding proves and leads to the truth of the divine being, for knowledge of the divine truth is impressed on every soul, and all knowledge is by virtue of the divine truth.

Every affirmative proposition proves and leads to that truth. For every such proposition posits something. And when something is posited, it is also posited that something is true; and when it is posited that something is true, then that truth, which is the cause of everything true, is also posited.

A negative proposition, on the other hand, does not infer the truth, except, as they say, sophistically. Therefore, from the propositions “there is nothing” or “there is no truth,” one cannot conclude or infer that truth exists. For the proposition “there is nothing” destroys all truth. Therefore, no affirmative proposition follows it. And the following proposition is false: “If there were nothing, ‘there is nothing’ would be true.” Now if one objects that every proposition implies that what it says is true; the response is that if there is nothing, there would be no proposition nor anything else. Augustine mentions this argument; but he does not accept it, he only uses it as a point of enquiry.³⁷

Therefore, one should grant that the truth of the divine being is so great that one cannot think with assent that it does not exist, except due to ignorance on the part of the knower, who does not know what the term ‘God’ means.³⁸

The arguments on this side of the question should be granted, though some are dubious.

Replies to the objections:

1. Therefore, to the objection to the contrary “to the extent that pernicious evil prevails,’ I reply: Damascene is speaking about the kind of

thinking that comes from blindness, which is clear from his words, especially when he says ‘evil.’

2. Likewise, to the argument about idols, I reply: The idolater errs, because he does not know *what God is*. Consequently, he does not think ‘God does not exist’ as a universal proposition.

3. To the objection that even though God is understood not to exist, we can understand other things, I reply: Boethius is speaking about the kind of understanding when we think about a proposition asserting something impossible but we do not assent to it.

4. To the objection about what is most hidden from us, the reply is clear: *what God is* is most hidden from us, while *that God exists* is most clear to us.

5. To the objection about what it means to say the divine truth cannot be thought not to exist, I reply: This is to say that someone cannot believe that God does not exist and yet be making use of the power of reason. But the same thing is not true of creatures. For even if it is certain that one creature is present to another, it need not be present to all others, since it is not so powerful that it offers itself equally to all, as is the case with the first truth.

6. To the objection that what we can express, we can also think, I reply: In one way, thinking can be taken in a general sense for any act of the mind, whether we err or not, whether we assent or not. In this way, the claim is true. In another way, thinking involves assent. In this way, the claim is false. For we can contradict axioms with the exterior expression of reasoning, but not with interior reason itself, as the Philosopher says in the *Posterior Analytics*.^{[39](#)}

NOTES

¹ In the midst of his lengthy consideration of the three persons of the Trinity (d. 4-34), Master Peter Lombard devoted one short section (d. 8) to the unity of the divine essence. He introduced the topic this way: “Now the truth or property and unchangeableness and simplicity of the divine nature or substance or essence must be treated” (Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, 1.8.1; 1: 95). Lombard merely tried to clarify what unity of essence, lack of change, and simplicity in God mean.

More attuned to the value of reason, Bonaventure used this opportunity to compose a small metaphysical treatise on the doctrine of creation. This is clear in his answer to dubium 2 about Lombard’s text. To the question why Lombard mentioned only “truth, unchangeableness, and simplicity, when there are many other features of the divine essence,” Bonaventure replies: “Through these three properties one can sufficiently *distinguish uncreated from created being (esse)*. For created being, as created, has *being after non-being*, and so its being is hollow and possible; and consequently it has *being mixed with possibility*, and for this reason it falls away from truth, stability, and simplicity. But uncreated being has contrary properties, and is sufficiently distinguished in this way.”

Bonaventure’s doctrine of creation involves the existence of God as creator and two aspects of “created being”: a *chronological* feature, wherein all creatures begin in time, while the creator is beyond time; and an *ontological* feature, wherein a creature is ontologically complex, while the creator is ontologically simple. Here in d. 8, Bonaventure begins with God’s existence (Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1-2) and ends with the God’s ontological simplicity (Part 2, Q. 1-2). Following the order of Lombard’s text, he delays taking up the temporal aspect of creation until Book 2, d. 1.

² During the period when Franciscans, led by Alexander of Hales, were pioneering in theology the use of philosophical arguments for God’s *existence* (1238-1257), the Dominicans Albert and Thomas were not particularly interested in them: Thomas did not include even one argument in his commentary on the *Sentences* (1252-6), and Albert included only one—a brief proof from causality (1243-8, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 3. 6).

Bonaventure’s approach to the existence of God was influenced by Hales, who was the first master to use Anselm’s argument. The *Summa Halesiana* (1.1.1.1.1, 2.1, and 2.2, 1: n. 25-27), had raised three questions about the existence of God. (1): “Must there necessarily be a divine substance?” (2.1): “Must the divine essence be so known that it cannot be thought not to be?” (2.2): “Is it a property of the divine essence that it cannot be thought not to be?”

To prove God exists (q. 1), the *Summa Halesiana* used two of the three Dionysian “ways”—those of eminence and causality. But instead of Dionysius’s negative way of “remotion,” it substituted three positive arguments based on the transcendentals. This produced five arguments for God’s existence: (1) an argument “through the notion of *eminence*”; (2) an argument “by reason of *causality*”; (3) an argument “through the notion of a *being (entis)* or the *being (esse)*”; (4) an argument “through the notion of *goodness*”; and (5) an argument “through the notion of *truth*.”

In his *Sentences* commentary, Bonaventure limited himself to the way of truth, at once simplifying and deepening the *Summa Halesiana*. The two questions in D. 8, Part 1, Art. 1, work together: in q. 1, Bonaventure lays out the various senses of truth; in q. 2, he uses them to argue for God’s existence.

³ Cf. Bonaventure, *De mysterio Trinitatis*, 1.1; *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.3.2.1-2 (1: n. 87-95); Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1. d.8.1; 1. d.46.11; *Summa theologiae*, 1.4.19.1,3; Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1.16.5; *Summa contra gentiles*, 1.60.

⁴ Bonaventure sets up the question in terms of the transcendentals truth and being. His vocabulary of “being” includes *ens*, *esse*, *essendi*, and *essentia*; but he also uses *existere* and *existentia*, which are not etymologically related to “being,” but come from *ex* and *sistere*, referring to something that

“stands independently” of its causes. A creature is both *ens* and *existens*, but the two terms are not synonyms. *Ens* points out that it actually is some kind of being, while *existens* points to it as an effect resulting from its causes. Twentieth Century “existentialism” made the task of translating these medieval Latin terms more difficult, by tempting translators to use “exist” for Latin terms connected etymologically with *esse*.

J. Quinn, in *The Historical Constitution of Bonaventure’s Philosophy* (1973), attempted to be rigorously consistent in his translations, but resorted to a typesetter’s solution to do so, translating *ens* as “being,” *esse* also as “being” but put in italics, and rendering *existere* as “existing,” also in italics. Z. Hayes, in his translation of the *Itinerarium*, consistently renders forms of *existere* with “existence” terms, and usually renders both *esse* and *ens* by “being.” But occasionally he translates *esse* terms by “exist” (*Itinerarium* 1.13; 3.3; 5.3), which makes it occasionally unclear whether “exist” renders *existere* or *esse*.

We have avoided italics and have translated these terms as follows: *ens* = “a being” because it often refers to a concrete thing, but when it refers to an abstraction, it is sometimes translated simply as “being”; *esse* = “to be” or “is” when used as a verb, but “being” or “the being” when used as a noun; *essendi* = “being”; *essentia* = “essence”; *existere* and *existentia* = “to exist” or “existence.” When they occur together, *ens* is rendered by “a being” while *esse* is rendered by “the being.” When required, we have inserted the Latin term after its translation.

There is one exception to these rules. Following normal English usage, we have translated *est* as “exist” in phrases like “God exists (*Deus est*),” rather than “God is,” and “Does it exist? (*An sit?*),” rather than “Is it?”

⁵ Bonaventure’s problematic echoes *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.3.2.4 (1: n. 91): Arg. a-g reason that truth is found only in God, not in creatures, while Obj. 1-4 say that truth is also found in creatures.

⁶ Not Jerome, but Isidore, *Etymologiae*, 7.1.10-3 (PL 82: 261).

⁷ Augustine, *De vera religione*, 36.66 (PL 34: 151, CCSL 32: 230.12-14).

⁸ Augustine, *Soliloquiorum*, 1.8.15 (PL 32: 877); *De vera religione*, 34.64, 36.66 (PL 34: 150-51; CCSL 32: 229-30).

⁹ Anselm, *De veritate*, 13 (PL 158: 484-6; ed. Schmitt, 1: 196.27-199.29).

¹⁰ Augustine, *Soliloquiorum*, 2.5.8 (PL 32: 889).

¹¹ In this response, Bonaventure uses materials scattered throughout the treatise on truth in the *Summa Halesiana*, but never there brought together consistently (see *Summa*, n. 88-91 and 94). Bonaventure begins with the three senses of truth—ontological, cosmological, and epistemological—whose “comparisons” are respectively within a creature, between a creature and God, and between a created knower and the creature it knows. He then defines them as “indivision, imitation, and expression” respectively. But “indivision” seems to be the common meaning that unites all three senses of truth: indivision between potency and act within a creature (ontological truth), indivision between a creature and its divine exemplar (cosmological truth), and indivision between thought or speech and reality (epistemological truth). The purpose of the “response” is to clarify the three senses of truth in creatures, then contrast them with truth in God.

This is not Bonaventure’s only division of truth. He also distinguishes truth into “the truth of things” (ontological truth), “the truth of signs” (epistemological truth), and “the truth of morals” (In *Hexaemeron*, 4.2; *De donis spiritus sancti*, 4.7), which corresponds with the Stoic division of the philosophical sciences into physics, logic, and ethics (*De reductione*, 4; *Itinerarium*, 3.6).

¹² Bonaventure defines ontological truth as “the indivision of act and potency,” based on *Summa Halesiana* (1.1.1.3.2.1.2c, 1: n. 88): “Although in reality true, one, and good coincide in the same thing, the notions of them differ, as was said above in the question on unity. For a being (*ens*) and an entity (*entitas*) have an absolute meaning. But ‘one’ adds to a being (*ens*) indivision, so that unity is the indivision of a being. And ‘true’ adds to the indivision of a being (*entis*) the indivision of the

being (*esse*), so that truth is the indivision of the being (*esse*) and that which is. And ‘good’ adds to the indivision of a being (*entis*) and of the being (*esse*), indivision about well-being (*bene esse*), so that the good is called the indivision of act from potency, and act is called the completion or perfection of the possibility that a thing has by nature.”

Following Philip the Chancellor (*Summa de bono*), the *Summa Halesiana* used “indivision” to explain the ontological sense of all three transcendental attributes—unity, truth, and goodness. Bonaventure recognizes the slippage among these definitions, and here he uses the *Summa*’s definition of goodness as his definition of truth. For the more a thing actually fulfills the potentialities of its nature, the “truer” such a thing is to its nature. Repetition among definitions of one, good, and true in the *Summa* led Bonaventure to limit his argument for God’s existence to one transcendental—truth. Aquinas reacted to the *Summa* in a different way, using “indivision” to define only one transcendental—unity—while explaining goodness and truth differently (*De veritate*, 1.1).

Bonaventure defines the cosmological sense of truth as “the representation or imitation of the supreme and first truth” (reading *veritatis* with the mss.), a definition that compares a creature to its divine source. See *Summa Halesiana*, n. 89 (“uncreated truth”); n. 90 (“the truth of the cause and the truth of the caused”); n. 91 (truth as “the intelligible light” of God); n. 94 (the “first truth” and the truth “in a creature by which it has a likeness to God”).

Bonaventure defines the epistemological sense of truth as “expression” and as “the reason for distinguishing” (reading *ratio distinguendi* with the mss.). Bonaventure’s phrases (*ratio distinguendi* and *ratio discernendi*) reflect the language of the *Summa*, which had described epistemological truth using the terms *discernere* and *distinguere* (“to distinguish,” and “to discern” in the sense of “to know”). The *Summa* also called this sense “the truth of the sign or of signification” and defined it: “truth is the adequation of thing and intellect” (1: n. 89, n. 94). Bonaventure adds the term *ratio* to his account of epistemological truth, and later his account of the divine ideas (d. 35) focuses on the “rational means of understanding” (*ratio intelligendi*) or “rational means of knowing” (*ratio cognoscendi*). *Ratio* has both subjective and objective senses (“my power of reason” and “the reason for the thing”), and so it shows that the “comparison” in knowledge involves both created knower and creature known. On *ratio*, see below [p. 219 n. 8](#).

¹³ Recognizing multiple senses of truth makes it necessary for Bonaventure to reply both to the *Objections* and the arguments *To the contrary*, which espoused notions of truth that are too limited.

¹⁴ Cf. Bonaventure, *De mysterio Trinitatis*, 1.1; *Itinerarium*, 1-3, 5; *De scientia Christi*, 4; *In Hexaemeron*, 10; *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.1.1-2 (1: n. 25-7); Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 3.1-3, 6; *Summa theologiae*, 1.4.19.1.4; Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 3.1.2; *Summa theologiae*, 1.2.1.

¹⁵ Bonaventure does not formulate the question as “Does God exist?” but follows the formulations of Alexander of Hales and Anselm. He collapses what were for Hales three questions (see [q. 1](#), [n. 2](#), [XXX](#) above) and for Anselm two questions (see *Proslogion*, 2 and 3), into just one question.

¹⁶ The three kinds of truth he distinguished in q. 1, form the basis for the three ways of arguing for God’s existence that Bonaventure presents in his “response” here in q. 2: the ontological sense of truth, as it applies to God, forms the basis for his version of the *ontological argument*; the cosmological sense of truth forms the basis for his type of *cosmological argument*; and the epistemological sense of truth forms the basis for his version of the *illumination argument*.

¹⁷ Bonaventure’s problematic: The arguments *pro* all hold that God exists, while the objections to the contrary hold, not so much that God does not exist, but that humans can assert atheism (against Anselm, *Proslogion* 3). The affirmative arguments are further subdivided, based on the structure of an Aristotelian science. Here Bonaventure moves well beyond Anselm, who did not know Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics*, and Hales, who did not apply its teachings rigorously to the issue of the existence of God.

An Aristotelian “science” uses un-demonstrated but true principles to demonstrate conclusions about some subject. (See [16 n. 3](#).) Its principles are divided into: (1) “axioms” or common principles and proper principles, which are further subdivided into (2) definitions of fundamental terms and (3) suppositions or postulates, that is, fundamental propositions assumed as true in the science.

Bonaventure’s full problematic, then, is this: On the side of falsity: 1) Is it possible to deny that God exists? On the side of truth: 2) Is God’s existence an axiom known by all and undeniable? Or is God’s existence deniable because it is 3) a postulate known by a “few,” and if so, is it based on faith or reason? Or is God’s existence deniable because it is 4) a rationally demonstrable conclusion?

Most theistic philosophers choose only one of these options and one kind of argument for the existence of God, to the exclusion of others. But, inspired by Francis, who seemed to find evidence of God everywhere, after laying out the possible routes to the existence of God, Bonaventure then proceeds to follow them *all*. He does so because he explicitly holds that the same conclusion can be proven through different kinds of rational argument, as well as being known through faith:

“Someone who knows something through a demonstration of the fact or by means of an effect, if he begins to understand it by means of a cause or through a demonstration of the reason why, does not for this reason lose his earlier knowledge, even though the second kind of knowledge is finer than the first. Therefore, one can have two kinds of knowledge of the same thing, one of which is finer than the other, where the one does not expel or remove the other. And if this is true, then it seems that at the same time something can be known which is acquired by reasoning and also is infused by illumination. Therefore, about the same thing at the same time one can have both faith and scientific knowledge.” See [33-34](#) above.

¹⁸ Arg. a—c hold “God exists” is an undemonstrated principle. Behind them stands Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, 3. Pr. 10: “The *common conception* of human minds shows that God, the first principle of all things, is good; for, since nothing can be thought of better than God, who would doubt that that than which nothing is better is good?”

¹⁹ This is Anselm’s description of God. “Therefore, there is no doubt that *something than which a greater cannot be thought* must exist both in the intellect and in reality,” *Proslogion*, 2 (PL 158: 227; ed. Schmitt: 1: 102). Bonaventure says this truth is a “common conception of the mind (*communis animi conceptio*),” a phrase not found in Anselm, but one that goes back to Euclid, *Elements* 1, who called Aristotle’s axioms “common conceptions.” Later, Boethius in *De hebdomadibus* somewhat confusingly used the term “common conception” widely, as a synonym for “principle,” which he subdivided into those common conceptions known by all humans [= Aristotle’s axioms] and those known only to the wise [= Aristotle’s proper principles]. Following Boethius, Arg. a seems to understand God’s existence as an axiom rather than a postulate.

²⁰ Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, 1.1 (PG 94: 790; ed. Buytaert, 12). Bonaventure knew this text of Damascene from Alexander of Hales. See [n. 18](#) below.

²¹ Arg. d—g, which present God’s existence as a demonstrated conclusion, are variations on the illumination argument, reasoning from the effect of knowledge in the human mind to God as its ultimate cause. Behind these arguments stands Augustine, e.g., *Confessiones*, 7.10, 17; but none of these arguments is based directly on Augustine’s text.

²² “Argument for the middle term (*probatio mediae*)” is a technical expression from the logic of his day that Bonaventure uses for supplementary arguments that explain or defend using the middle term of a particular syllogism to connect its subject and predicate terms. The focus is on the middle term as a link. Such an argument is different from arguments that defend the truth of the major or minor premisses: *probatio majoris* and *probatio minoris*.

²³ Augustine, *Soliloquiorum*, 2.2.2, 2.15.28 (PL 32: 886, 898).

²⁴ Uppermost in Bonaventure’s mind on this side of the question is the empirical fact that some people are atheists, contrary to Anselm’s over-reaching conclusion in *Proslogion* 3. Arg. 1 gives the most powerful reason why most atheists deny God—the argument from evil. Arg. 4 gives the most

powerful reason why some theists, such as Albert and Aquinas, hold that God's existence is not obvious, even if true—God's hiddenness.

²⁵ Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, 1.3 (PG 94: 794; ed. Buytaert, 16), citing Ps 13:1.

²⁶ Boethius, *De hebdomadibus*, (PL 64: 1312-3; ed. Loeb 44-50).

²⁷ 1 Tim 6: 16.

²⁸ Bonaventure begins his subtle response by defending the real possibility of atheism. Since knowledge is a relation of knower to known, there are two possible causes of false claims: either some error in the knower or some deficiency in the object of knowledge. Bonaventure looks first at the problem from the side of the human knower, then from the side of the object known—God.

²⁹ Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 2.1 (89b21-35; Aristoteles Latinus, 4.1-4: 69.1-15) had set out four scientific questions: 1) “Whether it is a fact (quia)?”, e.g., “Is God good?”; 2) “What is the reason why (propter quid)?”, e.g., “Why is God good?”; 3) “Does it exist (an sit)?”, e.g., “Does God exist?”; and 4) “What is it (quid sit)?”, e.g., “What is God?” Bonaventure follows Alexander of Hales and Hugh of St. Victor in limiting himself to 3) and 4).

³⁰ *Summa Halesiana*, 1. Intro. 2.2.2 (1: n. 14), “According to Hugh [of St. Victor], ‘from the beginning God so tempered human knowledge of himself that just as a human could never comprehend what he is, so a human could never ignore that he exists.’ Therefore, I reply: knowledge that God exists can be obtained through natural reason, but not knowledge of what he is.... That he is, as Hugh said above, John Damascene also says: ‘Creation itself and its permanence and the governance of things preach the greatness of divine nature, so that in all humans, knowledge of the existence of God has been inserted by nature.’” Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis*, 1.3.1 (PL 176:217A; Corpus Victorinum 74). Also, Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1.d.3.2c, where to the question “What did the philosophers know about God, only that he exists?” he answered: “They knew only that he exists and what he is not, not what he is, as was said above. For though they knew about certain attributes of God, they did not have certain knowledge about them.”

³¹ Bonaventure here shows how atheism is possible, in spite of the fact that God's existence is an axiom known to all. This can happen because human knowledge of God's nature is defective. We are led to erroneous conceptions of that nature, from which can follow by logical inference the conclusion that God does not exist in the first place. Bonaventure correlates the kinds of mistakes we can make with the three acts of the mind—apprehension of concepts, judgment of propositions, and reasoning—at *De mysterio Trinitatis*, 1.1c. In sum, he thinks humans are spontaneously theists, but can convince themselves to become atheists.

³² Bonaventure now turns to the objective side of the issue, where mistakes are possible either because the object known is not present to us or because evidence for it is lacking.

³³ Anselm, *Liber apologeticus contra Gaunilonem*, 1 (PL 158:250; ed. Schmitt, 1:131-32). Creatures are not ubiquitous, so mistakes owing to their lack of presence abound; but God is ubiquitous, so there is no deficiency in God's presence.

³⁴ The second source of error is lack of evidence of the object. Here philosophical arguments for the existence of God come into play, because they show there is no deficiency in the evidence for God's existence. The neoplatonic movement to God—from the exterior to the interior, and from the inferior to the superior—Bonaventure knew from Augustine and Dionysius. An argument can start inside or outside the mind, and it can proceed from cause to effect or from effect to cause. Since there is no cause of God, this neoplatonic movement produced three kinds of arguments:

1) Bonaventure's ontological argument starts with a notion of God and proceeds logically from the divine nature as cause to God's existence as effect, arguing that the very nature of God entails existence. Such an argument shows that God's existence is “evident in itself” (*evidens in se*). The other two modes of argument move from effect to cause and therefore make God's existence “evident through proof” (*evidens in probando*). 2) Bonaventure's cosmological argument begins in the world

and moves to God as ultimate cause, while his 3) illumination argument also proceeds from an effect, but one in the mind, to God. Each argument uses one of the three senses of truth described in d. 8, part 1, q. 1, above 100, 113 nn. 11-12.

On how these three routes follow the neoplatonic movement to God, see *De mysterio trinitatis*, 1.1c: “The existence of God is doubtless true, for whether the intellect turns within itself, outside itself, or looks above itself, if it proceeds rationally it knows with certainty and without doubt that God exists.”

³⁵ Though this is Bonaventure’s earliest version of the ontological argument, he has already absorbed Anselm into his thought, and also moved beyond him:

1) His training in logic allowed Bonaventure to present this argument as reasoning in support of God’s existence conceived as a principle; this argument does not lead to God’s existence as a demonstrated conclusion.

2) Anselm had provided an argument strategy, not just one argument limited to his particular description of God. (See *De mysterio trinitatis*, 1.1, Arg. 21-29.) Bonaventure presents three different middle terms for the ontological argument: Anselm’s formula and two additional middles of his own devising, which are transcendental attributes of God. Each middle casts a different light on the inference. Anselm’s formula emphasizes that atheism contradicts itself. “Highest truth” points to the role of indivision in the argument, indivision among the terms “God,” the transcendental attributes Bonaventure uses for middle terms, and the predicate term “is” (*est*). And “being itself” points to what is arguably Bonaventure’s greatest contribution to the ontological argument, his account of why God’s existence is “evident in itself”:

3) Bonaventure was the first master to use Aristotle’s account of per se at *Posterior Analytics* 1.4 to explain what makes this or any other principle self-evident: The subject of the proposition (God), under Bonaventure’s three descriptions, causes the predicate of the proposition (is). An appropriate middle term for the ontological argument shows that God’s very nature entails that God exist, and necessarily so.

This reasoning was so powerful that even Aquinas embraced it, when God is considered “in himself (in se).” See *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 3.1.2c, *Summa theologiae*, 1.2.1. Where the two friars parted company is about the access humans have to the nature of God.

³⁶ Bonaventure’s exceedingly brief cosmological argument proceeds from a real effect in the world to God as its cause. Here Bonaventure uses four different descriptions of creatures as middle terms. The effect chosen is first described as transcendental “truth” in its ontological sense, then as “created nature.” In supporting the inference from creature to God, Bonaventure then adds two more middle terms: “being by participation,” which implies being in itself, and being “from another,” which implies being not dependent on another. These two terms are disjunctive transcendentals. (See below [164-65](#), [n. 23](#).) In *De mysterio trinitatis*, 1.1, Arg. 11-20, Bonaventure uses these two and adds eight other middle terms taken from the disjunctive transcendentals. These middle terms form what he there describes as “ten self-evident postulates and suppositions,” that is, ten truths that are empirical and philosophical, but so fundamental as to be philosophical principles. When they are applied to the case of God, these middle terms demonstrate that God exists.

³⁷ Bonaventure’s illumination argument begins within the mind with epistemological truth. For the human soul to attain “true understanding,” it must be impressed by “divine truth,” which therefore must exist. Bonaventure’s argument does not follow Augustine’s arguments closely, and it does not clarify which aspect of “true understanding” requires divine intervention. But when he further elaborates his illumination argument in *De scientia Christi* 4 and *Itinerarium* 2, Bonaventure will show that it completes Augustine’s argument by indicating that it is the certitude found in scientific knowledge, and that alone, that must come from God. See also, *De mysterio trinitatis*, 1.1, Arg. 1-10.

³⁸ In this summary, the phrase “the truth of the divine being” re-emphasizes the way transcendental truth provides the three routes to God. In this question, Bonaventure locates knowledge of God’s existence within all three parts of an Aristotelian science—as axiom, postulate, and conclusion. Knowledge of God’s existence, in short, is ubiquitous.

Common axiom: God’s existence is an axiom of rational human thought known by all humans. But it can be doubted and denied, when we make mistakes about God’s nature. Consequently, while common to all, most have only an uncertain opinion that God exists, because they lack an adequate definition of God. Bonaventure recognizes two remedies for this deficiency, one taken from faith, the other from reason. In both cases, God’s existence is recognized by “a few” and in this way comes to function more like a postulate than an axiom known by all.

Postulate of theology: One remedy for doubt about God’s existence, Bonaventure had already presented at the outset of his commentary. At Prologue, q. 1 (3, 16 n. 6, above), he introduced God as known through faith. Such faith makes God’s existence a postulate of theological science. Faith postulated on the authority of revelation is certain, but its certainty comes from God, not human reason.

Postulate of metaphysics: The rational remedy is Bonaventure’s version of the ontological argument, a philosophical argument supporting a rationally known principle. It proceeds deductively from a description of God to the consequence that God must exist. (See “If God is God, God is,” *De mysterio trinitatis* 1.1. Arg. 29, which Bonaventure drew from the *Summa Halesiana*). As an argument for rather than from a principle, this reasoning is dialectical; but it opens the mind up to an intuition that is certain, by recognizing that God’s nature does entail existence. Here concepts of the transcendental attributes—being, true, good—provide the mind with the notions it uses in this argument for the one God’s existence.

Demonstrated conclusion: God’s existence is also known philosophically when it is proven through two kinds of “demonstrations of the fact”: the cosmological argument and the illumination argument. These proofs proceed from created truth as a vestige to God who is its cause. The cosmological argument uses created truth present in a creature (its ontological truth), while the illumination argument uses created truth in the human mind (epistemological truth).

All three of the arguments Bonaventure uses here are philosophical and metaphysical arguments, because they proceed in purely rational terms. But Bonaventure also incorporates them into theological science, where they lose nothing of their rational character, because the function of theology is to make the object of belief also understood (*credibile ut intelligibile*). In this response, Bonaventure considerably developed rational arguments for the very existence of God within theology itself, a practice that was just beginning when he wrote these words, but which under his influence became popular in the second half of the thirteenth century. It was even adopted by the Dominicans Albert and Thomas in later works (Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1.2.3; Albert, *Summa theologiae*). Bonaventure himself further developed all three lines of argument. See *De scientia Christi*, 4 (illumination argument), *De mysterio trinitatis*, 1.1, Arg. 1-10 (illumination), Arg. 11-20 (cosmological), and Arg. 21-29 (ontological); *Itinerarium*, c. 1 (cosmological), c. 2-3 (illumination), c. 5-6 (ontological).

³⁹ Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 1.10 (76b26-27; *Aristoteles Latinus*, 4.1-4: 24.22-23).

TOPIC 4: THE NATURE OF GOD: DIVINE IMMUTABILITY

Book 1
Distinction 8

PART 1
ARTICLE 2: ON GOD BEING UNCHANGEABLE¹

QUESTION 1

*Is God unchangeable?*²

*That God is unchangeable is argued as follows:*³

a. All change is either substantial or accidental. God does not change substantially, because everything subject to such change is destructible. But God, or the divine substance, since it has no cause, is indestructible. Therefore, etc.

b. Nor does God change accidentally, for there is no accident in God. Therefore, there is no change in God at all.

c. Everything that changes is in potency before it is in act, and in this respect, act differs from potency. But God is pure act. Therefore, God cannot be changed in any way.

d. Richard of St. Victor gives this argument: “All change results in a better state, a worse state, or an equal state.”⁴ But the divine nature cannot be changed in any of these ways: not into a better state, because it already exists in the truest way possible; not into a worse state, because it exists in itself; and not into an equal state, because it is perfect. Therefore, being subject to change is in no way suitable to the divine being.⁵

To the contrary:

1. The book of *Wisdom* says: “Wisdom is more mobile than any motion.”⁶ Therefore, etc.

If one replies: Wisdom is called mobile as a cause, since it makes other things to move:

I say to the contrary: Nothing gives what it does not have. Now God gives all things motion. Therefore, motion or change exists to the greatest degree in God.⁷

2. Everything, that now is something it previously was not, has changed. Now the Son of God is a human, but was not a human from all eternity. Therefore, the Son of God has changed.

If you reply: 'Human' is predicated of the Son of God, not through inhering in him, but through union with him. Now union is a kind of relation, and relation comes without change, as value comes to coins of money, as Augustine says in *On the Trinity*.⁸

I say to the contrary: Ambrose argues in a similar way against a heretic who said the Son was generated in time from the Father. If this is so, then the Father went from not being the Father to being the Father. Therefore, he changed; and the same is true in the present case.⁹

3. Whoever goes from not being an agent to being one is changed by proceeding from inaction to action. But God has proceeded from not creating to creating. Therefore, God has changed.

If you reply: God has gone from not being an agent to being an agent, not due to some change in him, but due to a change in the effect produced, like the sun going from not illuminating to illuminating:

I say to the contrary: It is not because there is a creature that God creates, but rather because God creates, a creature comes about or is produced. Therefore, God's acting is prior to the creature coming to be. Therefore, since the posterior is not the cause of the prior, it is not because a creature comes to be a being from non-being that God comes to be a creator from not being a creator. Rather, the converse is true, for change comes about by reason of the agent, not by reason of the effect.

4. God wills things that he did not previously will, for in time he willed to create what he did not will from all eternity. But whoever wills something not previously willed has changed. Therefore, etc.

If you reply: From all eternity he willed to create the world in the first instant, just like I can will to go to Mass tomorrow:

I say to the contrary: The will of God is a proximate and immediate cause of things. But once a proximate and immediate cause is posited, the

effect is posited as well. Therefore, if God willed it from all eternity, the world would exist from all eternity.

Response:

As Boethius says, “God, while remaining stable, makes everything move.”¹⁰

So the divine essence is unchangeable. For it does not change place, since it is everywhere; it does not change through time, because it is eternal all at once; and it does not change form, because it is pure act. God’s *simplicity* eliminates change in form; God’s *eternity* eliminates change through time; and God’s *immensity* eliminates change in place.¹¹

And because in God there is the greatest stability, there is also the cause of all motion. For, as Augustine proves and the Philosopher holds, every motion proceeds from something immobile.¹² For example, when the hand is moved the elbow remains stationary, and when the elbow moves, the shoulder remains stationary. Therefore, since the wisdom of God is stable, it moves all things.¹³

Replies to the objections to the contrary that God is changeable:

1. To the objection that wisdom is called “mobile,” I reply: Wisdom is called mobile in an active sense, because it makes things move. Wisdom is not called mobile in a passive sense, in the way an animal is called sensible.

To the objection that nothing gives another what it does not have, I reply: There are three ways of having something: formally speaking, as an exemplar, and as a cause. In each of these ways, that which has something can give it. God does *not* have motion in the first way, but does in the second and third.¹⁴

2. To the objection based on relation, I reply: A relation that begins at a certain point necessarily results in some change in one of the two things related, but not necessarily in both. Therefore, a relation of one divine person to another person results in some change in one of the persons, and due to that change, the other persons are changed as well, since all are the same in essence. Therefore, there would necessarily be a change if the Father became the Father from not being the Father. However, the relation

of one essence to another essence does not necessarily result in some change, except in one of the things related. Since the essences are different, one can be changed without the other being changed. Therefore, in God's relation to creatures, change is always understood to come about in the creature, but not in God. In fact, God is not related, properly speaking, to the creature, except verbally and in a manner of speaking.

It can also be said that there is a lack of similarity in the two cases. The relation of divine persons makes the person to exist, but relation to creatures does not work this way. Therefore, this inference follows: if he begins to be the Father, he begins to be. But this inference does not follow: if God begins to be human, God begins to be. Therefore, the argument of Ambrose is valid: If the Father began to generate, he would have changed because he would have begun to be, not because he would have changed from one state to another.

3. To the objection when from not being an agent, etc., I reply: There is one kind of agent that is its own action, and another kind of agent that is not its own action, but whose action is something that comes from it. The agent that is not its own action so acts that between it and its effect some middle thing comes to be that sets them apart. And this kind of agent never becomes an agent from not having been an agent without some change occurring, since something new comes to it. But an agent that is its own action acts on its own. Therefore, between it and its effect there is no middle thing setting it apart. Therefore, when it becomes an agent from not having been an agent, since nothing new happens to it, it is not changed. And God is this latter kind of agent.

4. To the objection concerning the will of God: Proximate and immediate cause is said in three ways: with respect to substance, with respect to disposition, or with respect to act. With respect to substance, no other substance acting as a cause falls between the proximate and immediate cause and the effect. With respect to disposition, no other disposition is added to the proximate and immediate cause to produce the effect. With respect to act, there is said to be a proximate and immediate cause when the cause is conjoined with the act. Therefore, I reply that the will of God is the proximate and immediate cause, from all eternity, in relation to substance and disposition, but not in relation to act. For the will

is not joined to an act except at the time it wills to act. This is clear when I say ‘I want to lecture tomorrow.’ The will is not now conjoined to the act, but will be tomorrow.

QUESTION 2

*Is God alone unchangeable?*¹⁵

The second question is whether being unchangeable is a property of the divine essence,¹⁶ in such a way that it does not apply to any creature?

*It seems that this is true:*¹⁷

a. *1 Timothy* says of God: “he alone has immortality.”¹⁸ And Augustine says in *Against Maximinus*: “In every changeable nature, its death is a kind of change.”¹⁹ Therefore, if God alone has immortality, God alone is unchangeable.

b. Everything destructible is changeable. But every creature is destructible. That is why Damascene says: “Everything which begins out of destruction tends to destruction.”²⁰ Therefore, etc.

c. Everything that in its own nature tends to nothingness is, when considered in itself, changeable. But every creature is like this. Consequently, Gregory says: “All tend to nothingness, unless the hand of the creator sustains them.”²¹ Therefore, etc.

d. No accident is stable in itself. But being is an accident of every creature, as Hilary says and the text of the Master asserts, since being comes from another.²² Therefore, every creature is unstable in its being.

e. Everything that is empty is subject to variation. But every creature is empty, since it comes from nothing. Consequently, Romans says: “The creature is subject to emptiness.”²³ Therefore, if every creature is empty, no creature is unchangeable.

f. Everything that has changed is changeable in itself. But every creature has been made. Therefore, every creature has been changed, and consequently is changeable.

To the contrary: Being unchangeable is said in three ways, for the invariable, the incorruptible, and the completely indestructible are all called unchangeable:²⁴

1. One can show that invariability applies to creatures, as for example to principles. For Augustine says in his *Confessions* that unformed matter is invariable, since what lacks form lacks order, and what lacks order lacks alteration, and consequently variation.²⁵ And the author of the book *On the six principles* says about form that “it consists in a simple and invariable essence.”²⁶

2. It seems that being invariable applies to the blessed, for where there is perfect happiness, there is no loss, and where there is no loss, there is no variation.

3. In his *Literal Commentary on Genesis* Augustine says that variation is either in place or time.²⁷ But some creatures lack a definite place and time. For example, universals are always and everywhere, and the empyrean heavens are outside time and place. Therefore, etc.

4. If being unchangeable means being incorruptible, the same conclusion follows. “For all natural corruption derives from contraries,” as the Philosopher says in his book on life and death.²⁸ But many creatures lack contraries. Therefore, they also lack corruptibility.

5. All corruption is toward something prior to the thing corrupted, since natural corruption is corruption toward something. But there is nothing prior to principles, such as matter. Therefore, they are incorruptible.

6. Everything that is perpetual is incorruptible. But some creatures are perpetual by nature. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor: being perpetual belongs to the nature of an image. Consequently, Augustine says: “The soul

would not be an image, if it ceased to be at the point of death.”²⁹ Therefore, since the soul is by nature an image, it is by nature immortal or perpetual.

7. One can show that a creature is indestructible, as follows. Destructibility is toward non-being. But there is nothing which can turn a creature into non-being. For it is not completely destroyed by itself, since nothing corrupts itself. Nor is it completely destroyed by another, since the activity of a creature terminates in that from which it began. But the activity of no creature begins from non-being. Therefore, etc.

Again, there is an infinite distance between the being of a creature and nothing. But between extremes which are infinitely distant, no finite power can produce a change. Therefore, nothing can proceed to nothing, unless God produces this effect.

8. Destruction is defined as corruption into complete non-being. But nothing which is corrupted proceeds all the way to non-being. Therefore, nothing that is corruptible can be completely destroyed.

If you reply: A creature is not indestructible by nature, but only by grace:

I say to the contrary: That which is found in everything is natural, for grace is something special, while what is natural is the same for all. Now almost every creature is indestructible, since no creature is reduced completely to nothing. Therefore, this kind of indestructibility is natural.

9. Likewise, one can show that a creature is not indestructible through grace; for grace is a perfection of nature. Therefore, what is contrary to nature cannot be given through grace. Therefore, if indestructibility were contrary to the nature of a creature, it could not be given through grace.

10. One can object concerning this grace, since if it is a creature, then it is destructible. Consequently, if indestructibility is found in it, this must happen due to some other grace; and this would set up an infinite regress. Therefore, if this sequence comes to an end, it cannot do so through grace. If you say that the grace in question is not called a habit, but God is freely preserving the creature, this amounts to no explanation, since no creature acts without God’s action. Therefore, as no creature would be indestructible

except by grace, so no creature would act except by grace. Therefore, no action would be natural, which is a foolish thing to say.

Response:

Something is said to be unchangeable due to lack of the ability to change. Now there are three kinds of change. One kind of change is from one state of a being to another state of a being; and this is accidental change and is called *variation*. The second kind of change is from a being absolutely speaking to a being in potency or a being in some respect; and this is a change in form and is called *corruption*. The third kind of change is from a being to what is absolutely not a being; and this is a change of the whole substance of the thing and is called *destruction*. Correlatively, there are three ways of being unchangeable: the first is invariability; the second is incorruptibility; and the third is indestructibility.^{[30](#)}

Concerning the way of being unchangeable called invariability, I say it is not in any way found in a creature, neither naturally nor through grace. For everything created either is an accident or has an accident, and therefore is variable. Properly speaking, invariability is proper to God alone.

Concerning the way of being unchangeable called incorruptibility, I say it is found in some creatures. It is found in some things naturally, for example, in simple beings, and it is found in some things through grace, for example, in glorified bodies. Therefore, properly speaking, incorruptibility is not proper to the divine essence.

Concerning the third way of being unchangeable, I say that while it can exist in all creatures through grace, it is found in nothing by nature, except God. For the indestructible by nature is what has out of itself the ability to remain in existence. This is found in what has no emptiness and in which a change in essence can never take place, neither in the direction of being nor in the direction of non-being. Now this kind of thing alone is eternal. Therefore, this indestructibility is found only in God and, properly speaking, is proper to him. Indestructibility through grace, however, can be found in all, or at least in many, creatures. For God, through the goodness of his grace, keeps everything else from falling into nothingness. I am speaking here of creatures that are said to have a complete quiddity and to exist in their own right (*per se existens*).^{[31](#)}

Therefore, one should grant that being unchangeable, as lack of accidental variation, whether actual or potential, belongs to God alone. Likewise, being unchangeable as a lack of change into non-being, whether actual or potential, belongs to God alone as a natural attribute, though grace can bestow it on many creatures.

Since the first set of arguments proceeds to these conclusions, they should be granted.

Replies to the objections to the contrary:

1. To the objection to the contrary that the principles of things are invariable, I reply: The objection is true, when principles are considered in their abstract essences. But when principles are considered in their natural being, then they necessarily have conjoined accidents, and can vary. Accidental variation, however, concerns being.

2. To the objection that there can be no variation among the blessed, I reply: This is true with regard to the substance of their reward and with regard to the very essence of the reward. But variation can occur with regard to their turning toward those below, both in affections, as is clear in the case of angels, and in actions. Therefore, the blessed will be agile and able to be moved.

3. To the objection about universals and the empyrean heavens, I reply: Both of these undergo variation. The universal varies by reason of that in which it exists, since when we are moved, the things which are in us are moved. The empyrean heavens are moved by reason of what they contain. For it is possible for them to contain something they do not now contain and not to contain something that they now contain.

4-6. To the objection about incorruptibility, I reply: As has been indicated, being incorruptible is true of some creatures. For some creatures are so simple and unified that no contrariety is found in them, nor is there any more basis for corruption in them than there is in principles. Yet just as principles cannot be analyzed into something further, such simples could nevertheless fall into nothingness if they were left to themselves. And the same thing should be understood about certain substances. Consequently, one should not say that it is true that every composite can be analyzed into

things, but, as Anselm says, “some are analyzable really, others only rationally.”³² Consequently, the arguments making this point should be granted.

7-8. To the objection about destructibility, I reply: Every creature is destructible by nature, if left to itself. If you ask about the reason for this, I reply: Since destruction of this sort is a pure lack, one can find neither an efficient cause for it nor anything that reduces it to pure non-being, but one can only find lack of a cause. To understand this we should note that nature is said to be the natural origin of a thing. Now the origin of a creature is *both* from nothing and from its principles. For this reason, something is said to be natural to the creature in two ways: because it is present in it either because it is from nothing or because it is from its principles.

Since there is not an efficient cause of nothing, but rather lack of a cause, it follows that properties present in a creature because it is from nothing are not positive characteristics, but privations in the creature. They do not come from power, but from privation of power, and they do not have an efficient cause, but privation of a cause. Such things are emptiness, instability, and destructibility. Therefore, if one asks why a creature is destructible, I reply: not on account of some efficient cause but through some lack in the thing itself.

In so far as we call natural what is in a thing through its proper and intrinsic principles, privations and defects are not said to be in a thing naturally, whereas positive attributes are. Therefore, taking natural in this sense, no creature can be destroyed all the way to non-being. On the other hand, neither is a creature called naturally indestructible, since what is natural is that over which the nature has power. But the principles of a thing have no power to conserve the thing, nor even to conserve themselves. Therefore, indestructibility is not a natural feature of these kinds of things. On the other hand, indestructibility is not *contrary* to nature, but is *consonant* with nature. For each nature desires its own preservation, even when it cannot do this by itself. This is most of all true about the creature that desires beatitude, which is the creature made in the image of God. And since no desire of a nature is in vain, where nature is lacking, God’s gratuitous influence steps in. In this way it is clear that destructibility is in a creature by nature, while indestructibility comes from grace.³³

9. To the objection comparing grace to nature, one must understand that grace is called an aid, coming from above, with regard to what is beyond the power of nature. This aid is two-fold: either in relation to being absolutely or in relation to being perfect.

In relation to being absolutely, for example, the conservation of being, since they are empty (*vana*), no principles can preserve themselves in being by themselves in such a way that there are no other means, infused or bestowed, whereby they are preserved. Since it concerns being, and since being is common to all things, this grace is common to all things. Consequently, this is the grace that has the manner of nature, and this is the grace whereby other things are said to be indestructible.

In the second way, grace is called an aid with respect to being perfect. Since the perfection of being is found in what is ordered to beatitude, it concerns well-being and not what belongs to all. Therefore, this is a special habit some possess, though not all, and it is grace operating after the manner of grace. From this it is clear how the objection looks at grace. For the objection looks at grace in this latter way, as a special habit contrary to nature, since it refers to something created anew. But it does not look at grace in the former way.

10. From this the answer to the last objection is clear: For grace is called an aid with respect to what is beyond the power of nature, but the preservation of principles is beyond the power of nature, whereas the issuing of actions is under nature's power. Therefore, it is clear, etc.

NOTES

¹ Having established the existence of God under the rubric of divine truth, Bonaventure now develops the logical consequences that the divine truth must be unchangeable (d. 8, Part 1, Art. 2) and ontologically simple (d. 8, Part 2). Here in q. 1 he looks at God as unchangeable in himself; then in q. 2 he compares God with changing creatures. Bonaventure's argument in the response presupposes that God is ontologically simple. Recognizing the problem with Lombard's order of presentation, he changed to a strictly deductive order of topics in *De mysterio trinitatis*: "Therefore, the first principle, because it is first (q. 1) is supremely one (q. 2), and for this reason is *supremely simple* (q. 3) and immense (q. 4), and for this reason is eternal (q. 5), *unchangeable* (q. 6), and necessary (q. 7), ..." (q. 8, response; 5: 114, see Hayes tr. 263-4). This order was inspired by Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis* 1.2, (PL 176:210B-211C, Corpus Victorinum 65-67) c. 9-10 (that God exists); c. 11 (that God is three and one); c. 12 (that God is supremely one); c. 13 (that God is unchangeable).

² Cf. Bonaventure, *De mysterio Trinitatis*, 6; *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.1.2.1-2 (1: n. 28-29); Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1.d.8.16-17; *Summa theologiae*, 1.4.21.1,2; Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1.d.8.3.1; *Summa theologiae*, 1.9.1.

³ Bonaventure's problematic: Arg. a-d reason that God is unchangeable because change is incompatible with the divine nature. Obj. 1-4 argue that God must change in some way because connected to creation as its cause.

⁴ Richard of St. Victor, *De trinitate*, 2.3 (PL 196: 903; ed. Ribailier, 110).

⁵ Arg. a-d set out principles Bonaventure borrows from the philosophers to use in both q. 1 and 2. These are Aristotle's categories and causes, which fall under what Bonaventure earlier had called the "special conditions" of being (75 above). The ten categories show that all change is either substantial or accidental; but God cannot change in either way (Arg. a and b). The four causes show that all change requires a subject which initially has the potential for some end and then, through a process of change induced by an efficient cause, actually achieves that end. Both of these conditions are impossible for God (Arg. c and d).

In the background of these arguments are some important Aristotelian claims: (1) change requires four causes: matter, agent, form, and end (*Physics*, 2.4, 194b23-195a3); (2) change is "the actualization of the potential in so far as it is potential" (*Physics*, 3.1, 201a10-11); (3) time is the "measure of change with respect to before and after" (*Physics*, 4.11, 210b1); and (4) the categories determine four species of change: generation and corruption in the category of substance; alteration in the category of quality; increase and decrease in the category of quantity; and locomotion in the category of place (*Physics*, 5.2, 226a23-36).

⁶ Wis 7: 24.

⁷ The arguments *To the contrary* give us a glimpse into Bonaventure's classroom where his two student respondents argue back and forth dialectically.

⁸ Augustine, *De trinitate*, 5.16.17 (PL 42: 922; CCSL 50: 225.43-45).

⁹ Ambrose, *De fide*, 1.9.59 (PL16: 542; CSEL 78:26.10-19).

¹⁰ Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, 3 meter 9 (PL 63: 758; CCSL 94: 51.94). Bonaventure's response consists in arguing for each of the two Boethian claims: God is unmoved; but God is a mover. Bonaventure here shows his adroitness in reasoning demonstratively about the *nature* of God in two quite different ways. He uses a deductive and synthetic argument that moves from cause to effect in the neoplatonic-style of Proclus and the *Book of Causes*, to reason for God's immutability. Then he uses an empirical argument that proceeds from effect to cause, in the manner of Aristotle and Augustine, to reason that God, as first cause, "moves all things."

¹¹ See *De mysterio trinitatis*, 6.1c: “All who think rightly—not just the saints but also the philosophers—affirm that the divine being is unchangeable because it is in the highest degree simple, immense, and eternal.” From God’s existence as divine truth (1. d. 8, Art. 1), Bonaventure deduces that God must be ontologically simple, eternal, and immense. It follows that God cannot change in form, time, or place, the three ways that things change, according to Hugh of St. Victor. (“Every body changes either in place or in form or in time.” *De sacramentis*, 1.3.13; PL 176: 221C; Corpus Victorinum 79). It further follows that God must be completely unchangeable.

See Hugh, *De sacramentis*, 1.3.13 (PL 176: 220D-221A; Corpus Victorinum 79): “God cannot at all be varied or changed. For *he cannot be increased who is immense*; nor diminished who is one; *nor change in place who is everywhere*; *nor change in time who is eternal*; nor change in knowledge who is completely wise; nor change in affection who is completely good.”

¹² Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, 8.21.41-2 (PL 34: 388-9; CSEL 28.1: 260-61); Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 12.7 (1072a24-26; *Aristoteles Latinus*, 25-2: 213.3-5), *On the motions of animals*, 1 (698a27-b4).

¹³ To support the second Boethian claim—that God is a mover—Bonaventure turns to Aristotle and Augustine. The human mind moving the arm, moving the hand, and moving some object, was a favorite example of the scholastics, because it clearly shows subordinated causes operating together at the same time, in order to produce an effect. Aquinas will use the example to argue for God’s existence as first mover (*Summa theologiae*, 1.2.3, first way). Bonaventure uses it to illustrate the general principle that not only must there be a cause of motion, but the first cause must be unmoved. (See Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 8.30: “every species of motion is reduced to an immobile mover.”) For Aristotle, “moved movers” depend upon an “unmoved mover,” whether we are considering the motions of the heavenly bodies, which depend upon a completely unmoving “separate substance,” or the motion of an animal, which depends upon a relatively unmoving “soul.”

¹⁴ Bonaventure here clarifies how God can possess traits that seem incompatible with the divine nature. Obj. 1 contained an attractive solution—that God causes motion without moving. But it also noted that this reply is incomplete, because it does not explain what God *has* that allows him to cause motion without moving. In this Reply to Obj. 1, Bonaventure explains that God is an *exemplar cause*.

An exemplar must possess the trait at issue, possess it to the highest degree, and act as a formal cause of the trait in other things. There can be two kinds of exemplars for motion. The circular motion of the heavenly spheres is one, since they actually move with one, unceasing, and uniform motion that is imitated by all lesser motions. But God cannot be this kind of exemplar, since God is immutable.

But God can be an exemplar of motion, in two ways. First, motion is a kind of imperfect actuality, but God is complete actuality. Second, God can function as an exemplar, by possessing the idea of motion, an idea that functions as a pattern used to create a moving world. (See below, [d. 35](#).) God thereby possesses the perfection of motion without its imperfection, much as an artisan has in mind the perfection of his work without the deficiencies necessarily incumbent upon the actual product.

¹⁵ Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.1.2.3, (1: n. 30); Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1.d.8.16; *Summa theologiae*, 1.4.21.3; Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1.d.8.3.1,2; *Summa theologiae*, 1.9.2.

¹⁶ Bonaventure here applies to God the Aristotelian doctrine of the five predicables, often called by medievals the five universals. (See *Categories* 2 for how Aristotle used division of concepts to arrive at a definition, and *Topics* 1.4-8 for his four predicables. The predicables were codified in Porphyry’s *Isogage*, his introduction to logic, which greatly influenced Arabic and Latin philosophy.) The predicables describe the relation of predicate to subject in a categorical proposition. The predicate of any categorical proposition falls either within the essence or outside the essence of the subject. If within the essence, the predicate is either the genus, species, or difference of the subject, each of which in some respect constitutes or causes that essence. If outside the essence, the predicate is either a property, which flows as an effect from the essence of the subject, or an accident, which is

unrelated to the essence of the subject and therefore requires an external cause. The school example Bonaventure learned from his Masters of Arts in Paris, and which has endured, is understanding “human (*homo*),” through its genus (animal), difference (rational), species (rational animal), property (risible, that is, able to laugh), and accidents (such as white or dark, tall or short).

¹⁷ Bonaventure’s problematic: Here in q. 2, Bonaventure sets the Biblical tradition against the philosophers. Arg. a–f present a strong Biblical view that God *alone* is unchangeable, while the world created “from nothing” tends to return to nothingness, making all creatures changeable. Obj. 1—10 follow the philosophers in arguing that creatures are unchangeable in certain respects and cannot be utterly destroyed.

¹⁸ 1 Tim 1: 17.

¹⁹ Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, 2.12.2 (PL 42: 768).

²⁰ Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, 1.3 (PG 94: 794; ed. Buytaert, 16-17).

²¹ Gregory, *Moralia in Job*, 16.37.45 (PL 75: 1143; CCSL 143a: 825.15-16). John Damascene and Gregory the Great interpreted Biblical creation to mean that by their nature creatures come from nothing, and therefore they return to nothing, making God alone unchangeable.

²² Hilary, *De trinitate*, 7.11 (PL 10: 208; CCSL 62: 271.34-35): *Esse enim non est accidens nomen, sed subsistens ueritas et manens causa et naturalis generis proprietas*; Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, 1. d.8.1.1 (1: 96.30-2).

²³ Rom 8: 20.

²⁴ In order to show how creatures are unchangeable in certain respects, change and its opposite are divided, as Bonaventure explains in his response. Change (*mutatio*) has three species: variation (*variatio*), corruption (*corruptio*), and complete destruction (*versio*). Their opposites are the unchangeable (*immutabile*), divided into what is invariable (*invariabilis*), incorruptible (*incorruptibile*), and indestructible (*invertibile*). Philosophers had generally not distinguished corruption from complete destruction or annihilation.

Obj. 1-3 try to show that some creatures are invariable, that is, not subject to change in their accidents; Obj. 4–6 try to show that some creatures are incorruptible, that is, not subject to change in substance; and Obj. 7–10 argue that utter destruction, understood as “corruption into complete non-being,” is not found in creatures, because natural changes always begin and end with something.

²⁵ Augustine, *Confessiones*, 12.9.9 (PL 32: 829; CCSL 27: 221.10-12).

²⁶ *De sex principiis*, 1 (ed. Heysse 8).

²⁷ Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, 8.20.39 (PL 34: 388; CSEL 28.1: 259.12-14).

²⁸ Pseudo-Aristotle, *On length and shortness of life*, 3 (465b8-9).

²⁹ Augustine, *De trinitate*, 14.2.4-6 (PL 42: 1038-40; CCSL 50a: 425-29).

³⁰ Bonaventure here sets himself the difficult task of reconciling the “philosophers” and “saints,” i.e., the Church fathers. The first two kinds of change follow Aristotle’s analysis of the natural world. Creatures are composed of substance and accidents. *Variation* as accidental change, where substance remains the same: change *ab ente in ens*. *Corruption* (whose opposite Aristotle called generation) is loss of substantial nature through loss of form, where matter is left over: change *ab ente simpliciter in ens potentia*. These two kinds of change the philosophers discovered in the world of nature.

Destruction and its opposite in the Fathers, namely, creation, are quite different. They are not discernible in nature, whose processes always begin and end with something. Destructibility is more a theological or metaphysical concept. If creatures come “from nothing,” it seems plausible they will return to nothing: change *ab ente in simpliciter non ens*. Bonaventure distinguishes the senses in which God and creatures can be unchanging in order to show how the doctrine of creation and destruction, which comes from religious sources, is consistent with the account of physical change, which comes from the philosophers.

³¹ Bonaventure draws his conclusions in terms of the three kinds of change he recognizes: variation, corruption, and destruction.

(1) All creatures, whether physical or spiritual, are variable because all are substances with accidents that change. Consequently, only God is invariable, because God has no accidents that could vary.

(2) All physical substances composed of form and physical matter are corruptible by nature. But some substances (Bonaventure mentions “simple things (*simplicibus*),” that is, substances not composed of form and physical matter, such as the human soul and angels), are incorruptible by nature, because they do not have the kind of *physical* matter that can lose its substantial form. Consequently, God is *not* the only incorruptible being.

(3) But God alone is indestructible. The full reason is given later at d. 8, part 2, art. 1, q. 1-2 (below, 138-47), namely, that God is ontologically simple. But through grace God can make any creature indestructible.

Bonaventure treats the tricky question of reconciling (3) with (1) and (2) in the reply to Arg. 7-8.

³² Anselm, *De fide trinitatis et De incarnatione Verbi*, 3 (PL 158: 270D-271A; ed. Schmitt, 2, *Epistola de incarnatione Verbi*, Ch. 4, 17, lines 17-18).

³³ Bonaventure rounds out his synthesis of “saints” and “philosophers” by explaining how their insights into the “nature” of creatures are different but compatible. Since we never experience a creature being reduced to non-existence, the task of the Aristotelian philosophers was to use philosophical principles—the four causes, substance and accident—in order to explain the changes we actually see in nature. But substantial and accidental changes (generation, corruption, and variation) do not exhaust the reality of nature. When looking at nature as did the “saints,” Bonaventure notes that a creature is intrinsically “empty (*vana*),” “unstable (*instabilis*),” and “destructible (*vertibilis*).” Consequently, a creature must be held up in being by God, who can be compared to a man who holds up a heavy body to keep it from following its “nature” and falling down (*In Sententiis*, 1. d. 37.1.1.1c). Bonaventure’s metaphysical insight is that creatures are “destructible by nature,” even if no creature is completely annihilated, and so creatures are ontological composites who depend upon God for their “preservation,” a preservation that comes from grace acting “in the manner of nature” (Reply to Obj. 9).

Art. 2, then, offers a sharp contrast between God, who is completely indestructible, and creatures, who are destructible. To complete the comparison, Bonaventure turns to the ontological simplicity of God, which accounts for God being indestructible, and the ontological complexity of creatures, which explains why they are destructible.

TOPIC 5: THE NATURE OF GOD: DIVINE SIMPLICITY

Book 1
Distinction 8

PART 2: ON THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD

QUESTION 1

*Is God simple in the highest degree?*¹

*About the first question, that God is simple in the highest degree, the arguments in favor are:*²

a. Everything which is first is the most simple, since to the extent something is prior it is also simpler. Now God is first in the order of beings, because nothing can be nor be thought to be prior to him. Therefore, God is so simple that nothing can be nor be thought to be simpler than him. Therefore, God is to the highest degree simple.³

b. Everything that *is* what it *has* is simple to the highest degree. Now God is what he has. Therefore, etc. The first premise is clear on its own. Proof of the minor: God has power, wisdom, and other such attributes. Either he is the same as his power or not. If he is, I have my conclusion. If God is not his power, then since God would be powerful by means of some power, he would have this power from another. Therefore, God would be from another. But if this conclusion is false, then the premise from which it follows is also false.⁴

c. Every condition involved in being fine should be posited to the highest degree in the finest being. But God is the finest being; and simplicity is one condition of being fine. Therefore, simplicity should be posited in God to the highest degree. Therefore, God is simple to the highest degree.⁵

d. To the extent that something is simpler, to that degree its power is stronger; and the converse is true as well, since unified power can do more than dispersed power. But God is infinite and immense in power. Therefore, God is infinite in simplicity, and hence he is simple in the highest degree.⁶

*To the contrary:*⁷

1. Something is thought of as simpler when it is thought of as abstracted from many things, rather than as contained in them. Since our faith thinks of God as in many things, it does not think of him as completely simple. Therefore, if faith is thinking of him truly, God is not completely simple.

2. There is greater simplicity where there is identity without diversity, rather than with diversity. But in God there is identity along with diversity of supposits.⁸ Therefore, there is not in God the highest simplicity.

3. There is greater simplicity where there is unity without plurality. For number signifies some sort of composition, in relation to which unity is simple. Therefore, since in God there is unity combined with a plurality of persons, it is clear that etc.

4. There is greater simplicity where the subject is not only the same as a property, but also one property is the same as another property. For where one property differs from another property in a single thing, there are many distinct things in it. Therefore, it is not simple. But in the same divine person, one property differs from another, as being un-generated differs from paternity. Therefore, etc.

Response:

As the first set of arguments show, simplicity in the highest degree must be posited in God.

Replies to the objections to the contrary:

1. To the objection that faith does not think of God as completely simple, I reply: Faith does understand God to be completely simple; and whoever understands otherwise does not understand him as simple in the highest degree. This is clear as follows: We can understand something to be one in a single thing, or one while multiplied in many things, or one in many things while not being multiplied. Now the one multiplied in many things we understand to be simpler than what is one in a single thing. This

is clear, since the universal is simpler than the singular. But we understand what is one in many things while not being multiplied to be even more simple. This is the way our faith understands God. Therefore, since he is in all things while not multiplied, God is simpler than if he were in only one thing or if he were multiplied in many things. Consequently, God is completely simple and our faith understands him to be completely simple.

Whoever understands God as many in essence, or as one in supposit, takes away from his highest degree of simplicity. For wherever we understand the highest degree of simplicity to be, there we must also understand the highest degree of actuality to be, if that being is the finest being. And wherever there is the highest actuality, there we should also posit the highest degree of imparting and communication. But this can happen only in an eternal production of something infinite in all respects and equal in power to what produced it. And this cannot be the case when what is produced is different in essence. Therefore, we cannot understand the divine essence to be most simple, unless it is understood to be in three persons, one of which comes from another.

Therefore, the objection that what is simpler is abstracted from many things rather than in many things is true, but only if it is multiplied in many things. If it is not multiplied, the objection is not true.

2. To the objection that there is more simplicity where there is no diversity, I reply: Diversity can come in two ways, either from addition or from origin. Diversity comes from addition when there is diversity in absolute properties, which differ in different things, for example, whiteness in Peter and blackness in Paul. This kind of diversity lacks simplicity, since it presumes composition. There is another kind of diversity that comes from origin alone, for example, since one person emanates from another it differs from the other. This kind of diversity is not opposed to simplicity, since it presumes no composition, but only an order and relation to another. And this latter kind is not, properly speaking, called diversity, but distinction or discretion. This is clear if we understand that the Father by himself generates the Son, and even if we understand the Father to generate, and then again not to generate, there is no composition, since there is no addition.

3. To the objection that there is more simplicity where there is no plurality, I reply: There are two kinds of plurality. One kind of plurality is that in which there is more in two things than in one. For example, in two men there is more goodness than in one. And this kind of plurality is opposed to simplicity, since unity adds something to unity. But the other kind is a plurality in which there is as much in many as there is in one. This is the kind found in God, since, however much being and goodness and power there is in one person, there is that same amount in many. And this kind of plurality adds nothing to unity. Therefore, in no way does it presume any composition nor is it in any way lacking in simplicity.

4. To the objection that in the Father one property differs from another, I reply: Properties can differ from each other in three ways, in relation to their subjects, in relation to each other, or in relation to their objects. When properties differ in relation to their subjects, since they are caused by the different natures in which they are found, they presume composition, because they presume a subject that comes from many things. When properties differ in relation to each other, as when being musical and being grammatical differ in Peter, they likewise presume composition, since they presume a subject that is common to many things. When properties differ in relation to their objects, they presume a subject that is compared to many things. But this does not imply composition, but distinction. An example is the point, which is both a beginning and an end in relation to different lines.⁹ This is the way the difference among properties is found in God.

QUESTION 2

*Does simplicity in the highest degree apply only to God?*¹⁰

The second question is whether simplicity is a property of God alone.

*That it is may be seen in the following:*¹¹

a. No creature is pure actuality, since, as Boethius says, in every creature there is a difference between that whereby it is (*quo est*) and that

which is (*quod est*).¹² Therefore, in every creature there is actuality along with possibility. But every such thing has multiformity within itself and lacks simplicity. Therefore, etc.

b. Every creature has finite and limited being (*esse finitum et limitatum*). Therefore, its being is restricted. But wherever there is limited being, there is something that contracts it and something that is contracted; and in every such thing there is composition and difference. Therefore, every creature is composed. Therefore, no creature is simple.

c. Every creature has being given from elsewhere (*esse datum aliunde*); thus its being is received from elsewhere; hence, no creature is its own being; therefore, in every creature there is some dependence or difference. Now nothing of this sort is absolutely simple. Therefore, etc.

d. Everything after the first unity falls short of that unity. Therefore, it immediately falls into duality, just as Dionysius says that after the monad comes the dyad.¹³ But every creature comes from the first unity. Therefore, every creature falls short of the first unity.

To the contrary:

1. From something one only something one proceeds, and from something true only something true proceeds. But unity and simplicity have the same basis in God. Therefore, just as something one comes from something one, so something simple comes from something simple.¹⁴

2. It seems that in some special cases there is simplicity in creatures, since the simple is what has no parts. Now the point has no parts, since this is the way it is defined: the point is that of which there is no part. Therefore, etc.

3. Everything to which nothing else is prior is simple, for if it were a composite, something would have to be prior to it. Now being is first, as the author of the *Book of Causes* says: “The first of created things is being (*esse*).”¹⁵ Therefore, etc.

4. Any analysis stops at what is simple. But analysis stops at the principles of matter and form. For matter cannot be analyzed further, since it is the point at which causes stop; otherwise there would be an infinite regress. Therefore, since analysis stops at something created, something created is simple. If you reply: Principles are not simple in every way, since, though not composed *out of* other principles, they are composed *with* other principles:

I reply to the contrary: That principles are composed with other principles does not seem to work against their simplicity. For the mere fact that something is not able to be composed with something else does not produce any simplicity, since this property is found in complete individuals, which are composed in the highest degree. Therefore, what I call “able to be composed with others” does not destroy simplicity in these principles, and so, etc.

Response:

Simplicity of essence denies composition, and it denies difference or multiplicity in the essence. Therefore, the simple is what does not have composition of parts or multiplicity in actions or forms. Now in God alone is there privation of *composition* and privation of *difference* or *multiplicity*. Therefore, in God alone is there simplicity of essence.^{[16](#)}

Consequently, one should note that there are many kinds of *composition*. One kind of composition comes from essential parts, and this kind of composition is found in everything that is a being in its own right (*per se entibus*). A second kind of composition comes from integral parts; and this kind of composition is found in all bodies. A third kind of composition comes from dissimilar or opposing parts, and this kind of composition is found in all animate or living things. Therefore, in every substance that is a being in its own right, which is the proper meaning of creature, there is composition, because every creature is either corporeal or spiritual or composed of the two.^{[17](#)}

Likewise, we can consider three kinds of *difference* in creatures. The first is the difference among substance, power, and activity, or between substance and accident. The second kind of difference is the difference between supposit and essence. The third kind of difference is that between a being and its being (*entis et esse*). The first is a difference in a thing in so

far as it is an agent, the second in so far as the thing is a being in some genus, and the third in so far as the thing is a being in itself (*ens in se*).¹⁸

The first kind of difference is found in every subject, since every subject has mixed being (*esse mixtum*); and thus it does not act from its whole self, and thus there is a difference in it between that whereby it acts (*quo agit*) and that which acts (*quod agit*), or among action, subject, and property.¹⁹

The second kind of difference is found in every individual, since each individual has limited being (*esse limitatum*); and thus it agrees in one respect with another individual and it differs in another respect from it. Consequently, in every individual, essence is different from supposit, for the essence is multiplied in different supposits.²⁰

The third difference is found in everything that is created or created along with something else, since everything other than God receives being from elsewhere (*esse aliunde*), whether it is a principle or caused by a principle. Consequently, nothing is its own being, just as light is not its own illumination.²¹

Therefore, if we are speaking of simplicity as a privation of *composition*, it is a property of God alone, when *considered as a substance*, because there is no other substance that is not composed of at least possibility and actuality.

But if simplicity means privation of *difference* and dependence in the essence, so that there is neither diversity nor dependence in the essence, then it is a property of God, *considered as a being*. For there is no other being in which there is not found some sort of diversity or dependence.

Therefore, I grant that simplicity is a property of God, as we have seen.

Composite creatures, however, are not truly simple²²: because they have being mixed (*esse mixtum*) from act and potency, because they have limited being (*esse limitatum*) and consequently through addition they are contracted into a genus and a species, and because they have being given from elsewhere (*esse aliunde datum*), since they have being after the one God from whom they derive, and for this reason they fall into composition.

A second and briefer response:

Something is said to be simple through privation of composition. Now we should note that we speak of composition in two ways: in one way, the composition *out of* (*ex*) something; and in a second way, where something is said to be composed *with* something else. Therefore, if simplicity denies composition *out of* other things, this applies even to creatures, for example, to first principles that are not composed out of other principles. But if simplicity is a lack of composition *with* (*cum*) other things, then this is found only in God. For every creature is either a being through itself and in itself, in which case it is composed *out of* others; or it is a being with another and in another, and so composed *with* the other.

Furthermore, everything created is either a principle, and so composed *with* another, or it is derived from principles and so is composed *out of* other things. Consequently, simplicity, as a property of a thing, comes about through some privation, that is, privation of both kinds of composition.²³

Replies to the arguments to the contrary:

1. Therefore, to the objection that from something one only something one proceeds, I reply: Being simple is not a general condition of being, as being one is. For simplicity signifies the finest mode of unity, which God communicates to no creature. For a creature cannot receive it, since its being is limited and is mixed, and also is dependent and comes from elsewhere.

2-4. To the objection about the simplicity of the point, of being, and of principles, I reply: In these cases there is simplicity due to a lack of composition out of other things, but not simplicity that means complete lack of difference. As has been said, in all these cases there is some kind of difference and dependence. For even though they are not composed, their being depends on what is composed or on composition.

Therefore, I grant the final point that being composed with another does take away from the simplicity of a thing, in so far as simplicity is a lack of multiplicity and difference in the simple thing, even though this does not take away from simplicity in so far as it denies composition out of other things. For all dependence makes what is dependent fall away from the highest simplicity and lack of difference. God alone, however, is not dependent. All other things are dependent, whether it be in comparison with

the principles from which they derive, or as one component principle connected to another, or as a dependent being in comparison with God, or on God himself. Now nothing dependent is its own dependence. Therefore, no such thing is simple in the highest degree, since whatever is completely simple is completely absolute.

Dubia concerning the Text of Master Peter Lombard

Dubium 2: When it says in the text of Lombard, “And the same (divine essence) is properly and truly simple, because it is not composed of parts,” he seems to say something superfluous, for the simple is what has no parts, as something is called composed that has parts.

Bonaventure’s Response: The Master here is clarifying simplicity, as it is a property of God, and in this respect it is opposed to both composition and multiplicity. Concerning denial of composition, he says that God does not have multiplicity of parts; concerning denial of extrinsic multiplicity, he says that God does not have a variety of accidents; and concerning denial of intrinsic multiplicity, he says that God does not have a variety of forms, such as genus, species, and difference. In this way, simple means what is truly and properly simple, which applies to God alone.

Dubium 6: There is a question about the quote from Hilary, “For not out of components does God, who is life, subsist; nor is God who is power contained by the powerless; nor is God who is light affected by the dark; nor is God who is spirit formed out of what is unlike him. For in him the whole is one.” What difference is there among these different features of God? For if there is no difference this seems to be just a rhetorical display of words.

Response:

Some say that by means of these four features he excludes from God four *kinds* of composition. For the first is composition of an essence out of essential principles; and this is why he says God is not “out of components,” that is, things put together. The second is composition of a substance out of the natural principles of matter and form; and this is why he says “not by the powerless,” because matter is subject to privation, which makes form to be unstable and infirm, and matter likewise. The third

is composition of a mixture out of its ingredients; and this is why he says “not out of what is dark,” because a mixture always involves some confusion of forms, and so darkness. Fourth is composition of a living thing out of disparate parts, namely, out of soul and body; and this is why he says “not out of what is unlike,” for he is spirit.

A second reply is that he excludes composition coming from different *conditions*. For in order for some principles to constitute something, it is necessary that the principles be different, dependent, imperfect, and possess different forms. For if they were completely the same in form and perfect, they could not constitute something, because nothing comes from two actual beings. Therefore, since they are different, they must be “composed,” as it were, put together with others; since they are dependent, they must be “powerless”; since they are imperfect, they must be “dark”; and since they are dissimilar, they must be “unlike.” Now God cannot come from different and diverse conditions, because he is essentially life; God cannot come from dependent and powerless conditions, because he is essentially strength; God cannot come from imperfect and dark conditions, because he is light; and likewise God cannot come from disparate and dissimilar conditions, because he is essentially spirit. Therefore, the highest actuality, highest power, greatest clarity, and greatest spirituality do not permit any composition in God. Consequently, from these four conditions are drawn four arguments proving God is completely simple.

QUESTION 3

*Is the rational soul as a whole in the whole body and as a whole in each of its parts?*²⁴

The third question is whether the rational soul is in the whole body in such a way that it is in each of its parts.²⁵

That it is, is seen as follows:

a. Augustine says that just as God is in the macrocosm, so is the soul in the microcosm.²⁶ But God is in the macrocosm so as to be wholly in each

part. Therefore, the soul is in the microcosm, that is, in the body, in the same way.

b. What gives being (*esse*) to both whole and parts is united to whole and parts essentially. For a form through its essence gives being, but it does this only to what it is united essentially. But the soul gives being to the whole body and to all its parts. Therefore, etc.

c. In the eye there is seeing, sensing, and living. So I ask whether these are one act or different acts. They are not one act, as is clear because when deprived of vision, a human can still sense through touch, and if deprived of sense, he is still living, as in the case of a paralytic. Therefore, since living comes from substance and seeing comes from a power, the soul must be in the eye substantially. And by the same argument it can be proven that the soul is in all the parts of the body.

d. The soul operates throughout the whole body; therefore it must exist throughout the body by means of its power. But the power of the soul is simple. Therefore, if there is one power in hand and foot, the same thing is true for all the different parts. But power is not something simpler than substance. Therefore, etc.

e. The soul is in the body. Therefore, either it is in every part of the body, or in one definite part of the body, or only in a point. If it is in every part, then I have my conclusion. If it is in one part, since that part in turn comprises many parts, the soul, since it is simple, must be in many parts. And by the same argument that it is in many parts, it must be in all the parts. Finally, if it is only in one point of the body, then since a point is not proportioned to the whole body, the soul would be disproportionate to the whole body. But then there could not be any perfection, since proportion is a relation of perfection to the perfectible. Likewise, a point is a substance with place or having position. Therefore, the soul would occupy some place in the body. But no form in a place can be a mover sufficient to move the body. Therefore, etc.

To the contrary:

1. A form that is one in the whole and in the parts denominates the parts and the whole for a similar reason. Consequently, each part of fire is fire. Therefore, if the soul is in each part, then each part of an animal is an animal in the way the whole is, since each part is an animate, sensible substance.

2. The existence (*existentia*) of the rational soul does not depend on some part of the body, since it is determined on its own. Therefore, it is not in any part of the body.

3. The operation of the rational soul does not depend on some part of the body, nor is it communicated to some part of the body. Therefore, the rational soul is in no part of the body, neither as its perfection nor as its mover. Consequently, the Philosopher says that “the soul is the act of no body,”²⁷ that is, of no part of the body. But where it is, it is like an act.

4. An organic body has different features (*rationum*) in its parts and in the whole; therefore, it possesses different perfections. Since the soul perfects the whole through its essence, and perfects the parts through its power, it follows that the rational soul is in the parts of the body only through the feature that is its power. The Philosopher also says this, “just as the soul is to the body, so are the parts of the soul to the parts of the body.”²⁸

5. If the soul is wholly in each part of the body, then it is wholly in the hand. But when some whole is in something, it is moved along with the motion of that thing. Therefore, when the hand is moved, the soul also would be moved; and, likewise, when the hand comes to rest, the soul would come to rest. Consequently, since one hand can be moved while the other remains at rest, one and numerically the same soul would at the same time and in the same respect come to rest and be moving.

6. If the soul is wholly in many parts, the reason why it is in three parts is the same reason why it is in more parts, and the same reasoning goes on indefinitely, however far the body extends. Therefore, the soul by nature can be everywhere, and for this reason it seems the soul is not a limited substance, but an immense substance.

7. If the whole soul is in the hand as it is in the other parts, then, since life comes from the soul, the hand does not receive motion and sense from the heart, any more than the heart does from the hand. But this is contrary to all the philosophers. And from this, such incorrect consequences as this follow: just as when the heart is injured, life perishes, so also when the hand is injured, life should perish.

Response:

Some thinkers say that the soul is essentially in some definite part, and through its power it exists and flows through out the whole body, just as a spider exists in its web.²⁹ Consequently, they have said it is in the heart, because the heart is the home of life, and the soul is its householder. What has led them to say this is experience combined with defective reasoning. Experience, because we can see that when the heart is injured the soul separates; and from the heart flow the senses and movement; and it is an important organ present in the middle of the body, as though it were its center. And defective reasoning, because these thinkers could not understand how something limited could be one and wholly the same throughout many parts; and because faith does not require them to believe this, and their reason could not understand it, they said one should not assert that the soul is in the whole body by reason of the totality of its parts.

The opinion of other thinkers, like Augustine, is that the soul is wholly in each part of the body.³⁰ And what moves them to say this is experience, example, and reasonable argument. Experience, because in the parts distant from the heart, the soul senses as quickly as in the parts near the heart; also, all at once, as in the blink of an eye, it perceives an injury in distant parts of the body; and even when the soul is separated there can be pain in the individual parts of the body, as well as healing. Likewise, example moves them; as Augustine says: "For we see that in one, fully healthy animal, there is one health in each of its parts, not more health in a larger part or less health in a smaller part."³¹ Now if this is true for a corporeal form, how much more is it true for a spiritual form? And reasonable argument moves them, because the soul is a simple form and a sufficient mover. Since it is the form of the whole body, it is in the whole body. Since it is simple, it is not divided into one part and another. Since it is a sufficient mover, it has no place, and therefore is not confined to a point or a definite part of the body.

Since that opinion is more reasonable which is founded on reason rather than on defective reasoning, and since Augustine holds this view, I approve this opinion as the better one.

Replies to the arguments to the contrary:

1-2. To the objection to the contrary that the form that is in the whole, etc., I reply: There are three kinds of forms. One kind of form perfects the body, is extended through the body, and depends upon the body. Since it perfects the whole, it exists in the whole. Since it is extended, it communicates the perfection of the whole to its parts. And since it is dependent, it does not act on its own, but communicates its operation to the parts. This is clear in the form of fire, since each part of fire is fire and each part heats.

There is a second kind of form, which perfects the body and depends upon the body, but is not extended throughout the body. Now this kind of form, since it perfects the whole, is in the whole and in each part. But since it is not extended, it does not attribute the act of the whole to the parts. And since it depends on the body, it communicates the operation of the whole to the parts. Now this kind of form is the vegetative soul and also the sensitive soul, because no part of an animal is an animal, but each part of an animal lives and senses.

And there is yet another kind of form, which perfects the whole, but is not extended and is not dependent in its operation. Now this kind of form, since it is a perfection, is in the whole and in the parts. But since it is not extended, it does not communicate the perfection of the whole to the parts. And since it is not dependent, it does not communicate its operation. And this kind of form is the rational soul, because no part of a human is *the* human, and no part of a human understands. But even if it does not communicate the act of the whole to the whole, it does communicate it to the parts, since each part is part of the human and is caused to be living by the perfection of the human. Therefore, the perfection of the human is in every part.^{[32](#)}

3. This also makes clear the response to the objection that the soul is the act of no body. This is because the soul does not communicate its proper operation to any part of the body; nor does it communicate to a part the

perfection of the whole, though it perfects all the parts that are in the whole. A similar reply is made to the other point about the form. For a form that is in the parts does not denominate the whole and the parts in the same way, unless it is a form that is both dependent and extended. But I am speaking here only about substantial form, not accidental form.

4. To the objection that the whole and the parts do not have the same features, I reply: In the parts of the body one can consider both their organization and their complexity. In the feature that is their complexity, the parts are uniform with the whole, they are disposed to the same type of life, and they are perfected by one thing. But in the feature that is their organization, the parts are different and they are perfected by the different powers of the soul.

5. To the objection that the soul is moved when the hand moves, etc., I reply: A perfection has control over a perfectible whole, both over its substance and over its power. Since the soul is the perfection of the whole body, it has control over the whole body, and consequently its substance and its power are not defined by any part less than the whole body. Now it is defined by its own body, which it perfects, and as a consequence it is moved by the motion of that body. But it is not defined by its parts, because they are less than the whole, and so it is in one part in a way that is beyond another part. Therefore, since the soul is in no part of the body by definition, it is not moved by the motion of some part, just as God is not moved by the motion of some creature.

6. And this line of reasoning makes clear the reply to the following argument. For the whole body is compared to the soul as though it is in one place; and therefore the soul is in many parts of the body only in so far as it is in one place. Consequently, if the parts are separated, the soul will not be in them. Now it does not follow from this that the soul is infinite, because the nature of all its components make it limited, and it is the cause (*ratio*) of magnitude and growth, and in this way is the cause of the human body. Consequently, one can think of a body so large that it could not be vivified by a soul.

7. To the last objection, that then one part of the body receives nothing from another part, I reply: Just as in the macrocosm God is immediately in

every creature by containing it—although following the order of the universe God causes something to flow from one creature to another—one likewise should understand this about the soul. Through its presence, the soul is immediately in each part of the body, which it contains and preserves, but not all in the same way; for it causes something to flow to all the parts through one part. Therefore, when that part and its influence stops, the essential order of the body perishes and, as a consequence, the soul separates from the body.

QUESTION 4

*Is God in a definite genus or category?*³³

Fourth and last is the question whether God is in a definite genus.³⁴

And that God is in a definite genus is argued as follows:

1. Whatever is distinguished from other beings has some definite nature; but God is this sort of thing, because he distinguished from all creatures, since nothing created is God. Therefore, God has a definite nature. But whatever has a definite nature is in a definite genus. Therefore, etc.

2. Whatever has some univocal and essential notion standing above it has being in a definite genus. But God has some notion standing above him, namely, substance, which is said of God and creatures essentially and univocally, according to the definition of substance as “a thing existing through itself.” Therefore, etc.

3. It seems God is in every genus. For everything that contributes to the perfection of a creature should be attributed to God. Now every category contains some aspect of perfection. Therefore, things in every category are in God. But whatever is in God, is God; and the converse is true, as well. Therefore, in the essential order God is the subject for some predicate in every category, and therefore is in every category.

4. In the highest good there is no deficiency of goodness, and so in the highest being there is no deficiency of being. Therefore, in God there is every kind of being and every difference related to being. Therefore, since the differences of beings are the ten categories, they are all present in God.

To the contrary:

a. In *On the Trinity* 5, Augustine says: “God is good without quality and great without quantity.”³⁵ Therefore, the greatness of God is not in the genus of quantity, nor is the goodness of God in the genus of quality. Therefore, neither is the substance of God in the genus of substance; consequently, God is in no genus.

b. It seems that God is not in a definite genus, because everything that is in a definite genus has being that is finite and limited; but God is infinite; therefore, etc.

c. It seems that God is not in any genus, because what in itself contains things in many genera is composite; but God is absolutely simple; therefore, etc.

Response:

God cannot be in *one* definite genus, because every such thing has the kind of being (*esse*) that is limited, confined, and composed.

Nor can God be in *several* genera. For one way that something can be within several genera is through a diversity of natures and properties. For example, white, as signifying some subject or thing that is white, is in the genus of substance, but as signifying the form which is whiteness it is in the category of quality. The other way something can be within several genera is owing to its generality, as happens with “one” and “being.”

Now God cannot be within many genera owing to a multiplicity of natures, because everything like this is composed and has many forms. But God is simple. And God cannot be within many genera owing to generality, because such being has nothing distinct from created things. But God in himself has a being (*ens*) distinct from things and has the being (*esse*) that is simple and infinite.

This is the reason why God cannot be in one genus or in many genera.³⁶

Replies to the arguments to the contrary:

1. To the objection that whatever is distinguished from other things has a distinct nature, etc., I reply: The objection is true when distinction is through something that contracts and confines it in the way a difference applies to a genus. But God is not distinguished from things in this way, but through himself.

2. To the objection that God has some univocal notion standing above him, I reply: There is nothing standing above God, because there is nothing more simple than God. Nor is the notion mentioned univocal, because the definition of substance given in the argument does not apply uniformly to creature and creator. For God is “a being through himself” because God depends on nothing, while a creature is “a being through itself,” because it is not in another as in a subject, but it does depend on another to preserve it in being.

3. To the objection that everything that contributes to perfection and goodness should be posited of God, I reply: This can happen in two ways. In one way, through diversity, but this produces the kind of being (*esse*) that is in diverse genera; in the other way, through absolute unity, and this produces the kind of being (*esse*) that goes beyond every genus.

4. To the last objection, that in God there is no deficiency of goodness, I reply: God is said not to be deficient in goodness because every difference related to some *particular* good is not in God through some difference, but because it is in God through the power of equality. For, since God is the highest good, God contains in himself all good. And the same thing should be understood about a being (*entitate*). In this way, the reply is clear.

NOTES

¹ Cf. Bonaventure, *De mysterio Trinitatis*, 2.1, 3.1 (English translation available in WSB III [St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1979; reprinted 2000]); *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.1.3.1-2 (1: n. 31-32); Albert, *In Sententiis* 1 d. 8.22; Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 8.4.1, *Summa theologiae*, 1.3.5, 7.

² Simplicity is an aspect of transcendental unity. Describing something as “one” means two things: externally it is divided off or different from other things; internally it is whole or undivided in itself. In the *De mysterio Trinitatis*, Bonaventure will distinguish these two linguistically, using the terms “one” for external division and “simple” for internal indivision; but here simplicity covers both internal indivision and division from external things.

Here at d. 8, Part 2, Bonaventure further develops the ontology of creature and creator he had set out in d. 3 and d. 8, part 1. In q. 1 he argues for God’s simplicity; then he contrasts it with the ontological complexity of creatures in q. 2. In q. 3, he deals with the special complexity found in creatures composed of soul and body; and in q. 4, he gives the main reason why God is simple.

³ This argument uses a neoplatonic principle: in the hierarchy of beings, priority in rank of order immediately implies greater internal ontological simplicity. Arg. a, c, and d are three variations of the same argument, based on God as first being, finest being, and most powerful being. At *De mysterio Trinitatis*, 3.1 arg. 3 (5: 68; Hayes tr. 159), Bonaventure says this principle is “self-evident,” but offers a dialectical defense of it: “Everything absolutely first is most simple. But the divine being is like this. Therefore, etc. Proof of the major: What is composed is posterior to what composes it, but what is simple is prior to what is composed. Therefore, the cause of the predicate is contained in the subject of the major premise; and so it is self-evident.”

Bonaventure’s principle seems to result from combining two propositions in the *Liber de causis*: Prop. 17, “Every unified power is more infinite than a multiplied power,” (quoted by Bonaventure in *De mysterio Trinitatis*, 3.1, Arg. 6); and Prop. 28, “Every substance subsistent through its own essence is simple and indivisible.”

The *Liber de causis* was an Arabic work about the eternal causes of the sublunar world—God and three hypostases, being, mind, and life—which was thought to complete the philosophical theology of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. When writing this commentary (1250-2), Bonaventure sometimes identified Aristotle as its author (*In Sententiis* 2. d. 1.1.3.2, Obj. a), at other times more cautiously referred simply to its “author” (see this Art., q. 2, Obj. 3). Around 1268, Aquinas recognized that the *Liber de causis* depended on Proclus, not Aristotle, and Bonaventure did not attribute it to the Philosopher when writing his *Collationes in Hexaemeron* (see 10.18), in 1273.

⁴ See *De mysterio Trinitatis*, 3.1 arg. 7 (5: 69; see Hayes tr. 160).

⁵ See *De mysterio Trinitatis*, 2.1 arg. 4 and response (5: 60-61; Hayes tr. 140, 143). Arg. c picks one divine attribute, “fine (*nobile*)” (the Latin translation of *kalon*, one of two Greek terms for goodness, the other being *agathon*, translated into Latin as *bonum*); Arg. d picks another attribute, “power (*potentia*).” In *De mysterio Trinitatis* 2.1, Bonaventure expands this list to six divine attributes—nature, power, wisdom, goodness, influence, and causality—and uses them to argue for divine unity.

⁶ See *De mysterio Trinitatis*, 2.1 arg. 2 (5: 59; see Hayes tr. 139).

⁷ Bonaventure now turns to two kinds of difficulties the Christian view of God must face. Obj. 1 concerns the problem of how the God who is one, that is, “divided off” from creation, can also be present “in” creation; Obj. 2-4 concern how the God who is simple, that is, internally undivided, can also be three persons.

⁸ “Supposit” renders *suppositum*, a term used by Latin theologians to refer to the persons in God, but not limited to them. We have simply transliterated the term here because of its complicated history. (See *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, 1967, 13: 763-4, and 2003, 7: 263-4). Father, Son, and Spirit were called by the Greek fathers *hypostaseis* and by the Latin fathers *personae*. The literal translation of *hypostasis* into Latin is *substantia*, but this term had been used as early as Cicero to translate *ousia*. To call the persons three *substantiae* might therefore have seemed to mean there are three essences in God or conceivably three gods. As a remedy, *hypostasis* was rendered into Latin by *subsistentia*, but also by *suppositum*, which literally means “placed under.” A “supposit” is an individual subject for essential predication. Consequently, an individual tree is the subject or supposit for an accident like color, while the tree’s matter is the subject or supposit for its substantial form.

Only an intellectual being, however, can be a person and therefore a supposit in the full sense of the term. Different supposits or persons, though they have the same nature, are different substances existing separately because they are composed of matter and form. In the triune God, a divine person is also supposit or subject for the common divine nature, but the persons are not different substances. The reason is because existence is a function of the one divine nature, not of the three persons, since a divine person is a subsistent relation, but not a substance. Finally, the one person of Jesus Christ is supposit or subject for two natures and two modes of existence, divine and human; this is the doctrine of the hypostatic union. Bonaventure begins to sort out these differences in the replies to Obj. 2-4.

⁹ See *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.1.3.1 ad 2m (1: n. 31).

¹⁰ Cf. Bonaventure, *De mysterio Trinitatis*, 2.1, 3.1; *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.1.3.3 (1: n. 33); Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 8.24; Aquinas, *In Sententiis* 1 d. 8.5.1; *Summa theologiae*, 1.3.1-4.

¹¹ Bonaventure’s problematic: In q. 1, Bonaventure argued for divine simplicity, here in q. 2 he turns to the complexity of creatures. What results is a sharp contrast between God, the only absolutely simple being, and creatures, which all are ontologically complex in a variety of ways, and therefore dependent upon God.

Arg. a—d reason in favor of ontological complexity in creatures. Arg. a—c introduce the middle terms Bonaventure will use to argue for complexity in the first and longer part of his “response.” Creatures are complex because they have “being mixed (*esse mixtum*)” from potency and act, substance and accident (Arg. a), “being limited (*esse limitatum*)” by definitions set out using genus and difference (Arg. b), and “being given from elsewhere (*esse datum aliunde*),” that is, by God as cause (Arg. c). Arg. a and b point to two different kinds of complexity found within the “special conditions” of being, that is, within the range of the categories; Arg. c and d point to two kinds of complexity found within the “general conditions” of being, namely, the transcendentals. This question further develops Bonaventure’s doctrine of being (*ens*) begun at d. 3.1.2, XXX above.

The objections to the contrary are designed to preserve some kind of unity in ontologically complex creatures, while reserving absolute simplicity to God alone.

¹² Boethius, *De hebdomadibus* (ed. Loeb, 40). “Diverse are being (*esse*) and that which is (*quod est*). For being itself (*ipsum esse*) is not yet, but that which is, once it has received the form of being, is and remains.” The contrast is between a concrete creature conceived as a totality (*quod est*) and an intrinsic principle of it. Boethius had called the principle *esse*, identified as form; but the twelfth century masters at Chartres generalized it to *quo est*, which does not commit the interpreter to any particular ontology. *Quo est* refers to an intrinsic principle of a creature, distinct from the creature itself considered as a whole (*quod est*). This distinction immediately introduces a complexity into creatures that is not found in God. In his response, Bonaventure describes this complexity as *esse mixtum*, limiting it to the range of Aristotle’s categories.

¹³ Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 1.4; 13.2 (PG 3: 589D, 978; *Dionysiaca* 23, 540.)

¹⁴ Arg. 1 is based on transcendental unity. Just as God, who is one, produces creatures that are one, since divine simplicity is a modality of divine unity, God who is simple also produces creatures

that are simple. Arg. 2—4 focus on various created principles—the point, being, form, and matter—which are simple. These arguments set up Bonaventure’s “second and briefer response.”

¹⁵ *Liber de causis*, prop. 4 (ed. Pattin; 142.37-8). Its author understood being (*esse*) as part of a triad of neoplatonic hypostases—being, mind, and life. These are created but eternal causes of the sublunar world, subordinate to the first and uncreated cause—God.

Bonaventure expanded being (*esse*) to describe permanent things like angels, but also individual sublunar things, where being (*esse*) refers to what is relatively unchanging in such changing beings (*entia*). Being (*esse*), therefore, becomes an intrinsic principle rather than an extrinsic principle or entity, as in the *Liber de causis*.

¹⁶ In this response, Bonaventure further develops the ontology of creatures he began at d. 3.1.2 (75-78 above) and developed at 1 d. 8.1.1.1 (100-01 above), in order sharply to contrast creatures with God. He begins the first and longer of the two responses by looking at complexity, the opposite of simplicity, in two ways: first, considering the more obvious “composition of parts” found in created *substances*; then, looking at the more subtle issue of the differences within the essences of created *beings*. What he finds is that all creatures are composed in some way, only God, whether considered as a substance or as a being (*ens*), is ontologically simple.

When considered as substances, creatures form an ontological continuum from the most complex and least unified to the less complex and more unified: 1) Bodies are the most obviously complex substances, because they are made up of physical “parts outside of parts,” as is clear from experience. 2) Living creatures, in addition to having composite bodies, also have souls, a conclusion that is not obvious but drawn from philosophical analysis of plants, animals, and humans. 3) Even substances called “simple” by the philosophers, such as the human soul or the angels, are substances composed of “essential parts.” (See *Itinerarium*, 1.13.) God, by contrast, has no body, is not composed of body and soul, and does not even have essential parts.

Albert presented the same three-fold hierarchy as three levels of relative simplicity in creatures: “In a spiritual nature there is a kind of simplicity, as in an *angel*, without any dependence on corporeal matter. Now this is a greater simplicity than that found in the *soul* of a rational nature which, though it has no quantity, does depend on the body. And after these kinds of simple things comes the simplicity of things that are *in quantity* in some way.” *In Sententiis*, 1 d. 8.24 ad ultimum.

¹⁷ Bonaventure here reminds his reader that a creature is a “substance, which is a being in its own right (*ens per se*).” He does so in order to lead into the second step of this argument, which focuses on the divisions of being he used earlier (75), where he divided being (*ens per se*) into general conditions—the transcendentals—and special conditions—the categories, including substance. In the second stage of Bonaventure’s argument, the test cases are angels and the human soul, which are not composed of physical parts, as bodies are, nor are they composed of body and soul, as living creatures are. But they are composed of “essential parts.”

¹⁸ Bonaventure here introduces three ways in which all created beings are composed “from essential parts,” seen by focusing on certain ontological “differences” found within creatures. Even angels have “difference or multiplicity in the essence.” These distinctions are finer than those between one body and another, or between body and soul. Bonaventure uses the notions introduced in Arg. a—c above, arranged under the notion of “a being through itself (*ens per se*).” This metaphysical perspective reveals that (3a) creatures are composed of substance and accidents, and so have “being mixed” from potency and act; (3b) individual creatures, by having an essence or nature, also have “being limited” by definitions in which the genus is “contracted” by the difference to produce the specific nature; and (3c) creatures have “being given from elsewhere.” By contrast, God is “pure being (*esse purum*).” “immense” or “infinite being,” and “being in itself (*esse in se*).”

¹⁹ Bonaventure’s argument at 3a) focuses on being as divided into *substance and accident*. The Boethian distinction mentioned in Arg. a is the difference between the creature taken as a whole (*quod est*) and a principle or power (*quo est*) within the creature that allows it to act. The *activity* of a

created agent proceeds from it to affect another creature, and it is different from the *power* to perform it, which remains within the agent, which in turn is different from the even more internal *nature* of the acting subject (“action, subject, property” and “substance, power, activity”). Moreover, activity and power are *accidents* of the agent, other than its *substance*. Accidents are related to substance as act is related to potency. Consequently, creatures must “have being (*esse*) mixed from act and potency.” This composition of act and potency falls under the “special conditions” of being, that is, within the categories as divided into substance and accident.

By contrast, God is “pure being,” that is, pure act, not having any potentiality, not divided into substance and accident, and not confined within the categories (as Bonaventure will make clear in q. 4 below, 155-58).

²⁰ Argument (3b) peers within the *substance* of the creature and finds there a second kind of ontological complexity, one revealed in its definition. Bonaventure has in mind Porphyry’s tree, where individuals like Socrates or Plato are defined first by their species (human), then by a series of higher and higher genera (animal, living, physical), ending with the category of substance. (See Porphyry, *Eisagoge*, 2.) Socrates is an individual substance or “supposit,” and so there is a “difference” between his individuality and the nature he shares with Plato, other animals, and other substances. Consequently, creatures “have limited being (*esse limitatum*),” because this being is “contracted into a genus and species through addition.” There is more unity and less complexity here than in the composition of accident with substance, since Socrates, while acquiring and losing accidents during his life, remains the same substance. But as long as he is the individual we call Socrates, he must also be human and animal and substance. In Dubium 2, Bonaventure describes the species, genus, and difference as “forms,” in accord with the theory of the plurality of substantial forms.

By contrast, God is not an individual whose being is determined by “contracting” genus into species through difference, because such attributes, while perfections, to be sure, are also limitations. God’s being (*esse*) is unlimited, perfect, infinite, and immense being.

²¹ Bonaventure’s arguments at (3a) and (3b) concern the “special conditions” of being limited to categorical aspects of creatures. In this last argument (3c), Bonaventure looks at the thing “as it is a being in itself (*prout est ens in se*),” that is, at its “general conditions” or transcendental aspects. Here, the “difference” is that between an individual being (*ens*) and the kind of being (*esse*) it has. Peering into the transcendental reality of creatures, Bonaventure draws two conclusions: a creature depends for its being (*esse*) on an external cause, namely, God; and, because it does so, within the creature itself there is yet another kind of ontological complexity, that between a being (*ens*) taken as a whole and the being (*esse*) that gives it the nature it has.

The light analogy Bonaventure uses here helps explain this third kind of ontological complexity in creatures. The sun illuminates creatures on the earth by means of sunlight. When we consider that sunlight, light (*lux*) is not the same as its act of illumination (*lucere*). By analogy, a created being (*ens*) is not the same as the being (*esse*), understood as an act, that it has. Here *esse* seems to mean the cause giving the creature its essence, but the argument does not make the point completely clear. (See [n. 13](#) for further clarification.)

By contrast, God’s being (*esse*) does not come from elsewhere, and God conceived as an individual is identical with his own being (*esse*) or essence.

²² Later at Bk. 2 d. 8, Bonaventure applies all three kinds of ontological complexity mentioned here to the case of angels, and he further develops his account of the composition between *ens* and *esse*.

It is certain that an angel does not have an essence so simple that it is deprived of every kind of composition. For it is certain that an angel is composed with different kinds of composition. (1) For it can be considered in comparison with its cause; and in this respect it is composed in so far as it depends on it. For what is most simple is absolute to the highest degree, and everything that depends upon it falls into some kind of composition. (2) Secondly, it can be

considered in comparison with its effects; and in this respect it has to be composed of substance and power. (3) And it also can be considered as a being in a genus (*ut ens in genere*). Now in this respect, (3a) the metaphysician says it is composed of act and potency, while (3b) the logician says it is composed of genus and difference. And it also can be considered as (4) a being in itself (*ut ens in se*). Now in this respect, (4a) concerning its actual being (*esse actuale*) there is in it the composition of a being and its being (*entis et esse*), while (4b) concerning its essential being it is composed of ‘that whereby it is’ (*quo est*) and ‘that which is’ (*quod est*) and (4c) concerning its individual or personal being it is composed of ‘that which is’ and ‘who it is.’ Therefore, when the angelic essence is called ‘simple,’ this does not imply privation of these kinds of composition. *In Sententiis*, 2. d. 3.1.1.1c.

The *esse mixtum* of the present question in 1. d. 8 is found at (2) and (3a) in this text about the angels; the *esse limitatum* of d. 8 is found at (3b); and the *esse aliunde* of d. 8 is found at (1), then expanded to include (4a), (4b), and (4c).

Then in the next question about angels, Bonaventure finally makes clear that the kind of composition between *ens* and *esse* involves a third component:

The metaphysician considers the nature of every creature, and especially of substance, a being on its own (*substantiae per se entis*); and within it he considers both the act of being (*actum essendi*), and this the *form* gives, and being established as existing on its own (*stabilitatem per se existendi*), and what gives and displays this is what the form depends on, namely, the *matter*. *In Sententiis*, 2. d. 3.1.1.2c.

This metaphysical composition involves three factors: a created being (*ens*), which is composed of two principles, *esse* and *existere*. *Esse* gives the thing its essence or nature, and is caused by form; while *existere* gives the thing its independent existence and is caused by matter. Here Bonaventure correlates the doctrine of ontological composition, explained using the language of being, with the doctrine of universal hylomorphism in creatures, explained using the language of matter and form.

²³ Bonaventure’s two lines of argument in favor of ontological complexity in creatures greatly influenced Br. Thomas Aquinas, O.P.

In his own commentary, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 8.5.1c (written in 1252-6, shortly after Bonaventure wrote his, 1250-2), Thomas followed Bonaventure’s “second and briefer response,” arguing that every *creature* in the full and proper sense of the term “falls into composition,” while the *principles* of creatures are “not composite, though they fall short of the simplicity of the first” cause. See E.M. Macierowski, *Thomas Aquinas’s Earliest Treatment of the Divine Essence* (Binghamton, NY: SUNY Binghamton, 1998), 108-11.

In *Summa theologiae*, 1.3.1-4 (written 1265-68), Thomas returned to Bonaventure’s response here, but this time to the metaphysically richer first response. Thomas organized his questions about divine simplicity along the lines Bonaventure set out. Art. 1: God does not have the maximal complexity of a *physical body*. Art. 2: God does not have the lesser complexity of essential parts combined as substantial *form and matter* or act and potency [=Bonaventure’s *esse mixtum*]. Art. 3: God does not even have a composition of supposit (or individual subject) and essence [= Bonaventure’s *esse limitatum*]. Art. 4: God is not composed of essence and *esse* [= Bonaventure’s *esse aliunde*]. Consequently, God is absolutely simple.

Only on the last point is there significant difference between the two friars. Where Bonaventure says created beings (*entia*) are composed of existence (*existere*) and being (*esse*), or matter and form, Aquinas, following Avicenna, denies universal hylomorphism and says created beings (*entia*) are composed of essence (*essentia*) and being (*esse*). However, both agree that the two hallmarks of a creature are ontological composition and beginning in time.

Chart: Bonaventure’s division of created being (ens)

In Sententiis, 1. d. 3 and d. 8

I. A being (*ens*)

A. A being through itself

Type of *esse*: *ens per se*

1. General conditions of a being (*ens*) or transcendentals = *esse aliunde* (i.e., vestige): *esse + existere*
 - a. Universal transcendentals
 - (1) a being (*ens*)
 - (2) one
 - (3) good
 - (4) true
 - b. Disjunctive transcendentals
 - (1) being through its own essence (*ens per essentiam*)
 - (2) being through participation (*ens per participationem*)
2. Special conditions of a being (*ens*) or the ten categories (i.e., shadow)
 - a. (1) *substance*: *esse limitatum*
 - b. 9 *accidents*: *esse mixtum*
 - (2) quantity
 - (3) quality
 - (4) relation
 - (5) when
 - (6) where
 - (7) position
 - (8) equipped
 - (9) action
 - (10) passion

B. An accidental being: *ens per accidens*

e.g. “musician is a builder”

²⁴ Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 2.1.4.1.1.3.2.2, (2: n. 348); Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 8.26; Thomas Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 8.5.3; *Summa theologiae*, 1.76.8.

²⁵ To support the ontological simplicity of God, Master Peter Lombard turned to his favorite authority, Augustine, who had argued for this conclusion based on the fact that “every creature is multiple and in no way truly simple.” This is true even of “a spiritual creature, such as the soul,” which, “while simple in relation to the body” is not simple in itself, and “is wholly in every part of the body (*in qualibet eius parte tota est*)” (*De trinitate*, 6.6 (PL 42: 928-29; CCSL 50: 237.24-5).

The *Summa Halesiana* did not raise a question about the soul at this point, but Albert did (*In Sententiis*, 1. d. 8.15-17). Bonaventure’s question is about the *rational* soul, but since it is designed to fill out the reasoning of the two previous questions, q. 3 widens to include all animate substances, not just humans. The issue is whether the soul is directly united to the whole body, or does the ontological difference between a spiritual soul and corporeal body require some intermediary to unite them. There is evidence on both sides.

Bonaventure’s problematic: Arg. a—e point out that in living substances the parts of the body are all alive and possessed of the same essence, provided by the soul as formal cause: every part of the human body is human. On the other hand, Obj. 1—7 sound the theme that at least the rational soul exists on its own (Obj. 2) and seems to be connected to the body through its power to give life, which seems to reside in the body’s principal organ, the heart (Obj. 7). Unlike other organs such as the hand, when the heart dies, the human dies. Bonaventure uses this dialectic to set up his “response,” but as sometimes happens in the disputed question format, the “response” is not as important as the replies to the objections, which develop the metaphysical theme of the ontological complexity of creatures begun in q. 2.

²⁶ Pseudo-Augustine (probably Alcher of Clairvaux), *De spiritu et anima*, 35 (PL 40: 805).

²⁷ Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 2.1 (413a8).

²⁸ Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 2.1 (412b23-5).

²⁹ William of Auvergne, *Magisterium divinale et sapientiale* (= *De universe*), Pars 3, *De anima*, c. 5, part 8, (tr. Teske, 203). See also 290, 369, 401, 451.

³⁰ Augustine, *De trinitate*, 6.6 (PL 42: 929; CCSL 50: 237.24-5).

³¹ Augustine, *Epistula*, 187.4.13 (PL 39: 836; CSEL 57: 91.22—92.3).

³² The reply to Obj. 2 shows why Bonaventure included a question about the soul in his treatise on the metaphysics of creator and creature. In q. 1, he set God at the top of the ontological hierarchy of beings; in q. 2, he arranged the creatures of the world into a hierarchy of three grades: “spiritual” creatures, including angels; “animate” or “composite” living creatures; and merely “corporeal” creatures or inanimate bodies.

Bonaventure here focuses on the middle sort—living substances. At the bottom of the ontological hierarchy is prime matter. With no actuality of its own, a pure potentiality open to all forms, prime matter is therefore *potentially* the most ontologically complex of all beings. The differences among physical substances are a function of the form that actualizes their matter. There are three different kinds of forms, arranged from lower to higher. All forms perfect the body to which they are united, by giving the body a nature.

The lowest kind of form, illustrated here by the form of the ancient element of fire, (1) actualizes an inanimate substance. It also (2) depends upon the body (which is why it cannot exist independently of the body it informs) and (3) is extended throughout the body (which is the reason why all the parts of a fiery body are themselves fiery).

Midway up the scale are the forms of “animate” or living bodies, those found in plants and animals. Following traditional Aristotelian terminology, Bonaventure calls this kind of form “soul,” and he calls the soul animating plants “vegetative” and that animating animals “sensitive.” Such forms (1) perfect their bodies by giving them their natures and (2) depend upon their bodies in order to exist. But they are superior to the forms of inanimate things because (3) they are not extended throughout the whole body. This is why vegetative and sensitive souls function in one organ of the body but not in another. It is also why such souls are ontologically simpler or more unified, even while the bodies they affect are more complex.

Standing first in this hierarchy of forms is the rational soul. It perfects the human body by (1) making it human; but (2) it does not depend upon the body for existence; and (3) it is not extended throughout the body. Consequently, the rational soul is superior to lower souls and forms, and it is ontologically simpler than they are, even while the human body is more complex. This ontological simplicity also makes the rational soul capable of existing independently of the body after death.

³³ Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 1.2.1.1.2.2 (1: n. 338) and 1.2.1.1.2.3.1 (1: n. 339); Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 8. 31-32; Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 8.4.2-3; Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1.3.5-6.

³⁴ Bonaventure’s Problematic: “Genus” or “category (*praedicamentum*)” refers to Aristotle’s ten categories: substance and the nine accidents: quantity, quality, relation, when, where, position, equipment, action, and passion. Bonaventure sets up his problematic by having Arg. 1—4 reason that God has attributes falling under the categories, while Obj. a—c argue that God cannot be so confined.

The *Summa Halesiana* (1: n. 338) had tried to deal with the problem by stretching the notion of a “category,” holding that “categories are said in two ways, properly and commonly. ... Commonly anything is said to be a category which can be said in the mode of a predicate; in this way a category can be said of the divinity. For some things are said [of God] in the mode of substance, others in the mode of relation.” The *Summa* (1: n. 339) went on to explain how God is called a substance: “Substance is said in two ways: In one way, from the property of standing under a form or accident. And in this way, God cannot be called a substance, because in him there is no accident of what

subsists, nor is there a form differing from substance. In the second way, from existing through itself, as when substance is said to be a being through itself (*ens per se*), not requiring another in order to be. And in this way, substance is said of God.”

Albert followed Hales, but Bonaventure recognized how wrong it is to confine God within a category in any way; so he turned to the transcendentals. Moving beyond the categories is Bonaventure’s way of giving a positive description of God, one that opens a way to understanding the perfection of God’s absolute ontological simplicity.

³⁵ Augustine, *De trinitate*, 5.1 (PL 42: 912; CCSL 50: 207.37-40).

³⁶ Bonaventure’s starkly rigorous argument takes off from q. 2.

(1) God cannot be limited to *one* category, because the kind of being (*esse*) every such thing has is “limited, confined, and composed.” In q. 2 he showed that “limited being” (*esse limitatum*) is “contracted into a genus and a species” and therefore inherently imperfect. “Confined being” (*esse arctatum*) seems to be a synonym for the “being mixed” (*esse mixtum*) from act and potency of q. 2, that is, a mixture of substance and accident and so also inherently imperfect. “Being from elsewhere” (*esse aliunde*), while described at the level of the transcendentals, was also shown to involve ontological composition. None of these modes of being is appropriate to God.

(2) But neither can God be placed in *many* genera through division, the way subdivisions under the categories are derived, as a human is substance but also has accidents. For in God there are no such divisions, also shown in q. 2.

(1) and (2) force our mind to turn away from the “special conditions” of being toward (3) its “general conditions,” the transcendentals, as the only possible way of understanding God.

But the transcendentals can be understood in two ways. In one way, (3a) they are attributes that move “across” but are found *within* the categories. For example, unity in the category of substance is sameness; unity in the category of quantity is equality; unity in the category of quality is similarity. But God is not found in several categories in this way, because all such attributes involve imperfection, since they are confined within some category.

However, there is another way of understanding the transcendentals. If the “response” points out how *not* to use the transcendentals to describe God, the Replies to the Objections show how the transcendentals *can* be used of God. (3b) Transcendental being, when correctly applied to God, signifies “a kind of being that goes *beyond* every genus” (*esse extra omne genus*) because completely and absolutely one (Reply to Obj. 3). And transcendental goodness, when correctly applied to God, describes God as “the highest good,” not by containing the sum total of “particular goods” established “through difference,” but a highest good who “contains in himself all good” because completely one (Reply to Obj. 4).

TOPIC 6: USING HUMAN LANGUAGE ABOUT GOD

BOOK 1
DISTINCTION 22

SINGLE ARTICLE: ON THE DIVINE NAMES

QUESTION 1

*Can God be named?*¹

*In regard to the first question, it is argued that God cannot be named, based on both authority and reason.*²

Arguments from authority:

1. Dionysius says in his book, *On Divine Names*, that “It is possible neither to speak about nor to understand God.”³ And again: “Of God there is neither name nor word nor definition nor opinion nor image.” Therefore, God is altogether unnamable.

2. The Philosopher says in *The Book of Causes*, “The First Cause is above all telling.”⁴ But what is above all telling cannot be spoken, and whatever cannot be spoken cannot be named; therefore, etc.

Arguments from reason:

3. A name has a certain proportion and likeness to the thing named, just as a spoken word does to what it signifies. But God is completely infinite, while a spoken word is finite. Therefore, since there is no proportion here, there will be no expression through a spoken word, and, consequently, no naming of God.

4. Every name is taken from some form.⁵ But in God one does not posit a determinate form. This is why Augustine says that “God, who eludes all form, cannot be attained by our intellect.”⁶ Therefore, etc.

5. Every noun signifies substance with quality.⁷ But in God there is merely substance, without quality or quantity. Therefore, there is no way to signify God by means of a noun.

6. Nor can God be signified by a pronoun. For a pronoun only has determinate signification through pointing out its referent or through some relation. But pointing things out only happens by means of accidents that we can see with our eyes. Yet, such things are not found in God. Therefore, it seems that there is neither a noun nor a pronoun for God.

To the contrary:

a. We read in the Psalms: “God is his name” (67:5). And again we read: “How wondrous is your name in all the earth” (8:2). Therefore, God does have a name.

b. Dionysius wrote a book about the divine names. Therefore, either God can be named or the knowledge passed down to us by means of that book is vain and pointless.

The same thing is seen by reason.

c. For everything that can be expressed by a word can be expressed through the sign of that word. But the sign of a word is a spoken sound. Therefore, since God is expressed by his own Word, God can be expressed by a vocal sound. Yet, whatever can be expressed by a vocal sound can be named. Therefore, etc.⁸

d. Whatever one can understand, one can signify or name. But God can be known by us; this is certain and was proved above.⁹ Therefore, etc.

e. What one can praise, one also can name. But one can praise God; indeed, God is worthy of praise in the highest degree.¹⁰ Therefore, God is nameable.

Response:

Just as understanding is said in two ways, so too are what can be spoken and what can be named. For, in one way, understanding means complete comprehension, but, in another way, it means “halfway (*sempiennam*)” cognition. Likewise, what can be spoken is said in two ways: in one way, as a complete expression; in another way, as a “halfway” account. And the same thing holds for what can be named.

Accordingly, if what can be spoken or named is meant in the sense of complete expression, I reply: Just as God is intelligible to himself alone, so God can be spoken or named by himself alone, and by no other than he is nor by any other word than he is. And, just as God cannot be comprehended by us, so also God cannot be spoken and, consequently, cannot be named by us. Now this is how the Philosopher and Dionysius speak.

But if what can be spoken and named are meant in the sense of some sort of account, then I reply: Just as God is knowable by us, so too God can be spoken and named by us, and whoever knows more, speaks better and names God better and more clearly. This is why a believer names him more clearly than an unbeliever, and writing that undergirds the faith, such as Holy Scripture, names him more clearly than reason or philosophy. This is how the arguments and authorities to the contrary proceed.^{[11](#)}

Replies to the objections:

1-2. To the objections drawn from Dionysius and the Philosopher, the reply is clear by now, because they speak of the kind of naming where there is complete expression of the thing named.

3. To the objection that the spoken sound of a name is proportional to the inner word or the thing signified, I reply: This claim is understood in reference to the naming which encompasses the entire meaning of a thing. Or, the statement is not true except when there is understood some sort of proportion to the thing under the aspect of its knowability, and, in this sense, the thing is nameable. For, even though God is infinite, He is knowable by us in a finite way.

4. To the objection that God has no form, I reply: God does not have a form that is amenable to our intellect, which is to say, a form of the sort whose image is in the senses. Yet, he does have a form, because God is the

kind of form that is the very basis for knowing (*ratio cognoscendi*). For, even if we do not know God in himself, God knows himself in himself, and we know him in a created form. Consequently, we take names from the created form that we do see and understand.

5. To the objection that a noun signifies substance and quality, I reply: Substance and quality are not understood here properly, but in a general sense. Substance means what is known, and quality means that whereby a thing is known, and this by way of inactivity. I add this because of the verb, participle, and adverb, the last being a disposition of the verb. And since, in creatures, for the most part, that which is known and that whereby a thing is known differ, a noun, in creatures, for the most part, signifies a creature's diversity in them. But, with respect to God in himself, the thing known and the means of knowing are identical in God. Therefore, with respect to the thing, a noun, when applied to God, signifies these two things indifferently. And this is how the notions of substance and quality, so far as these pertain to a noun, apply here.

QUESTION 2

*Does God have one name only, or many names?*¹²

In the second place, we ask whether God has only one name or many.¹³

And it seems that God has many names:

This seems so by authority:

a. On the authority of Scripture, which calls God by diverse names. We read in Exodus 6:3: "I have not told them my great name, *Adonai*." Exodus 15:3: "All-powerful is his name." And the Psalm 67:5 says: "Lord is the name for him." Therefore, if these are different names, it is obvious from the authority of Scripture that God has many names.

b. Dionysius, in his book *On Divine Names*,¹⁴ gives many names to God; Ambrose does likewise in his book *On the Trinity*, and the Master does much the same here in the text of the *Sentences*.

Again, the same point is seen by reason.

c. For no name adequately expresses the divine being (*esse*), either in itself or in relation to our intellect. This is clear, since every perfection is in God and is understood to be in God. But no name expresses the perfection of every condition. Therefore, since this cannot be accomplished by a single name, we need many names.

d. We must speak of that in which all things both agree and differ either with many names or equivocally with just one name. But equivocation produces ambiguity and should be avoided. Therefore, it is fitting to express such a thing by means of different names. Therefore, since, in the divinity, there is both something common and something proper—and this happens in many ways—there must be many names.

e. Although there is one first truth, the articles of the faith are many. Therefore, if faith believes in many articles about God, and “whatever is believed in the heart for justice’s sake, one must confess with the mouth for salvation” (Romans 10:10), then faith can and must confess many articles with the mouth. But many articles are not expressed clearly or explicitly by one name. Therefore, we must employ many names.

To the contrary:

1. Hilary says that “reality is not subject to speech; rather, speech is subject to reality.”¹⁵ Therefore, since there is a comprehensive real unity in God, there also should be unity in both the vocal sound and the name of God.

2. Everything that is in God is God. Therefore, that is God which signifies something that is in God. But God is one. Therefore, all the divine names have one significate. But all such terms are synonymous; yet, in synonymous names, no more is expressed by one term than by another. Therefore, it seems that all names other than one are unnecessary.

3. Multiplication of divine names comes either (a) from the side of the reality named, or (b) from the side of the knowing intellects, or (c) from the side of God's effects. (a) If the multiplicity arises from the side of the reality named, then goodness and truth are not diverse names, since the reality they name is altogether one. (c) If the multiplicity arises from the side of God's effects, then unity and eternity are not diverse, since they do not connote an effect made. (b) If the multiplicity arises solely from the side of the knowing intellects, then it seems that all such names are empty and vain, since they have nothing corresponding to them in reality.

4. And, in Scripture, the name of God is expressed in the singular, whether the name is added to one word, as when it says, "The Lord is the name of him" (Psalm 67:5), or whether the name is added to many words, as when it says, "In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit" (Matt 28:19). Therefore, because the definition of *a* thing and of *one* thing are the same, and so also are the definition of *a* name and *one* name,¹⁶ God has but one name.

Response:

Three things are involved in a name (*nomen*): vocal sound (*vox*), signification (*significatio*), and the rational means of becoming known (*ratio innotescendi*). This is why "name" is taken in different ways.¹⁷

Sometimes, a name is taken for a vocal sound signifying something, as when we say "Peter is the name of an Apostle." And, in this way of understanding names, it is clear there are many names of God.

At other times, a name is taken for the thing signified, as when we say "the good and the fine are the same in name." And, in this way of understanding names, when it comes to the divinity, there is a sense in which we speak of one name, but another sense in which we speak of many. For if the thing signified is said essentially, then they all are one, but if the thing signified is said personally, then the things are many, and, so too, are the names that correspond to them.

At still other times, a name is taken for the very notion (*ipso notamine*) or rational means of becoming known. And, in this way of understanding names, I reply that, in one way, there is one name, and, in another way, there are many.

For, if the rational means of becoming known is taken from the side of God, he comes to be known through his power, which is one and great. In this way, there is one name of God: a great name, or even the greatest. This is why it says in Jeremiah (10:6), “You are great and great is your name,” which refers to the rational means of becoming known, or the power whereby God becomes known, as we read in the Psalms (75:2), “God is known in Judea; great is his name in Israel.”

But if the rational means of becoming known is taken on the side of effects or creatures, then there are different names. For God becomes known to us in three ways: through causality, through remotion, and through excellence.¹⁸ And, in this way, there is a multitude of names. For if God is named through causality, there are many names, because God has many effects. If God is named through denial, there are many names, because many things are removed from him, namely, everything created. And if God is named through excellence, there are many names, because God exceeds creatures in many things, namely, in all of the conditions ingredient in something fine (*nobilitatis*).

From the foregoing, the objections clearly are resolved:

1. To the objection that there is unity on the side of the reality, I reply: There is also plurality, where “reality” is taken for “person.” And if “reality” is taken for “nature,” even if there is no plurality in the thing itself, there is still plurality in the manner of God’s becoming known. Therefore, there are many names of God.

2. To the objection that such names are synonyms, I reply: Names are synonyms when their only difference arises from the vocal sounds. But, in the present case, there is a difference according to the rational means of becoming known; therefore, these names are not synonyms. Another reason for this was discussed above, at distinction 8, question 1.

3. To the objection that if the multiplicity of names arises only on the side of understanding, then such names are vain, I reply: The multiplicity does not come from this reason alone, because to the rational means of becoming known, there corresponds a plurality in creatures, while, in God, there corresponds a true unity encompassing that entire plurality.

Consequently, because we understand the power and the wisdom of God through diverse things, we name God in diverse ways. And because, in God, there is truly power and wisdom, there is no vain talk here.

4. To the objection that Scripture expresses the name of God in the singular, I reply: Scripture often proclaims the name of God as great, wonderful, holy, and praiseworthy. In this way, it does not speak about a name, insofar as it involves a vocal sound, but, rather, insofar as it involves the rational means of becoming known, on the side of God. And, in this way, the name is one. Nonetheless, this consequence does not follow: “Scripture speaks in the singular; therefore, there is only one name.” For, often what is said in the singular is also said universally, as is obvious in many examples in the Law, as when it was said: “a person from the house of Israel” (Leviticus 17:8) or “a person who did” this or that, understanding by the expression any person.

QUESTION 3

*Are all the divine names said by transference?*¹⁹

The third question is whether all the divine names are said by transference (*translative*)²⁰ or whether some of them are said properly, as well.

It seems that all of them are said by transference:

1. In the *Rules of the Faith*, it says: “Everything simple exists properly, but is spoken of improperly.”²¹ But what is spoken of improperly is named improperly. Therefore, since God is simple, God must be named improperly. But the improper is reduced to the proper. Therefore, names are said of God improperly, but are said of other things properly. Now, what is said of something improperly is said by transference, if it said of something else properly. Therefore, etc.

2. Whatever one can understand, one also can signify. But one can understand God only through the properties and conditions of creatures,

and, consequently, one can name God only in the same way. But what is named through the properties of other things is always named by transference. Therefore, etc.

3. There are only two types of theology, according to what Dionysius tells us, namely, mystical and symbolic.²² But each type of theology names God by transference, for mystical theology names God through spiritual and invisible creatures, while symbolic theology names God through bodily creatures. Therefore, all naming of God is by transference.

4. Each divine name is taken for the sake of our instruction. But all our learning begins from the senses. Therefore, every name of God is taken from something sensible. But there is no sensible property in God, speaking truly, but only speaking by transference. Therefore, etc.

*To the contrary:*²³

a. At Ephesians 3:15, the Apostle says, when speaking of God: “From whom every fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named.” But if every fatherhood on earth is named from the fatherhood of God, then God is called more properly and more principally “father” than are other things. Therefore, God is not named only by transference. Based on the authority of the Apostle, both Dionysius and John Damascene say the same thing. For Damascene says, “Know that the names of fatherhood, sonship, and procession are not transferred by us to the blessed Deity, as the divine Apostle says, ‘From whom every fatherhood ...’”²⁴ Therefore etc.

b. And St. Ambrose says—we find this in the text of the Master—that there is a three-fold difference of divine names, but only one of these are names by transference. Therefore, not all divine names are said by transference.²⁵

c. Some things are said of God which have their opposite in the case of creatures, for example, “eternity” and “immensity.” But every name said by transference involves some kind of likeness. Therefore, such names as these are not said by transference.

d. Certain things are said of God, whose meaning is properly found in God alone, for example, the name “good” in Luke 18:19, “No one is good save God alone,” and “who is” in Exodus 3:14. For Augustine says, “God *alone* truly *is*, in comparison with whom all other things are not.”²⁶

Response:

To this question, certain thinkers have held that there are some names that God has applied to himself, while there are other names that we apply to God. Now, if we are speaking about the names that *God* has applied to himself, since God understands himself properly, these names are proper to God. *Good* and *Who is* are said to be names like this. Consequently, Dionysius seems to hold that only the name *good* is the proper and principal name of God, while John Damascene seems to hold that only the name *Who is* is the proper and principal name of God.²⁷ The first of these names brings to mind the perfection of God, while the second brings to mind the absoluteness of God, and both bring to mind what is proper to God.²⁸

But if we are speaking about names that we apply to God, then, since we know God only through creatures, then we name him only through the names of creatures. And they say that this is why these names only are said of God by means of transference: either because they belong to a creature properly and in the first instance, or because they are applied to a creature in the first instance, but they do not belong properly to the creature alone. Now, this latter case is a kind of transference, even though, properly speaking, transference only occurs when some names belong properly to the things from which they are then transferred; for example, laughter belongs properly to humans and then is transferred to meadows.

But it seems that this position cannot be maintained. For, since we know God in three ways, namely, through effects, through excellence, and through remotion, it is clear that we name God in all these different ways.²⁹ But when we know God through effects, there is no transference, and the same thing is true when we know God through remotion, because transference involves some likeness, “For all speaking by transference speaks so according to some likeness.”³⁰

This is why I reply differently: There are certain names that signify a reality (*rem*) whose truth is found in God, but its opposite is found in creatures, for example, “immense” and “eternal.” Such names in no way are

said by transference, neither concerning the reality (*rem*) nor concerning their application (*impositionem*). There are other names that signify a reality (*rem*) whose truth is found in God and whose likeness is found in creatures, for example, “power,” “wisdom,” and “will.” Such names are said by transference from creatures to God, not concerning the reality but concerning their application—for these names are applied to creatures prior to being applied to God. But their reality exists first in God. And there are still other names that signify a reality (*rem*) whose truth is found in creatures, while a similar property is found in God, for example, “stone” and “lion.” For the reality signified is in the creature, but a like property, such as steadfastness and courage, is found in God. Now these are the names properly said by transference. Therefore, we should grant that, in the divinity, there are some names that are said by transference, but not all names are of this sort.³¹

Replies to the objections:

1. To the objection that “simple” is spoken of improperly, I reply: Here, “to speak of” does not mean “to name” but “to assert,” because, in a simple being, there is no composition in its being, but there is a composition in asserting something about it. Therefore, this is improper, but not in the way a name is improper. Or I reply: Not everything spoken of improperly is spoken of by transference.

2. To the objection that God is understood only through creatures, I reply: Although God is understood only through creatures, God is not understood only through a likeness. Rather, God also can be known through negation and unlikeness.

3. To the objection that symbolic and mystical theology name God by transference, I reply: Although mystical theology does name God by transference, as far as properties of excellence are concerned, nonetheless, it does not name God only in this way, but also through negation. Therefore, it does not name God only by transference.

4. To the objection that all of our learning begins from the senses, I reply: The claim is true enough. And every name has something sensible about it, namely, the vocal sound whereby it is heard. But it is not necessary

that it have a signification only about sense, for the word of our understanding, which itself is not an object of sense, takes on a sensible, vocal sound.

QUESTION 4

*Are all names that are said of God said according to substance?*³²

The fourth and last question is whether all names that are said of God are said according to substance.³³

It is shown that this is not true, but that they are said in other ways:

First, by authority:

a. Augustine, in his *On the Trinity*, says: “Let us hold onto this point above all: whatever is said of that most outstanding and divine sublimity in reference to himself is said substantially, but what is said through comparison is not said substantially but relatively.”³⁴ But Father and Son are said through comparison. Therefore, etc.

b. Boethius, in his book *On the Trinity*, says: “God is great without quantity, good without quality, but God is not related without relation.”³⁵ Therefore, relation truly and properly is found in God, and, so too, is the mode of speaking using relation.

The same point is seen by reason.

c. For, in the divinity, some names are incommunicable, as is clear for all of the personal names. But the divine substance is communicable, since it is one in the three persons. Therefore, such personal names do not point out substance. Consequently, in the divinity there is a manner of speaking other than according to substance.

d. In the divinity, there are several modes of comparison, because the Son is compared to the Father in a different manner than the Holy Spirit is

compared. But there are not several kinds of being or subsistence in God. Therefore, since one can understand this, and can express that understanding, it is necessary that there be a manner of speaking and understanding about persons that is other than that according to substance. Therefore, etc.

To the contrary:

1. Everything which is said of something is said either according to substance or according to accident, because substance and accident adequately divide being (*ens*). But in the divinity, nothing is said according to accident. Therefore, it is said according to substance.

2. Everything that is said, either is said through itself (*per se*) or is not said through itself. If it is said through itself, then it is said according to substance, but if it is not said through itself, then it is said through another and is said to be present in another. But all the things said of God are said through himself. Therefore, all the things said of God are said according to substance.

3. Something being said according to substance and according to relation either describes a diversity on the side of the thing, or a diversity on the side of the mode of understanding or the mode of speaking. If they describe a diversity on the side of the thing, then in God there would be diversity and composition. But if they describe a diversity in the mode of speaking, then there is a different mode of speaking in saying “God is good,” and in saying “God is great,” and in saying “God exists.” For if one asks, “how large is God?” one answers “great,” but not “good.” Likewise, if one asks “what sort is God?” one answers “good,” but not “great.” Therefore, there are not just two modes of something being said of God, but many more than two.

4. The answer to a question posed along the lines of “what is it?” is said according to substance, both concerning the thing in reality and the mode of speaking. But concerning God, relative names answer a question posed along the lines of “what is it?” Therefore, they are said according to substance. Proof of the minor premise: Augustine says in his book *On*

Christian Doctrine: “If one is asked ‘what is God?’ the right reply is: ‘Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.’”³⁶

5. Since certain names are found in the divinity that are not said according to substance or according to relation, such as the name “incarnate” and the name “un-begotten,” it seems that the division given does not include all the divine names.

Response:

To understand the foregoing arguments, one should observe that things are said differently (*dici diversimode*) in three ways.³⁷

In one way, things are said differently based on *different modes of being*. These are being in its own right (*per se*) and being accidentally (*per accidens*). Now, in this way, nothing is said differently about the divinity, because this kind of diversity in the mode of being posits a diversity of essence in the thing about which we are speaking. But, in this regard, there is only one way of speaking about God, for all the things said about God are God himself and his substance.

In a second way, things are said differently based on *different modes of understanding*. These we find based on one or another reason or means of knowing. In the case of the divine names, not only are things said in different ways, but they are said in every way, for God is known not just by means of different things, but by means of all the genera of things. Among the names said of God in this way, some are said in the mode of substance, such as *God*, others in the mode of quantity, such as *great*, and still others in the mode of quality, such as *good*. And the same thing is true of all other names.³⁸

In a third way, things are said differently based on *different modes of comparison*. This is found in what is absolute and in what is comparative or relative. Now, this type of difference is less than the first one but more than the second one. It is less than the first, because the first involves essential diversity and composition, but it is greater than the second, which does not involve any distinction at all in reality. According to this third way of things being said differently, both unity and plurality are found in God: unity in an absolute sense and plurality in a relative sense. Also, according to this mode, there are only two ways of speaking, namely, according to substance,

such as those things said in reference to the thing itself, and according to relation, such as those things said in reference to something else. Accordingly, because the latter do not describe another mode of being, they are predications of the first type and are one. But since they do describe another mode of comparison, in terms of the mode of being, there is unity, but in terms of comparison, there is plurality. From this, the replies to the objections are clear.³⁹

Replies to the objections:

1. To the objection that everything that is said is said either according to substance or according to accident, I reply: In the divinity, this rule finds a counter-example: where relation is not an accident, but is not said according to substance.

2. To the second objection that everything that is said about the divinity is a being through itself (*ens per se*), I reply: This claim is true enough. But this consequence does not follow: “Something is said as a being through itself, therefore it is said according to substance.” For it is not said that a name is said according to substance, insofar as substance is said through itself (*per se*), but rather in so far as substance is said in reference to itself (*ad se*).⁴⁰

3. To the objection about the kind of diversity, either according to reality or according to the mode of understanding, I reply: This diversity is according to the mode of comparison, which is found not only in our minds, but also in reality.

4. To the fourth objection that relative names answer a question made concerning substance, I reply: Substance is said in two ways: either a being through itself (*ens per se*) or a being in reference to itself (*ad se*). If substance is said as a being through itself, then all names, both relative and absolute, describe the substance of God. And since, in this way, substance answers a question posed along the lines of “what is it,” all names can answer such a question. But if substance is said as an absolute being, without comparison, what is said in reference to itself is said according to substance. Now, Augustine does not take substance in this way;

consequently “Father,” “Son,” and other relative names are not said according to substance.

5. To the last objection that many things are said of God that are not said according to substance or according to relation, I reply: In the divinity, being said relatively is understood in two ways; for some names are said relatively from the principal meaning of the name, while others are said relatively by way of extension.

The first set of relative names can be subdivided into three types: some signify relation and are said relatively, such as “Father”; others signify relation simply, such as “Fatherhood,” which is not said in reference to another, but is that whereby it is referred to another, and still others are said relatively, because they are the privation of relation, such as “un-begotten” and “without procession.” But this last alternative is not purely a privation, as will be pointed out below.^{[41](#)}

The terms that convey relation by an extension of their primary meaning likewise are subdivided into three types: Some are held to be said relatively because they stand for relatives, as when we say “God generates God,” meaning by this that “the Father generates the Son.” Others are said relatively, because they contain relation within what they signify, as when we say “incarnate.” For the sense is that he is united to flesh, and union describes a relation that bears upon a single person, as does “to assume flesh” and things of this sort. And still others are said relatively, because they include a relation within their subject, such as “like” and “equal.” For things cannot be similar unless they both refer to each other and are distinguished from each other.

NOTES

¹ Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 1.2.1.1.1.1 (1 n. 333); Thomas Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 22.1.1; *Summa theologiae*, 1.13.1.

² In his commentary on d. 22, Albert treated the nature of the divine names cursorily, concentrating on specific names, like “trinity” and “incarnate.” He did not raise the issues that Bonaventure treats in q. 1 and 2 here, which are part of Bonaventure’s full-blown theory of divine names, one that allowed Aquinas to follow him closely.

Bonaventure’s problematic: In q. 1, Bonaventure uses Obj. 1–6 to raise the fundamental issue of whether any names for an infinitely perfect God can be accurate, an issue as old as Exodus 3:14, where God told Moses that his name is “Yahweh” (in Latin, *qui sum*), a name considered so holy that it was not even pronounced, but replaced by “Adonai” (see q. 2, Arg. a). Arguments *To the Contrary* a–e reflect the equally ancient religious tradition of attributing meaningful names to God.

³ Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 1.2 (PG 3: 588; Dionysiaca, 7), 1.5 (PG 3: 593; Dionysiaca, 40–41). The phrase “divine names” had been popularized by this book, written ca. 500 by a Syrian monk who presented himself as the Dionysius mentioned at Acts 17:34, and later translated into Latin.

⁴ *Liber de causis*, prop. 5. (Ed. A. Pattin; 147.22).

⁵ Alan of Lille, *Theologiae regulae*, rule 17. (PL 210: 629).

⁶ Augustine, *De verbis Ioannis*, Sermo 117.2.3, (PL 38: 662.49–663.39).

⁷ Priscian, *Institutiones Grammaticae*, 2.5 (ed. Teubner, *Grammatici Latini*, 2: 55.6).

⁸ Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, 1 (16a3–4): “Spoken words are the symbols of mental thought, and written words are the symbols of spoken words.” Arg. c brings together two very different traditions about “names.” Greek philosophers like Aristotle had thought of a name (*onoma*; *nomen*) or a word (*logos*; *verbum*) as a human instrument for understanding the world. Written and spoken words signify things in the world, but only through the intermediation of mental thoughts or “words.” In this case, a name is a means of knowing, a written, spoken, or mental term. By contrast, Stoic philosophers had said that the world is run by a reality that they conceived of as a cosmic “word.” And, in his Gospel, John had clarified the Genesis story that “In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth,” by describing as a “word” the person within the divinity responsible for creation: “In the beginning was the Word,” identified with the second person of the Trinity. A name, in this sense, is first and foremost a reality, not just a term signifying a reality. Bonaventure incorporates into his theory of divine names both the terms and the realities they signify.

⁹ *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 3. 1.1.1, above 68–73.

¹⁰ Augustine, *Confessiones*, 1.1 (PL 32: 660–1; CCSL 27: 1.1–17).

¹¹ Although the issue is couched in terms of divine *names*, Bonaventure here makes clear that human language about God (“speech” and “names”) depends upon the conceptions present in the human mind. The underlying issue concerns *knowledge* of God, which Bonaventure began to treat at d. 3. Language about God, treated here in d. 22, is subsidiary, though important. Bonaventure’s account of the divine names ties the two together. His main thesis here is that humans cannot attain the kind of fully comprehensive knowledge about God that they can have about creatures; human knowledge of God is a “halfway cognition,” like a cup “half-full (*semi-plena*).” The three following questions fill out this memorable metaphor.

¹² Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 1.2.1.1.1.3.1–2 (1 n. 336); Thomas Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 22.1.3; *Summa theologiae*, 1.13.4.

¹³ Bonaventure's problematic: Scripture, theology, and philosophy all point to many names for God (Arg. a–e). On the other side, God's ontological simplicity (d. 8, part 2) does present problems (*To the Contrary*, Obj. 1–4). We use many terms to know creatures because they are ontologically complex, but God is absolutely simple. It might seem that God's one nature requires only one name (Obj. 1) or many names that are synonyms—different words with the same meaning (Obj. 2). But these conclusions are faulty.

¹⁴ Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 1.6 (PG3: 595; *Dionysiaca*: 45). Ambrose, actually *De fide (ad Gratianum augustum)* 2.prol.2 (PL16: 559; CSEL 78: 58.5-14).

¹⁵ Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate*, 4.14 (PL10: 107; CCSL 62: 116.26-28).

¹⁶ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 4.2 (1003b19-21).

¹⁷ Bonaventure succinctly lays down the principles on which his response is based. Names are understood in the context of knowledge, and knowledge involves a relation of knower to thing known. All relations, such as “I am to the right of you,” involve three things: the subject of the relation (I), the terminus of the relation (you), and the foundation or nature (*ratio*) of the relation (position, to the right of). Consequently, following the Aristotelian account of language that he learned from his Masters in Arts, Bonaventure understands a name to involve these three aspects of relation: a “vocal sound,” which is the subject of the relation, the “thing signified,” in this case God, which is the terminus of the relation, and the cognitive relation itself.

The Latin term *ratio*, like its Greek counterpart *logos*, is difficult to render into English, because Bonaventure, like most scholastics, used it to describe all three parts of the cognitive relation: the knower, the thing known, and knowing relation itself. Sometimes, he used it subjectively, to refer to “reason,” that is, the power of reason or the act of reasoning whereby we know things. At other times, it is used objectively to refer to some feature of things that we know by reason, a usage that goes all the way back to Aristotle (*logos*). In this meaning it can be translated as a “feature,” “aspect,” “nature,” or even “cause” in the thing known, as it is discovered by reason. Following a long tradition, Bonaventure also uses *ratio*—usually in combination with another term—to describe the act of knowing or becoming known, and the relations that it involves. In this third case, *ratio* refers to the nature, manner, means, mode, or cause of that act of knowing.

Here in d. 22, he concentrates on how the “divine names” allow God to come to be known by humans. So, he uses the phrase *ratio innotescendi*. We translate this phrase as “rational means of becoming known.” It could also be translated as “cause of becoming known” or “method of becoming known.” We have chosen “rational means of becoming known” in order to retain a form of the English term “reason” in the translation of *ratio*.

Later in d. 35, Bonaventure will treat the divine ideas. There, he gives his account of God's knowing, and, following the Augustinian tradition, he calls a divine idea a *ratio*. He uses the expressions *ratio cognoscendi* and *ratio intelligendi* to describe the cognitive relation involved in God's knowing (as distinct from God's being known, which is treated here). There we will translate *ratio cognoscendi* as “rational means of knowing” and *ratio intelligendi* as “rational means of understanding.” Bonaventure recognized that this kind of *ratio* involves a relation between divine knower and created thing known; so, in his explanation of the divine ideas, he often will specify whether he is looking at the cognitive relation “on the side of the knower” or “on the side of the thing known.” See below, [195-209](#).

¹⁸ Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 7.3 (PG 3: 869D-872A; *Dionysiaca*: 402): “Therefore, we approach what is beyond all as much as our powers allow, and we proceed through negation and transcendence of all, and through the cause of all.” Also, *De mystica theologia*, 1.2 (PG 3: 1000), cited above 32 n. 30. Bonaventure then rounds out his “response” using this three-fold scheme taken from Dionysius: “affirmative theology” through causes, “negative theology,” which denies created attributes of God, and “superlative theology” which concentrates on the transcendentals, here “fine” (Greek *kalon*, Latin *nobile*), a synonym for the transcendental “good” (Greek *agathon*, Latin *bonum*).

In this way, he points to the transcendentals as the proper language for the most accurate names of God, which are developed in “superlative theology.”

¹⁹ Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 1.2.1.1.1.2.2 (1. n. 335); Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 22.1; Thomas Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 22.1.2; *Summa theologiae*, 1.13.3, 6.

²⁰ The Latin term *transferre* / *translatum*—the root of Bonaventure’s adverb *translative*—was the normal and literal translation of the Greek term *metaphora*. The meaning of *translative* is one of the important issues in this question. Ambrose and Albert had used the term to mean “metaphorical,” but Bonaventure has a broader understanding of *translative*; so, we have translated it as “by transference.”

In q. 1, Bonaventure showed that we have imperfect, but real knowledge of God. And in q. 2, he showed that God can be known through a multitude of concepts and names, although God is spiritual and ontologically simple, and, therefore, the most difficult object of human knowledge. This multiplicity is primarily owing to the “rational means of becoming known” (*ratio innotescendi*). Here in q. 3, Bonaventure covers the only issue that Albert had considered about the divine names. Are humans limited to the kind of poetic and metaphorical language about God favored by scripture, mystics, and poets, men like St. Francis and Dionysius, or, in addition, is it possible to use language about God in a “scientific” way, that is, to develop demonstrative understanding of God?

Bonaventure’s problematic: Obj. 1–4 reason that the names of God are only metaphorical, while Arg. a–d try to make logical space for “proper” or scientific names of God. Bonaventure distinguishes two kinds of names that are used *translative*, one that is strictly metaphorical, the other that is said “by transference,” but is still scientific, what we might call analogical, though he does not use this term.

²¹ Alan of Lille, *Theologicae Regulae*, rule 20 (PL 210: 630). This “rule” sets the main theme for the four arguments that follow: the ontological simplicity of God combined with the fact that human knowledge begins in sensation seems to require that the names and knowledge of God are metaphorical.

²² Dionysius, *Epistula*, 9.1 (PG 3: 1106; *Dionysiaca*: 624). See also *De divinis nominibus*, 1; *De mystica theologia*, 1.

²³ Arg. a–d *To the contrary* use a text from Ambrose (Arg. b) that had been quoted by Master Peter Lombard in order to add, beyond metaphors, two more kinds of divine names. These are non-metaphorical and, therefore, “proper” or scientific names of God: names that describe attributes really present in both God and creatures, but more perfectly present in God (Arg. a), and names that describe attributes present only in God, not in creatures (Arg. c and d).

As cited by Lombard, Ambrose’s *De fide* (*ad Gratianum Augustum*), 2.prologue.2 (PL 16: 559; CSEL 78: 58.5-14), was significantly changed, so we quote Lombard’s version (*Sententiae*, Bk. 1, d. 22, c. 1; ed. Quarrachi, 1: 178): “There are some names that make evident a property of God; there are other names that express the clear truth of the divine majesty, and there are still other names that are said of God through likeness by a transference (*translative*). Those indicating a property of God are: generation, Son, Word, and names like these; those indicating the eternal unity are: wisdom, power, truth, and names like these; while those that express a likeness are: shining, mark, mirror, and names like these.” The first names refer to the divine persons, the second to the divine essence, and the third are limited to metaphors used of God. Tellingly, the term *translative* is not in Ambrose’s text, because in that clause Ambrose was referring to personal terms that indicate a “likeness of Father and Son”; he was not setting out a theory of metaphorical or analogical terms predicated of creatures and God.

²⁴ Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 1.4 (PG 3: 592; *Dionysiaca* 24-25). John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, 1.8.10 (PG 94: 820; ed. Buytaert, 37). Eph 3:15.

²⁵ In his commentary (d. 22, q. 1), Albert had reduced Ambrose’s threefold division to a two-fold division: “The division of Ambrose, though it has three parts, must be reduced to two members, as

follows: Every name said of God either is said properly, indicating a real property, or it is said through transference of some likeness of a thing. Now, if said properly, either it describes (*dicit*) a property by which one person is distinguished from another, or it describes the divine essence. For every name said of God falls within this two-fold division. Now, the reason for the first part of this division is that a name describes the thing from which it is applied (*imponitur*), but also describes the thing to which it is applied. That thing to which a name is applied a grammarian calls the ‘substance’ of the name, but that from which it is applied, since it is the principle for understanding (*principium intelligendi*) what is described by the name, is the ‘quality’ of the name. Therefore, one alternative is that that from which the name is applied is primarily in God and only secondarily in a creature, and, in this situation, the name is said properly: for example, eternal father, essence, life, wisdom, and names like these. Alternatively, if that from which the name is applied is inconsistent with the divine nature, then the name is said of God through some kind of likeness to corporeal things and is transferred (*translatum*) to the divinity: for example, stone, lion, shining, mirror, and names like these.”

Bonaventure sets up his question in terms of Albert’s two divisions. First, Albert recognized that the personal and essential names that Ambrose had distinguished have something in common: they “properly” predicate attributes really found in God. This separates them from metaphors used of God, where the attribute is really present in the creature, but not in God. Second, while proper attributes are found in both God and creatures, they exist more perfectly in God than in creatures, and, therefore, are said *per prius* of God and *per posterius* of creatures. For Albert, all non-metaphorical predications of God are what we might call analogical predications, though he did not use the term here.

²⁶ Augustine, *De civitate dei*, 8.11 (PL 41: 236; CCSL 47: 228.45-49).

²⁷ Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus* 3.1 (PG3: 679; Dionysiaca: 121). John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* 1.9.2 (PG94: 836; ed. Buytaert, 48-49).

²⁸ Cf. *Summa Halesiana* (1: n. 352).

²⁹ Dionysius, *Mystical Theology*, 1.2 (PG 3: 1000; Dionysiaca, 571-2).

³⁰ Aristotle, *Topics*, 6.2 (140a10-11; *Aristoteles Latinus*, V.1, 116): “Omnes enim tranferentes secundum aliquam similitudinem transferunt.”

³¹ Bonaventure goes beyond both Ambrose and Albert by expanding the notion of “transference” beyond metaphor. Names that Albert had called “proper” to God, Bonaventure says involve a second, non-metaphorical kind of “transference.” The reason is that, in addition to considering whether the reality (*res*) is found in God or a creature, he adds a second criterion, the “application (*impositio*)” of the name to God and creature. Bonaventure therefore lists three kinds of divine names. (1) Names unique to God, like “eternal” and “immense,” involve no transference at all, neither of reality nor name. There is no eternal reality in creatures, and, therefore, no creature is called eternal. (2) At the other end of the scale, metaphors transfer the name from creature to God, but there is no transference of reality. God is not a lion. (3) The middle set of divine names, however, those that Albert had called “proper,” involve a two-fold transference. There is transference of the *reality* of divine wisdom, since human wisdom is a likeness, but only a likeness, of divine wisdom, and there is also a transference in the opposite direction, where the *name* “wisdom” is first “applied” to humans and then “applied” to God. Transference in the narrow sense is a metaphor, while, in this wider sense, transference is what we now call analogy, although Bonaventure does not use this term here. We can call Bonaventure’s three kinds of names for God: unique names, metaphorical names, and analogical names.

³² Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 1.2.1.1.2.3.1-2 (1: n. 339-340); Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 22.6; Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 22.1.4 ad 4m; *Summa theologiae*, 1.13.2.

³³ Thus far, Bonaventure has established that the divine names help us have partial, imperfect, but real knowledge of God (q.1), we use many concepts and names of God, names whose plurality is

based on the plurality of *rationes innotescendi* in creatures through which we can know God (q. 2), and the names of God are best categorized into three different kinds: unique names, analogical names, and metaphorical names (q. 3). In q. 4, Bonaventure completes his short treatise on the divine names by showing how the “proper” or analogical names help us acquire “scientific” theological knowledge of God.

Bonaventure’s problematic: The sharp logic of *To the Contrary*, Arg. 1, sets the problematic for the question. Metaphysics and logic, as Bonaventure learned them from his Masters of Arts, show that being (*ens*) is divided into “a being through itself (*ens per se*),” or substance, and “a being not through itself (*ens non per se*),” or accident. Since there are no accidents in God, it looks like the divine names are limited to substance, a theme developed in the arguments *To the Contrary*. On the other side, Arg. a – d point to non-substantial terms that are truly said of God.

³⁴ Augustine, *De trinitate*, 5.8.9 (PL 42: 916; CCSL 50: 215.1-4).

³⁵ Boethius, *De trinitate*, 4 (PL 64: 1252).

³⁶ Augustine, *De doctrina Christiana*, 1.5.5 (PL 34: 21; CCSL 32: 9.1-10).

³⁷ Bonaventure does not intend his “response” to be read in isolation. Normally, he chooses one set of arguments over another, but here he draws truth from both Arg. a–d and objections *To the Contrary* 1–5. He sets out the “response” in terms of three modes of predication, but he has already pointed out the close connections among written and spoken names, mental names, and the reality they signify. So, the first kind of difference among predications concerns the “modes of being.”

³⁸ The second way that things are “said differently” is based on “a different mode of understanding (*secundum diversum modum intelligendi*).” Bonaventure is inspired by Boethius’s claim in Arg. b that God is “great without quantity and good without quality.” Boethius seemed to envision some way of unhooking an attribute like “good” or “great” from its superior category, but he offered no explanation of how this could be done. Bonaventure says that some names are predicated of God “in the way of substance,” as substance means an independently existing reality, but also that God can be known through terms predicated “not just in different ways,” but “in every way (*omnimode*).” that is, “by means of all genera of things.” How is this possible? Only through the transcendentals. They make it possible to say that God “is” on his own and is “good,” without the imperfection of created qualities, and that God is “great,” without the imperfection of created quantities.

³⁹ The last way that something “is said differently” is through comparisons. This makes room for *personal names* of God. He understands divine persons through relation. In creatures, the category of relation is an accident. But understanding divine persons through relations does not introduce accidentality into God. A divine person is a subsistent relation, one that is not an accident existing in a subject, but is a relational feature of a superior kind of “substance,” one without the imperfections of normal substances.

⁴⁰ Bonaventure uses this reply to try to state with technical precision how divine names are said “according to substance.” Put in metaphysical terms, Obj. 2 had asserted that, since God is a being through itself (*ens per se*), then it must follow that God is a substance. Bonaventure fully admits this inference for creatures, but denies it of God. A being *per se*, literally “through itself,” owes its being to its intrinsic causes, which in turn depend upon extrinsic causes. But God has no intrinsic or extrinsic causes. Consequently, God is a being *per se* only in an analogous sense, and, therefore, is not a substance in the normal meaning of the term. To express the point, Bonaventure uses the expression *ad se*, which he picked up from Albert. Stated succinctly, his view is that God is a substance in the sense of a being *ad se*, something that exists on its own, but God is not a substance or being *per se* in the normal sense of these terms, which imply imperfection, ontological complexity, and being the effect of some cause.

⁴¹ Bonaventure, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 28.1.

TOPIC 7: DIVINE KNOWLEDGE: IDEAS IN THE MIND OF GOD

BOOK 1
DISTINCTION 35

SINGLE ARTICLE: ON THE DIVINE IDEAS

QUESTIONS 1-6

Presentation of the Questions

To understand the present distinction, we raise questions about the rational means of divine knowledge (*de ratione divinae cognitionis*) that is customarily termed an *idea*.

First, we ask whether in God there should be posited an ideal reason (*ratio idealis*).

Second, assuming that it should, we ask whether it has any real plurality.

Third, we ask whether it has plurality according to reason.

Fourth, we ask whether it has plurality based on the number of universals or of singulars.

Fifth, we ask whether it has plurality that is finite or infinite in number.

Sixth, whether among ideas there is plurality based on number that is ordered or number that is not ordered.¹

QUESTION 1

*Should ideas be posited in God?*²

The first question is whether ideas should be posited in God.

*That they should, is argued as follows:*³

First, from authority:

a. Augustine states in his book *On 83 Questions*, “Ideas are forms that are eternal and unchanging, and which are contained within the divine intelligence.”⁴ From these three conditions, one concludes there is an idea in God.

Again, it is argued from reason as follows:

b. Every agent that acts from reason, not by chance or necessity, knows the thing produced before it exists. But every knower possesses the thing known, either in truth or in a likeness. But prior to their existence, things cannot be possessed by God in truth; therefore, they are possessed in some likeness. But the likeness of a thing, through which it is known and produced, is an idea. Therefore, etc.

c. Everything that leads in a definite way to knowledge of something else has within itself a likeness of the thing known or is itself its likeness. But the eternal mirror leads the minds of those who see it to knowledge of any created thing, as Augustine tells us, “they know more there than elsewhere.”⁵ Therefore, it follows that in God dwell likenesses of things. And it is clear that they are in God as in a knower, for they present things not just to others but also to him. And this is the very definition of an idea. Therefore, etc.

d. Since things are produced by God, they are in God as in an efficient cause; indeed, God is in the truest sense an efficient cause. Likewise, since things are ordered to him as an end, he is in the truest sense an end.⁶ Therefore, by similar reasoning, since things are known and expressed by God, in himself God is in the truest sense an exemplar. But there can be no exemplar unless there are ideas of things patterned after it. Therefore, etc.

To the contrary:

1. Dionysius says in his book *On Divine Names*: “The divine intellect knows, but from itself and through itself, not based on an idea that is mixed up with individuals, but as the one *cause* of excellence it knows all things

and contains all things.”⁷ Therefore, God does not know individuals by means of an idea.

The same point can be seen by rational argument.

2. Idea includes in its definition likeness, and likeness, in turn, includes in its definition agreement. But there is no agreement between God and creature—there is the greatest distance between them; or, if there is some agreement, it is minimal. Therefore, either there is no idea in God or, if there is one, it is imperfect in nature. But nothing imperfect should be posited in God. Therefore, etc.

3. The finest mode of knowing should be attributed to God. But knowledge by means of a thing’s essence is finer than knowledge through a likeness of a thing. Therefore, God knows by means of the essence of a thing, not means of a likeness. But an idea is a likeness, not the essence of a thing. And so, etc.

4. An idea is needed only to direct knowledge or to regulate action. But nothing needs direction or regulation except what can err or go astray. But God does neither of these things. Therefore, it is pointless to posit ideas in God.

Response:

There are two opinions regarding this issue.

Some thinkers have said that God does not know by reason of an idea but by reason of causality. And they have given the following simile: If a point could know its own power, it would know lines and the circumference. Likewise, if unity had cognitive power whereby it could reflect upon itself, it would know all the numbers. These thinkers claim that much the same is true about God. For, since God has the power to produce all things and knows his full power, it follows that God knows all things. And they say that Dionysius perceived this when he said “not based on an idea but as the one cause of excellence does God know all things.”

But this position cannot stand. First, because God does not know through a process of comparing, moving from principle to result, but rather by simple insight (*simplici aspectu*). Second, every knower, as a knower, is

like the thing known. Therefore, either it possesses a likeness of it or it is a likeness of it. Third, every knower produces something distinct because it knows distinctly; but not the converse. Therefore, the rational means of producing (*ratio producendi*) is not the rational means of knowing (*ratio cognoscendi*). And finally, God knows some things that do not come from him. On account of these and similar arguments, I reply differently.

Consequently, there is a second position, one followed both by the saints and by the philosophers, namely that God knows through ideas, and God possesses in himself reasons (*rationes*) and likenesses (*similitudines*) of the things which he knows. And in these [reasons and likenesses] not only does God himself know but so too do those who gaze upon him. Now these reasons (*rationes*) Augustine calls ideas and primordial causes.

In order to grasp the force of the four arguments laid down at the beginning of the question, one must understand that an idea is defined as “a likeness of the thing known.” Now ‘likeness’ is said in two ways. In one way, there is a likeness based on the agreement of two things with a third; and this is a univocal likeness. In a second way, there is a likeness based on one thing being said to be like another. Now this kind of likeness does not involve agreement with something common, since the likeness is alike in itself and not due to some third thing. This is the way a creature is said to be a likeness of God or conversely God is said to be a likeness of the creature. In this second way of taking “likeness,” the likeness is the rational means of knowing (*ratio cognoscendi*)⁸ and it is called an idea.

But this happens differently in ourselves and in God. In us, the rational means of knowing is the likeness, while the thing known is truth. For in us, a likeness is received and impressed from outside, because our intellect is possible with respect to what is known and is not pure act. Therefore, it becomes actual through something from the thing known, which is a likeness of it. But in God the case is reversed, because the rational means of knowing is truth itself, while the thing known is a likeness of the truth, namely, the creature itself. And since the rational means of knowing consists in the first truth itself, the rational means of knowing in God is expressive to the highest degree. But since everything that is expressive to the highest degree is perfectly like what is known, by a likeness appropriate to knowledge, it is clear that truth itself, by reason of *causing* knowledge, is an expressive likeness and an idea. But the reverse is true of us, where the

likeness, as a likeness, *causes* knowledge. From this, the replies to the objections to the contrary are clear.

1. To the objection that God is not mixed with individuals based on an idea, I reply: By these words Dionysius does not mean to remove from God the nature of an idea, but he means to say that there is not in God the kind of multiplicity and differentiation of ideas concerning individuals that is found in us.

2. To the objection that there is no agreement or minimal agreement, I reply: There is a likeness of univocity or participation, a likeness of imitation, and a likeness of expression. Between God and creature, there is in no way a likeness of participation, because they have nothing in common. There is only a slight likeness of imitation, because the finite can imitate the infinite only to a slight degree. Consequently, there is always more unlikeness than likeness. But an expressed likeness is the highest kind of likeness, because it is caused by the meaning of truth, which is the expression itself, as we saw before. Therefore, God knows all things in the highest degree.

3. To the third objection, that knowledge through the essence is finer, I reply: There is one kind of likeness caused by the truth of the external thing, and about this likeness it is true that it never expresses the thing as perfectly as the thing itself would, if it were present to the soul. But God does not know by means of this kind of likeness. Now there is another kind of likeness, which is the truth itself, expressive of the thing known and a likeness of it precisely because it is truth. Now this kind of likeness expresses the thing better than the thing can express itself, because the thing itself receives the intelligibility (*rationem*) of expression from it. Based on this kind of likeness, there is more perfect knowledge, so God knows in this way.

4. To the objection that an idea is for the sake of regulating and directing, I reply: Regulating and directing can occur in two ways: either through a regulation that differs from the thing directed and regulated, which includes imperfection and the possibility of error; or through a regulation that is the same as the thing regulated, which includes the impossibility of error. Since a regulation cannot err, and God is that very

regulation and idea, it is impossible that God err. And so it is clear that an idea in God does not imply imperfection, but perfection.

QUESTION 2

*Should a real plurality of ideas be posited?*⁹

The second question is whether one should posit a real plurality of ideas.

*And it seems that one should:*¹⁰

1. For Augustine says that “ideas are eternal and unchangeable forms.”¹¹ If there are many forms, since form describes what an idea is absolutely, it seems that there are many ideas, based on what they are absolutely.

2. An idea is a likeness wholly expressing the thing patterned on the idea (*ideatum*). But things wholly like one and the same thing are the same, in no way are differing from each other. Therefore, if in its own nature the idea for all things were one, then all things would be without any differences.

3. Again, if an idea is one quiddity, then it is either one common likeness or one proper likeness. If it is one common likeness, then through it things are never distinguished; but if it is one proper likeness, then through it a plurality of things never can be known.

4. Again, if an idea is the rational means of knowing, but every knower knows according to the exigencies of its rational means of knowing, then it follows that if the idea is one quiddity, since distinction does not fall within ‘one,’ God would not know things distinctly, but rather indistinctly.

To the contrary:

a. Augustine says in *On the Trinity* 6: “The Son is a certain ‘art’ of the all-powerful God, filled with all the reasons for living things, and in him all things are one.”¹²

b. Whatever is more perfect should be attributed to God. But it is more perfect to be able to know and produce many things through one principle than through many.¹³ Therefore, this should be attributed to God. Therefore, God knows all things by means of one idea.

c. In every type of cause there is rest (*status*) in one simple thing, for example, in efficient and final causality. Since God is the exemplar in whom there is rest in every way, there must be in God the highest unity. But an exemplar that contains a multitude of things is not completely one and simple. Therefore, in the divine exemplar there is only one idea in reality.

Response:

To understand the foregoing arguments one should note that there are two opinions concerning this matter.

Some thinkers have said that ideas in God are distinct in reality. For they said that we should consider the entire range of forms: in God; in the soul; and in the world or in matter. In matter or in the physical universe, forms are distinct, composed, and opposed, because they exist there materially. In the human soul, forms are distinct and composed, but not opposed. This is because they are in a certain way spiritual, although not entirely so, since they arise from things outside the soul.¹⁴ Therefore, there is composition, for they are different from the soul itself. Now in God, forms are distinct, but not composed or opposed, because of the supreme simplicity of God. And although in God they are distinct, they are but one exemplar, just as many particular forms in a signet ring produce one seal.

This position, although initially it seems probable, in the end contains an error. For if in God one were to posit ideas really different or distinct, then there would be a real plurality in God other than the plurality of persons, which is abhorrent to pious ears. If you reply that this position would not posit a second absolute plurality, but only a relative one, then I raise this question about that relation: Either it is something or it is nothing. If it is nothing, then there is no real distinction in God. But if it is

something, we can only grant that it is the divine essence. But all essential features of God are one.

This is why there is a second position: that the ideas are one in reality. Now this is made clear as follows. An idea in God describes a likeness which is a rational means of knowing. Now this reason in reality is the divine truth itself, as was shown above (q. 1). Since the divine truth is one, it is clear that in reality all the ideas are one. And this is what Augustine says explicitly, namely, “in that ‘art’ all things are one.”

Replies to the objections:

1. To the objection that the ideas are forms, I reply: There are two kinds of forms, namely, a form that is the perfection of a thing, and an exemplar form. Augustine understands “forms” in the definition of “ideas” to mean exemplar form. Now in both cases form is said in a relative sense: the first in relation to the matter that it informs, the second in relation to what is patterned on it (*exemplatum*). Therefore, since “form” describes some relation to another, as does “likeness,” when there are said to be many forms, there is no implication that in the ideas there is a plurality that is real or in that which they are; but in regard to that *toward* which they are related.

2. To the objection that an idea is a likeness wholly expressing, therefore, etc., there is one way of responding: An idea does not describe some likeness *through* which a knower is assimilated to other things, but rather it describes a likeness *to* which many things are assimilated. But many things can *be assimilated* to one thing. For example, if from the form of a signet ring, the same expression of a figure is made in wax, there can be many different impressions from one and the same form, because the signet ring is impressed more or less upon the wax. Those who hold this view understand something of this sort to be true in the case of God, since multiplicity in things arises from their levels and their approximation to the divine being itself.

But this response is not adequate, because God makes all things diverse in form, not simply in their level and dignity; and God knows them through something one in reality, which is the *likeness of the thing known*.

If you say this is because God knows by himself, just as he acts by himself, so that just as through one thing he does many things, so also through one thing he knows many things, this is still no solution. For the question still remains how God himself can be *like* many things.

For this reason, I reply: There is a certain kind of likeness that is based on the property of a genus; and there is no doubt that, about this sort of likeness, there cannot be one likeness for many things differing in genus. This is the sort of likeness that is expressed and caused by a thing limited to a definite genus. But there is a second kind of likeness that is absolutely outside any genus, and this sort of likeness, since it is not restricted to a particular genus, for the same reason it is a likeness of that genus, it is a likeness of another genus. And for the same reason it is a likeness of part of a thing, it is also a likeness of the whole. And this kind of likeness is the divine truth and idea in God.

If you raise the question how we should understand this sort of likeness, [I reply:] It can be understood, though something completely similar cannot be produced. Since this kind of likeness is pure act and truth itself, as we have stated, all other knowable things, however noble they are in their essences, are compared to it in the manner of possible things. And just as a thing one in form can be assimilated to many things diverse in matter, so too in this case, there can be one real likeness for all knowable things. And we can give an example drawn from light, for light, though numerically one thing, expresses many and varied species of colors. In *our knowledge*, however, since our knowledge is related, in the manner of the possible, to a thing known, and is in a way capable of being informed by it, we cannot find a similarity but a dissimilarity. So this is why, if we focus upon *our own* manner of knowing, it seems to us that we cannot understand this [likeness].

3. As to the question whether the likeness at stake is proper or common, I reply: God is not said to be a universal cause or a particular cause, absolutely speaking, but he has something of the nobility of a universal cause—since he is capable of so many effects—and yet he also has something of a particular cause—since he is capable of producing any single effect immediately and sufficiently. So concerning God’s knowledge, we should understand that it is not altogether universal nor altogether particular knowledge. Likewise, we should understand about the likeness and idea

that it is common with regard to its indifference and fullness, but it is proper as a completely distinct expression.

The reason for the unique character of this likeness is that it is an *expressive* likeness, not an *impressed* likeness or an *expressed* likeness. Since it is altogether completely expressive, it is expressive in the highest degree and in every condition. And further, from the fact that it is not expressed, it is not confined or limited, but is extended to all things; just like the divine essence, although it is wholly in one [person of the Trinity], but not in one in such a way that it is not in another.

4. To the last objection stating that he knows according to the exigencies of the rational means of knowing, I reply: Just as the rational means of knowing (*ratio cognoscendi*) is one, yet it represents many things that are known in completely distinct ways, according to their proper conditions, so, as regards the mode of knowing (*modum cognoscendi*), divine knowledge is one and simple and without distinction. But *in comparison with its object*, [divine knowledge] knows things distinctly. Therefore, when it is said “God knows all things distinctly,” if the distinction is posited in knowledge *in comparison to the knower*, the statement is false; but if it is posited in knowledge *in comparison to the thing known*, the statement holds true.¹⁵

QUESTION 3

*Is there a plurality of ideas according to reason?*¹⁶

The third question is whether there is a plurality of ideas *according to reason*.

*That there is, is argued as follows:*¹⁷

a. Augustine says in his book *On 83 Questions*: “By one reason (*ratione*) the human was created, and by another the horse.”¹⁸ Therefore, if an idea describes the very rational means of knowing, it is necessary that it be multiplied *according to reason*.

b. The same point can be shown by observing his manner of speaking and defining, for Augustine speaks in the plural and defines the ideas themselves in the plural, when he says that they are forms. Now they must be multiplied either in reality or according to reason; but not in reality; therefore, according to reason.

c. An idea describes a likeness to the thing known; and a likeness, although it is something absolute in God, involves a manner of speaking (*modum dicendi*) that bears upon another or is relational. But multiplying a relative likeness comes from the thing to which it is assimilated. Therefore, since the things patterned on the ideas are many, the ideas must be many, according to the manner of speaking.

d. Prior to producing things, God knew distinctly and actually. But then there was no distinction in God the knower or in the thing known. Therefore, it is necessary that distinction be founded on the rational means of knowing.

To the contrary:

1. If the ideas are multiplied according to reason, but not in reality, then it seems that such a plurality is nothing but empty talk.

2. If there is plurality in the name “idea,” this is either by reason of what it is or by reason of that toward which it points. But plurality cannot be due to what it is, since this is the divine essence. If the plurality is due to that toward which the idea points, then, since word, exemplar, and art all describe a relation to the creature, at least nominally the ideas ought to be multiplied. But this is false.

3. Again, if the ideas are many, not because of what they signify but because of what they connote, then I raise this question: Is the thing connoted eternal or temporal? If it is eternal, then it seems that there are many things from eternity. But if it is temporal, then it seems that *idea* is said of God only in relation to time, just as *lord* and *creator* are said of God only in relation to time.

4. If the ideas are many because of the things patterned on them, this is either because of the being (*esse*) that the things patterned on the ideas have in God, or because of the being they have in their own proper genera. If it is because of the being that they have in God, then I say to the contrary: in God they are one and by reason of that being they cannot be called many. If it is because of the being they have in their own proper genera, which they only have in time, then either the ideas are many only in the order of time, or the temporal is the cause of the eternal. But both of these are impossible.

5. An idea either describes something or nothing. If nothing, then the idea has neither unity nor plurality. If it describes something, then, if there are many ideas, there are many things. Therefore, if there are many ideas from eternity, there are many things from eternity. But these things are not many in relation to persons, since an idea does not describe something pertaining to persons. Therefore, the things would have to be many in the order of essence.

Response:

As is clear from what was said above,¹⁹ d. 30, although in God there is no real relation to a creature, it is true that the very essence of God can be signified in relation to the creature by means of many names. Now a name or word is not empty. Therefore, one should understand that the name “idea” signifies the divine essence in comparison or relation with a creature; for an idea is a likeness of a thing known. Although in God this likeness is something absolute, according to the mode of understanding it describes a relation midway between the knower and the thing known. And even though in reality this relation holds more on the side of the knower, since he is God, nonetheless, *according to the rational means of understanding or speaking*, the likeness holds more on the side of the thing known. Since the knower is one, but the things known are many, it follows that all the ideas in God are one in reality, yet they are many according to the rational means of understanding or speaking. Consequently, we should grant that all reasons (*rationes*) in God are one quiddity, though they are not one idea or reason, but many.²⁰

Replies to the arguments to the contrary:

1. To the objection that nothing underlies this reason (*isti rationi*) on the side of the thing, I reply: This is false, because what underlies the relation on the side of God is his essence, not a relation; but on the side of the creature what underlies is truly a relation. This is why when that relation is signified it does not imply any falsity. In this way, for this plurality of relations, although there is no underlying plurality on the side of God, there is an underlying plurality on the side of the things *connoted* by the relation. Consequently, a relation multiplied in this way is neither false nor empty speech.

2. To the objection that “word” and “art” describe a relation, I reply: They do indeed describe a relation, but in a different way than do idea or reason (*ratio*). For an idea or rational means of knowing (*ratio cognoscendi*) is taken more from the rational means of understanding *on the side of the thing known*. For a likeness, as such, does not describe a relation to that *in which* it exists, but rather to that *of which* it is a likeness. On the other hand, a word is taken more from the side of the speaker, and likewise art and exemplar are taken more from the side of the producer. Now since there are many things known but one knower, there are many ideas, but only one art.

A second reply: A reason (*ratio*) and an idea describe a relation to things in so far as the things are distinct, but this is not true of the other terms.

3. To the objection that the things connoted are not plural from eternity, I reply: Plurality among the ideas comes by reason of the things connoted. But we may speak about what is connoted in two ways: either as they exist or as they are connoted. If we speak about them as they exist, then they exist only in time. But if we speak about them as they are connoted, they can be connoted both temporally and eternally. They are connoted eternally when a habitual relation is implied, as happens with the term “predestination.” For predestination is eternal, since it connotes an effect that is not actual, but habitual. They are connoted temporally when an actual relation is implied, as happens with the verb “to create.” Accordingly, as the things connoted are temporal, since they are in the future, but future things are many, it follows that things are connoted as many. Nevertheless, the things so connoted, although they are connoted eternally, do not exist

eternally but in time. So too, the multiplicity in the things connoted, although it is said eternally, it does not posit real multiplicity except in time.

4. To the question about whether the ideas are many based on the being of things patterned on the ideas, I reply: They are many based on the being that the things patterned on the ideas will have in their proper genera. Although they only have such being in time, they were going to have it from eternity. Now the ideas are of things as they *will be*. Therefore, they are understood to be many, not only from time but also from eternity. So this case is different from how we understand predestination and condemnation to have been from eternity; for the ideas are not by reason of that which *has* been from eternity, but by reason of that which *will* be in time.

5. To the objection that if the ideas are many, then the things are also many, I reply: An idea does not describe only what something is, but also a relation to what will be or even to what can be. And it is by reason of that relation that the idea is receptive to multiplicity. Now since that relation does not posit something actual but only something potential, it follows that the eternal plurality of ideas does not posit some actual plurality, just as no actual plurality is posited if we say “he can make many things.” But what the term “thing” describes implies this absolutely. Now this is why when one says “there are many things,” an actual multiplicity is posited. Therefore, the argument is invalid. In fact, the fallacy involved is that of moving from what is said in a qualified sense to what is said absolutely.²¹ It would be like saying, “many things are possible for God, or many things are known by God, therefore many things exist.” Likewise, this inference is invalid: “there are many ideas, therefore, there are many things.” For the ideas are many not by reason of *what* they are, but by reason of that *toward* which they are.

QUESTION 4

*Are the ideas many, in comparison to the things patterned on the ideas, insofar as these things are diverse in species or diverse as individuals?*²²

Fourthly, we ask whether the ideas are many in comparison to the things patterned on the ideas, according to the multiplicity of these things that arises from a diversity of universals or of singulars.

*And it seems that the multiplicity arises from a diversity of singulars:*²³

a. The reason for distinguishing (*ratio distinguendi*) comes from the ideas. But God not only distinguishes one universal from another universal, he also distinguishes one singular from another. Yet since he distinguishes one universal from another, he has many ideas or reasons for these many universals. Consequently, “by one reason the horse was created, by another the human was created.”²⁴

b. Again, the truest knowledge of a thing is according to its totality. But the singular adds something to the universal. Therefore, since God knows the whole, he not only has an idea of the universal, but also an idea of what is superadded, namely, the singular. And the same thing is true for other singulars. Therefore, if the features added are diverse according to their “reason,” or their many ideas, it is clear, etc.

c. Again, God predestines certain people, yet reproves others. But he predestines from one reason and reproves from another. Therefore, those are foreknown and predestined according to different reasons and ideas in God. But this is an individual or numerical type of diversity. Therefore, etc.

d. Again, an idea is multiplied in God by reason of a reference or relation to the thing patterned on the idea. Therefore, when one of these things is multiplied, so too is the other. Therefore, since a human, who is something patterned on an idea, is multiplied in diverse individuals in reality, the idea corresponding to these individual humans will also be multiplied according to reason.

To the contrary:

1. Augustine says in his *Letter to Nebridius*: “I say that, with regard to the human, there is there only a reason of the human; not a reason of me or you.”²⁵ Therefore, multiplication or distinction of ideas is found only according to a diversity of universals.

2. Again, a created artisan produces many things through one idea. Therefore, since to do so is a mark of nobility, God produces many things diverse in number through an idea that is one both in reality and according to reason.

3. Again, the singular as singular is more composed than the universal. Therefore, if there is an idea of the singular as singular in God, then one idea will be more simple than another. But this is wrong. Therefore, etc.

4. Again, the singular is more proper than the universal. Therefore, if in God there is an idea of the universal as universal and of the singular as singular, then one idea will be common and the other proper. But the common is prior to and more simple than the proper. Therefore, one idea is prior to and simpler than another. Therefore, we must posit an essential order and composition in God. Therefore, etc.

Response:

In reality an idea in God is the divine truth; yet, according to the rational means of understanding, it is a likeness of the thing known. This likeness, moreover, is an expressive rational means of knowing (*ratio expressiva cognoscendi*) not only the universal but also the singular, even though it in itself is neither singular nor universal, just as God is neither. Consequently, the idea is not only a likeness of the universal, as it is a universal, but also of the singular, as a singular. Therefore, since it is a likeness of both, an idea is multiplied not only according to the multiplicity of universals, but also according to the multiplicity of singulars. And this is what Augustine says to Nebridius, “I say that, as to making the human, there exists only the reason of the human, but, as to the world of time, there are different reasons of humans dwelling in that purity [of the divine truth].”^{[26](#)}

1. From this the solution is clear regarding the statement of Augustine. For Augustine says that, even though there is one idea of the universal as it is a universal, there are many ideas of singulars as singulars. Consequently, he says in that same place that “if someone wants to make an angle, it is enough for him to have the notion of an angle. But if he wishes to paint a square, he needs to have the notion of four angles.”^{[27](#)}

2. To the objection that the created artisan produces many things through one idea, I reply: He does so through applying that idea to different parcels of matter. Consequently, if he has only one idea, it is impossible to understand how he would know diverse things through that one idea, by an act of simple understanding. God, however, by an act of simple understanding, knows singulars as diverse, so that he knows them as a whole and according to their proper differences and properties. Consequently, the analogy fails.

3-4. To the objection regarding composition and priority, I reply: Neither in reality nor according to reason is it necessary that the idea itself possess the properties of the thing patterned on the idea. For even in creatures there can be a spiritual likeness and a simple likeness of a composite thing. Therefore, it is not necessary that one *idea* be simpler or prior to another. However, a likeness, according to the rational means of understanding, does have the property of the thing patterned on the idea, as regards distinction. This is because of the mutual relations between the two, since it is necessary that when one relative is multiplied, so is the other—at least according to reason, where there is a relation based on reason. Also, this is because that likeness is the reason for expressing and distinguishing. Therefore, even though the property of distinction needs to apply in this case, the same thing does not have to be true in other cases.

QUESTION 5

*Are the ideas in God numerically finite or infinite?*²⁸

The fifth question is whether one should posit in God a multitude of ideas that is numerically finite or infinite.

*And it seems that one should posit a multiplicity that is numerically infinite:*²⁹

a. Augustine says in *On The City of God* 11: “There is one wisdom wherein there are infinite treasures of all intelligible things.”³⁰

b. Augustine says in *On the Trinity* 6 that “the Son is a certain ‘art,’ full of all the reasons for living things.”³¹ But it is clear that such an ‘art’ is infinite. Therefore, it cannot be filled with anything less than infinity. Therefore, there is present there an infinitude of reasons.

The same conclusion can be seen by reason:

c. For, it is clear that God knows all the species of numbers. Therefore, all these species have their ideas in God. But the species of numbers are infinite. Therefore, etc.

If you say that the species are infinite from our point of view but not in reality, I reply to the contrary:

Suppose that all the species of numbers exist in reality. On this supposition, it necessarily follows that an infinite number of things absolutely exist in act. Therefore, if the ideas of all the species of number are in God actually, then it is clear, etc.

d. God can produce an infinite number of things. But he can produce nothing about which he has no knowledge or idea. Therefore, God has ideas of an infinite number of things. But the more the things, the more the ideas. Therefore, of an infinite number of things there must be an infinite number of ideas.

e. We can think of more than all finite things, since something greater than everything finite can be thought. But neither God nor man can think of more things than God knows, because then God’s knowledge would not be the highest knowledge. But if this were true, then since God knows through ideas, it is clear that, etc.

To the contrary:

1. Augustine in *The City of God* 12 says that “whatever is known is rendered finite by the comprehension of the knower.”³² But it is clear that the reasons for knowing are themselves known. Therefore, they are rendered finite. But whatever is rendered finite is finite. Therefore, etc.

2. The multitude of ideas is based on the multitude of things patterned on the ideas. But it is obvious that all things other than God must be finite in act. Therefore, something similar is true of the ideas.

3. Wherever there is infinity, there is confusion and a lack of order. But, in the eternal exemplar, there can be no confusion or lack of order. Therefore, etc.

4. To posit an infinity in act in a creature is to posit an imperfection. Consequently, for everything created, in the measure that it is finite, to that degree it is perfect. But every condition of imperfection must be denied of God. Therefore, etc.

Response:

As is said in the Psalm, “of divine wisdom there is no number.”³³ This is why there is no number for the reasons through which divine wisdom knows. Since they have no number, they cannot be numbered. Therefore, there is no finite number of them, but an infinite number. Accordingly, the arguments and authorities on this side should be granted.

1. To the objection that everything knowable is finite, I reply: Everything knowable through comprehension is finite to the one who comprehends it. The eternal reasons, however, are known through comprehension by God alone. Therefore, they are finite to God alone. Now this does not follow: “this thing is *equal* to the infinite, therefore it is finite.” Rather there is a fallacy involved of moving from something stated in a qualified sense to something stated absolutely.³⁴ In fact, the opposite follows: “therefore, this is *not* finite.” In the same way should we judge the matter in the present case. Those reasons are not able to be comprehended by any finite intellect. Therefore, it is clear the objection fails.

2. To the objection that the multitude of ideas arises from the multitude of things patterned on the ideas, I reply as before:³⁵ Such a multitude does not come from the multitude of things patterned on the ideas, insofar as they are created, but insofar as they are connoted. An idea, moreover, does not connote the thing patterned on the idea according to its actual existence, but only according to its potentiality. And since God *can* make an infinite number of things, even though he always makes only a finite number, it follows that the ideas or the reasons for knowing are infinite *in God*, because there are ideas not only of things that do exist or will exist, but of

all things that are possible for God. For God can do nothing that he does not know in actuality.

3. To the objection that the infinite introduces confusion, I reply: One can posit an infinity that includes real diversity, and such an infinity does eliminate distinction and order, if it is posited to exist in actuality. But the multitude of ideas is not a multitude of diverse things; rather, it describes the immensity of the divine truth that expresses and knows everything that is possible for God. And this in reality and actuality is one. Therefore, there is no confusion involved.

4. To the objection that infinity in a creature is a mark of imperfection, I reply: Although it is a mark of imperfection in a creature, it is not such in the creator, since understanding an infinite occurs either through defect or through excess. An infinite through defect can exist in a creature, as in matter, and this is a sign of imperfection. This kind of infinite is not found in the creator in any way. On the other hand, the infinite through excess cannot exist absolutely in a creature, since it has created, composite, and limited being (*esse*). But God has none of these limitations, and therefore possesses infinity, which is a mark of the highest perfection.

QUESTION 6

*Do the ideas have an order among themselves?*³⁶

In the sixth and final place, we ask whether there is an ordered series among the ideas.

*And it seems that there is:*³⁷

1. Augustine seems to tell us as much when he says “by one reason the human was created, and by another the horse,”³⁸ since a human is one sort of thing and a horse another. Therefore, since a human is more noble than a horse, by similar reasoning the human was created by a more noble idea or reason than the horse. But wherever there is more and less of nobility, there is an order. Therefore, etc.

2. Again, just as God knows and produces distinct things through ideas, so he knows and produces ordered things. Therefore, just as we posit a plurality in ideas from the plurality of things known or of things patterned on ideas, so we ought to posit one order from the other order.

3. Again, wherever there is plurality or distinction, there must be either order or lack of order. But in God there is no lack of order or confusion. Therefore, in God the ideas have an order.

To the contrary:

a. The ideas are many, because God knows distinctly through them. God, however, does not know one thing after another, but he knows all things simultaneously. Therefore, the ideas are simultaneous in God.

b. Again, if there is an order, it must be an order of priority, or of dignity, or of origin. It cannot be an order of priority, since then one idea would be posterior to another; and this is saying something incorrect. And it cannot be an order of nobility, since every idea in God is noble to the highest degree. And it cannot be an order of origin, since if one idea arose from another, then in that case there would be a true distinction in reality. Therefore, it seems that in no manner whatsoever is there an order among the ideas.

c. Again, every infinite either eliminates order altogether or removes the perfection that comes from order, since it removes rest and fulfillment. But there is infinity in the ideas, as we saw in the previous question. Therefore, there is either no order or an incomplete order among the ideas. But there cannot be an incomplete order; therefore there is no order.

Response:

As was touched upon in the arguments to the contrary, there is no order amongst the ideas or rational means of knowing, in relation to each other, neither a real order nor an order according to reason. To be sure, the ideas do have an order with respect to the things patterned on the ideas, but not to each other. For one of the ideas is neither prior to another, nor posterior to

another, nor does one come from another, nor is one nobler than another. And that is why no order is posited among them.

Now the reason for this is that, from the very meaning of their name, the ideas describe a relation to things known. And since those things are many, the ideas are also many, based on the primary feature of their name. But “order” describes a new feature, respect, and a new relation, when one idea is compared to another. And since, once we prescind from the relation to the things patterned on the ideas, in God the ideas are absolutely one and have no order to each other, it follows that we should not grant that the ideas have a plurality nor that they have an order in relation to each other.

Replies to the objections:

1. To the objection that an idea is different since the human is different and thus it is nobler, since the human is nobler than horse, I reply: The cases are not similar. For a likeness, by the very fact that it is compared to something else, has to be distinguished from it; but it does not have to be nobler than it, unless it receives something from the thing to which it is compared. And since the idea of the human receives nothing from a human and the idea of the horse receives nothing from the horse, one idea is not said to be nobler than another.

2. To the objection that God knows ordered things, I reply: Even though he knows ordered things, nonetheless he knows them simultaneously and in an equally noble way. Therefore, just as a distinction was posited among the ideas, because God knew distinctly through them, so simultaneity and equal nobility ought to be posited, because he knows simultaneously and in an equally noble way. For this reason, no order should be posited in them. For even though there are no white ideas in God, God knows white things, and in the same way, even though God knows ordered things, it is not necessary that they be ordered in God.

3. To the objection that wherever there is plurality without order, there is confusion and lack of order, I reply: This statement is false, since there can be simultaneity there; and this is the case in the ideas.

Or I reply: The claim has a place, where there is real plurality. But this is not found among the ideas, since they are all one. And this is why there

cannot be any lack of order among them.

NOTES

¹ Bonaventure holds there must be ideas in God's mind, because God is a creator and therefore must know beforehand what he creates. This position presents the difficulty of reconciling God's unity with the plurality of things he creates, for in order to create many things it seems there must be many creative ideas in the divine mind. Here in d. 35, Bonaventure begins by saying there must be divine ideas, because in creating the world God knows in a practical way, not in a theoretical way (q. 1). He then turns to the difficult issue of whether there is but one divine idea, or many. He recognizes there must be some kind of plurality among divine ideas, but he must explain this plurality without endangering God's unity (q. 2–3). Q. 4–6 deal with some fine points of Bonaventure's theory of divine ideas.

² *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.5.1.1.3.1 (1. n. 175); Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 35.7; Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 36.2.1; *Summa theologiae*, 1.15.1.

³ Bonaventure's problematic: Arg. a–d reason there must be ideas in God in order for him to know beforehand what he creates (Arg. b), in order for Bonaventure's illumination theory of human knowledge to be true (Arg. c), and because God is an exemplar cause of creatures (Arg. d). Arg. 1–4 *To the contrary* attack the foundation of the divine ideas, the notion that there can be a 'likeness' of God toward creatures. In his "response" Bonaventure solves this dilemma by pointing out that ideas, as "rational means of knowing," work in God in a way that is the opposite of how they work in creatures.

⁴ Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus lxxxiii*, q. 46.2 (PL 40: 30; CCSL 44a: 71.26). Also quoted by Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 35.7. Obj. 1.

⁵ Augustine, *De civitate dei*, 11.29 (PL 41: 343; CCSL 48: 349.11–32).

⁶ Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus* 6.10 (PG 3: 825; *Dionysiaca*: 364).

⁷ Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 7.2 (PG 3: 870; *Dionysiaca*: 397).

⁸ Bonaventure repeatedly uses the phrases *ratio cognoscendi*, *ratio discernendi*, and *ratio innotescendi* in presenting his theory of the divine ideas. *Ratio* in its primordial sense means the power of reason in an intellectual being, or the act of reasoning, powers and acts which exist in the intellectual subject. This is the subjective sense of the term. As early as Aristotle, however, philosophers had used the terms *logos* (*ratio* in Latin) to mean a rationally discernible aspect of some thing. This is the objective sense of the term. In these phrases, *ratio* is used in its subjective sense, to mean a power, habit, or act of reason which is the means whereby the intellectual subject comes to "know" or "discern" or to make something "become known." In order to highlight the subjective and "rational" meaning of this phrase, we normally have translated *ratio cognoscendi* as "rational means of knowing." In a finite knower this "means" is ontologically distinct from the substance of the knower; in God, however, this "means" is not ontologically distinct from the substance or essence of God. The *ratio cognoscendi*, then, always involves ideas existing in the knower, but these "means" work differently in God and creature, as Bonaventure goes on to point out.

⁹ *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.3.1.2.4 (1: n. 80), 1.1.1.5.1.1.4.1 (1: n. 175); Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 35.9, 14; Thomas Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 36.2.2; *Summa theologiae*, 1.15.2.

¹⁰ Bonaventure's problematic: In q. 2 and in q. 3, Bonaventure uses the "rational means of knowing (*ratio cognoscendi*)" to answer the questions asked, because this *ratio* involves the relation between the knower—who knows things through ideas—and the things known—whose natures are a function of those ideas. Humans use a plurality of "ideas" in practical and productive knowledge, because they make or do many things different in nature (*ratio*). For us, both the ideas in our minds and the natures of the things we know and produce are many. Things are different for God. So here in q. 2, Bonaventure asks whether the ideas or *rationes*, as found in the divine mind, whereby God

knows the things he creates, are many “in reality (*secundum rem*),” as they are for us, or one in reality. In q. 3, he will ask whether they are many “according to reason,” that is, based on the many natures of the things God creates, or one “according to reason.”

Arg. 1–4 here reason there must be a plurality of divine ideas. Arg. a–c emphasize the unity of divine ideas in God. In his response, Bonaventure says the ideas must be ontologically one in God; but they can still be “many.” He begins to address the difficult problems involved in how the divine ideas can be many in the replies to the objections in this question, and further develops his answers in Q. 3.

¹¹ Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus*, lxxxiii, q. 46.2 (PL 40: 30; CCSL 44a: 71.26-30).

¹² Augustine, *De trinitate*, 6.10.11 (PL 42: 931; CCSL 50: 241.20-24).

¹³ Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, 2.12 (292a22-27).

¹⁴ Augustine, *De trinitate*, 11.5.9 (PL 42: 991; CCSL 50: 345.49-52).

¹⁵ In this reply, by *ratio cognoscendi* Bonaventure is referring to God knowing through divine ideas. By *modus cognoscendi*, Bonaventure is referring to God’s intuitive “manner” of knowing, as distinguished from the discursive way humans know. Bonaventure’s final argument here, that the plurality of divine ideas is based on the many objects of divine knowledge, rather than using ideas as the means of knowing, was taken over by Thomas Aquinas. See his *Summa theologiae*, 1.15.2c. “It follows that in the divine mind there are many ideas. How this is not repugnant to divine simplicity is easy to understand, if one considers the idea of something done to be in the mind of the doer, *as what is understood*, but not as the species by means of which it is understood, which is a form bringing the intellect into actuality. For the form of a house in the mind of the builder is *something understood* by him, in whose likeness he forms the house in matter. It is not contrary to the simplicity of the divine intellect that it understand *many things*, but it would be contrary to its simplicity, if its understanding were formed through many species. Consequently, there are many ideas in the divine mind, *as things understood by it*.” Aquinas thought this difficult problem easy to solve, because Bonaventure had already distinguished the thing understood by God from the means whereby God understands it—the divine *idea*, *ratio*, *similitudo*, *species*, *forma*.

¹⁶ *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.3.1.2.4 (1: n. 80), 1.1.1.5.1.1.4.1 (1: n. 175); Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 35.14; Thomas Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 36.2.3; *Summa theologiae*, 1.15.2.

¹⁷ Bonaventure’s problematic: Arg. a–d argue for many divine ideas “according to reason,” because the “likeness” or “reason” in the divine mind is “many” only in relation to the things known by God. Obj. 1–5 *To the Contrary* argue that the consequences of saying the divine ideas are multiple, even if only based on the many creatures God will create, are unacceptable. For a multiplicity of ideas either introduces multiplicity into God or makes God change over time.

In the previous question, Bonaventure used the “rational means of knowing (*ratio cognoscendi*)” to look at the ontological status of the divine ideas, as they exist in the mind of God. In God, there is no real plurality of ideas; they are one with the divine essence. Here he uses the *ratio cognoscendi* to ask whether the content of the divine ideas, that is, the *rationes* or natures found in creatures, must be many. When we look at the many natures and individualities found in creatures, we see there must be many creative divine ideas.

¹⁸ Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus* lxxxiii, q. 46.2 (PL 40: 30; CCSL 44a: 72.50-55).

¹⁹ Bonaventure, *In Sententiis*, Bk. 1, d. 30, q. 3 (1: 524).

²⁰ In the “response” and replies to objections here in q. 3, Bonaventure expands the explanation he began in the previous question. Looking at the “rational means of understanding (*ratio intelligendi*)” helps us to distinguish God’s way of knowing from our own. Subjectively, knowing must involve “reasons” or “likenesses” in the divine mind of the things known. Since God, unlike us, is ontologically simple, there can be no real distinction among the divine ideas, as they exist in God. But because an idea or likeness involves a relation to the thing known, we have to look on that side

of the “rational means of understanding,” as well. Humans can know all animals, for example, through one universal idea of “animal.” But we have many ideas in our mind of the many different kinds of things we know, as well as of different individuals. God knows all things, and so far as the number of ideas is determined, not by the mind of the knower, but by the differences in kind and in individuality of the *things known*, God’s ideas are many, but only in this respect.

In q. 2, then, Bonaventure argued there is no real plurality among the divine ideas, as they actually exist in the mind of God as the means whereby God knows. For there is no ontological difference between the one divine essence and the divine ideas. Here in q. 3, Bonaventure looks to the “reasons” or “created natures” that constitute the content of the divine ideas. There is different content among the divine “ideas” or “reasons,” but only because there are different things known by God. Bonaventure uses the notion of the *ratio cognoscendi* in order to answer both questions. Aquinas will put the question in different terms, but come up with fundamentally the same answer as Bonaventure’s.

²¹ See Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* 5 (166b35-167a20).

²² Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.5.1.1.3.6 (1, n. 173). Thomas Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1.d.36.2.3.

²³ Bonaventure’s problematic: This question assumes the explanation of how the divine ideas are many, given in q. 2 and 3, that is, the ideas are many only in relation to the creatures understood. Given this assumption, q. 4–6 address three further questions. Q. 4 distinguishes the ideas of universals, such as species, from the ideas of individuals or singulars.

Arg. a–d assume there are different divine ideas of universal natures, but add that there are also different divine ideas for individuals. Arg. 1–4 *To the contrary*, following Avicenna’s doctrine that God only knows universals, not individual creatures, argues that there are only divine ideas of universals.

Bonaventure’s solution depends upon the view that any multiplicity in the divine ideas comes from their objects or things known. Consequently, multiplicity in the objects of God’s knowledge requires a corresponding multiplicity in the divine ideas; but in themselves there is no multiplicity in the divine ideas, because they are ontologically identical with the one divine essence.

²⁴ Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus lxxxiii*, q. 46.2 (PL 40: 30; CCSL 44a: 72.50-55).

²⁵ Augustine, *Epistula*, 14.4 (PL 33: 80; CSEL 34.1: 34.17-20)

²⁶ Augustine, *Epistula*, 14.4 (PL 33: 80; CSEL 34.1: 34.17-20).

²⁷ Augustine, *Epistula*, 14.4 (PL 33: 80; CSEL 34.1: 34.22-23).

²⁸ Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.5.1.1.3.2 (1, n. 169); Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.15.3.

²⁹ Bonaventure’s problematic: Given that there are many divine ideas, Bonaventure here turns to the question of whether that number is finite or infinite. Arg. a–e reason that the number of divine ideas is infinite, based on considering them as the means whereby God, who is infinite, knows. Obj. 1–4 *To the contrary* reason that the number of divine ideas is finite, because the number of divine ideas is determined by the things known, which are finite. In his “response,” Bonaventure says the number is infinite, citing Psalm 147. He gives his philosophical reasons in the replies to the objections.

³⁰ Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 11.10.3 (PL 41:327; CCSL 48: 332.74-5).

³¹ Augustine, *De trinitate*, 6.10.11 (PL 42: 931; CCSL 50: 241.10-12).

³² Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 12.18 (PL 41: 367; CCSL 48: 374.4-6).

³³ Ps. 147(146): 5.

³⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *On Sophistical Refutations*, 5 (166b37-167a20).

³⁵ Q. 3 ad 3m (35 - 2above).

³⁶ This question seems to be unique to Bonaventure; there are no parallel texts in the *Summa Halesiana*, Albert, or Aquinas.

³⁷ Bonaventure's problematic: Arg. 1–3 reason that there must be some order of the divine ideas in relation to each other. Arg. a–c *To the contrary* reason that there cannot be an order of one divine idea to another, because the ideas are multiplied only in relation to the created things they signify. In his “response,” Bonaventure agrees with the latter arguments, holding that created things have an order, but not the divine ideas in themselves.

³⁸ Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus lxxxiii*, q. 46 (PL 40: 30; CCSL 44a: 72.50–55).

TOPIC 8: DIVINE KNOWLEDGE: FOREKNOWLEDGE

BOOK 1
DISTINCTION 38

ARTICLE 1: ON THE CAUSALITY OF DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE

QUESTION 1

*Is divine foreknowledge the cause of things?*¹

*It is shown as follows that divine foreknowledge is the cause of things:*²

1. Augustine, *De trinitate* 15: “Therefore, things that will be are because God knows them.”³

2. Again, the same point can be shown by reason. Everything that precedes something else and is such that, once it is posited, the other thing is posited, is the cause of that other thing—this is clear from the definition of a cause. But divine foreknowledge precedes everything that will be and, furthermore, posits what will be in respect of which it is. Therefore, the foreknowledge is the cause.

3. Again, everything is either from God, or from nature, or from free choice—and I understand these last two causes broadly, as including chance and fortune. But no thing can come to be from nature or free choice, save through the working of God. Therefore, everything is from God, and everything that will be. But a thing can be from God’s agency only through his art and knowledge. Therefore, etc.

4. Again, everything which is known is, in a certain way, either in itself or in its cause. Therefore, everything that is foreknown by God is in God as in a cause. But everything that is in God is from God. Therefore, everything that will be is foreknown by the divine foreknowledge as its cause. Therefore, etc.

5. Again, everything that is known either is known through its cause, or through its species, or through its effect. Therefore, if God foreknows, he must foreknow in one of these ways. But he cannot foreknow through effects, because effects follow upon him. He cannot foreknow by species or likeness, since they either are at the same time as or succeed the thing of which they are the likeness. Therefore, he must foreknow through the cause. Therefore, the divine foreknowledge is the cause of the foreknown.

To the contrary:

a. God only is the cause of something through his will. But he foreknows many things that he does not will. Therefore, etc. Proof of the middle: He foreknows that you will lie; yet, this is not to say that he wills that you will lie; therefore, he is not the cause of your lying.

b. Again, if foreknowledge is a cause, it is either by the reason of its being knowledge or by reason of its preceding. But not by reason of its being before, because this only describes order. Likewise, it cannot be by reason of its being knowledge, because God knows many things that he never will make. Therefore, in no way is he is a cause of such things.

c. Again, if foreknowledge is the cause of what is foreknown, God will be the cause of evil, since he foreknows evil. But this false.

d. Again, if foreknowledge is a cause, when he shares with someone his foreknowledge of a thing that will be created, God will share his causality with respect to that thing. But this is impossible. Therefore, etc.

e. Again, Anselm says, in *On the Harmony of Foreknowledge and Free Choice*, that “to say ‘If God foreknows this, this will be,’ is no more than saying ‘if this will be, of necessity, it will be.’”⁴ But there is no causality involved in such a case. Therefore, neither is there in the present case.

Response:

Foreknowledge describes knowledge in advance of what will be. Therefore, we may speak of foreknowledge either with reference to the thing signified or insofar as it is signified by the term [foreknowledge]. If

we speak concerning the meaning of the term [foreknowledge], the term does not signify in the manner of a cause; but, if we speak in reference to the thing implied, the term [foreknowledge] does describe a cause, yet not always in relation to the thing foreknown or that will be.

For what will be can exist in three different ways. First is that of which God is the total cause, as are those things which are created. Second is that of which a creature, such as the will, is the total cause, as are defects and sins. Third is that of which both God and a creature together are the cause, as are the products of nature and moral deeds, because God cooperates with his creatures.

According to this division, we should understand that, with respect to what will be in the first sense, divine foreknowledge is the cause and the total cause. With respect to what will be in the second sense, divine foreknowledge is neither a cause nor the total cause, because the thing does not have an efficient cause, but only a deficient cause, though it is the cause of its opposite. With respect to what will be in the third sense, divine foreknowledge is a cause, but not the total cause.

We should grant, therefore, that divine knowledge or foreknowledge is a cause, in a certain sense, of what will be. But if foreknowledge is understood in its general meaning, I say that divine foreknowledge always implies some causality, but not always with reference to what is foreknown, for example, when the thing foreknown is evil. And it is in this sense the arguments showing that foreknowledge is not a cause were meant.

Replies to the objections:

1. To the first objection, that foreknowledge is the cause of the foreknown, I reply: Augustine speaks about the knowledge of things or of good things that come from God.

2. To the second objection, which claims that the cause is what precedes and posits something else, I reply: “posit something else” is twofold: namely, according to producing it and according to consequence. And what posits something else according to producing it is truly a cause of being (*causa vere in essendo*), but what posits something else only according to consequence is not a cause of being, but only in logical consequence.

3. To the objection that something arising through free choice is from God, I reply: The claim is true about what comes from free choice as from an efficient cause, but vices and sins come from free choice as from a deficient cause.

4-5. To the objection that, necessarily, everything that will be is known by God through being its cause, I reply: As was said above regarding the awareness of evil,⁵ in all knowledge, there is assimilation, but nothing is made similar to God, unless it is from him; therefore, in all knowledge of God, there is causality. But when the knowledge of God bears upon something that describes being absolutely, in this case, God's knowledge is a cause and an idea. But when God's foreknowledge bears upon a privation, then the nature of causality and the idea concern the opposite.

Therefore, I reply: For something to be known, it is necessary either that the thing itself or its opposite have being in reality or in a cause. Not only the opposite of evil, but also the will itself, which is the principle of evil, are in God as in a cause. Yet, evil is not in God as in a cause, either essentially or accidentally, because the meaning of causing is altered, as will be seen below.⁶ An example makes this clear. If an artisan is working upon some knotty wood that is not suitable to receiving a form, he foreknows that there will be a defect in the image, but it does not come from him. We should understand something similar about God and free choice, that it produces a defect in its work, when it is not conformed and obedient to God, the maker. Therefore, it suffices that the opposite of evil, or that by which evil comes to be, is in God as in a cause, for evil to be foreknown.

QUESTION 2

*Is divine foreknowledge caused by things?*⁷

In the second place, we may ask whether divine foreknowledge is caused by things.

*And that it is so caused is shown as follows:*⁸

1. Origen says in his *On the Letter of Paul to the Romans*: “Because something will be, it is known by God before it comes to pass.” “Because” either describes the cause of being or the cause of a logical consequence (*causam essendi vel consequendi*). If the cause of a logical consequence, then, just as it follows “this will be, therefore it is foreknown,” so the converse is true. Therefore, just as he says “Because something will be, therefore it is foreknown,” so he would have to say the converse: “Because it is known, therefore it will be.” Yet he denies this claim in the text: “It is not because God knows a thing that the thing will be.”⁹ Therefore, “because” describes the cause of being.

2. Again, this is seen by reason. For, if we assume that God foreknows nothing, we still can understand some thing that will be. But the converse is not true. Therefore, the thing that will be is the reason and cause for divine foreknowledge.

3. Again, the following argument is a good one: This man is lying; therefore, God has foreknown that he will lie. Therefore, there is some inferential relation, and none can be discovered except the relation of cause to effect. But God is not the cause of the lying. Therefore, it remains that the cause of God’s foreknowledge is what will be.

4. Again, whenever two things are so related that they follow upon each other as consequences, then either both are caused by a third thing, or one is the cause of the other. But this is precisely how these two things are related, namely, the lying and God’s foreknowledge. And we cannot say that both of them are caused by some third thing. Therefore, one of them is the cause of the other.

To the contrary:

a. Augustine: “For God does not know things which are created just because they have been created.”¹⁰

b. Again, the same point is seen through reason. Divine foreknowledge is not caused by things, for every cause is nobler than its effect. Therefore, if divine foreknowledge were caused by some thing, then, since divine

foreknowledge is uncreated, whereas a thing is created, the created would be nobler than the uncreated.

c. Again, divine foreknowledge is eternal. Therefore, since a thing is temporal, if divine foreknowledge were caused by things, the temporal would be the cause of the eternal. And, since a cause is prior to its effect, then the temporal would be prior to the eternal.

d. Again, if things are the cause of foreknowledge, this is either by reason of the thing principally signified or by reason of what is connoted. If by reason of the thing principally signified, since that is the divine essence, then things are the cause of God. But if things are the cause of divine foreknowledge by reason of what is connoted, since what is connoted are the things themselves, then the things will be the cause of themselves.

Response:

Some have wanted to say that “cause” is spoken of in two ways, properly and commonly: properly, in such a way that a cause gives being to something else, and, in this way, things are in no respect the cause of divine foreknowledge; in the other way, cause is spoken of commonly as that without which a thing is not, and, in this way, a cause is a necessary condition. And, in the latter way, since the divine foreknowledge cannot be without future things existing, future things may be said to be causes in this second sense.

But, since the term “cause” always implies intrinsic worth in relation to that whose cause it is said to be, it also implies some kind of priority. Therefore, it still seems not altogether sound to say that a cause is a necessary condition. Moreover, the view taken by these men cannot resolve the authoritative text of Origen, since he denies the converse.

Therefore, I reply differently: Cause is taken in three different ways, namely, as the reason for being (*rationem essendi*), and as the reason for inferring (*rationem inferendi*), and as the reason for speaking (*rationem dicendi*). Therefore, I say that, according to the reason for being, foreknowledge can be the cause of some things that are foreknown, though not in every respect. But in no way is the converse true. According to the reason for inferring, divine foreknowledge and things mutually are causes,

because they mutually precede and follow upon each other. According to the reason for speaking, what will be is the cause of the foreknowledge, and not the reverse. For foreknowledge is said to be knowledge before an occurrence. Therefore, it is clear that foreknowledge implies an order with respect to what occurs later; therefore, if something known always were present, one would speak of knowledge, but not foreknowledge; for foreknowledge to obtain, one requires the futurity of the thing. And this is how Origen understands matters.^{[11](#)}

Replies to the objections:

1-2. And so our reply to the first [two] objections is clear enough.

3. To what is objected in the third place regarding the rule of inference, I reply: There is an inference, based on convertibility.

4. To the final objection, I reply: We find a counter-example in the very matter that we are discussing. And because in God alone there is such a counter-example, the objection should be withdrawn. The reason for this is that the foreknowledge of God is related to the true, and it is related to everything true. This is why we say [the true] both “posits” and “is posited.” And because it is related to a truth that does not come from God, insofar as it functions as the subject of a sentence, but not the converse, [a predicate]. Therefore, divine foreknowledge is neither a cause nor is it caused. Accordingly, foreknowledge is related to the true, because it is divine, and it is related to everything true, because nothing is hidden from God. That is why we say [the true] both “posits” and “is posited.” Moreover, because divine knowledge describes simple awareness, it does not cause; and because foreknowledge is divine, it is not caused. Therefore, it “posits” and “is posited,” but it does not “cause” and it is “not caused.”

NOTES

¹ Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.5.2.1.2 (1: n. 182); Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.14.8.

² Obj. 1–5 reason that God’s foreknowledge is the cause of the things that he creates. Arg. a–e *To the contrary* reason that God’s foreknowledge is not the cause of things, since there are many things that God foreknows, but does not will, and, therefore, does not cause. In his “response,” Bonaventure distinguishes when God’s foreknowledge means God is a cause of something from when it merely means God foresees but does not cause that thing.

³ Augustine, *De trinitate* 15.13.22 (PL 42: 1076; CCSL 50a: 495.27-30).

⁴ Anselm, *On the Harmony of Foreknowledge and Free Choice*, q. 1 (ed. Schmitt; 2: 248.7).

⁵ See above, d. 36, art. 3, q. 1.

⁶ See below, d. 46 q. 3.

⁷ *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.5.2.1.3 (1: n. 183); Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.14.8 ad 1m.

⁸ Bonaventure’s problematic: In q. 1, Bonaventure said that God’s foreknowledge is the total cause of creation, it is not at all a cause of sin, and it is a partial cause, along with creatures, of natural and human effects. Here, in q. 2, Bonaventure looks at the same relation, but moving in the opposite direction. Are created things the cause of God’s foreknowledge? Arg. 1–4 offer reasons why creatures might be the cause of God’s foreknowledge. Obj. a–d *To the contrary* reason that creatures cannot cause God’s foreknowledge, because they are effects of that foreknowledge.

⁹ Origin, *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, 7.8 (PG 14: 1126).

¹⁰ Augustine, *De trinitate* 15.13.22 (PL 42: 1076; CCSL 50a: 495.30).

¹¹ In order to answer the question fully, Bonaventure distinguishes three senses of “cause”: “reason for being” (*rationem essendi*), an ontological cause; “reason for inferring” (*rationem inferendi*), a cause of knowing; and “reason for speaking” (*rationem dicendi*). Creatures are never ontological causes of divine foreknowledge. But inferences between creatures and divine foreknowledge can go either way, since humans can know about God by proceeding from effect to cause, but also by proceeding, as it were, from cause to effect—as we saw in Bonaventure’s arguments for the existence of God in d. 8.

BOOK 1
DISTINCTION 38

ARTICLE 2: ON FOREKNOWLEDGE IN RELATION TO NECESSITY

Regarding foreknowledge insofar as it bears upon the notion of necessity

Consequently, a question arises in this second article, namely, about divine foreknowledge insofar as it bears upon the notion of necessity. On this point, two questions are raised. The first question is whether divine foreknowledge imposes necessity on the thing foreknown. The second question asks whether divine foreknowledge has necessity in itself.

QUESTION 1

*Does the foreknowledge of God impose necessity on the things foreknown?*¹

*And it is shown in the following way that Divine foreknowledge does impose necessity:*²

1. Anselm, in his book *On the Harmony of Foreknowledge and Free Choice*: “What God has foreknown necessarily will come to be.”³

2. Again, we may show the same point by reason, as follows. The Philosopher tells us in the first book of the *Prior Analytics*: “From a necessary major premise and an assertoric minor premise, the conclusion always is necessary.”⁴ Therefore, let the following syllogism be stated:

Everything foreknown necessarily will come to be—this is clear enough through Anselm. But this thing is foreknown—you may point to anything you like. Therefore, it is necessary that it will come to be.

3. Again, everything which God foreknows is true, but, as the Philosopher says in *On Interpretation* 1: “Everything which is, when it is, necessarily is.”⁵ Therefore, if something foreknown is now true, it is necessary that it be true now. But what will be is foreknown; therefore, it now is necessary that it will be. Therefore, it necessarily will come to pass.

4. Again, this same point is shown by a reduction to the impossible. Given that God foreknows something on the affirmative side, I ask whether that is able not to be. If not, then it is necessary. But, if so, then it may turn out differently than as God foreknows. Therefore, divine foreknowledge is fallible and uncertain. This is the argument of Augustine and also of Boethius in the *Consolation of Philosophy* 5: “If the things foreseen can turn in another direction, other than as was foreseen, then there will be no firm foreknowledge of what will be.”⁶

5. Again, God foreknows that something is going to be. Then either it is possible that it will not be, or it is impossible. If it is impossible that it will not be, then it is necessary. But if it is possible [for it not to be], but everything possible is something that can be posited, and once something false, though possible, is posited as being, then it follows that it is not impossible. Therefore, let us posit that this is not, but that God has foreknown it is. Therefore, God has foreknown something false. But this is impossible. Therefore, one of the claims that went before also must be impossible.

To the contrary:

a. That divine foreknowledge does not imply necessity is shown on the authority of Augustine, who reasons by analogy in the book *On the Free Choice of the Will*: “Just as my memory does not require that the things which happened in the past were done, so God’s foreknowledge does not require that the things which will be have to be done.”⁷

b. Again, the same point is shown by reason. Let us assume that God foreknows nothing. Therefore, from this, nothing accrues to free choice. Therefore, positing foreknowledge removes nothing from it. Therefore, since free choice, of itself, is the cause of things which may be one way or the other, and are contingent, divine foreknowledge in no way detracts from this.

c. Again, as was proven above (Art. 1, q. 1), divine foreknowledge, as in many matters, either is not a cause or is not the total cause. But because it imparts necessity to something, it has the nature of a cause; for, from whatever something has being, it also has necessary being. Therefore, since of many things that will be—for example, of evils—divine foreknowledge is not their cause, divine foreknowledge imposes no necessity on things.

d. Again, divine foreknowledge foreknows things just as they will come to pass, since it knows nothing but the truth. Therefore, when it foreknows that someone will sin, since the sin only can come to be through the will, it foreknows that this human does this through his will, and it foreknows that he can do something else. Therefore, if everything it foreknows is true, it is true that this human will do this deed through his will and is able to do otherwise. Now, if this deed is contingent, then, since divine foreknowledge is contingent in regard to things, there will be no necessity.

e. Again, the same point may be shown by arguments leading to an impossible consequence. If foreknowledge imposes necessity upon things, then chance and fortune perish. A second impossible consequence is that free choice and deliberation perish. A third impossible consequence is that merit and demerit perish. And a fourth impossible consequence is that praise and blame perish.

Response:

There have been three positions regarding this matter. For some have said that foreknowledge necessarily imposes necessity, since it is infallible, and thereby it has removed free choice and sin. Now, this position was heretical and wicked, since it destroys good moral habits. There was a second position that claimed that divine foreknowledge, if it existed, would

impose necessity and thus would render null all virtue and praise. And, because the proponents of this position loved the common weal, they removed from God foreknowledge and, likewise, truth regarding propositions bearing on the future. But this view was heretical and impious, since it detracted from the divine nobility.

The third position is the Catholic one, which gives honor to God and preserves good morals, and, therefore, is just, pious, and true, namely, that there is divine foreknowledge, but, nevertheless, it does not place necessity upon things. For divine foreknowledge knows in advance all the things that will come to pass, just in the manner that they will come to pass. Therefore, since many things are going to come to pass contingently, for example, the things which arise from free choice and fortune and chance, then just as God foreknows that these things are to come to be from these causes, so too he foreknows the *mode of contingency* according to which they are to come from these causes.

In order to understand the objections brought forth, however, we should note that necessity is of two sorts: namely, *absolute necessity and relative necessity*. Absolute necessity, which is opposed to contingency, is called the *necessity of the consequent* (*necessitas consequentis*). Relative necessity is called the *necessity of the consequence* (*necessitas consequutiae*), and this is not opposed to contingency, for something contingent follows necessarily: for example, if someone is walking, it follows necessarily that he is moving.⁸

Replies to the objections:

1. Therefore, I reply: In what is foreknown, there is no absolute necessity, but only the necessity of the consequence. For this follows necessarily: God foreknows this; therefore this will be. And this is the manner for understanding the authoritative text of Anselm, along with the related authorities, which are put forward on the side of necessity.

2. To the second objection regarding the syllogism composed of a necessary major premise and an assertoric minor premise, I reply: As is clear and as Aristotle explains, it is understood in regard to a proposition that is assertoric, absolutely speaking, that it is equivalent to a necessary one. But the minor of this syllogism, namely, “this is foreknown,” is not

assertoric, absolutely speaking, as will become clear in the next question. So, it is not a necessary proposition.

3. To the objection regarding what is foreknown, namely, that it is true, but, if it is true, it now is necessary, I reply: The Philosopher makes this argument in order to show that there is no truth about what will be, and the argument is sophistical. For, when it is said, “everything which is, when it is, necessarily is,” this is understood in reference to what posits something in act in regard to a concrete subject, for which, precisely because it has been posited, it is impossible that it not be posited. But what is true about the future posits nothing in regard to a concrete subject, because it is not true about the present, but only about the future. Therefore, there is no necessity, neither absolutely speaking nor necessity for the present (*ut nunc*), since it posits nothing for the present.

4. To the objection through reduction to the impossible, that, if the future *could* be otherwise, God *could* be deceived, etc., I reply: Falsity arises from a discord between the intellect and the object of cognition, and, likewise, the power of deceiving arises from the ability to create a discord. I say, therefore, that, since what is foreknown necessarily follows upon foreknowledge, for this reason, discord is not possible. Therefore, God neither is deceived nor is capable of being deceived.

5. To the objection asking whether the future could be otherwise, I reply: It can be otherwise, precisely because God could have known otherwise. And, when it is posited that it is otherwise, it is posited too that God foreknows otherwise. Therefore, when this inference is made: “something can be otherwise than as it is, and God foreknew it in this manner; therefore, the thing can be otherwise than as God foreknows,” we should distinguish the sense of the conclusion. For the conclusion can be understood in the divided sense, and, in this way, it is true, and its sense is: God foreknows that this is going to come about, and it is possible that it not come about. If, however, we understand the conclusion in the composite sense, then it is false, and its sense is: it is possible that God foreknow something in one way and it come about in a different way.

And there is a fallacy of composition in this line of reasoning, of this sort: a runner is able not to move; therefore, it is possible that someone run

and not move. This does not follow. Likewise, when it is asked that the supposition be posited, it should be posited. But when it assumes: “God has foreknown this,” then this is the opposite of what we are asked to posit, and, therefore, this should be denied.

QUESTION 2

*Does God necessarily foreknow the things which he foreknows?*⁹

In the second place, there is the question of whether divine foreknowledge has necessity in its own right, that is, whether it is necessary that God foreknow what he foreknows.

*And it is shown in the following way that he must foreknow what he foreknows.*¹⁰

1. First, on the authority of Anselm, in the book *On the Harmony of Predestination and Free Choice*: “What God foreknows, it is impossible not to foreknow”;¹¹ therefore, by equivalency, it is necessary for him to foreknow.

2. Again, this is seen by reason, for everything true said of the past is necessary—consequently, if he ran, it is necessary that he has run—but if God foreknows, he has foreknown. Therefore, since this is said about the past, it must be necessary.

3. Again, although the power of God is indifferent with respect to producing something outside himself or not producing something outside himself, nonetheless, from the fact that he has actually produced something outside himself, it is necessary that he has done so. Consequently, even though he was able to create or not create, prior to his creating, nonetheless from the fact that he has created, it is necessary that he has created. Therefore, from the fact that he has foreknown, it is necessary that he has foreknown.

4. Again, if a human has willed and has foreknown something, it is necessary that he has known and willed it. Therefore, if there is no less certitude regarding God's knowledge than there is regarding human knowledge, but, in fact, there is even more, then its necessity is much stronger. If you say, as some say, that, in this proposition, "God has foreknown," the whole of it belongs to the future in reality, but is understood under the formality of the past, so that the statement "God foreknows" means nothing other than "God is and this will be," I say to the contrary: Were we to assume that God had no knowledge, but, nonetheless, the thing would be in the future, then this would be true "God foreknows." But this is clearly false. Moreover, assume that an act passing into the past is added to his foreknowledge, such as a promise or a prediction or a prophecy. In that case, something passes into the past, but, truly, we have the same logical problem and the same doubt. Therefore, this way of resolving the problem does not work.

5. Again, being and non-being are further apart than the necessary and the contingent. But something which does not exist absolutely has being in God's foreknowledge. Therefore, all the more so is something that is contingent in itself able to be necessary in God's foreknowledge. Therefore, etc.

6. Again, everything unchangeable is necessary. But when we say "God foreknows," this is unchangeable. Therefore, it is necessary. The first premise is manifest. The second becomes clear, for, when it is said, "God foreknows," if there is a change so that he no longer is foreknowing, this is due either to a change in the thing or in God. The change cannot occur in the thing, because the thing foreknown still is nothing, and, thus, does not change and is not able to change. If the change happens in God, then God himself would be changed.

7. Again, everything eternal is necessary, for only one thing is eternal, and that is something in which no contingency is to be found, but rather the highest necessity. But the foreknowledge of God is eternal. Therefore, it is necessary that God foreknow what he foreknows.

To the contrary:

a. There is a rule of logic that states: if the antecedent of a well-formed conditional proposition is necessary, then the consequent is, too, and, if the consequent is not necessary, then the antecedent is not either. But this follows: if God foreknows that this will be, then this will be, no matter what contingent thing is designated. For the opposite cannot stand. Therefore, since the consequent is not necessary, the antecedent cannot be necessary either.

b. Again, there is a rule of logic that the necessary is compatible with every possible. For everything repugnant to the necessary is impossible. But, if reference is made to someone who is foreknown to be damned, it is possible that he be saved. Therefore, these two can stand together: that he is foreknown to be damned and that he is saved. But this is impossible. Therefore, etc.

c. Again, there is a rule of logic that the opposite of a contingent is contingent and the opposite of a necessary is impossible. And, again, there is a rule that if an antecedent leads to its consequent, then the opposite of the antecedent leads to the opposite of the consequent. From these rules, I argue as follows: let A be a contingent foreknown by God. If God foreknows it, A will be. Therefore, applying the one rule, if A will not be, God does not foreknow it. But 'A not to be' is contingent and 'God not to have foreknown' is impossible. Therefore, something impossible follows in the present case upon something contingent. But this is contrary to the art of logic. Therefore, it is necessary that this be contingent, namely, that God foreknows this.

d. Again, every divine action that concerns an object which is able not to be can itself cease to be. Consequently, although God conserves the created thing, he can cease to conserve it. Therefore, since foreknowing has reference to something contingent, it will be contingent.

Response:

As was shown above about necessity (Arg. a–d), it is clear and is not doubtful that God foreknows something contingent. Since God's foreknowing is antecedent to something contingent, and connotes

something that has contingent truth, it itself must be judged to be contingent.

Now, some have wanted to judge divine foreknowledge to be contingent, because the whole of what is expressed through divine foreknowledge is said of the future. But that has been disproven,¹² because it is false and even unintelligible. For every intellect which understands this, even though it does not understand time to involve God, understands that the act of divine foreknowing was in God from eternity, and that it differs from the thing that will come to be. Moreover, as was said above,¹³ this approach does not solve the problem.

Others have wanted to judge divine foreknowledge as being contingent because it depends on something future, despite the fact that it is said of something past. And they say this in the case of what is believed and prophesied and said by Christ, and in like matters that infer necessarily a proposition about the future. But this is implausible, as it seems, since, if the act of divine foreknowing depended upon the future, then, since there is no certitude in regard to the future on the side of a contingent thing, then there will not be any certitude either in divine foreknowledge. Moreover, how can divine foreknowledge depend upon something, since it is not caused by it in any way? And, again, how does that which necessarily has been, as an act of knowing or believing or predicting, depend upon what will be? Such a view seems neither plausible nor intelligible.

Therefore, we should speak in a different way by noting that, sometimes, something is said in the past tense and refers to the past, as, for example, when we say that “Peter has read.” Sometimes, however, something is in the past tense but refers to the future, as when we say “the anti-Christ was going to be born.” Still, at other times, something is in the past tense and refers to the past, but depends upon something in the future, as when we say “Peter truly said that the naval battle was going to happen.”¹⁴ For, in order for this statement to be true, there is required the outcome of the battle, and upon that outcome depends the truth of our assertion and our thought, which is caused by things. Finally, sometimes, what we say is in the past tense but it does not rely upon, but rather connotes, something future, as when we say “God has foreknown that this will be.”

For, since the knowledge of God only bears upon what is true, it *connotes* truth regarding what is said about the future. But since divine

cognition does not take its certitude from a thing—because it neither is caused by nor originates from it—therefore, it does not depend upon that thing; and this is why divine knowledge cannot be deceived, even when it connotes the future. Consequently, in foreknowledge, these two things are expressed, namely, the act of divine cognition, and this necessarily is or was, and the order of the future to this act of knowledge, and this order of the future to that act is not necessary. And contingency should be judged about the entire expression, not by reason of the totality or even of the principal thing signified, but by reason of what is connoted. And, if we should posit that God does not foreknow something which he, in fact, does foreknow, then that can and ought to be understood not by removing the principal thing signified, but by removing what is connoted or that temporal order to the eternal, which, indeed, is contingent by reason of the other thing, namely, the temporal. Therefore, contingency is in the entire expression because it connotes that something will be true in the future, and that, indeed, is contingent.¹⁵

And this is clear in the following manner. When it is said, “God foreknows that you will be saved,” this includes a twofold act and a twofold composition, namely this, “you will be saved,” and this, “God has knowledge about your salvation and has had it from eternity.” Having knowledge is a necessary and eternal act, since it does not depend upon a thing, but being saved is a future act and is contingent. Therefore, since the act of divine cognition does not depend upon the thing known, it can be certain in itself even though the resulting thing is contingent. But, since divine knowledge, when it is referred to in the manner of foreknowledge, *connotes* something future, and, since every statement that includes in itself something contingent must be judged to be contingent, then the entirety of divine foreknowledge is judged to be contingent. And this solution is true and also applies overall to the problem at stake. For the act of belief, the act of prophecy, and the act of divine proclamation, inasmuch as they concur in referring to divine foreknowledge, connote something future, but do not depend upon it. And this is why they are certain and infallible in regard to things that are not certain in themselves.

Replies to the objections:

1. To the objection drawn from Anselm, namely, that he must foreknow what he foreknows, I reply: Anselm understands this about the act of foreknowing, which necessarily was, but not about the connotation of the future.

2-3. To the objection that what has been expressed is in the past tense, I reply: Insofar as it bears the aspect of the past, it is necessary, but since it *connotes* the future, it is contingent. And, from this, what follows is clear, since, in reference to what will be, it is not yet a potency brought into act, but it still is able to produce something outside of itself. Therefore, etc.

4-5. To the objection that there is knowledge without the actual presence of the things known, and, therefore, that there can be necessity without the necessity of the thing known, I reply: It is true that, in the act of divine cognition, there is necessity, but not as a whole. Nor is the analogy with the present appropriate, since foreknowledge does not *connote* the actual presence of the thing, but rather it *connotes* the futurity of the thing. And, in order for such a statement to be necessary, it is necessary that there be necessity in what is connoted.

6. To the objection that everything immutable is necessary, I reply: Two things are required for something's being mutable: that it be found in one condition earlier, and that it be found in a different condition later. And, in opposition, the immutable can be said in two ways: either because it is nothing in act, or because it is in act and is not able to be otherwise. Therefore, the immutable which is and is not able to be otherwise is convertible with the necessary. But that which is immutable because it is not something in act is not convertible with the necessary. And this is how it is true about the contingent in reference to the future, prior to the thing actually existing. This statement, "the Antichrist will be," now is immutably true, since, if it is posited to be true, it is posited that it always was true. Likewise, if it is posited to be false, it always has been false, because it posits nothing in actuality. Therefore, since "God has foreknown" connotes some future contingent, the statement immutably is true. But, from this, it does not follow that it is necessary, as was seen above.

Nonetheless, some want to say differently that "God foreknows this future contingent" is immutable on the side of the foreknower, but is

mutable on the side of the thing foreknown, and on that side is contingent. But this is difficult to maintain. For what is foreknown once always has been foreknown, and God is not able not to fore-know a future contingent in such a way that nothing comes about in the future, so that no change transpires. So, for this reason, the other manner of speaking is more reasonable.

7. To the final objection that no eternal being (*ens*) is contingent, I reply: A being is eternal in one of two senses: either it purely is eternal, or it is something that connotes the temporal in reference to the future. Now, the purely eternal is necessary, but that which connotes the temporal order in reference to the future can be judged as contingent by reason of what is connoted, just as it can cease by reason of what is connoted.

Here is a summary of what we have said. The statement, “God foreknows some future contingent,” is a statement that comprises in itself the eternal act of divine cognition, and it describes an ordering toward a future contingent. Now, even though the act of divine cognition posits some result, both necessary and eternal, nonetheless, that ordering posits something future, which is contingent. Again, even though it describes an ordering, yet, it does not describe dependence, but only a connotation of the future. This is why it does not posit any uncertainty. And it follows that the statement, “God foreknows something future,” is contingent by reason of the connotation towards something contingent, but is immutable by reason of the ordination to a future that is not able not to be, with no change taking place. And it is certain by reason of its independence from the same kind of change. Now, this will become clearer in the distinction below treating of predestination.^{[16](#)}

NOTES

¹ Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.5.2.1.4 (1: n. 184); Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.14.13.

² Bonaventure's problematic: Here in Art. 2, Bonaventure turns to the most difficult issue involved in trying to reconcile divine foreknowledge with human freedom. God's foreknowledge—like all true knowledge—is necessary. And God's foreknowledge encompasses the whole of creation, down to its smallest parts. So, the question arises: does the necessity that is clearly a feature of God's foreknowledge transfer over to the created things known, imposing necessity on them? This is the issue that Bonaventure treats in q. 1.

Arg. 1–5 reason that the necessity of God's foreknowledge does transfer over to the created things that he knows. Arg. a–e *To the contrary* reason that God necessarily foreknows some things that are necessary and some things that are contingent. But the necessity of God's knowledge does not make his creatures necessary.

³ Anselm, *De concordia praescientiae et liberi arbitrii* 1.1 (PL 158: 507; ed. Schmitt, 2: 245-47).

⁴ Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* 1.9 (30a15-33).

⁵ Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 9 (18a28-32).

⁶ Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. 5, prosa 3 (PL 63: 839; ed. Loeb, 376.58-60). Augustine, *In Ioannis Evangelium Tractatus*, tract. 53, par. 4, l. 1-26. (PL 35: 1776; CCSL 36: 453.21-22).

⁷ Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* 3.4.11 (PL 32: 1276; CCSL 29: 281.34-36).

⁸ The “necessity of the consequence” is a logical necessity: if A is true, then B must be true. It does not entail any ontological necessity about the things involved—A or B. The “necessity of the consequent” is an ontological necessity. It refers to a kind of being that is necessary in its nature.

Aristotle had clearly distinguished logical necessity from ontological necessity. He recognized the formal logical necessity of a valid syllogism, but he distinguished demonstrative from dialectical knowledge in terms of the necessity found within their propositions.

Avicenna had popularized the language of ontological necessity by distinguishing necessary being from possible beings, and, among possible beings, further distinguishing those whose natures make them eternal and necessary, say, the angels, from those terrestrial beings that are contingent. Further, he added that all beings are necessary, to the extent that they exist, elaborating the point that Aristotle had made, which is quoted in Obj. 3.

Bonaventure shows himself familiar with Aristotle and Avicenna on necessity, but he also shows that the logic of the two kinds of necessity can be accommodated within his Christian metaphysics.

⁹ Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.5.2.1.6-7 (1, n. 186-87); Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.14.15.

¹⁰ Bonaventure's problematic: In q. 1, Bonaventure had looked at God's foreknowledge and necessity on the side of the created things that God foreknows. Here, in q. 2, he investigates necessity within God's foreknowledge itself. Arg. 1–7 reason that God necessarily must foreknow things. Arg. a–d *To the contrary* reason that God's foreknowledge is not necessary. In his “response,” Bonaventure opts for the latter view, though with reservations.

¹¹ Anselm, *De concordia praedestinationis et liberi arbitrii* 1.1 (PL 158: 507; ed. Schmitt, 2: 245.9-247.3).

¹² See Arg. 4.

¹³ See Arg. 4.

¹⁴ See Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, c. 9 (19a30-19b4).

¹⁵ To capture the contingency of future events, Bonaventure says that, while God's “knowledge” is necessary, God's “foreknowledge” is contingent, but only because of the future contingency it

connotes. Bonaventure's solution may seem odd, but it is based on Aristotle's claim about the future naval battle. Aristotle had said that, before the outcome, we do not know the truth of a proposition about what the outcome will be, in fact, the proposition is neither true nor false. We can know its truth only afterwards.

Bonaventure adopts this model for understanding God's knowledge of future contingents. The difference, of course, is that God knows everything, with necessity, from all eternity. In order to convey the sense of future contingency, Bonaventure notes that God's knowledge of future contingents has two quite different features, based on the difference between what a proposition means and what it connotes. Its meaning is taken from God's way of knowing, which is totally prior to the created thing known. The second feature is what God's knowledge connotes: the modality—future and contingent—that 'goes along' with the basic meaning of a future contingent statement. Since the "entire expression" has a character, Bonaventure does not hesitate to draw the conclusion that, taken as a whole, the "expression" is contingent, even though the contingency of God's foreknowledge is only due to the connotation that it concerns a future, contingent, created thing. There is no contingency within God's knowledge itself. This is how Bonaventure safeguards both the necessity of God's knowledge and the contingency of God's created world.

¹⁶ Bonaventure is referring forward to Book 1, Distinction 40, Article 2, Questions 1 and 2. He seemed to realize that his position, as described here, is subject to misinterpretation. So, in this final summary, he brings together the essential strands of his doctrine. Considered as a divine act of cognition, God's foreknowing future contingents is necessary and eternal knowledge. When Bonaventure says that this knowledge is "contingent," this is based on its *connotation* about the future. This future God knows with necessity, but it is a future that is contingent in its own reality.

TOPIC 9: DIVINE POWER

BOOK 1
DISTINCTION 43

SINGLE ARTICLE: ON THE INFINITY OF DIVINE POWER

QUESTION 1

*Is the power of God, considered as a kind of power, infinite?*¹

The first question is: Is the power of God infinite?

*That the power of God, considered as a kind of power, is infinite, is argued as follows:*²

a. The infinite is said to be what has no limit.³ Now with regard to its ability, divine power has no limit. Therefore, etc. The first premise is obvious. The second is clear from a homily of Chrysostom: “God is called all-powerful, because his ability never encounters inability.”⁴ Therefore, if he always has ability, for those things receiving some quantity of his power, there is always more to receive. Therefore, that power is infinite.

b. Every active power which can produce infinite effects is actually infinite. Now divine power is this kind of power. Therefore, etc. Proof of the first premise: If a power is purely actual, then it actually achieves everything it can achieve. If it actually achieves everything, and cannot grow or receive anything new, and its power, as power, extends infinitely, then it must be actually infinite in itself. The minor is clear, because divine power never attains so many effects that it cannot achieve more. Therefore, it is clear that divine power is infinite.

c. Every power which can achieve an actual infinite, if it is completely actual, is absolutely infinite. Now divine power is power of this kind. Therefore, etc. The major is clear, as follows: As one power is related to another, so is one act related to another. But an infinite act infinitely

exceeds a finite act. Therefore, an infinite power infinitely exceeds a finite power. Therefore, if a power is completely actual, it is infinite. The minor is clear, because God is said to last forever, and can conserve creatures forever. Therefore, etc.

d. Every power which can extend beyond limits infinitely to an infinite distance, is itself infinite. But divine power is like this, for it makes something from nothing; and between something and nothing there is an infinite distance. Therefore, etc.

e. Every power which is not at all different from its essence is infinite. But divine power is like this. Therefore, etc. Proof of the first premise: Whenever two things have no distance between them, wherever the one is, the other will also be found. Therefore, if a power is not at all different from an essence, where the power is, the essence will also be found. But where the essence is, there is the center-point of power. Therefore, wherever there is this kind of power, it is concentrated as at a center-point. Therefore, since no power is limited at its center-point, but extends beyond it, either divine power can do nothing, or it can do whatever it wills, without limit. Therefore, in itself that power can act infinitely. Now that power is completely lacking in differentiation and is simple. Therefore, it is the same extensively and intensively. If it is extensively infinite, it is also intensively infinite. Consequently, it is completely infinite. This is what the Philosopher says in the *Book of Causes*, “as a power is more unified, so it is more infinite.”⁵ Therefore, since divine power is utterly one, since it is completely the same as its origin, it has the same power everywhere as it has at its origin. Therefore, it can never lack power.

To the contrary:

1. Everything is finite in which is found a boundary. But there is a boundary to divine power, since one can find things which God cannot do, as has been indicated above,⁶ for example, physical acts and deformed acts. Therefore, etc.

2. What is exceeded by something is finite, since the infinite is exceeded in no way. But the knowledge of God exceeds his power with

regard to the objects of his knowledge. For he knows more than he can do, since he knows evil, but cannot do evil. Therefore, etc.

3. In created powers we see that they are infinite due to matter, while finite due to form.⁷ Since the power of God is completely form or formal, involving nothing of possibility, it follows that God's power is absolutely finite and in no way infinite.

4. Between contradictory opposites there is an infinite distance. Now the power of a creature moves from one finite extreme to another, like making the non-runner to run. Yet it is finite. Therefore, etc.

5. I recognize that the soul has a power completely without difference from its essence, such as the power to make a body to live. And it has the power for an infinite act, such as the power of lasting or remaining infinitely. And it even has power for infinite acts. Yet that power is finite in itself. Therefore, a similar argument seems to work for divine power, since the soul is expressly the image of God.

Consequently, the previous arguments seem not to work.

*Response:*⁸

One must posit the divine power to be infinite in act and in habit.

The arguments offered here⁹ have reasoned to this conclusion by proceeding from what is posterior—effects. For divine power produces effects infinite with regard to duration and addition, to which divine power is related as pure act and as complete cause. Therefore, divine power must have in itself full and perfect actuality in relation to infinite effects. Consequently, since divine power wholly possesses everything it will ever possess, and does so out of itself, it must be infinite.

A second line of argument shows this by proceeding, as it were, from what is prior. Due to having the greatest absence of division between power and essence, and due to having the greatest unity within its power, wherever it can do something, it can do it as a whole, as great at the ends of the world as in the center, in height as in width, and in every respect infinite.

No similar nature is found in any creature, either in causing effects, or in producing acts, or with regard to unity.¹⁰

Not with regard to causality, because no power of a creature, in comparison with infinite duration, is purely active. Rather, a creature's power needs to be preserved by divine influence.

The same thing is true about producing acts. A creature has an infinite passive power for receiving actions. But no such power is actually infinite, only potentially infinite. Since the potentially infinite depends upon the actually infinite, all infinitude in the duration or activity of a creature depends on the infinitude of uncreated power. This is what the Philosopher says in *The Book of Causes*: "All infinite powers depend on the one infinite first, which is the power of powers."¹¹

Something similar is true with regard to simplicity or unity. For divine power is completely simple in itself, and has a completely simple essence or substance, completely lacking differentiation from that essence. Therefore, it is completely one, with every sort of unification, and consequently is infinite. But in no creature, however fine, is there power which is completely simple. For every power in a creature involves some relation of dependence. And power in a creature is not based on a completely simple substance. Nor is power in a creature completely lacking differentiation; for no creature is its own power, speaking about its essence.

Therefore, since every creature falls short of the greatest simplicity, it follows as a consequence that it also falls short of infinity. In this way, it is clear that divine power is infinite, and is the reason for infinitude.

This last argument shows why the arguments to the contrary do not work.

1-2. Therefore, to the objections which find some limit and excess, I reply: Divine power is infinite in those cases where power is ability. In other cases, where power is really impotence, divine power is neither finite nor infinite, because it can do nothing in such cases.

When it is said that one finds a limit or excess, I reply: This claim is false, because the excesses and limits of a thing are found in those things to which the thing extends. But divine power only applies to good things, and, with regard to these, God does not know more than he has the power to do, nor in these areas do we find limits on God. Therefore, the response is clear.

There is a second response: One can speak about power and knowledge in two ways, in themselves or in relation to their objects. In themselves, one does not exceed the other, since whatever God knows he can know, and whatever he can do he knows he can do. In relation to their objects, there are again two ways of speaking, with regard to form or species, or with regard to number. With regard to number, since God's power can do an infinite number of things, it is not exceeded by his knowledge. With regard to form, since God's power regards only good things, it is exceeded. But it does not follow that God's power is not infinite.

Consider the following example: If someone imagines two infinite lines, these two lines are more than one line, because one line is not infinite with regard to number, but only with regard to length. Thus, the two lines are not greater or longer than one. The same thing is true in the matter under consideration. For God's power is said to be infinite with the number of its objects, not with regard to their quality, since God cannot do evil or do things which are really privations.

In this way the answer to the first two objections is clear. Although one can find a limit in relation to evil, one cannot in relation to good. Such a limit or excess really describes infinity, since it is not ability but inability. Therefore, though the way we understand this may seem to imply some limit, in truth it does not. For not being capable of evil is completely due to the immensity of God's virtue.

3. To the objection that the infinite is a property of material power, I reply: This is true with regard to the kind of infinite which depends on a privation of completion or of complete being. But this is not true of infinitude through privation of limitation. For the first is infinite in passive or receptive potency, and therefore is primarily in matter. The second is actually infinite, and therefore is truly and properly only in that which is only act, and pure act, and completely perfect act.

4. To the objection that a creature has the power to do things which are maximally distant from each other, I reply: Being and non-being are not said to be maximally distant from each other because they are opposed as contradictories, but because they have nothing in common, either with regard to a subject genus, or with regard to a predicated genus. But resting

and moving, or moving and not moving, which refer to the same thing, do have something in common in both respects. Consequently, there is not an infinite distance between them, nor something like an infinite distance.

5. To the objection concerning the power of making something live, I reply: In one way, living signifies a consequent act, like being moved. This kind of act comes from the soul, through the mediation of powers which are different from the essence of the soul. In a second way living is predicated as a first act, and comes from the essence of the soul as a form, not as an agent. In this respect, being limited to operation is not under consideration. For example, whiteness in itself causes something to be white, where we ignore the expression of something coming from a power which is also an agent. However, we are speaking here of a power which is functioning as an agent and is producing something, which power, though the same, signifies an inclination, and consequently dependence. Therefore, this power is deprived of simplicity, and, as a consequence, of infinity. In God, however, this is not the case. Therefore, this argument, when properly understood, does not apply to God.

QUESTION 2

*Is the divine essence infinite?*¹²

The second question: Is the divine essence infinite? Or, is divine power infinite with regard to its being?

*It seems the divine essence is infinite:*¹³

a. No power is finer than its substance; but divine power is infinite; therefore, since it is not finer or better than its substance, that substance must necessarily be infinite.

b. Hypothetically, if two things were completely the same, and one of them were infinite, then the other would also be infinite. Now the substance and power of God are the same, as are his being and ability. Therefore,

since divine ability is infinite, so divine being must be infinite, and the divine essence must also be infinite.

c. When two things are so related that one does not extend to anything to which the other does not also extend, then, if the one is infinite, so too the other must be infinite. But the power of God does not extend to anything to which the essence of God does not also extend. For God can only do what his substance allows him to do, according to 1 Kings: “If heaven and the heaven of the heavens, etc.”¹⁴ Therefore, etc.

d. Something can be thought of that is greater than every finite thing, namely, what is infinite. But the divine essence is so good and so great that nothing greater or better can be thought, otherwise it would not be God.¹⁵ Therefore, etc.

e. Every finite good is better with the addition of another good than it is by itself, since a finite addition to a finite good produces more good. Therefore, if the divine essence were finite, it would be something more with an addition than it would be only by itself. Therefore, the divine essence would not be completely perfect and best, which would be a completely impious thing to say.

f. Any finite good sometimes can be equaled or repeated through duplication of a finite amount. This clearly happens with lines. And I say that what is doubled is more, due to its end-points. Now if the divine essence were finite in perfection and goodness, then the goodness of a creature eventually would rise up to a goodness equal to the divine goodness, if doubled repeatedly. But this is false and it is impossible that a creature be proportional to the creator, as Augustine says in *On the Trinity*.¹⁶ Therefore, the source of this consequence, that the divine essence is finite, is also false.

To the contrary:

1. The Philosopher says that, “finite and infinite are proper attributes of quantity.”¹⁷ But an essence, considered as an essence, does not have an amount of quantity. Therefore, if considered as an essence, in abstraction from power, the divine essence is neither finite nor infinite.

2. Every power that can only do one thing and not another is a finite power. Therefore, by a similar argument, every essence that is only one and cannot be another is a finite essence. Now the divine essence can be God and nothing else. Therefore, etc.

3. Everything that is finite in relation to the highest truth is absolutely finite. This is clear because the highest truth judges how each thing is. This is also clear for similar cases, that when this thing is white or black or good in relation to God, then it is good, absolutely speaking. But the divine essence is finite in relation to the truth of divine cognition. For God comprehends the divine essence, and understands it perfectly. As Augustine says, “what is known is finite in the comprehension of the knower.”¹⁸

4. Nothing infinite provides an end for something else, since nothing gives what it does not have.¹⁹ Therefore, if the divine essence is infinite, then it provides an end for nothing. Therefore, it is the end of nothing. But if this were true, nothing would be good.

5. No infinite is comprehended by the finite. But God is comprehended by the blessed, since they would not be blessed if they did not know God perfectly. For their appetites would always want more, and they would not achieve rest, and so not be blessed. Therefore, if God is comprehended, he is not infinite.

6. No privation is finer than attainment. Since “infinite” describes privation, while “finite” describes attainment, and everything finer is attributed to God; therefore, etc.

Response:

On this point some wanted to say the divine essence, considered under the aspect of an essence, is finite, but considered under the aspect of a power, is infinite. For essence denominates God as he is in himself, and as such he is finite because complete. He is also finite because surrounded by something finite, namely, the blessed. And they have said this because of the simplicity of his essence, which they said is seen as a whole. Considered under the aspect of a power, however, the divine essence involves a relation to its effects. Since there is no stopping point here, because one can always

add something else, they said that in relation to its power the divine essence is infinite.

This position is manifestly false. For these two claims are inconsistent, namely, that the divine power is infinite while its subject substance (*existente substantia*) remains completely finite. For the two are completely the same, since his substance is prior according to the rational means of knowing, and because, to whatever his power extends, under the aspect of his power, his essence also extends, as has been shown.²⁰

For this reason, some have said that, absolutely speaking, the divine essence is absolutely finite, though it is infinite to us. They wanted to say that in truth both the divine essence and divine power are finite, because they are limited in God, who is truth; but both are infinite to us, because they exceed us beyond all proportion. Therefore, “God is called infinite, because he is bounded neither by place nor by time nor by confinement,” as John Damascene says.²¹

This position, too, cannot stand. For it has been proven above (q. 1) concerning power that there is no stopping point for what it can do, and also that it is completely in act, and therefore, God truly is held to be infinite. The same can be proven about the divine essence.

Therefore, it is necessary that the divine essence be completely infinite in act. This should be granted and held as true, because it is more in accord with faith, which describes God as “immense,” and it is more in accord with the authority of the saints, who all say he is infinite. Therefore, John Damascene says that God is “an infinite ocean of being.”²² Finally, this view is more in accord with the opinions of the Masters, as well as being more in accord with reason.

In order to understand the objections on the opposite side, let us note that “infinite” is said by way of negating an end. Therefore, “infinite” is said in two ways, namely, based on the side of negation, and on the side of end.

On the side of end: “end” is said in two ways. In one way, end is completion. In this way, ‘infinite’ is said through privation of completion. And in this way, “infinite” is said of matter, and in the genus of substance and in the other genera. In this way, it does not apply to God, because he is completely perfect. In a second way, “end” is called a termination, like the

end of a field. In this way, infinite is said of what lacks a termination and rest.

With regard to negation, “infinite” is also taken in two ways, for it can be understood privatively or negatively. When understood privatively, it does not have a termination, though by nature it ought to have one, because it has limited being (*esse limitatum*). In this respect, “infinite” describes lack of completion, and is not in God. The other mode is negative. Here the “infinite” is what does not have a termination, nor by nature should it have one. And in this way, “infinite” is posited of God, due to God having the highest immensity.^{[23](#)}

Replies to the objections to the contrary:

1. To the objection that the infinite is an attribute of quantity, I reply: Just as the term “quantity” is extended to a quantity of power, the same is true of the term “infinite.” Now a quantity of power is found not only in deeds, but also in the nobility of a man’s valor. This is clear because, as Augustine says, in spiritual things, more and better are the same.^{[24](#)}

2. To the objection that one is such that it is not another, I reply: Something can be compared to a multitude of things in two ways, depending on whether the comparison is based on causality or identity. Being compared to many things by reason of causality applies to the infinite because it is infinite; but comparison based on identity does not apply to the infinite. Consequently, because it is infinite, it is extended to many things; but it does not follow that it is identical with those many things. Consequently, if the divine essence or power is compared to things according to the aspect of identity, neither of these two features is identical with many things. Consequently, divine power is not identical with another power, nor is the divine essence identical with another essence. However, if the comparison is according to the aspect of causality, then it applies to both divine power and the divine essence. For, just as it applies to power to do many things, so it applies to essence to be in many things.

3. To the objection that it is finite in relation to the highest truth, I reply: This claim is two-fold: for either it is finite in relation to the highest truth because that truth judges it to be finite, or because it does not exceed

the comprehension of the highest truth. In the first way, God is not finite in relation to himself, but infinite, for he truly understands himself to be infinite. In the second way, God is finite, because he does not exceed himself, since he is infinite. Thus, the argument is invalid, and it is fallacious both in relation to one of its terms, and absolutely: if God does not exceed the infinite, then, absolutely speaking, he is finite.

4. To the objection that the infinite does not provide an end, I reply: The infinite, through privation of perfection, does not provide an end; but the infinite, through negation of limitation, does have the nature of providing an end, because, as it is the highest [end], in it there is a point of rest for everything. For in it infinity is not inconsistent with simplicity and completion.

5. To the objection about being comprehended, I reply: God is not comprehended by being contained, but God is comprehended through perfect vision, love, and attainment, which [comprehension] is perfect on the part of the human who is comprehending him, but not on the part of what is comprehended. Therefore, since the one blessed is perfected, he rests, though he does not attain what is beyond him.

6. The last objection has been solved. For the objection concerns the infinite, said privatively; but the infinite as it is predicated of God does not signify a real privation, but only a privation with regard to its mode of signifying. What corresponds to it is the highest positive attribute. For, nothing is called “immense” unless it has the highest and most perfect actuality, with nothing confining or limiting it. Consequently, even if “infinite” seems to be predicated privatively, in truth it excludes every privation.

QUESTION 3

*Can divine power produce an actually infinite effect?*²⁵

The third question concerns the infinite divine power in relation to its product: Can the divine power produce an actually infinite effect?²⁶

*That the divine power can produce an actually infinite effect, is argued as follows:*²⁷

1. Power is related proportionally to its product, so that a certain level of power can produce a certain level of product. Therefore, more power produces more product, and power actually infinite produces a product that is actually infinite.

2. Every power which operates using all of itself, if it is infinite, produces an infinite result, since it operates using all of its ability. Now divine power, since it is completely simple, operates using all of itself. Therefore, it seems that it produces an infinite effect.

If you say that this cannot happen because of defect and limitation in the effect, I reply to the contrary: A power is in vain which is not reduced to act. Consequently, the Philosopher says active potency is in vain when there is no corresponding passive potency.²⁸ Therefore, either divine power is infinite but in vain, or there corresponds to it an infinite effect and infinite passive potency.

3. Every power can manifest itself. Therefore, divine power, since it is infinite, can manifest its infinitude. But infinity is not manifested except by an infinite effect. Therefore, etc.

If you say that it is manifested in producing the Son and Holy Spirit, then I object that the Holy Spirit has infinite power; therefore it can manifest itself, but not in producing yet another infinite person; therefore, it manifests itself in producing a creature.

4. Everything possible can be posited in being (*esse*). Now God can produce infinite effects. Therefore, production of infinite effects is possible, and so we can posit them. Now when the possible is posited in being, nothing incorrect (*inconveniens*) happens. Therefore, when it is posited that God produces infinite effects, nothing incorrect happens. But God is able to do everything which is not incorrect for him to be able to do or to actually do. Therefore, God can produce actually infinite effects.

5. Let everything which can be created be called A. Then I ask: Either A is finite or it is infinite. If it is finite, and God can only produce A, then

God can only produce finite effects. Therefore, his power is finite. If A is infinite, and God can produce A, then he can produce something actually infinite.

6. A continuum is infinitely divisible.²⁹ I ask whether God can reduce the potency of the continuum into act. If God cannot, then the potency of the continuum exceeds the power of God. But this is absurd, since then divine power would be finite. If God can reduce this potency completely into act, this could not take place unless it is actually divided into infinite parts. Therefore, etc.

To the contrary:

a. It seems that God cannot produce an effect infinite in intensity, because absolutely nothing is greater than the infinite. If God were to produce an infinite effect, then nothing would be greater than that effect. Therefore, God would not be greater. If part of God's supreme nobility is that nothing can be equal to him, then producing such an effect is contrary to the nobility of divine power. Therefore, etc.

b. Everything which is actually infinite is simple in the highest degree. For wherever there is any composition, there is confinement and limitation. Therefore, if God produced an infinite effect, that effect would be completely simple. But in something completely simple, essence, goodness, and power are all the same. Therefore, if that effect is infinite in power and goodness, it will be the highest good, and consequently not good due to another, and further, not good due to God. Therefore, neither would it be from God, because "the Lord has made the universe for himself" (Proverbs 16:4), and the end is the same as the first principle. Therefore, if an effect is infinite, it is not from God, and therefore is not an effect. Thus, it is clear, etc.

c. If God could produce an actually infinite effect, I ask you whether he could produce another. If not, then in producing that effect he would lose power, and his power would decrease in acting. On the other hand, if he could produce another effect like the first, let it be the case that he makes it. Therefore, it is posited. These two effects are similar in nature; therefore they are in the same genus. But if they are in the same genus, they have

something in which they agree more, and some proper features in which they differ. Therefore, they are exceeded by something and are confined by something. But all such things are finite. Therefore, etc.

d. One way of showing that God cannot produce an actual infinite is because there cannot be many infinities. If God produced actual infinities, he could not produce many actual infinities. Therefore, God would lack power. But nothing can make God lack power. Therefore, etc.

e. Where there is an actual infinite in number, there is lacking a stopping point, and order, and distinction. But divine wisdom does not allow God to produce something without mode and measure. Therefore, etc.

Response:

There are two kinds of infinite, the actually infinite and the potentially infinite. The potentially infinite God can produce, and does produce. The actually infinite God cannot produce, and does not produce. I say “cannot produce,” because that would be inconsistent with the nature of God and with the nature of a creature.³⁰

It would be inconsistent with the nature of God: Since God is good in the highest degree, he cannot produce anything unless it is good. Consequently, he cannot produce anything unless it is ordered to himself. Now order presupposes number, and number presupposes measure, since only things subject to number are ordered to something else, and they are not subject to number unless limited. Therefore, it was necessary that God produce all things with “number, weight, and measure” (Wisdom 11:21). God was not able to do otherwise, nor is he able to produce something actually infinite, or an actually infinite number of things.

There is also a reason why this would be completely inconsistent with the nature of a creature. For the actually infinite must be pure act; otherwise, if it had any limit or constraint it would be finite. But what is pure act is essentially its own being (*suum esse per essentiam*), and this kind of thing does not receive its being from some other essence or from nothing. Therefore, if a creature, considered as a creature, is from elsewhere (*aliunde est*) and is from nothing,³¹ in no way can it be pure act, and in no way can it be infinite.

And if there cannot be one infinite creature, in no way can there be an infinite number of creatures, because the many must be reduced to some one creature. But an infinite cannot be reduced to a finite. Therefore, it is clear, etc. And that they must be reduced to something finite is clear, for one must posit an order among creatures, not only in relation to God, but also in relation to each other.

The fundamental point of this response, therefore, is that it is not right for God to produce a creature without it having order and measure. This argument is from the side of the creature, because every creature must be limited, due to being created from nothing, and due to being a composite.

1. To the objection that a certain level of power produces a certain level of product, I reply: There is producing the product and the product produced. Creating is an example of producing a product; a creature is an example of a product produced. Therefore, I reply that producing the product is infinite, as is the creator himself; but the product produced is necessarily a finite product. Therefore, the objection that the product is proportionate to the power, if understood about producing the product or action, generally speaking, is true. However, if understood about the product produced, it is not true, except when the cause and effect are related univocally, and are in one genus. But this is not the case here.

2. To the objection that God operates using all of his power, I reply: Using all its power sometimes an agent makes something by nature, and here it acts to such a degree as it can, and to such a degree as it is, where the production is of something similar. But sometimes an agent acts by deliberation and willing, and this kind of agent acts only based on order and as much as it wills. Consequently, using the same power it can produce things large and small. This is the way God acts.

To the objection that a power is in vain which is not reduced to act, I reply: This is true concerning the kind of power which is completed by acting. But divine power is not completed by acting, and therefore is not in vain, even if there is no corresponding passive potency. Nonetheless, this argument is not true about a power which is infinite, if it is understood to be completely reduced to act. It is reduced to act and can be reduced to act in part, and still not be in vain.

3. To the objection that divine power, since it is infinite, ought to manifest its infinity, I reply: God does manifest his infinity in something which is infinite in power. This is clear because, as was shown above (q.1), unending duration manifests infinite power. His infinity cannot be manifested completely in something infinite in act, because that would not be appropriate; but it is manifested proportionally. For being (*ens*) infinitely exceeds non-being (*non-ens*); and God produces being (*ens*) from nothing, there being between these two an infinite distance.

Consequently, divine power is said to be infinite in three ways: in the eternity of duration, in the immensity of power, and in the generality or number of its effects. The first is manifested through the infinite in duration, which is finite in act, but infinite in potency. The second is manifested through creation from nothing, where there is an infinite distance due to complete lack of proportion. The third is manifested partly through positing and partly through privation; for as much as he has done, he still can do more, and as much as he has not done, he also could do more. Now this way is manifested in the other two manifestations of infinity.

Therefore, it is clear that it is not necessary that there be an actual infinite.

Now, as the objection indicates, it can be said that the power of the Father is manifested in producing the Word, and consequently the whole of divine power is manifested this way, since the power of the Son and the Holy Spirit are one, and they are equal in power.

4. To the objection about positing what is possible, I reply: There is what is possible for an infinite power, and what is possible for a finite power. What is possible for a finite power we can posit, because it can be completely reduced to act. But what is possible for an infinite power we cannot posit, because it is always in the process of reducing to act, but never has completely been reduced to act.

5. To the objection that all that can be created be called A, let it be so. To the question whether A is finite or infinite, I say: A is infinite, not actually infinite, but only potentially infinite. Therefore, it does not follow that if God can produce A, that God can produce an actual infinite.

If one replies: Let us posit that God produces A, I reply: This cannot be posited, for the reason given above.

6. To the question whether God can reduce the potency of the continuum to act, I reply: As the potency in the continuum is passively infinite with regard to being divided, so power in God is actively infinite. Consequently, as the continuum can be divided infinitely, it is impossible that it be totally divided; otherwise it would not be infinite. Thus, dividing it infinitely is possible by reducing it to act. But, just as it is impossible that divine power come to a termination, so it is also impossible to arrive at a termination of an infinite division. Consequently, God can reduce the potency of the continuum to act, because he can be in the process of reducing potency to act forever, so that this potency never extends beyond divine action. But the continuum can never be in a state of being completely reduced, just as God cannot be in a state of reducing it.

Therefore, I grant that it is impossible that something other than God alone, or his power, be actually infinite. This is what Hugh of St. Victor says: “Just as time is not equal to the eternity of God, and place does not equal his immensity, so likewise sense does not equal his wisdom, nor virtue his goodness, nor products his power.”³² Consequently, when it is said that God can produce infinite effects, infinity denotes power, not products. Consequently, some have made this distinction: The continuum can be divided infinitely, because the term “infinitely” can modify the term “can” or the term “divided.” But whichever way it is taken, it always means that actual infinity is a property of God alone.

QUESTION 4

*Does the rational means (ratio) of divine power extend to an infinite number of things?*³³

The fourth and last question about the infinity of divine power concerns the rational means of its operating (*ratio operandi*). And the question is whether the rational means of operating extends infinitely.

*That the divine power extends to an infinite number of things, is argued as follows:*³⁴

a. Whatever God is able to do, he can do in a reasonable way; but he is able to do an infinite number of things; therefore, it is reasonable that he is able to do an infinite number of things. But if so, then the rational means of operating of his power is extended infinitely.

b. As the rational means of knowing is related to knowledge, so is the rational means of producing related to power. But since divine knowledge is infinite, it contains within itself an infinite number of rational means of knowing. Therefore, since divine power is infinite, in a similar way it also contains an infinite number of rational means of producing things.

c. The rational means of operating in God is nothing other than his goodness and wisdom. But his wisdom and goodness are infinite. Therefore, his rational means of operating is also infinite.

d. The rational means of operating in God is nothing other than God or the divine essence, whatever that rational means (*ratio*) is called. But the divine essence is infinite. Therefore, his rational means of operating is also infinite.

To the contrary:

1. Power is extended to products according to the needs of reason—for it omits nothing of those things that the reason requires. Therefore, if the reason is extended infinitely, then it seems that divine power would produce an infinite number of things. But this is false.

2. The rational means of operating (*ratio operandi*) is itself an art or disposition. But a disposition concerns only a finite number of things. Therefore, the rational means of operating only concerns a finite number of things.

3. Now the rational means of operating is divine justice itself, because “mercy and truth are the universal ways of the Lord” (Psalm 24:10). But justice is only about a finite number of things. Therefore, it seems that God’s rational means of operating is likewise only about a finite number of things.

4. One can object about foreknowledge, which is similar to the rational means of operating and concerns more than God's power, since he has foreknowledge about evils. Nevertheless, his foreknowledge is not about an infinite number of things.

Now if you say that his disposition, foreknowledge, or justice, do not encompass the full reason why the divine power can operate, I reply to the contrary: If one of them does not encompass the whole reason, then divine power would be able to operate reasonably without them. Therefore, it would be possible for God to operate without his disposition, without his justice, and without his foreknowledge. But no such being would operate wisely or rightly. Therefore, etc. Wherefore, what remains is that they encompass his full reason for operating.

Response:

As the Master says in his text, some have wanted to say that the rational means of divine power (*ratio divinae potentiae*) is finite. They wanted to limit divine power for these reasons: since it cannot make something except for the best reason; nor can it refuse to make something except for the best reason; and it cannot make something unless it foreknows it; and it cannot make something but only in a just manner. Therefore, since there is a finite number of these things, namely, the things the divine power makes, they said the divine power is not *able* to make other than the number it makes.

Now this position is in error, as the Master shows in his text; and this is said to have been the position of Master Peter Abelard.³⁵ The reason for this foolish position was that they did not know how to distinguish the rational means (*rationem*) of his power from the rational means of his act. For there are two kinds of acts of a power: one is in the mode of a habit, namely, ability; the other is in the mode of an act, namely, operation.

Therefore, when we ask whether the rational means of divine power is infinite, I reply: Just as there are two kinds of act, so also "rational means" (*ratio*) can be taken in two ways. In relation to the kind of act that is "ability," "rational means" signifies habit, namely, divine knowledge and the care of divine goodness. Now this "rational means" extends to an infinite number of things, just like divine power with regard to the kind of act that is "ability." But with regard to the kind of act that is "making,"

“rational means” signifies an act, namely, how God disposes things well, whether by his foreknowledge or according to the requirements of merit. For he does nothing unless he disposes things well; and he judges only as merit requires, when he does judge. He governs and rules no thing in any way other than its nature or natural justice requires.³⁶

Replies to the objections:

1-2. Using the distinction just set out, the reply to the first objection and its arguments is clear. For some of them proceed in the first way, while others proceed in the second way.

3-4. To the following objection about justice, I reply: Justice, as it describes the fitness of divine goodness and power, is a general notion (*ratio generalis*) which encompasses all ability. But considered as it connotes the requirements of merit, it does not encompass all ability nor all action. And considered as it connotes the care of divine goodness about each actual time, it encompasses action, but not ability. Likewise, disposition and foreknowledge encompass action, but not ability; but action in relation to a finite number of things, as they exist, and ability about an infinite number of things.

Therefore, to the objections that God is able to operate reasonably without them, I reply: This is false and does not follow from the evidence given. For even though God can do more than he wills, he is not able to operate without his will. For he can make (*facere*) nothing unless he is able to will, as well as to foreknow and to dispose. For it is necessary that the power to accomplish acts is equated with them, namely, with disposition and will; but this is not true of a power considered as powerful. Therefore, it does not follow that God is able to make things without them.

NOTES

¹ Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.4.2.1.1 (1, n. 136); Thomas Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1.d.43.1.1, *Summa theologiae* 1.25.2.

² Bonaventure's problematic: Arg. a–e reason that God's power is infinite. Obj. 1–5 *To the contrary* argue that God's power is not infinite, because there are things even God cannot do.

³ Cf. Aristotle, *Physics*, 3.6 (206b35–207a3); *Metaphysics*, 11.10 (1066a35–40).

⁴ Ps.-Chrysostom, Ioannis Mediocris, *Sermo* 27: *De expositione symboli* 2, (PL Supplementum 4: 822). Quoted in Lombard, *Sententiae* 1.d.42.3, 1: 296).

⁵ *Liber de causis*, 16(17), (ed. A. Pattin; 171.15).

⁶ Bonaventure, *In Sententiis*, Bk. 1, d. 42, q. 2.

⁷ Aristotle, *Physics*, 3.6 (207a20–25).

⁸ In his “response,” Bonaventure offers two arguments directly about God, then adds three arguments that contrast creatures with God. The first argument about God proceeds from effect to cause, the second argument from cause—the divine nature—to effect.

⁹ Arguments a – d.

¹⁰ The last three arguments of Bonaventure's “response” contrast God's power with the power of creatures, in three areas: how a cause produces effects, how a cause acts, and concerning the ontological unity of the cause. In all three ways, every creature's power is finite, God's is infinite.

¹¹ *Liber de causis*, 15(16), (ed. Pattin; 168.70).

¹² Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.2.1.1 (1: n. 34); Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.7.1.

¹³ Bonaventure's problematic: Bonaventure now turns from divine power to the divine essence. Arg. a–f reason that God's essence must be infinite. Their common theme is the correlation between power and essence for any being, including God. Obj. 1–6 *To the contrary*, argue that God's essence cannot be infinite, mainly by invoking the Greek notion that the infinite involves potentiality, which cannot be found in God.

¹⁴ 1 Kings 8:27.

¹⁵ Augustine, *Confessiones* 7.4 (CCSL 27: 94.1–7); Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae*, 3. Pr. 10 (PL 63: 765; ed. Loeb, 268.25–29); Anselm, *Proslogion* 2 (ed. Schmitt; 1: 101–102). Augustine was the first philosopher to describe God as, in Bonaventure's words, something “so good and so great that nothing greater or better can be thought.” He had assumed God exists and is good, and then used this kind of description to deduce that God must be “incorruptible.” Boethius then used this kind of description of God to demonstrate something Augustine had assumed, namely, that God is good, indeed, completely good. Anselm then took this line of reasoning one step further, and used this description to prove that God exists in the first place, a mode of arguing for God's existence Bonaventure embraced (see [108](#) and [117 n. 35](#) above). Bonaventure here uses the same description of the divine essence to argue that it must be infinite.

¹⁶ Augustine, *De trinitate* 8.2.3 (PL 42: 948; CCSL 50: 270.1–271.40).

¹⁷ Aristotle, *Physics*, 1.2 (185a33).

¹⁸ Augustine, *De civitate dei*, 12.19 (PL 41: 368; CCSL 48: 375.27–30).

¹⁹ Aristotle, *On sophistical refutations*, 22 (178a36ff).

²⁰ Arguments a – c.

²¹ John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, 1.4.5 (PG 94: 800; ed. Buytaert, 21).

²² John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, 1.9.2 (PG 94: 836, ed. Buytaert, 49): “Totum enim in seipso comprehendens habet esse, velut quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum.”

²³ Bonaventure understood that Aristotle and the ancients connected the infinite with matter, not with God. They did so because the etymology of “infinite” is not-finite, and “finite” is connected teleologically with “end” (Greek: ἄτελές). Matter, then, is “infinite” in the way it is ‘im-perfect’ in not having reached its fulfillment or end.

The distinctions Bonaventure makes in his “response” are designed to show how the Greek sense of infinite does not deny the Christian understanding of an infinite God. Here he offers four senses of ‘infinite,’ only one of which applies to God.

(1) The infinite understood as ‘incomplete’ or ‘imperfect’ applies to matter and to categorical terms, but not to God. (2) The infinite that is like a field with no end covers things that act without achieving a termination or point of rest. This is also not like God. (3) Infinite meaning “privation of what is natural” also cannot apply to God. (4) But God is infinite in the sense that he has no termination or limit in his perfection, nor does his infinite nature require one.

²⁴ Augustine, *De trinitate*, 6.8.8 (PL 42: 929; CCSL 50: 238.8-11).

²⁵ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.7.3, *De veritate* 2.10.

²⁶ After treating God as infinite in himself, both in his power (q. 1) and in his essence (q. 2), Bonaventure turns to the effects produced by God. Here, in q. 3, he looks at quality, considering whether an effect of God’s infinite power can be actually infinite. Then in q. 4, he looks at quantity, considering whether God’s infinite power can produce an infinite number of effects.

²⁷ Bonaventure’s problematic: Arg. 1–6 reason that God’s power can produce an actually infinite effect, on the grounds that his infinite power must have a proportionate and infinite effect. Arg. a–e *To the contrary* reason that only God can be infinite in act, though in certain respects creatures can be infinite in potency.

²⁸ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 9.1 (1046a10-13).

²⁹ Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* 3.7 (207b11).

³⁰ Although God has actually infinite power and essence, even God cannot do the impossible, which is what producing an actually infinite effect would be. Bonaventure argues that producing an actually infinite effect would violate both the nature of God and the nature of the creature.

³¹ See [142](#), [160 n. 11](#), [161 n. 16](#), [162 n. 19](#) above.

³² Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis* 1.2.22 (PL 176: 216C; Corpus Victorinum 73).

³³ Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.4.2.2.1-3 (1: n. 140-142); Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.25.5.

³⁴ Bonaventure’s problematic: In this distinction, Peter Lombard had argued against Peter Abelard’s claim that divine power is finite in extension. Bonaventure sets up the question in terms of the divine power’s “rational means of operating (*ratio operandi*),” that is, the rationally intelligible way that God’s power operates. Arg. a–d reason that the *ratio operandi* of divine power must be infinite, because it is a feature of the infinite divine essence. Obj. 1–4 *To the contrary* side with Abelard, arguing that since what God has actually created is (and must be) finite, the *ratio operandi* of divine power must be finite, as well.

³⁵ Abelard, *Theologia ‘scholarium’* 3.5 (PL 178: 1324-1330), quoted in Lombard, *Sententiae* 1. d. 43, 1: 298-301.

³⁶ In order to answer this question, Bonaventure makes use of the philosophical distinctions among the substance, power, habit, and act of a thing, e.g., human substance, power of will, habit of justice, and a particular just act. The “rational means of operating,” that is, the structure of operations that involves the relation of agent to task accomplished, can be understood in two ways. A creature can “activate” one of its powers to develop both “habits” which facilitate actions and actions

themselves. Because he wrote before the diffusion of most of Aristotle's works, Abelard was not aware of this distinction. Using it allows Bonaventure to say that God's "rational means of operating" is in one way infinite, in another way finite. When the "rational means of operating" refers to a "habit" and is applied to God's power, that habit has a range of infinitely many actions, because "habit" refers to what God *can* do, not what God has actually done. But when the "rational means of operating" refers to the actual "operations" God has performed in creating the actual world, then, of course, the range of things must be finite, because the actual world God has created is finite.

TOPIC 10: DIVINE WILL

Book 1
Distinction 45

QUESTIONS TREATED:

In order to understand the present distinction, three principal issues are raised:

The first issue concerns the quiddity of the divine will. The second issue concerns the causality of the divine will. The third issue concerns the means of signifying the divine will.

About the first issue, two questions are raised.

The first question is whether we should posit a will in God.

The second question is whether God can be called ‘all-willing,’ as he is called ‘all-powerful.’

ARTICLE 1: ON THE NATURE OF THE DIVINE WILL¹

QUESTION 1

Should we posit a will in God?²

*That one should not posit a will in God, is based on the following authoritative texts and arguments:*³

1. In *On Free Choice*, Augustine says: “The will is rational motion presiding over sense and appetite.”⁴ But in God there is neither motion, nor sense, nor appetite. Therefore, there is no will in God.

2. In his book *On the Two Souls*, Augustine says: “Will is the motion of the mind pursuing something, or fleeing from it.”⁵ But we do not posit in God either aversion or pursuit. Therefore, we do not posit will in God.

3. By rational argument: Since the will is the power in us most subject to change, the other powers cannot turn to evil, but will alone is the source of sin. But in God there is nothing at all subject to changing to evil. Therefore, etc.

4. The will, as will, is open to opposites; and as open to opposites, it is contingent and variable. But no contingency or variation happens in God. Therefore, etc. Proof of the first premise: The will, as will, is a rational power. But “rational powers are open to opposites,” as the Philosopher says.⁶ Therefore, etc. Likewise, as will, the will is free. But if so, it is not determined to one thing, because then it would not have freedom, as natural powers do not. Therefore, it is open to opposites, and so is variable.

To the contrary:

a. In the Epistle to the Ephesians, the Apostle Paul says, “According to the counsel of your will,” and “according to what your will has proposed.”⁷ And the term “will,” as found in God, is found throughout scripture. Therefore, etc.

b. The Philosopher concludes that “willing is the action of God himself.”⁸

c. The same conclusion is seen by rational argument: The will is that in which resides the greatest power among creatures. Now if will in its essence signifies power, since it presides over everything in the kingdom of the soul and has no ruler, then, since God is completely powerful, everything which belongs to power should be attributed to him. Therefore, etc.

d. The will is that in which is found the highest enjoyment or felicity; for blessed is the one who has everything he wills. Consequently, nothing is enjoyed unless one has a will or something similar to a will. Now God is the happiest being, in whom is found every felicity and delight. Therefore, etc.

e. The will is that in which reside justice and equity, for justice is nothing other than having a right will. Consequently, whatever has no will is not capable of justice. Now all the sages agree that God is completely just. Therefore, God has a will.

f. The will is a force in which is found the greatest freedom, for all freedom comes from love. Now it is agreed that love is an act of the will. In God one must posit the greatest freedom. Therefore, one must also posit love and will.

Response:

One ought to posit a will in God, as is shown in the four arguments to the contrary, based on four conditions of the will, namely, power, enjoyment, equity, and freedom. For these concern the will. And these four conditions more properly and completely exist in God than in us.

For there is a will in us due to the differences among our substance, our action, and how far we are removed from our end. But there is a will in

God due to complete lack of difference among these, that is, among substance, power, action, and end.

Now since there is will in us due to the difference between our substance and our action, our will presides over the other powers, and varies through its diverse actions. Because it differs from our substance, in which there can be “rooted” other powers, the will presides over the other powers, such as sense and appetite. Because it differs from our actions, there is variation in our will, following changes in our affections. In God, however, neither of these things is true. So God’s will does not rule inferior powers, nor does it suffer variation due to various affections.

Therefore, since there is will in us due to how far we are removed from our end, this is the reason why our will is needy, and in it there are aversion and appetite, and sadness and malice befall it. For it can be turned away from its end, since it is not conjoined to that end. But God’s will is completely conjoined to its end. Therefore, God’s will suffers no aversion or appetite, nor do sadness or malice befall it; but it is completely joyful and just.⁹

Replies to the arguments that there is no will in God:

1-3. The reply to the first three arguments is clear. Although the conditions mentioned—appetite, aversion, malice, and variability—are conditions of a created will, they are conditions altogether removed from the divine will.

4. To the objection that the will is contingent and variable, I reply: There is contingency in an action and there is also contingency in an effect. If we are speaking about contingency in an effect, not only is there contingency in our effects, but also in many things which come from God. For God makes many things which are not able to act, even with nothing working against them. However, if we are speaking about contingency in an action, through which the will now can cease willing something and begin willing something—now willing something and now willing its opposite—this is found in the human will, for there is a difference between the human will and its action. Consequently, it is not always engaged in one action, nor in a uniform action. The divine will, however, due to the identity between it

and its action, cannot vary in any way at all; nor does it have any contingency within itself. In this way, all the issues are clear.

QUESTION 2

*Can God be called all-willing, as he is called all-knowing and all-powerful?*¹⁰

Supposing one posits a will in God, a second question arises: Must one posit that God is all-willing, so that he is called “all-willing” from his will, as he is called “all-powerful” from his power and “all-knowing” from his knowledge?

*That this is so is argued as follows:*¹¹

1. Since God is not called all-powerful because he would be able to do all things, but because he can do everything which is right for his power—for he is not able to do evil. God likewise wills all that it is right that he wills, with his will. Therefore, he ought to be called “all-willing,” as he is called all-powerful.

2. As the cognitive ability of God is related to the true, so is the affective ability, or the will, of God related to the good. But cognitive ability or intelligence includes everything true. Consequently, whoever would say God is ignorant of something true would constrain and denigrate his intelligence. By a similar argument, since his intelligence is neither wider nor more perfect than his will, his will regards every good. Therefore, just as he is called “all-knowing” because he knows everything true, so he is “all-willing” because he wills every good.

3. Just as God is called the truth of everything true, from whom everything true has truth, so he is called the good of every good, from whom every good has goodness. But God, in seeing his own truth, since it is the reason for all truths, knows all truths. Therefore, in loving his own goodness, God likewise loves every good. But everything God loves, he

wills. Therefore, he wills every good, just as he knows every truth. Therefore, etc.

4. A good will is one that embraces many goods. Therefore, a better will embraces more, and the best will extends to all. Therefore, an infinite will extends to an infinite number of goods. Therefore, just as power and knowledge embrace all things, even an infinite number of things, the same is true of the will. Therefore, the reason which makes God all-powerful and all-knowing, also ought to make him all-willing.

To the contrary:

a. Psalm 113 says: “Whatever he has willed, he has done.”¹² Therefore, he wills nothing but what he does. Now, he *can* do more, but he is not able to do so without willing. Therefore, he *can* will more. But if God could know more, he would not be all-knowing. Therefore, etc.

b. If a human could know something God did not know, God would not be all-knowing. Therefore, since a human does will something God does not will, for example, stealing, then God is not all-willing.

c. If the ability to do evil were an ability, then God would not be all-powerful, since he is not able to do evil. Now, since willing evil is willing, and since God does not will evil, God is not all-willing. Proof of the minor: Evil is not evil unless it is voluntary, since, as Augustine says, “sin is voluntary.”¹³ Therefore, the notion of willing is found in evil, and likewise an act of the will is found in willing evil. Therefore, etc.

d. Willing evil either is an instance of willing or not an instance of willing. If it is an instance of willing, I have what was proposed. If it is not an instance of willing, but not willing evil is good, then willing evil is good. Therefore, if God wills every good, then God wills evil, which is false. Therefore, the result is that willing evil is an instance of willing. But God does not will evil. Therefore, God is not all-willing.

But this argument is sophistical, because a similar objection can be made about power.

Therefore, the question arises: why is it that willing evil is an instance of willing, but being able to do evil is not an instance of power, but of

impotence.

In light of these arguments, the question at issue involves comparing power, wisdom, and will, with regard to the extension of their objects.

Response:

When we ask whether God is all-willing, this expression can have two meanings, because “all” can be distributed absolutely or in relation to the present “now.” If “all” is distributed absolutely, in relation to action and habit, then God would be called “all-willing” because he wills everything that *can* be willed. If it is distributed in relation to “now,” then God would be called “all-willing,” because he wills everything that is willed.

In both senses “God is all-willing” is false, while in both senses the correlatives about power and knowledge are true. Therefore, we admit absolutely that God is all-knowing and all-powerful, and we deny absolutely that God is all-willing.

How to understand this point, and the reason for it, are clear. If we take the term “all” absolutely, God knows everything that can be known, and can do everything that can be done; but God does not will everything that can be willed. For divine will signifies an actual cause; while divine power abstracts from the notion of actuality, while maintaining the notion of a cause, and divine knowledge abstracts from both notions. Therefore, since God is not the actual cause of everything he can do or will, just as he does not do everything he can will, so he does not will it either. Since power abstracts from the notion of actuality, power is said not only about things actually being done, but also about things it is possible for God to do. And because knowledge abstracts from both notions, there is knowledge not only about things being done, but also about possibles—not only concerning God, but concerning other things as well, even possible evils. This is the reason why an act of knowledge, such as knowing, exists in the manner of a habit. Likewise, powers, such as ability, exist in the manner of a habit. But the will exists in the manner of an act, like willing. Therefore, God’s knowledge incorporates all objects that can be known, and his power all the possibles that are in his power, but his will does not incorporate all the objects that can be willed. Therefore, God is not able to know more, nor is he able to do more, but he can will more.

Likewise, if we take the distribution to refer to the present “now” in relation to what is foreseen, what is done, and what is willed, then God’s knowledge concerns every thing to which the notion of knowledge refers, and God’s power concerns everything to which the notion of power refers. But God’s will does not concern everything to which the notion of will refers. For God’s knowledge is about everything that will be, that is, and that was, both good and bad, because they refer to the notions of knowledge and nobility, and because knowing evil is a kind of knowing, and knowing evil is noble. Likewise, God’s power concerns all goods, to which alone the notion of power refers. For the ability to do evil is not an ability. Consequently, the ability to do evil not only takes away from the perfection of God’s power, but also from the power itself, since the ability to make a mistake is not ability. Therefore, God is still “all-powerful.” But God’s will only concerns good, not evil. And even though willing evil does not preserve the dignity of the will, it does contain the notion of willing, because willing evil is a kind of willing. This is why God is not called “all-willing,” because he does not will evil, but he is called “all-powerful,” even though he is not able to do evil.

If you object: Why is the notion of power not preserved about evil, like the notion of will is? I reply: What power describes, it describes in the mode of a habit and something positive, speaking here of active power. Consequently, when we speak of privation, we speak, not of a power but of the lack of power. But what will describes, it describes in the mode of a kind of indifference and pleasure. Therefore, since the notions of consent and pleasure are found in evil, as well as good, willing evil is a kind of willing, but being able to do evil is not really an ability.

Replies to the objections:

1. To the objection that God wills everything which is right, I reply: That is not the reason why he is called “all-powerful,” but the reason is what has already been indicated, namely, because he is able to do everything which is within the ability of his power.

2. To the objection that God’s cognitive ability includes everything true, and his affective ability includes every good, I reply: God includes truth and goodness in different ways. For God “includes” with his cognitive

ability, by knowing everything which is true and which can be true. But with his affective ability, since its act involves acting, God “includes” and wills only the good which is or will be. Again, truth includes every act of cognition, since we know only the true, for knowing the false is not to know. But the good does not include every act of the will; for willing the opposite of the good is still willing. This is why God, in knowing everything true, is called “all-knowing,” but willing every good in this way, he is not called “all-willing.”

3. To the objection that in knowing himself, God, who is truth itself, knows every truth, etc., I reply: This is the case with truth, but the case is different with willing. For in knowing himself God is an exemplar cause, and the exemplar cause not only of what will be, but also of things which God could possibly bring about. But in loving himself, God’s goodness is an actual cause, as will become clear.¹⁴ Therefore, it does not follow that he wills only good things which will be or which he will produce; and for this reason he cannot be called “all-willing.” Nonetheless, there is another argument about this, which will become clear in Lombard’s text.¹⁵

4. To the objection that the will embracing more is better, I reply: Willing is a rational act. Consequently, the will is not called better simply because it embraces more things, but because it embraces more things in a rational way. Now since right reason dictates that creatures come to be in a definite number, because an infinite number cannot apply to things, the best and completely perfect will wills good things to be in some number, but in a finite number. From this it does not follow that God’s will concerns an infinite number, or all possibilities, or even all things.

It can be said that this objection, if it is true anywhere, is only true when the will receives something from the thing willed. But the will of God receives nothing, and so is not better when it wills three goods than when it wills one, or when it wills a thousand than when it wills three. Therefore, the argument fails.

From these points there is a clear answer to the customary question: whether will, power, and wisdom in God are equal. I reply: One can speak about them with regard to an affection or action, and with regard to an effect, and with regard to an object. With regard to an action, there is in God utter equality and indwelling, as is clear, because whatever God knows

and can do, God wills to know and to be able to do. And the reverse is true. With regard to an effect, they are still equal, because God makes nothing except through power, wisdom, and will. With regard to an object or what is connoted, however, they are not equal. For knowledge in this respect concerns more, power less, and will still less. For God knows both good and evil; God can do only good, whether it will be or will not be; but God wills only what is good and will be.

NOTES

¹ Having considered God's existence and intrinsic nature (d. 8), the Trinity of persons (d. 9–34), including the divine names (d. 22), Bonaventure then followed Master Peter Lombard's order and turned to what we can understand about God, based on his operations. We have covered God's knowledge (d. 35—the ideas), God's foreknowledge (d. 38), and God's infinite power (d. 43). As a prelude to consideration of creation in Bk. 2, the Master had ended Bk. 1 by considering God's will (d. 45–48). We here translate Bonaventure commentary on d. 45, Art. 1 and 2, on the nature of the divine will.

² Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.6.1.1. (1: n. 266); Thomas Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1. D. 45.1.1, *Summa theologiae* 1.19.1.

³ Bonaventure's problematic: Obj. 1–4 argue there is no will in God, based on the nature of the human will. Arg. a–f *To the contrary*, reason that God does have a will, but it must be different from the human will, especially with regard to four "conditions:" power, enjoyment, equity, and freedom.

⁴ Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* 1.8.18–1.10.20 (PL 32: 1231–1233; CCSL 29: 222.1–225.40).

⁵ Pseudo-Augustine, *De duabus animabus* 10.14 (PL 42: 105; CSEL 25: 68.23–25).

⁶ Aristotle, *On the Soul* 3.8 (432b26–433a8) and 3.10 (433a28–b4).

⁷ Eph 1:11 and 1:5.

⁸ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12.7 (1072b15).

⁹ At the outset of his "response," Bonaventure accepts Arg. c–f as proving the *existence* of the divine will. The rest of his "response" concentrates on how human and divine wills are different in *nature*. There is a real difference between human substance, power (like the will), and end. In God, there is no such ontological difference. This means that God has a will, but one quite different from the human will.

¹⁰ *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.4.2.1.1–2 (1: n. 136–7), 1.1.1.6.1.3. (1: n. 268); Thomas Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1. D. 45.1.1, 2.1–2, *Summa theologiae* 1.19.2–3.

¹¹ Bonaventure's problematic: Obj. 1–4 argue that God must be "all-willing," because the range of God's will is as wide as the range of his knowledge and power. Arg. a–d *To the contrary*, reason that God is not "all-willing," because he does not will evil, even though he knows evil and can do everything that is possible.

¹² Ps 113:11.

¹³ Augustine, *De vera religione* 14.27 (PL 34: 134; CCSL 32: 204.14–19).

¹⁴ Bonaventure, *In Sententiis*, 1. d. 45, a. 2, q. 1.

¹⁵ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, 1. d. 46.3, 1: 314–16.

BOOK 1
DISTINCTION 45

ARTICLE 2: ON THE CAUSALITY OF THE DIVINE WILL

QUESTION 1

*Is the will of God, considered generally, the cause of things?*¹

*That God's will is the cause, is argued as follows:*²

a. Hilary, in his book *On Synods*, says: “on all creatures his will has bestowed substance, but to the Son he has given his nature.”³

b. Augustine, in his book *Against the Manichees*, says: “Let us respond to those who want to deny a will to God, that the will of God is the cause of all the things which are.”⁴

c. This is also seen by reason: God is the cause of things. Now, everything whose cause is God comes about through his knowledge, power, and will. Therefore, God is the cause either because powerful or because knowing or because willing. But he is not the cause because powerful, because he can do many things he does not do; for a similar reason, not because knowing; therefore, because he is willing. But the cause is that whose being something else follows. Therefore, etc.

d. God is the cause of created things. Therefore, he causes either through nature or through will or through happenstance and fortune. He does not cause through happenstance and fortune, since they are causes in

an imperfect way. And not through nature, since in this way like is produced by like. Therefore, the remaining option is through will. Therefore, etc.

To the contrary:

1. If the will of God is the cause, it is so either by reason of its principal signification or by reason of what it connotes. If by reason of its principal signification, then, since wisdom, power, will, and essence are the same, they ought to be called causes. If by reason of what “will” connotes, then I ask what that is. It can only be by reason of an effect. But effect follows cause, by definition, not the reverse. Therefore, it cannot be by reason of what “will” connotes. Again, if “will” connotes an effect, then there would be no way to say “God wills himself to be,” since God makes absolutely nothing about himself. But this is false.

2. Either the will is the proper cause or the cause by appropriation. If the proper cause, then wisdom and power are not causes. If by appropriation, then this is because the nature of causality is in the will either by priority or more immediately. But not by priority, because power and knowledge precede willing according to the rational means of understanding them. Nor more immediately, because, as Hugh of St. Victor says, “God moves through his will, disposes through his wisdom, and executes through his power.”⁵ Therefore, power and knowledge are more immediately related to his works than is the will. Therefore, etc.

3. Either the will is a cause due to its ability (*virtutem*) to act or due to its mode of acting. It is not due to its ability, since “will” does not describe ability, but power describes ability. But if due to its mode of acting, I say to the contrary: The mode of acting which is by nature is finer. Therefore, nature is a greater cause than will. Proof: That agent is more able which is more sufficient and produces a finer effect. But nature is more sufficient in acting, both in needing less, and in producing a finer effect, in comparison with art or a voluntary agent. Therefore, etc.

Again, it seems not due to the mode of willing, because an agent which gives to its product properties which are naturally similar to itself acts through the mode of nature. Now God gives unity, truth, and goodness to

his effects. Moreover, God cannot produce things without these properties, and they are natural properties of the divine substance. Therefore, God acts through the mode of nature, not through the mode of willing.

4. Every voluntary agent acts by thinking ahead. But God does not act by thinking ahead, as Dionysius says in *On the Divine Names*, that just as the sun illuminates without thinking ahead, so God creates without thinking ahead.⁶

Response:

In order to understand this matter, one should note that even though the divine essence is one, utterly simple quiddity, nonetheless it is “an infinite sea of substance.”⁷ Therefore, all the things we have which are different from each other, I say, are found in God in a finer way, in complete identity, which nonetheless exhibits complete perfection and truth. Consequently, while in us wisdom, power, and will, truly are a being (*ens*) and a cause (*causa*) of the things which derive from us, they are also in God, but they are one. And even though they are one, because our intellect cannot comprehend the infinity of God’s substance, nor express it in one word, we understand God in many ways, and express our understanding using different terms. And since we understand in those ways, we say many things, so that we attribute something to God in one way, but not in another. And we do this truly, because all these have some existence in God. Therefore, since we understand God in one way when we say God is good, and in another way when we say God is eternal, we grant that he diffuses himself because he is good, not because he is eternal. For this is a property of goodness, not of duration. This is why, when we understand there truly is a will in God, and that a property of the will is to produce those things which proceed from his liberality, we say that God, in so far as he has a will, is the cause of things.

Now the reason why causality is attributed to the will is this, namely, that the reason for causing things is goodness, both by reason of producing effects and by reason of being an end. For the good is said to be diffusive; and the good is that for the sake of which all things are. What produces effects, however, only becomes an efficient cause in actuality for the sake of an end. Therefore, what describes the conjunction of the efficient principle

with the end is the reason for causing an effect. But the will is an act, in which a good is turned back to a higher good or to goodness itself. Therefore, the will unites the efficient cause with the end. This is why the will is the reason why causing produces an effect. Therefore, we attribute causality to God by reason of the will, not for any other reasons.⁸

This can be drawn from the words of Dionysius, in *On the Divine Names*, where he says: “All things desire goodness as containing all and as principle and as end: as the principle from which they are, as what contains them and through which they are saved, as the end to which they tend.” Consequently, “divine love is a kind of eternal cycle, from the best, through the best, to the best.”⁹ From this we conclude that he speaks about conjoining principle with end, and, therefore, an *actual* cause, when it wills to do something. So actuality in causing is referred to the will, not just at the instant in which one wills, but in what one wills to do. For example, I will to hear mass tomorrow, and my will makes me be tomorrow in act with respect to the thing willed. The same thing is true of God, in his own manner.

Replies to the objections to the contrary:

1. To the objection which asks whether the nature of causality applies to the will by connotation or as what is signified, I reply: It does not apply as only the thing signified, nor by connotation, but as a thing signified in this way: that the divine essence is signified as a will, to which the mode of signifying truth corresponds. Consequently, just as when we say that a stone is similar to God, in so far as it is a being, and an animal is similar to God in so far as it is living, and a human is similar to God in so far as he is understanding, while in fact essence, intelligence, and life, are the same thing in God, yet that same thing is understood in different ways, not on account of its connotation, but on account of the infinity of that same substance, in which all its noble properties are one. But these properties cannot be signified except through different terms.

2. To the objection based on whether the will is a proper cause or a cause by appropriation, I reply: Speaking absolutely, the will is the most proper cause. But when we compare the will with knowledge and power, it is called a cause by appropriation. This is because the will itself signifies

God as an actual cause. Consequently, primarily in the will we find the notion of actuality, not the notion of causality. For power and knowledge, even if they have the nature of a habitual cause, are not actual causes except through the will. Consequently, the will makes knowledge into a disposition or makes knowledge to be disposed, and makes power to execute. Therefore, God disposes because he wills, and he makes things because he wills. This makes the point clear.

3. To the objection which asks why the will is called a cause, whether due to the ability of the agent or the mode of acting, I reply: Due to both—for in God to will is to be able—but principally by reason of his mode of acting. For producing something different in form and nature, due only to the liberality of the agent, focuses on an agent as voluntary.

Now, the objection that the mode of a natural agent is finer, is true where the will is not omnipotent. But if an art could make whatever it wills, it would not act less well than nature. Yet, it can be said that a natural mode of producing applies to one divine person in relation to another, but not to the divine essence in relation to creatures, because they cannot agree in form.

To the objection that God produces something similar to himself, with regard to its properties, I reply: Nature produces something similar to itself in its *special properties*, if it is a particular agent. But if it is a universal agent, it produces by necessity, not out of its liberality. God, however, produces in neither of these ways.¹⁰

4. To the objection that God is not an agent that thinks ahead, I reply: This is true about that kind of thinking ahead which precedes willing, but it is not true about the kind of thinking ahead which is about a product. Dionysius is speaking about the first kind of thinking ahead, while the objector is thinking about the second.

QUESTION 2

Is the will of God the first and immediate cause [of things]?¹¹

The second question is whether the divine will is the first and immediate cause.

It seems the divine will is the first and immediate cause:^{[12](#)}

a. Augustine, in *On the Trinity* 3, says: “The will of God is the first and highest cause of all species of things and of all motions.”^{[13](#)}

b. Every cause whose first and proper act is producing a thing, is its first and immediate cause. But the divine will is a cause of this kind. Therefore, etc. Proof of the middle: The gloss on Psalm 144, “God is just in all his ways,” says: “For God to will is to make, because from his will things have being.”^{[14](#)}

c. This is seen by reason: Every cause is first and immediate, than which there is no other cause that is prior. But the divine will is a cause, than which there is no other cause that is prior, since it is the same as God. Therefore, his will is the first and immediate cause.

d. Every cause is first and immediate, which is in the whole effect through its own action. But everything which happens comes from God, and nothing can operate without him, since it could not be preserved in being, and God cooperates with the whole effect and is in the whole effect. Therefore, etc.

e. Every knower that knows a thing with absolute certainty and in the finest way, knows it through its proximate and immediate cause. But, whoever knows and sees God knows things in him with absolute certainty and in the finest way, as in its prior causes, as Augustine says. Therefore, in God is found the proximate and immediate cause. But this cannot be true unless that cause is the will of God. Therefore, etc.

f. What is attributed to God ought to be attributed to him as the end of all nobility. Therefore, if the notion of causality applies to him, the noblest causality must be attributed to him. But this is the kind of causality that is a first and immediate cause. Therefore, etc.

To the contrary:

1. There is *one* immediate cause for each thing. Therefore, if God is the immediate cause of all things, nothing has any cause other than God. But if so, all operations would cease, and consequently every power would cease, and every good would cease, along with other unacceptable consequences.

2. If the divine will is the proximate and immediate cause of everything, and when the proximate and immediate cause is posited, the effect must be posited, then, since the divine will is eternal, everything else must be eternal.

3. Everything which has a proximate, immediate, and necessary cause is demonstrable. Therefore, if the divine will is the primary and immediate cause of all things, all things would be demonstrable.

4. When the proximate and immediate cause is known, there is nothing else to seek. Therefore, if it is known that God wills something, one would labor in vain to seek another cause. But we know that God is the cause of every good thing which happens. Therefore, we should seek no other cause. Consequently, doctrinal knowledge would be vain, and would perish, along with all the sciences.

Response:

In order to understand this point, we should note that when we find universal causes and particular causes among creatures, in one way a universal cause influences the effect more than a particular cause, and in another way it has a lesser effect. For about what is innermost in things, a universal cause, because it is a prior agent, has more influence; but about actuality and what is proper to the thing, it has less influence. The reason for this is that a universal created cause does not possess actuality in every respect, nor does it possess complete power. Therefore, it cannot attain a specific form except accidentally, for example, through the form of a particular agent, which does not come from it.

The divine will, by contrast, is a cause which is first, completely universal, and also completely actual. Therefore, it has power over the whole effect, and over the whole substance of the thing, even without the addition of another cause. And no other cause can do anything, even a little,

without it. Therefore, it is necessary that the divine will be an immediate cause in every action and in every thing.

Therefore, the arguments on this side are admitted.

In reply to the arguments to the contrary, one should understand that, while God is the immediate cause of all things, of some he is the only cause, as of things which are created, but of other things God is a cause, along with another, particular cause, as of what happens due to nature or due to some particular will. And this other cause is a concurrent cause, not because of some deficiency in the divine will, but because of its great liberality. This cause not only gives things being (*esse*) but also operation and the ability to diffuse their own goodness, due to the order and connection of all things among themselves. Nor does the one cause take away something from the other cause, but the whole effect comes from the created cause *and* the whole effect comes from the uncreated will.¹⁵

1. On this basis, the reply to the first objection is clear: For the objection concerns an immediate cause in relation to another created cause, since two created causes cannot be immediate causes in the same line of causality.

2. To the objection that when an immediate cause is posited, etc., I reply: Causes are posited in two ways, either for being (*esse*) or for operation (*operari*). When a cause is posited, the effect is not posited in actuality, unless the cause is posited as operating. But this is not how the cause was posited from eternity, but at that time in which it was disposed and willed to produce a thing, from eternity.

3. To the objection that all things would be demonstrable, I reply: This objection is true, if that cause is also proper and limited to such effects.

4. To the objection that we would not seek another cause, I reply: If one could fully understand the will and internal disposition of God, then no one would ever want to know any other cause, since one would understand fully through the primordial causes. But since the divine will is not known, and its own action does not exclude the operation of a created cause, it does not exclude them from our knowledge. Therefore, it is good and useful to

try to study created causes, so that in some way we might come “half-way” to understand that supreme cause, which is the end of all cognition.

NOTES

¹ Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.6.2.1 (1: n. 269); Thomas Aquinas, *In Sententiis* 1. D. 45. 1.2, *Summa theologiae* 1.19.4.

² Bonaventure's problematic: The issue here is whether creation is a function of God's will or depends upon another aspect of the divine nature, such as God's essence, knowledge, or power. Arg. a–d reason that the divine will is the cause of created things. Obj. 1–4 *To the contrary* present difficulties to saying that God's will is the cause of creatures.

³ Hilary, *De synodis* 58 (PL 10: 520).

⁴ Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 1.2.4 (PL 34: 175).

⁵ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis* 1.2.6 (PL 176: 208BC, *Corpus Victorinum* 62-63).

⁶ Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus* 4.1 (PG 3: 694; *Dionysiaca*, 146-7).

⁷ John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* (PG 94: 836; ed. Buytaert; 49).

⁸ Here at the heart of his “response” Bonaventure combines the neoplatonic side of the good, that the good is beneficial, with the end, which is the teleological side of the good. Neoplatonists like Dionysius had shown how these two sides of the good form a kind of circle that explains action.

⁹ Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus* 4.4 (PG 3: 700A; *Dionysiaca*, 167): tr. Eriugena, *Et sic quidem omnia ad semetipsam bonitas convertit, et principaliter congregatrix est dispersorum, sicut principalis et unifica Deitas, et omnia ipsam ut principium, ut continentiam, ut finem, appetunt*. 4.14 (PG 3: 712D; *Dionysiaca*, 223): tr. Eriugena: *Sicut quidam aeternus circulus, per optimum et ex optimo et in optimo et in optimum inerrabili conversione circumiens, et in eodem et per idipsum et perveniens semper et manens et revolutus*.

¹⁰ Bonaventure again uses the distinction between the transcendentals and the categories, here to distinguish the way God acts as an efficient cause from the way created natures produce their effects.

¹¹ Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, 1.1.1.6.2.3 (1: n. 270). Albert, *In Sententiis*, 1.d.45.8. Aquinas, *In Sententiis*, 1.d.45.1.2-3, *Summa theologiae* 1.105.3-5, *Summa contra gentiles*, 3.66-67, 70.

¹² Bonaventure's problematic: Arg. a–f reason that God's will is not just the “first” or highest cause of creatures, but that God's will is also the immediate or proximate cause of creatures. In this way, Bonaventure rejects the views of the Arabic philosophers who espoused “mediated creation,” where God's creative action is passed on to lower causes, who are the immediate creative causes of things. But Obj. 1–4 *To the contrary* raise an important problem. If God's will is both highest and the immediate cause of creatures, then what room is left for secondary or created causes? Concluding his reply to the arguments to the contrary, Bonaventure upholds that the things God creates are real causes, which act concurrently with God in producing their effects. In upholding the reality of primary and secondary causes, then, Bonaventure also rejects the occasionalist view of the Arabic (Asharite) Mutikallimun, e.g., Al-Ghazali. Cf. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* 1.105.5, *Summa Contra Gentiles* 3.69-70.

¹³ Augustine, *De trinitate* 3.4.9 (PL 42: 873; CCSL 50: 136.23-4).

¹⁴ *Glossa ordinaria* (PL 191: 1267).

¹⁵ Looking not at the temporal but the ontological aspect of creation, God is the total, immediate, and only cause of creation. This means that all creatures are absolutely dependent upon God. They must be, because in their fundamental ontology a being (*ens*) is a composite of being (*esse*) and existence (*existentia*). Consequently, every creature requires God to unite *esse* and *existentia* in order for it to be a being (*ens*).

When God causes something along with a concurrent, created cause, Bonaventure says that God causes the “whole effect” (*totus effectus*), and so does the created cause, thereby rejecting the view

that God might provide, say, matter, while a created cause provides form. Rather, Bonaventure holds that if we look at the created effect in terms of its *specific nature*, the created cause is cause of the whole. But when we look at the creature in terms of the transcendentals—as a being (*ens*)—then God is the cause of the created effect. In short, the causality of God and creature explain different, rationally discernible features (*rationes*) of the creature, which are components of the whole.

GLOSSARY: LATIN TO ENGLISH1

ablatio: negation

acies: attention

aequiparantia: equivalence

affectus: affection

anima: soul

apertus: clear

appropriata: proper

arctatus: confined. from arceo.

articulus: article

attendo: consider; *attenditur*: is considered

beatitudo: happiness

certitudo: certainty; certitude.

clarus: clear

complacentia: satisfaction

concedendum: one should grant

concedo: I grant

conservatio: preservation

conveniens: correct

corruptibilis: corruptible

credibile: object of belief

dicere: to say; to describe; to signify

dignitas: axiom

in divinis: in divinity

duplico: imitate

effabile: what can be spoken

ens: being, a being
ens per se: being in itself; substance
ens non per se: being not in itself; accident
enuntiatio: [written or spoken] proposition
esse: to be; being; kind of being.
esse datum aliunde: being given from elsewhere
esse limitatum: limited being
esse mixtum: composed being
essendi: being
essentia: essence
exemplar: exemplar
exemplatum: patterned after an exemplar
existere: to exist; existence
existentia: existence

genus: genus

idea: idea
ideatum: thing modeled on an idea
illatio: inference [from *inferre*]; proposition inferred
immutabile: unchangeable
immutabilitas: being unchangeable
impositio: application
inconveniens: incorrect
incorruptibilis: incorruptible
iniquus: unjust
innatus: inborn; innate.
inquisitivus: inquiring
intelligere: to understand
intellectus: intellect
invertibilitas: indestructibility

latentia: hiddenness; concealment.

libidinosus: libidinous; lustful

manuductio: guidance [gradual, acquired gradually]

nobilis, e: fine; noble.

nomen: name

nominabile: what can be named

notamen: notion

notitia: notion, concept

objectum: a kind of object; object

a parte: on the side of

per accidens: accidentally; incidentally.

per aliud: through another

per se: through itself, essentially

perfectus, a, um: perfect; complete

perscrutatorius: examining

pluralitas: plurality

pluralitas secundum rationem: plurality according to reason

pluralitas secundum rem: real plurality

potest: has power

praedicamentum: category

probabilis: probative; using proof; probable

probatio mediae: argument for the middle term

propter: because of; on account of; for the sake of

quo est: that whereby it is

quod est: that which is

ratio:

[subjective]: reason; reasoning;

[objective]: reason [why], reason [for]; feature, aspect, intelligibility;
nature, definition; cause.

ratio cognoscendi: reason for knowing; rational cause of knowing; rational
means of knowing.

ratio discernendi: reason for discerning; rational means of discerning.

ratio innotescendi: reason for becoming known; rational cause of becoming
known; rational means of becoming known.

reparatio: reparation

res: thing; reality

respicio: consider

salvatur: is found

semiplenus, a, um: halfway

similitudo: likeness

simpliciter: absolutely

significatio: signification

simplicissimum: completely simple

Summe simplex: simple in the highest degree

suppositio: hypothesis

suppositum: subject; individual subject

sisto: remain, stop

spectant: they pertain to; they look to

in statu naturae institutae: in the state of original creation

in statu naturae lapsae: in the fallen state

super-excellentia: supreme perfection

transferre, translatum, translative: transfer; transferred; by transference

ut boni fiamus: for the sake of our becoming good.

ut nunc: in relation to ‘now’

vanitas: emptiness

verbum: word; verb

versio: destruction, complete destruction

vox: vocal sound

¹ The English terms listed are used in the vast majority of translations of the correlative Latin word, but context occasionally requires using an English term not listed in this Glossary.

APPENDICES

D ATE	F RANCISCANS	D OMINICANS	O THERS
1181	Francis born		
			Pope Innocent III (1198-1216)
1200		Albert born	
1202	Francis: knight, prison		
1205	Francis: Crucifix of San Damiano		
1206	Francis: hermit's habit		
1208	Francis: preacher's habit		
1209	Francis: approval of Pope Innocent III: beginnings of First Rule		
1210			Council of Paris bans <i>libri Aristotelis de naturali philosophia</i>
1215	4th Lateran Council: no new orders	OPs founded Toulouse	University of Paris: statutes of Robert de Courcon ban <i>libri Aristotelis de metaphysica et naturali philosophia</i>
1216			Pope Honorius III (1216-27)
1217	Bonaventure born	OPs arrive at Paris	
1218			Philip becomes Chancellor of Paris
1220	Hugolino dei Conti di Segni, Cardinal protector of OFM		
1221	Francis: First Rule codified	St. Dominic d.	
1223	Francis: creche at Greccio	Albert takes OP habit	
1224	Francis: Mt. La-Verna, stigmata	Thomas Aquinas, b. 1224/25	
1225	Francis: Br. Sun and Sr. Moon ca. Alexander of Hales, Master of Theology at Paris		
1226	Francis: d. Oct. 3 Bonaventure: miraculously healed by Francis. Br. Elias: 1st Gen Min OFM (1226-27)		
1227	John Parenti, OFM Gen Min		Pope Gregory IX (1227-41),

	(1227-31)		formerly Cardinal Hugolino
1228	Francis: canonized, July 19 by Pope Gregory IX		
1229		Roland of Cremona, OP chair	March 27 (Fat Tuesday): University Paris strike begins-to April 31, 1231
1230			Gregory IX, <i>Quo elongati</i> : makes it easier for OFM to be clerics
1231	Br. Elias Gen Min OFM 1231-39		April 31, Letter <i>Parens scientiarum</i> of Gregory IX, end strike University of Paris
1232	Anthony of Padua, OFM canonized	OPs given the Inquisition	
1234		Dominic canonized	
1235	Bonaventure: studies Arts at Paris; Alexander of Hales takes OFM habit, OFM chair of theology (1235-38)		
1238	Jean of la Rochelle, OFM Chair of theology (1238-45)		
1239	Br. Elias deposed as Gen Min OFM, d. 1253 Albert of Pisa, Gen Min OFM (1239-40)	John of St. Giles, second OP chair	
1240	Haymo of Faversham, Gen Min OFM 1239-42: “reformation” of OFM		
1241		Albert: <i>De natura boni</i> , (before 12441)	
1243	Bonaventure: M. Arts takes OFM habit (or 1244); studies Theology at Paris 1243-48	Albert: in Paris 1243-48; <i>In Sententiis</i> 1243-49	Pope Innocent IV (1243-54)
1244	Crescentius of Iesi, OFM Gen Min OFM (1244-47); conflicts of Spirituals and Conventuals begin	Aquinas: takes OP habit, Naples; 1244-45 Aquinas detained by family	
1245	Odo Rigaldus, OFM chair (1245-48)	Albert OP chair (1245-48) <i>Summa de bono</i> (1246-48) Aquinas studies	

		at Paris w. Albert (1245-48)	
1247	John of Parma OFM Gen Min (1247-57)		
1248	William of Melitona OFM chair (1248-54); Bonaventure: <i>Bachelarius biblicus</i> , licensed by John of Parma (Salimbene)	Albert in Cologne <i>In Dionysii de divinis nominibus</i> ; Aquinas studies theology at Cologne w. Albert (1248-52)	
1249	Bonaventure reads Bible cursorie (1248-50)	Albert: Aristotle paraphrases 1249-70	
1250	Bonaventure: <i>Bachelarius sententiarium</i> (1250-52) begins <i>In Sententiis</i>		
1252	Bonaventure- <i>Bachelarius formatus</i> (1252-53) reads, disputes, preaches	Aquinas: <i>Bachelarius sententiarium</i> in Paris (1252-56) <i>In Sententiis, De ente et essentia, De principiis naturae</i>	
1253			Fall: University of Paris goes on strike; 3 mendicants expelled as masters.
1254	Gerard of Borgo san Donino OFM at Paris: <i>Introduction to the Eternal Gospel</i> , published early in 1254; condemned 1255. Bonaventure: <i>licentia docendi</i> by Easter: <i>magister regens ad scholas fratrum</i> (1254-57)		<i>Apologia of the masters</i> , Feb. 4 Pope Alexander IV 1254-61 William of Saint-Amour, Master of Theology (1250-55)
1254-1255	Bonaventure: <i>QD De perfectione evangelii</i>		William of Saint-Amour: <i>De Antichristo</i> , 1254
1255-1256	Bonaventure: <i>QD De scientia Christi</i>	Aquinas: <i>Contra impugnantes dei cultum</i>	William: <i>De periculis novissimorum temporum</i> , 1255
1255			April 14, Alexander IV, <i>Quasi lignum vitae</i>
1256		Aquinas: Spring,	March 3 Alexander IV orders

		Master of Theology in OP house; Regent master 1256-59 <i>In Boetii de trinitate QD De veritate</i>	University of Paris to allow Thomas his <i>initium</i> ; October 5 William condemned by Alexander IV; October 23 Alexander IV orders Parisian masters to accept Bonaventure and Thomas to their rightful place among masters
1256-1257	Bonaventure: <i>QD De mysterio Trinitatis; Sermo: De reductione</i>		
1257	Bonaventure: Feb 2 Gen Min OFM		August 12 Oath of Christian Bevaquais at Church of Friars in Paris publicly recognizing Bonaventure and Thomas as part of <i>consortium magistrorum</i>
1259	Bonaventure: <i>Itinerarium mentis in deum</i> begun Oct. Mt. LaVerna	Aquinas: in Italy (1259-68) Aquinas: Naples (1259-61); SCG	
1260	General chapter orders Bonaventure to write legend of Francis		
1261		Aquinas: Orvieto (1261-65)	Pope Urban IV (1261-64)
1263	General chapter accepts Bonaventure's legend		
1265		AQUINAS: ROME (1265-68) <i>Lectura Romana SUMMAT 1</i>	Pope Clement IV (1265-68) Siger of Brabant, Master of Arts (1260-65/1277) cited Summa T in decree of Simon of Brion, papal legate Aug. 22, 1266 Siger, <i>Ques in 3 de anima</i> , before 1270
1266	General Chapter orders all other lives of Francis destroyed		
1267	Bonaventure: <i>Coll de 7 donis SS</i> Feb 26-April 7, Paris	Aquinas: 1268-72 2nd Paris regency <i>SummaT</i> 1-2 (1268-70) <i>SummaT</i> 2-2 (1270-72)	
1268	Bonaventure: Dec, preaches at Viterbo, probably instrumental in beginning of "conclave"		Nov. 29, 1268-Sept. 1, 1271: papacy vacant; remove roof of palace at Viterbo, bread/water for cardinals, beginning of "conclave"

1269	Bonaventure: <i>Apologia pauperum</i>	Aquinas: <i>de perfectione spiritualis vitae</i>	Gerard of Abbeville, Master of Theology (1252-72) <i>Contra adversarium perfectionae Christianae, Quod 9</i>
1270		Aquinas: <i>De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas</i> Albert: <i>Summa theologiae</i> , after 1270	Dec. 10 Bishop Etienne Tempier, Paris, condemns 13 propositions
1271			P. Gregory X, 1271-76, was Teobaldo Visconti. Immediately calls Council of Lyons for Christian unity.
1272		Aquinas: Naples 1272-74 <i>SummaT 3</i>	1272-75: strife in University of Paris Arts faculty
1273	Bonaventure: <i>Coll in Hex</i> April 9-May 28, interrupted, informed of elevation to cardinalate May 28 (Quar V: 450 n. 10)	Aquinas: Dec. 10, discontinued writing, compared previous work to “straw”	
1274	Bonaventure: Sermon to Council of Lyons, June 29 d. July 15 at Lyons	Aquinas: d Mar. 7 Fossanova	
1276			Pope John XXI (Sept. 8, 1276-77 (Peter of Spain—perhaps the University of Paris logician)
1276 CONT.			Nov. 23: Siger cited by Inquisitor of France, Simon du Val
1277			March 12: Bishop Etienne Tempier, Paris, condemns 219 propositions
1280		Albert d.	
1281			Pope Martin IV (1281-85) Simon of Brion d. of Siger before 1284

FRANCISCAN MASTERS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY¹

N AME	Y EARS AS M ASTER	<i>I</i> N <i>S</i> ENT	O THER M ASTERS
Richard Rufus Secular, then OFM 1238		1250 AT OXFORD	Philip Chancellor 1217-36
Alexander of Hales, as secular	c. 1220-29	<i>Glossa</i>	
Strike at the University of Paris	1229-1231		1229 Roland of Cremona, OP 1230-36 Hugh of St. Cher, OP,
Alexander of Hales as OFM (d. 1245)	1231-1243	<i>Summa Halesiana</i> ²	1239 John of St. Giles 2nd OP Chair
John of la Rochelle	1243-1245	<i>SH</i> 1, 3	1243-48 Albert, OP
Odo Rigaldus	1245-1248		1240-45 Richard Fishacre, OP at Oxford
William of Melitona	1248-1253	<i>SH</i>	
Bonaventure	1253-1257		1256-59 Thomas, OP
Guibert of Tournai	1257-1260 ³		Eudes de Rosny 1260-1263
Eustatius of Arras	1263-1266		
William of Barlo	1266-1267	<i>SENT. COMMENTARY</i> (LARGELY UNPUBLISHED FLORENCE MS)	
Walter of Bruges	1267-1269	<i>SENT. COMMENTARY</i> (LARGELY UNPUBLISHED MSS)	
John Pecham	1270-1271	<i>COMMENTARY ON BOOK I</i> (MS)	

William de la Mare	1273-1277	<i>CORRECTORIUM THOMAE; SENT. COMMENTARY: SCRIPTUM IN PRIMUM; SCRIPTUM IN SECUNDUM; SCRIPTUM IN TERTIUM ET QUARTUM SENTENTiarUM</i>	
Matthew of Aquasparta	1277-1279		
Bartholomew de Bologna	1280		
Guillelmus de Falegar	Uncertain but after Bartholomew de Bologna		
Richard of Mediavilla	1285-1287		
Peter of John Olivi⁴			

Summa Halesiana: Pope Alexander IV (r. 12 Dec 1254–25 May 1261), patron of Franciscans, on 7 Oct 1255, in bull *De fontibus paradisi*, ordered the *Summa Halesiana* to be completed by the Franciscans. William of Melitona worked on it until 1260; John de la Rochelle was principal author of Bk. 1, 3. Bonaventure was familiar with parts of it, and he may have contributed to it.

¹ Based on P. Glorieux, *Repertoire des Maîtres en théologie de Paris au xiii^e siècle* (Paris: Vrin, 1933-34), updated by J. Gracia and T. Noone, *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), and Bert Roest, *A History of Franciscan Education (c. 1210–1517)* (Leiden: Brill, 2000).

² *Summa Halesiana*: Pope Alexander IV (r. Dec. 12, 1254-May 25, 1261), patron of Franciscans, on October 7, 1255, in the bull *De fontibus paradisi*, ordered the *Summa Halesiana* to be completed by the Franciscans. William of Melitona worked on it until 1260; John de la Rochelle was principal author of Books 1, 3. Bonaventure was familiar with parts of it, and he may have contributed to it.

³ Gieben and C. Berubé give the dates of 1259-61 for Guibert holding the Franciscan chair.

⁴ Peter of John Olivi was sent down to southern France by the commission of the Four Masters, but otherwise would have been ready to become master right after Richard of Mediavilla.

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[Bonaventure of Bagnoregio: Life and Works](#)

[Bonaventure's Philosophy of God](#)

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[Topic 1: Philosophy, Faith, and Theology](#)

[Book 1, Prologue](#)

[Question 1: What is the matter or the subject of this book, or of theology?](#)

[Question 2: What is the formal cause or the method of proceeding in these books of Sentences?](#)

[Question 3: Is this book, or theology, for the sake of contemplation or for the sake of our becoming good, or, is this a speculative science or a practical science?](#)

[Question 4: What is the efficient cause, or who is the author, of this book?](#)

[Notes](#)

[Book 3, Distinction 23, Article 1: On faith, absolutely speaking, or on formed faith](#)

[Question 4: Is faith more certain than scientific knowledge?](#)

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[Book 3, Distinction 24, Article 2: On the object of faith in comparison with our knowledge](#)

[Question 3: Is faith about those things concerning which we have scientific knowledge?](#)

Notes

Book 3, Distinction 24, Article 3: On the object of faith with regard to its language

Question 1: On the definition of “article” by Richard of St. Victor

Notes

Book 3, Distinction 25, Article 1: On the sufficiency of faith

Question 1: Does the Apostles’ Creed sufficiently contain all those things that are appropriate to believe for the sake of salvation?

Notes

Topic 2: Knowing God

Book 1, Distinction 3, Part 1: On knowing God through remote likenesses, Single Article: On the knowability of God

Question 1: Can God be known (cognoscibilis) by a creature?

Question 2: Can God be known through creatures?

Question 3: Can a human in any state of life know God through creatures?

Question 4: Can the Trinity of persons combined with unity of essence be known naturally through creatures?

Notes

Topic 3: Philosophical Arguments for the Existence of God

Book 1, Distinction 8, Part 1, On the Truth and Unchangeability of God, Article 1: On the Truth of God

Question 1: Is truth a property of divine being?

Question 2: Is the divine being so true that it cannot be thought not to be?

Notes

Topic 4: The Nature of God: Divine Immutability

Book 1, Distinction 8, Part 1, Article 2: On God being unchangeable

Question 1: Is God unchangeable?

Question 2: Is God alone unchangeable?

Notes

Topic 5: The Nature of God: Divine Simplicity

Book 1, Distinction 8, Part 2: On the Simplicity of God

Question 1: Is God simple in the highest degree?

Question 2: Does simplicity in the highest degree apply only to God?

Question 3: Is the rational soul as a whole in the whole body and as a whole in each of its parts?

Question 4: Is God in a definite genus or category?

Notes

Topic 6: Using Human Language about God

Book 1, Distinction 22, Single Article: On the divine names

Question 1: Can God be named?

Question 2: Does God have one name only, or many names?

Question 3: Are all the divine names said by transference?

Question 4: Are all names that are said of God said according to substance?

Notes

Topic 7: Divine Knowledge: Ideas in the Mind of God

Book 1, Distinction 35, Single Article: On the divine ideas

Questions 1-6: Presentation of the Questions

Question 1: Should ideas be posited in God?

Question 2: Should a real plurality of ideas be posited?

Question 3: Is there a plurality of ideas according to reason?

Question 4: Are the ideas many, in comparison to the things patterned on the ideas, insofar as these things are diverse in species or diverse as individuals?

Question 5: Are the ideas in God numerically finite or infinite?

Question 6: Do the ideas have an order among themselves?

Notes

Topic 8: Divine Knowledge: Foreknowledge

Book 1, Distinction 38, Article 1: On the causality of divine foreknowledge

Question 1: Is divine foreknowledge the cause of things?

Question 2: Is divine foreknowledge caused by things?

Notes

Book 1, Distinction 38, Article 2: On foreknowledge in relation to necessity

Question 1: Does the foreknowledge of God impose necessity on the things foreknown?

Question 2: Does God necessarily foreknow the things which he foreknows?

Notes

Topic 9: Divine Power

Book 1, Distinction 43, Single Article: On the infinity of divine power

Question 1: Is the power of God, considered as a kind of power, infinite?

Question 2: Is the divine essence infinite?

Question 3: Can divine power produce an actually infinite effect?

Question 4: Does the rational means (ratio) of divine power extend to an infinite number of things?

Notes

Topic 10: Divine Will

Book 1, Distinction 45, Article 1: On the nature of the divine will

Question 1: Should we posit a will in God?

Question 2: Can God be called all-willing, as he is called all-knowing and all-powerful?

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[Book 1, Distinction 45, Article 2: On the causality of the divine will](#)

[Question 1: Is the will of God, considered generally, the cause of things?](#)

[Question 2: Is the will of God the first and immediate cause \[of things\]?](#)

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